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✠ JACOBUS C. CARDINALIS McGUIGAN
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THE PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES
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Henry of Ghent and the Unity of Man

ARMAND MAURER C.S.B.

RECENT studies on Henry of Ghent have brought his philosophy into clearer relief and have shown more precisely its place in the history of mediaeval thought.¹ In particular, Jean Paulus' essay on the tendencies of his metaphysics² has thrown considerable light on the figure of the Belgian philosopher and his importance in history. A secular master at the University of Paris in the generation after St. Thomas, he owed allegiance to none of the traditional doctrines of the Religious Orders, but was able to form his thought with greater freedom and independence. Hence his originality and also his eclecticism.³ Elements from many of his great predecessors can be found in his philosophy, including Aristotle and St. Thomas; but, fundamentally, he is said to belong to the Platonic and Augustinian tradition as handed down by Dionysius, Avicenna and the *Liber de Causis*.⁴ M. Paulus has spoken of his doctrine as "a Platonism explained and justified by Aristotelian and Thomist methods."⁵ At the root of his metaphysics has been found the Avicennian doctrine of *esse* which, in its own way, continued the Platonic doctrine of pure intelligible essences.⁶ On this side of his doctrine, Henry is said to have prepared the way for Duns Scotus. On another side, by his Averroist natural philosophy with its peculiar notion of the individual, he is said to have been the forerunner of William of Ockham. Historically, then, Henry of Ghent is presented to us as standing at the cross-roads of later mediaeval philosophy, continuing the traditional Augustinianism and Avicennism of the thirteenth century, while preparing the way for Scotism and Ockhamism, the two philosophies which dominate the fourteenth century.⁷

In the pages which follow, we will be concerned with but one phase of Henry of Ghent's philosophy: his doctrine of the rational soul and man, with particular regard to his solution of the problem of man's unity. A study of this particular problem, in which both psychology and metaphysics play a part, will perhaps throw added light on the thought of Henry of Ghent and, at the same time, give us a vantage point from which to appreciate the exactness of the historians' estimate of him.

I. THE SOUL AS SUBSTANCE AND FORM

The question whether the soul is a substance or a form, or both, was the subject of lively debate in the thirteenth century.¹ The controversy of course was not entirely new, for it had been begun by the Greeks and was carried on by early mediaeval thinkers. Basically the issue was between the Platonic notion of the soul as a complete substance separable from matter, and the Aristotelian notion of the soul as the form and actuality of the body. The Platonic view could not fail to appeal to the Christian writers of the Middle Ages, for it assured the soul's subsistence and immortality. But it tended to place the whole

¹Cf. M. DeWulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* II (6^e éd., Louvain and Paris, 1936), pp. 297-303; J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand, Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique* (Paris, 1938); G. deLagarde, 'La philosophie sociale d'Henri de Gand et Godefroid de Fontaines', *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, XIV (1943), 73-142.

²Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*

³M. DeWulf stresses his eclecticism and

originality: Le maître gantois n'est ni thomiste, ni augustinien, mais un penseur électique et personnel. *Op. cit.*, p. 303.

⁴Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

⁵Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

⁶Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-103.

⁷Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 376-378, 387.

¹Cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century* (Toronto, 1934).

nature of man in the soul, and to render difficult of explanation the union of soul and body. The Aristotelian view, on the other hand, while offering an explanation of the substantial union of soul and body, seemed to prejudice the subsistence and immortality of the soul.

The obvious course of the debate was to attempt a compromise, and to maintain that the soul is both a substance and a form. Such was the solution of the Arabian Avicenna² who exercised a profound influence on Christian writers, such as Albert the Great.³ But Avicenna remained fundamentally a Platonist, for in his view the soul is *in itself* a substance, and only accidentally does it exercise the function of informing the body.⁴ Christian writers could easily reconcile this teaching with St. Augustine's doctrine of the soul, which, for all its christianization, was still strongly marked with the influence of Platonism.⁵

Now, enough evidence can be gathered from the works of Henry of Ghent to show that his doctrine of the soul moves in this tradition. In writing about the soul, he likes to quote from St. Augustine and from the *De Spiritu et Anima*, which was widely used in the thirteenth century and frequently passed as an authentic work of St. Augustine.⁶ In the *De Spiritu et Anima* the soul is defined, not in the Aristotelian manner as essentially the form of the body, but as an intellectual spirit which receives its name of *soul* from its office of giving life to the body:

Anima est spiritus intellectualis, sed secundum officium sui operis variis nuncupatur nominibus. Dicitur namque anima dum vegetat, spiritus dum contemplatur, sensus dum sentit, animus dum sapit, dum intelligit mens, dum recordatur memoria, dum consentit voluntas, dum discernit ratio.⁷

Henry of Ghent quotes the above text, along with the passage from St. Augustine's *De Trinitate* which was often linked with it in the Middle Ages, in support of the thesis that the powers of the soul are not distinct accidents, but are substantially identical with it.⁸ According to Henry, the soul, considered in itself, is an essence or substance which is at the same time the form of the body. Considered in relation to its different actions and objects, it is called various powers, such as mind, memory, will or reason. These powers add nothing to the soul's essence except a relation to its specifically different acts.⁹

With regard to the union of soul and body, Henry again follows the *De Spiritu*

²For Avicenna's doctrine of the soul, cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin O.P., 'Sur les relations de l'âme et du corps d'après Avicenne', *Mélanges Mandonnet II* (Bibliothèque Thomiste XIV, Paris, 1930), 47-54; E. Gilson, 'L'Âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand', *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, XIV (1943), 13-22.

³Cf. E. Gilson, *art. cit.*, *passim*.

⁴Hoc enim nomen anima non est indicum ei ex substantia sua, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa et idcirco recipitur corpus in sui definitione, exempli gratia, sicut opus accipitur in definitione opificis, quamvis non accipiatur in definitione ejus secundum quod est homo. Avicenna, *Liber VI Naturalium I*, 1 (Venice, 1508), fol 1^{vb}.

⁵For Augustine's doctrine of the soul, cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (2^e éd., Paris, 1943), pp. 56-72; A. C. Pegis, 'The Mind of St. Augustine', *Mediaeval Studies*, VI (1944), 37-40.

⁶*De Spiritu et Anima*, PL 40, 779-832. Generally attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux, a twelfth century Cistercian. It was attributed to St. Augustine by St. Albert,

Summa de Creaturis, P. II, tract. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ed. Borgnet (Paris, 1896), vol. 35, p. 10; also by St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, concl., (Quaracchi, 1885), vol. 2, p. 450. St. Thomas, however, knew it to be apocryphal. Cf. St. Thomas, *Quæst. Disp. de Anima*, a. 12, ad 1m, ed. Marietti (Rome, 1942), p. 422. On the authorship of the *De Spiritu et Anima*, cf. A. Wilmart, O.S.B., *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris, 1932), pp. 174 ff.

⁷*De Spiritu et Anima XIII*; PL 40, 788-789. Quoted by Henry of Ghent in *Quodlibet III*, q. 14 (*Quæstiones Quodlibetales*, Paris, 1518, fol. 67¹⁻²).

⁸Haec igitur tria: memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens, consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate X*, 11, 18; PL 42, 983-984. Quoted in part by Henry of Ghent, *loc. cit.*, fol. 67¹. Cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, p. 290, note 2.

⁹Cf. Henry of Ghent, *loc. cit.*, fol. 67¹.

et Anima, teaching that the union is a society of two substances which are united, without any confusion of their natures, in the one man:

Sunt etiam utriusque quaedam similia, corporis scilicet supremum et spiritus infimum, quibus sine naturarum confusione, personali tamen unione necti possunt facile. Similia enim gaudent similibus.¹⁰

The soul is said to be joined to the body by natural affection and administration. It loves and rules the body which is, however, its prison, weighing it down and hindering it despite the love and care it lavishes upon it:

Quibusdam affectionibus in quadam amicitia anima coniungitur corpori, secundum quam amicitiam nemo carnem suam odio habuit, sed nutrit et fovet. Sociata namque illi, licet eius societate praegravetur, ineffabili tamen conditione diligit illud, amat carcerem suum, doloribus vehementer afficitur, formidat interitum qui mori non potest, timet defectum qui per naturam deficere non potest.¹¹

If this were all that Henry of Ghent said about the soul and its union with the body, it would not be difficult to understand his position and judge it to be Platonist and Augustinian. But we have seen but half of the picture. He devotes a whole *Question* in his *Quodlibets*¹² to the problem whether the rational soul is a substance and a form, and there his position appears to be, not Platonic and Augustinian, but Aristotelian and Thomistic. Like St. Thomas, he says that the rational soul is both a substance and by its very nature the form and actuality of the body.¹³ His arguments in support of the thesis, his references to Aristotle, his opposition to Plato and Averroes, bear a resemblance to the doctrine of St. Thomas in his *Quaestio Disputata de Anima: Utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid*,¹⁴ and *Summa Theologiae I*, 75, 2; I, 76, 1. Indeed, the reader is given the impression that Henry is merely making the thought of his illustrious predecessor his own.

Henry gives two proofs that the soul is substantially the form of the body, and for each there is a parallel in the works of St. Thomas. He calls the first *a posteriori* because it is based on our experience of understanding with the help of the senses.¹⁵ Every man who has the use of reason, Henry says, experiences in himself sensitive operations; and afterwards he is aware of his acts of understanding accomplished with the help of the senses. Now, these intellectual operations are ours as men. They are not accidental to us, nor are they the work of part of ourselves. We sense and understand precisely as men and as a whole. But this is possible only on condition that the principle by which these acts are elicited is a formal principle in us. Hence the soul, which is the principle of the acts of understanding, must also be the substantial formal principle of the being of man.

However, Henry is obviously more partial to the proof which he calls *a priori*, for he develops it at greater length and dwells on it with particular relish.¹⁶

¹⁰ *De Spiritu et Anima XIV*; PL 40, 789.

Quoted in *Quodl. IV*, 13, fol. 113^{r-v}.

¹¹ *Ibid.* Quoted in *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^r.

Henry *ibidem* also quotes from St. Augustine: Inest ei quidam appetitus naturalis corpus administrandi, quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo, ne tota intentione pergaat in illud summum caelum, quamdiu non subest corpus, cuius administratione appetitus ille conquiescat. *De Genesi ad Litteram XII*, 35; PL 34, 483.

¹² *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 71^{r-77r}.

¹³ Absolue ergo concedendum non solum ex fide et auctoritate, sed etiam ex rectae

rationis iudicio, quod intellectus, quod est forma separata secundum se subsistens, etiam sit forma et actus corporis, et hoc naturaliter, quia homo est ens unum per naturam per se, et non per accidens. *Loc. cit.*, fol. 72^r.

¹⁴ Cf. St. Thomas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima (Quaestiones Disputatae)*, ed. Marietti, Rome, 1942, vol. 2, pp. 366-371).

¹⁵ *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 72^r and 71^r. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae I*, 76, 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Cf. St. Thomas, *Qu. Disp. de Anima I*, p. 369.

The proof consists in establishing exactly the place of the intellectual soul in the hierarchy of beings. At the lowest level there is prime matter, entirely devoid of form. Above it there is an ascending order of forms which reaches its ultimate point in God. There is a natural order in the grades of these forms, such that those which are lowest and closest to matter have an essence and proper operation which are more imperfect and more immersed in matter. On the other hand, the forms which are higher and more remote from the bareness of matter are more perfect, and their essence and proper operation are less immersed in matter. Sketching briefly the degrees of forms: the simple forms of the elements are most material and have motive power only through material qualities. Next, there are the forms of mixed or composite bodies with powers beyond those of the elements; for example, the magnet attracts iron and a certain kind of stone draws blood. Above this grade of form there is the vegetative form of the plant which has a vivifying power enabling it to move itself from within in diverse ways, as by nutrition and growth. Hence in the vegetative kingdom there is a first principle of life, although it is as it were masked and hidden. The sensitive form rises beyond the vegetative in that it is moved, not in a material way, but spiritually, by sensing and apprehending material things and receiving their immaterial species.

Beyond sensitive forms there are human souls, which, Henry of Ghent says, everyone asserts to be in men and in human bodies, although they disagree as to the way they are in them. Averroes said that the intellectual soul is substantially separate from the human body and is joined to it simply by sharing with it the act of understanding. The phantasms in the sense powers (which, according to Averroes, belong to the sensitive body, not to the intellectual soul) are potentially intelligible and are actually intelligible in the possible intellect. Thus, in a certain incomprehensible way, the same intelligible species belongs to the intellect and to the human body, and through it the act of understanding belongs to the man and not simply to the separated intellect. Henry of Ghent opposes this view in much the same way as St. Thomas,¹⁷ by pointing out that phantasms have the same relation to understanding as sense objects have to sensation; and these sense objects in no way share in the act of sensing from the fact that sensible species are abstracted from them. Consequently, the sensitive body cannot share in understanding merely because the intellect abstracts intelligible species from it.

According to Henry of Ghent, Platonism agrees with the basic supposition of Averroism that the union of intellect and body is one simply in operation. Hence, in his view, his criticism of the latter is equally valid against the former. Plato, he says, maintained that the rational soul is man himself, and its relation to the body is that of a sailor to his ship or a man to his garment.¹⁸ But such a doctrine is as incapable as Averroism of explaining our experience that it is the whole man, soul and body, who understands, and not just a part of himself.

Moreover, even these philosophers agree that the rational soul is situated between material forms and those entirely separated from matter. The first form is the prime mover and the first cause of all things. The rational soul is the lowest of all the intelligences, standing on the confines of spirituality. Thus, it is by means of the rational soul that Divine Wisdom joins the higher spiritual things to lower corporeal ones. As Dionysius says, the wisdom of God created

¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, 76, 1.

¹⁸ Cf. St. Thomas, *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, p. 369. Avicenna seems to have held that the soul is to the body as a sailor is to his ship. Cf. *Lib. VI Naturalium* I, 1, fol. 2^{rb}.

The comparison does not appear to be in Plato's writings. It is mentioned and rejected by Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 1, 413a 8-9. For the doctrine of man as a soul using the body as its instrument, cf. Plato *Alcibiades* I, 129e-130c.

the universe in beautiful harmony and order, joining the ends of prior things to the beginnings of secondary ones.¹⁹ Dionysius did not go on to explain just how this conjunction is effected by means of the rational soul. But it is evident, Henry says, that it is not simply by the soul's moving a corporeal substance. For then man's soul would not be any different from the soul, which philosophers like Averroes say, animates and moves the heavens; nor would it be any different from an angel, which, according to the Faith, moves the heavens in obedience to the divine command. Now, human souls are lesser spirits than angels. Hence, their union with matter is closer than that between angels and matter. They do not simply move the bodies to which they are joined; they are their forms and actualities.

The problem remains of reconciling this fact with the subsistence of the soul apart from the body, for it would seem that the two are contrary to each other. How can the soul, with the natural independence and autonomy which befit it as a subsistent entity, naturally inhere in matter and be its form?²⁰ Henry replies that contrary dispositions cannot be present in one thing, if they belong to it equally naturally and primarily. But they are not incompatible with each other, if one belongs to it naturally and in the first place, in accord with its natural inclination, and the other belongs to it accidentally and secondarily, and contrary to its natural inclination. Thus, by its very nature, earth tends to rest in the centre of the universe; yet, accidentally, it can be expelled from that place and made to rise. In the same way, the rational soul naturally is a form united to the body and it does not desire to be separated from it; but rather it wishes to remain in it forever. If it is separated and subsists apart, this is accidental to its nature. Separation from the body is thus accidental and unnatural to the soul. The resurrection of the body does away with that unnatural state of the soul, which once more infuses itself into the body with the greatest love. There it regains its natural and perfect state which is to be the body's form and actuality.²¹

At this point Henry introduces the quotations from the *De Spiritu et Anima* and St. Augustine, cited above, describing the love of the soul for the body and their union in the Platonic and Augustinian spirit.²² They come somewhat as a shock to the reader in view of their context. We have been told that the rational soul is substantially the form of the body. In this Thomistic context we are told that the natural union of soul and body is one of love and administration, and that the body is after all the prison of the soul, weighing it down and hindering its higher functions. This juxtaposition of Aristotelianism and Thomism, on the one hand, and Platonism and Augustinianism on the other, is typical of Henry of Ghent, as well as an embarrassment to his historians and interpreters. For example, M. Paulus has found that his theory of knowledge is frequently couched in Aristotelian terms, yet admits of a mitigated doctrine of innate ideas and a divine illumination whose sources are Plato and St. Augustine.²³ Is Henry a pure eclectic, using texts and doctrines from any available source without any regard for their consistency? Or does his doctrine belong to one or the other of the two traditions, and does he interpret the opposing texts in the spirit of that doctrine? Or has he an original position which in some way attempts to reconcile the two? In order to answer these questions we must make a more detailed study of his doctrine of the soul and man.

II. THE SOUL AS AN INCOMPLETE SUBSTANCE

Henry of Ghent stresses the fact that the separated soul is imperfect and

¹⁹ Cf. Dionysius, *De Divinis Nominibus* VII, 3; PG 3, 872.

²⁰ *Quodl.* III, 15, fol. 71^r.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*, fol. 73^r.

²² Cf. *Supra*, note 11.

²³ Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp 1-13.

incomplete, since it is naturally the form of the body.¹ If the soul without the body were in every way perfect, its union with the body could not be more than accidental, like the union of the sailor and his ship or a man and his garment. At the same time, he insists that the soul can subsist apart from the body.² In a way, then, it would appear that the soul is complete without the body, for it does not depend on the body for its existence. But how can the soul be incomplete and at the same time complete?

St. Thomas had already met this difficulty in his *Quaestio Disputata De Anima*. There the objection is raised that, if the soul is a substance, it is subsistent and has in its own right a complete being (*esse*). Now, what is added to something over and above its complete being is accidental to it, as whiteness or a garment is to a man. Hence, if the soul were a substance, the body would be only an accidental addition to it, and the soul would not be the substantial form of the body.³

In reply, the Angelic Doctor does not deny that the separated soul is in a sense complete, but he carefully distinguishes the sense in which that is true. The separated soul, he says, has a complete *esse*, that is to say, a complete act of existing. And this is so because the soul does not depend on the body for its existence, since it can exist apart from the body. Far from perfecting the soul's act of existing, the body itself depends on the existence of the soul, 'since, by informing the body, the soul shares with it its own act of existing. However, the soul does not constitute by itself a complete species, but the body is joined to it for the completion of the species.'

... dicendum, quod licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi, tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam; sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei.⁴

In other words, for St. Thomas the soul is complete without the body in the order of existence, but not in the order of essence. In the essential order it is but one of several principles (form and matter) which together constitute the complete essence of man. But it has in its own right a complete act of existing. In this way, St. Thomas saves the subsistence of the human soul and at the same time its essential dependence on the body. But the Thomistic solution is valid only if the act of existing (*esse*) is really distinct from essence;⁵ for only on this supposition can the soul be complete in the existential order and incomplete in the essential. Now, Henry of Ghent denies the real distinction between existence and essence,⁶ and for this reason he has to look elsewhere for a solution of the problem.

In *Quodlibet III*, q. 15 he says that the being (*esse*) of the separated soul is diminished and imperfect; and so in its separated being it does not have the perfect nature of an individual or person or substance, as does an angel:

Esse enim eius separatum non est nisi esse suum diminutum et imperfectum, et sic in esse separato non habet perfectam rationem individui vel personalitatis. sive eius quod est hoc aliquid, sicut angelus habet, sed diminutam valde.⁷

¹ Cf. *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^r.

² Loc. cit. fol. 71^r.

³ Cf. St. Thomas, *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, obj. 1, p. 366.

⁴ Loc. cit., ad lm, p. 370. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5^e éd., Paris, 1944), p. 277.

⁵ For St. Thomas' distinction between *esse*

as act of existing and essence, cf. E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 53 ff.

⁶ For Henry's doctrine of essence and existence, cf. J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand*, pp. 284-291.

⁷ *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^r.

Unlike an angel, too, it does not have a perfect species. It is but a principle of the human species, of which matter is the complementary part. Therefore, the two, soul and body, belong to the genus of substance only by reduction. The soul does not have its complete being (*esse suum completum*) without the body, and the body does not have its complete being without the soul. Each essentially completes the other, the two constituting by their union one composite, perfect in nature and species.⁸

It seems, therefore, that Henry admits a more radical incompleteness of the separated soul than St. Thomas. For, although the latter teaches that the soul is an incomplete substance, he still maintains that it has by itself a complete *esse*,⁹ which Henry of Ghent denies. The soul, according to the Belgian philosopher, seems to be less autonomous and more closely allied to the body than for the Angelic Doctor.

But let us look further. In a later *Quodlibet* (VII, q. 13) Henry asks the important question: is the being of the separated and conjoined soul the same: *utrum idem sit esse animae separatae quod erat coniunctae?*¹⁰ In preparation for his answer, he distinguishes three meanings of the term *being* (*ens*). It means (1) a thing's nature or essence, (2) that which exists in the mind (*ens verum*), (3) that which exists outside the mind in nature (*ens in effectu*). Corresponding to this threefold distinction of *ens*, there is a threefold distinction of the term *esse*:¹¹ (1) quidditative *esse*, which is indicated by a thing's definition, (2) *esse* in the mind, (3) *esse* outside the mind. Being, whether in the sense of *ens* or *esse*, is thus either essential being or existential being in thought or in reality.¹² After making these distinctions, Henry goes on to explain that being, both in the essential and existential sense, belongs principally to the composite of form and matter. For the composite is that of which God principally has an idea, and it is properly *that which exists*. But, in a certain sense, it also belongs to matter and form. We shall see later in what way matter by itself has being. Here let us note that, for Henry of Ghent, essential and existential being belong to form as that by which something exists, since it is the formal principle by which being is communicated to matter and to the composite. But in its own nature a form such as the rational soul, which can naturally exist apart from matter, is a certain *something*, and as such it is known by God. It has a certain intelligible nature in itself in the mind of God who first conceived it; and it, likewise, has that same essential being in real existence when it is created.¹³ Looking at the rational soul in itself, then, we can see that in its own essential and existential being it is not something different joined to the body and separated from it. Of course, when it is separated, it does not give being to matter as it does when joined to the body. But it has precisely the same being whether it actualizes matter or not. It merely has it in a different way:

Nunc autem manifestum est quod forma in se nata existere extra suum compositum, cuiusmodi est anima rationalis, non est aliiquid aliud in suo

⁸ . . . anima non habet esse suum completum sine corpore, nec e converso; essentialiter utrumque per alterum completur, et constituant unum compositum perfectum in esse naturae et speciei. *Quodl.* III, 15, fol. 73^r.

⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, ad 1m and ad 3m, p. 370; *Summa Theologiae* I, 75, 2 ad 1m.

¹⁰ *Quodl.* VII, 13, fol. 267^r ff.

¹¹ For the meaning of *esse*, cf. *infra*, part IV, note 11, and p. 16.

¹² . . . ens tripliciter dicitur. Uno enim modo significat naturam et essentiam rei,

. . . Alio modo dicitur aliiquid ens secundum animam, quod Philosophus in V Metaphy. appellat ens verum. Tertio dicitur ens id quod est aliiquid in effectu extra animam. Consimiliter, cum ens dicitur ab esse, esse triplex est, scilicet esse quidditativum, quod indicatur per definitionem . . . Et hoc esse est rei essentiale, et reducitur ad praedicamentum de genere quod convenit rei ex eo quod est natura et essentia quaedam, cui accedit utrumque aliorum esse, scilicet in intellectu et in re extra. *Quodl.* VII, 13, fols. 267^r-268^r.

¹³ Loc. cit., fol. 268^r.

principio, aliquo dictorum modorum (scil. sive in essentia, sive in existentia) separata et coniuncta, licet separata non est quo aliud habet esse, quia nulli ipsum communicat, sicut cum est coniuncta. Idcirco dico quod esse unum et idem est ipsius animae separatae et coniunctae; sed alio et alio modo est aliquid separata et coniuncta.¹⁴

Consequently, in its essence and its existence the soul is the same when joined to the body and when separated from it. How can this be reconciled with the statement, in *Quodlibet III*, q. 15, that the separated soul is imperfect and diminished in comparison with the conjoined soul?¹⁵ It should be noted that *Quodlibet VII*, q. 13 also asserts that the separated soul is in a way (*quodammodo*) imperfect. This is so, Henry says, because, although the soul remains *itself* separated and conjoined, it is by its nature destined to be the act and perfection of the body. Hence, the soul is in a way imperfectly that which it is until it is in the body. For the same reason its being and operation are imperfect without the body:

Ideo anima separata, quia naturaliter nata est existere in alio ut in suo perfectibili, ideo quodammodo imperfecte est id quod est donec sit in illo. Propter quod consimiliter et imperfecte habet rationem sui esse donec habuerit ipsum in illo; et ulterius etiam imperfecte habet rationem suae propriae operationis.¹⁶

The problem, then, is not only to reconcile the two *Quodlibets* with each other, but *Quodlibet VII*, q. 13 with itself. The naturalness of the union of soul and body requires that the soul have a natural tendency to the body and, therefore, that it be in some way imperfect without the body. On the other hand, the soul is a being distinct from the body. It is an absolute entity, corresponding to a distinct idea in God's mind and capable of separate existence. As an absolute essence and existence, the soul always remains identical with itself.¹⁷ But how can the separated soul be both the same as the conjoined soul and, at the same time, less perfect than it? This is the problem which Henry of Ghent's position imposes upon him, and it must be said that he gives no clear solution of it. The solution which he hints at foreshadows that which Duns Scotus will later develop. The Subtle Doctor, under the influence of Avicenna's doctrine of absolute being or *esse proprium*, will distinguish between the soul in its proper being and in its various modes, and maintain that, in its proper being, it is equally perfect whether separated from the body or conjoined to it: *suo quidem proprio esse est aequa perfecta separata et conjuncta*.¹⁸ Likewise for Henry of Ghent, who was also influenced by the Avicennian doctrine of *esse proprium*,¹⁹ the soul as an absolute entity, separately conceived by God and capable of separate existence, has a self-identity which it keeps whether joined to the body or separated from it. But the same soul can exist in various ways, namely, separated or conjoined, and it is under the mode of separation from the body that the soul is imperfect. That is why Henry of Ghent says that the soul is *itself* whether separated from

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Cf. *supra.*, note 8.

¹⁶ *Quodl. VII*, 13, fol. 268^r.

¹⁷ Eadem forma semper habet idem esse, quia esse est a forma; sed anima est semper eadem forma, sive fuerit coniuncta sive separata. *Loc. cit.*, fol. 267^v. (Anima) sit id ipsum separata et coniuncta. *Loc. cit.*, fol. 268^v.

¹⁸ . . . anima manet aequa perfecta in esse suo proprio, sive coniuncta, sive separata, tamen in hoc habet differentiam, quia

separata non communicat suum esse alteri. Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxoniense IV*, 43, 2, n. 24, ed. Vivès, (Paris, 1894), vol. 20, p. 55. Cf. also *Reportata Parisiensis IV*, 43, 2, n. 22, ed. Vivès, (Paris, 1894), vol. 24, p. 499. For the influence of Avicenna's doctrine of *esse proprium* on Duns Scotus, cf. E. Gilson, 'Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot', *Archives d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, (1927), 129-149.

¹⁹ Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-81.

the body or joined to it; but that, separated, it is in a way (*quodammodo*) imperfectly what it is.

It thus appears that Henry conceives of the human soul as an absolute essence which guards its intrinsic perfection when separated from the body. Its independence of the body resides not only in the existential order, as it does for St. Thomas; it reaches also to the essential order. It can stand aloof from the body not only existentially, but also as a perfect nature in itself. This conclusion will be strengthened if we consider Henry's doctrine of matter and the human body which the rational soul informs and actualizes.

III. MATTER AND THE ORGANIC BODY

According to Henry of Ghent, the body, which is included in the essential nature of man, is itself composed of "pure matter" and a form inferior to the soul which he calls, following a long tradition, the *forma mixta*.¹ In order to understand adequately the structure of man, as seen by the Belgian philosopher, we must now consider his conception of matter and this inferior form which gives the body its organic structure and disposes it for the actualization of the soul. Only then will we be in a position to appreciate the difficulties which the problem of man's unity raises for him and the significance of his solution.

Henry of Ghent was acquainted with two conceptions of matter: that of "the philosophers" and that of St. Augustine, and he leaves us in no doubt about his preference for the latter. The former, he says, rests upon a false imagination and the deficiency of the philosophers' conception of being. They think that matter is merely a potentiality to form, incapable of existing by itself. It is, in fact, so close to nothing that, if it lacks the actuality imparted to it by form, it immediately falls into non-being.²

It is not difficult to recognize this as the Aristotelian notion of matter, which was adopted by St. Thomas and Henry's contemporary and opponent, Giles of Rome.³ For Henry of Ghent, however, it is an erroneous conception, and he thinks he can point out exactly the root of the error. Fundamentally, it fails to take into account the fact that matter is created, and, what is more, that its creation is distinct from that of the forms which actualize it. Following St. Augustine, he distinguishes between two creations: the first is the production of matter, which is creation properly so called; the second is the production of forms—a formation of matter rather than a creation. These two creations are not distinct in time; matter did not exist prior in time to its formation. But its creation is prior in nature to that of forms.⁴ In this way, like St. Augustine

¹ Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysica* IV, 2 (Venice, 1508), fol. 85^r, l. 45. Algazel, *Metaphysics* II, 4, 5, ed. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 172. Alexander of Hales (?) *Summa Theologica* I-II, Inq. IV, Tract. 2, sect. 1, q. 1 (Quaracchi, 1928), II, p. 513. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, XVII, 2, 2, ad 6m (Quaracchi, 1882), II, p. 423. Cf. on this question, M. DeWulf, *Le Traité "De Unitate Formae"* de Gilles de Lessines (Les Philosophes Belges I, Louvain, 1901), pp. 38 ff.

² Hic primo oportet excludere falsam imaginationem quam habent quidam de materia, videlicet quod nihil sit nisi potentia quaedam, et ita quantum est de se non est, quia quod solum est in potentia in quantum hujusmodi non est. *Quodl.* I, 10, fol. 8^r. Henry says that philosophy is not contrary to theological truth, but the philosophers' notion of being is deficient: Nam in theologia quod aliquid dicitur esse, hoc intelli-

gunt theologi quadam extrinseca denominatio ab esse primi principii, qua scilicet participant divino esse in quantum sunt similitudo quedam divini esse ut dictum est supra. Quod autem aliquid dicitur esse, ut homo vel corpus, vel aliquid hujusmodi, hoc dicunt ei convenire quadam denominatione intrinseca a natura sua essentiae. Loc. cit., fol. 8^r. The philosophers do not make this distinction (which is central for Henry's conception of matter) between *esse* and *esse aliquid*. fol. 9^r.

³ Cf. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 54. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, pp. 47-48. E. Hocedez believes it probable that Henry is here directly attacking Giles of Rome. Cf. E. Hocedez, "Le premier quodlibet d'Henri de Gand", *Gregorianum*, IX (1928), 96.

⁴ Cf. *Quodl.* I, 10, fol. 8^r, with the many quotations from St. Augustine. For St. Augustine's notion of matter and its con-

before him, he disassociates matter and form, and gives to matter an independence foreign to the doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas. He tells us that there is a distinct idea of matter in the divine mind and, when matter is created, it is endowed with a threefold being (*esse*). In virtue of its distinct production by God as by an efficient cause, it has a distinct existence (*esse simpliciter*). In virtue of its correspondence to the divine idea which is its formal cause, it has a twofold essential being (*esse aliquid*), by reason of which it has a certain essence or nature as a capacity for forms (*capax formarum*), and is the foundation (*fulcimentum*) of the composite of which it is a part.⁶

Thus endowed with its own essence and existence, matter is not the pure potency described by the philosophers. Its description is closer to that given by St. Augustine. Henry quotes St. Augustine as saying that matter is not a body, form, color or species; but it is not entirely nothing: *non est corpus, non forma, non color, neque species; non tamen omnino nihil.*⁷ It is, to use Augustine's phrase, *prope nihil*, close to nothing.⁸ And yet, Henry continues, it is not so close to nothingness, nor so in potency that it is not a nature and a substance essentially different from the forms it receives: *materia non ita est prope nihil, nec ita in potentia quin sit aliqua natura et substantia.*⁹ And indeed, how could it be otherwise? How can one conceive of a mean between nothing and something? If matter, then, is not nothing, even though it be ever so close to it, it is still something. And if it is something, it has a nature and an existence distinct from that of the form which actualizes it.

It is true, nonetheless, according to Henry of Ghent, that matter is of itself pure potency. By this he means that it does not actually exist, in the ordinary course of nature, unless it is made actual by a form.¹⁰ The error of the philosophers is to confuse this ordinary course of nature with what is supernaturally possible. According to the ordinary course of nature, which the philosophers are limited to describing, matter is never found despoiled of all forms. Aristotle is correct in this respect: the destruction of one thing is always the generation of another. But supernaturally, God can conserve pure unformed matter in existence as easily as He created it. Indeed He can do this more easily than He conserves

creation with form, cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, pp. 258-259, 264-268.

⁶ Est igitur secundum iam dicta in materia considerare triplex esse, scilicet esse simpliciter, et esse aliquid duplex, unum quo est formarum quaedam capacitas, aliud quo est compositi fulcimentum. Esse primum quo materia habet dici ens simpliciter, habet participationem quadam a Deo in quantum per creationem est effectus eius, sicut et alia, ut dictum est. Esse secundum quo materia est capacitas quaedam, habet a sua natura qua est id quod est differens a forma; et loquendo de tali esse, esse sunt diversa quorumcumque essentiae sunt diversae. Esse tertium non habet materia nisi per hoc quod iam capiat in se illud cuius de se capax est. Unde et id quod capit dat ei tale esse, et quia illud forma est quae non potest alteri dare nisi quod habet. Quodl. I, 10, fol. 9^r. For an analysis of this text, cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.* p. 214, note.

⁷ Loc. cit., fol. 8^v. Cf. St. Augustine, *Confessionum Libri XII*, 3, 3; PL 32, 827.

⁸ Ibid. Cf. St. Augustine, *op. cit.*, XII, 8, 8; PL 32, 829.

⁹ Loc. cit., fol. 8^v.

¹⁰ Bene verum est ergo quod materia de se est in potentia ad actum quem in composito nata est recipere a forma; tali enim esse

materia de se est in pura potentia et non est in actu nisi per formam; quia causa actus in composito non est nisi per formam. Loc. cit., fol. 9^r. Henry insists that matter is purely potential to the actual existence it receives from form because otherwise it would be actual of itself and the composite of matter and form would be a union of two actual beings, which could result only in an accidental aggregate. Cf. loc. cit., fol. 9^{r-v}. Of its very nature, matter has no actual existence, not even an imperfect one. The texts, which some historians quote to show that for Henry matter has an imperfect act and receives perfect act from the form, are not to the point. J. Paulus writes: La matière est comme un acte imparfait, qu'achève l'actualité de la forme (suus actus proprius est in potentia ad illum actum ulteriorem. fol. 9^r; actus proprius materiae est sicut in potentia ad actum formae . fol. 9^v). J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 214, note 1. Cf. also M. DeWulf, *op. cit.*, p. 301. But this *actus imperfectus* does not belong to matter of itself, but on the supposition of a supernatural action of God, giving it existence without form. Henry expressly denies that of its very nature matter has any actual existence, either perfect or imperfect. Cf. loc. cit., fol. 9^{r-v}.

the accidents of bread and wine without their substances in the Eucharist.¹⁰ Philosophers have to do with the mere natural aptitude of matter, and that is why they say that it is purely potential and incapable of existing by itself. They do not, like the theologians, deal with the order of what is supernaturally possible. Hence, they do not realize that matter can be actualized and made to exist, not only naturally by a form, but also supernaturally by the direct action of God:

. . . philosophi, respicientes ad naturalem materiae aptitudinem solum, dicunt quod materia est in potentia, et non habet esse actu in naturalibus secundum quod est materia, et esse non est in actu nisi formae . . . Nihilominus tamen ipsa ut est effectus quidam Dei per creationem, potens est supernaturaliter, si ei detur, habere esse simpliciter non a forma, participando in sua essentia divino esse.¹¹

True, if God conserves matter without form, it will not be as perfectly actual as if form actualized it. For the proper act which it then possesses will be but an imperfect act, being still potential to the further actuality it receives from the form.¹² Henry of Ghent says that if matter is made to subsist without form, it has its perfect nature or essence (*esse autem perfectum habet suae naturae*); but its subsistence, or actual existence, is most imperfect.¹³ But of its very nature matter is purely potential. It has neither the perfect act which it receives in the composite from the form, nor the imperfect act which it can receive supernaturally from God.

In the concrete world of nature, matter has thus no independent actuality apart from form, and the philosophers are quite correct in calling it pure potency. We must remember, however, that the matter so described by Henry is not that of Aristotle or St. Thomas, but is closer to the *prope nihil* of Augustine and the *receptaculum* of Plato.¹⁴ For St. Thomas, not even God can make matter exist apart from form, precisely because it is not a nature or essence, and it is only through and in essence that a thing exists.¹⁵ Henry of Ghent finds no contradiction in a self-subsisting matter, because for him it is endowed with a nature. It is a substance in its own right, a thing (*res*) really distinct from form, which can receive actual existence either from form, according to the normal workings of nature, or directly from God by His supernatural intervention.

Matter, endowed with its own essence and substantiality, is still not the proper subject which the rational soul informs. For Henry of Ghent, the soul actualizes, not "pure matter", but a body which has been given its organic complexity by a special substantial form called the *forma mixta*.¹⁶ Hence there are two substantial forms in man: the rational soul and this inferior form. Here the Belgian

¹⁰ Immo ipsa est susceptibilis esse per se tanquam per se creabile et propriam habens ideam in mente creatoris. Et licet secundum communem institutionis naturae sic sit facta materia, ut aliqua actione naturae non possit omnino spoliari forma quia actione pura naturae non est unius corruptio sine alterius generatione, tamen actione creatoris spoliari potest ab omni forma. *Loc. cit.*, fol. 8^r. J. Paulus points out that Henry is one of the first of the scholastics to oppose the actual, contingent order of the universe, which alone was known to Aristotle and the philosophers, to the order of divine omnipotence, which is limited only by the principle of contradiction. Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, fol. 9^r.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ . . . materia, si ponatur divina potentia agente secundum se existere in actu naturae suae sine omni forma, tamen non est hoc aliquid neque suppositum nisi incompletissimum et in potentia, et nullum habet esse subsistentiae nisi imperfectissimum; esse autem perfectum habet suae naturae. *Quodl. IV*, 13, fol. 114^r. For the identity of actual existence and subsistence, cf. *infra*, p. 16.

¹⁴ Cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 49a. Quoted in *Quodl. I*, 10, fol. 9^r.

¹⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia* I, ed. Roland-Gosselin (Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1926), p. 4; II, pp. 6-7.

¹⁶ Cf. *Quodl. IV*, 13, fol. 109^v.

philosopher differs from St. Thomas and his two contemporaries, Giles of Rome and Giles of Lessines, who taught that there is but one substantial form in man—the rational soul—which gives to him all his actual perfections, including his organic nature.¹⁷

The question whether there is a plurality of substantial forms in man was hotly debated at the time of Henry of Ghent. Without tracing the history of that debate and the important part he played in it,¹⁸ let us see his motives for ascribing to man a duality of substantial forms, reserving until later his reconciliation of this position with man's unity.

It was not a love of complicated solutions which prompted Henry to maintain a formal duality in man. He had no sympathy with the ultra-pluralist views, such as that of Matthew of Aquasparta,¹⁹ which multiplied substantial forms according to the distinct essences or natural operations discernible in a thing. There are some, he tells us, who say that there must be a distinct substantial form for each distinct natural being in a composite thing. For example, we find in man being, substance, corporeity, a mixture of various elements, as well as vegetative, sensitive and rational life. Now, it is the role of a substantial form to impart natural being. Hence, the argument runs, there must be as many distinct substantial forms in man as there are distinct natural beings.²⁰

A conception of man such as this, or any of the pluralist views similar to it,²¹ offended Henry's sense of economy in solving a philosophical problem. Using Aristotle's principle of economy, later made famous as Ockham's Razor, he set out to find the simplest solution possible.²² St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity of the substantial form was attractive to him for its simplicity, and he adopted it in the case of every natural substance except man. Only after some hesitation and with obvious reluctance did he accede to the pluralists that in the case of man several substantial forms are required.²³

The analysis which leads to this conclusion must be conducted, according to Henry, on the level of natural philosophy, not on that of metaphysics. Indeed, it is precisely because they confused these two orders of analysis that the ultra-pluralists came to their absurd conclusions. They multiplied substantial forms in man corresponding to the various conceptual notes which we can discern in him, and they considered these conceptual notes as really distinct "natural beings." In point of fact, the analysis which distinguishes such supposed natural

¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, ad 15m, p. 371: . . . hoc modo dicunt anima actus corporis organici physici, quia anima facit ipsum esse corpus organicum. For Giles of Lessines, cf. M. DeWulf, *op. cit.* p. [55]; for Giles of Rome, cf. E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton* (Louvain and Paris, 1925), pp. 459-477. This work should be consulted for Henry's relations to the two Giles, pp. 454-477.

¹⁸ Cf. on this subject, M. DeWulf, *op. cit.* Introduction; also O. Lottin, 'La pluralité des formes substantielles avant saint Thomas d'Aquin', *Revue Néo-scolastique de philosophie*, XXXIV (1932), 449 ff.

¹⁹ Rursus, quilibet homo, quamvis unus homo sit, tamen in uno et eodem homine sunt plura esse, quia plures formae substantiales perficientes secundum diversos gradus essendi, et per quas reponitur in diversis generibus gradatim ordinatis, secundum sententiam magistrorum Parisiensium. Matthew of Aquasparta, *Quaestiones Disputatae Selectae* II, *Quaestiones de Christo*, qu. ix, *Respondeo* (Quaracchi, 1914), p. 167. Cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Cen-*

tury, pp. 53-55.

²⁰ Cf. *Quodl. IV*, 13, fols. 104v-105r.

²¹ Cf. the pluralist view of Robert of Kilwardby, criticized by Henry (*loc. cit.*, fol. 104v), as well as by Giles of Lessines: Intelligere debet, quod una est animae rationis substantia in homine, non tamen simplex, sed composita ex partibus. Vegetativa enim, sensitiva, intellectiva partes sunt essentialiter differentes et secundum Philosophum et Augustinum. Letter of Kilwardby to Petrus de Conflito (ed. F. Ehrle, 'Beiträge zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Scholastik', *Archiv für Literatur- und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters*, V (1889), 628. Cf. M. DeWulf, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff.

²² Dignius autem est fieri per pauciora quam per plura unumquodque, ut dicitur in primo Physicorum (ch. 7, 189b23). Et ut dicitur secundo Caeli et Mundi (ch. 5, 288a3) de aptitudine naturae est ut faciat melius semper et nobilius, et hoc non est nisi dignius. Sed additur, secundum quod est possibile. *Quodl. IV*, 13, fol. 106v.

²³ For the stages in development of his thought on this subject, cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 211, note.

beings in man is metaphysical, not physical. Now, the metaphysician considers a thing in its intentional being, that is, the being it has as an object of knowledge (*in esse intentionale et cognoscitivo*).²⁴ His method is to begin with what is most universal and move towards the particular. Thus, considering all material things, he disengages from them the "intention" of pure materiality. This is conceived as purely potential to the most incomplete form, the form of corporeity, common to all bodies. Various differentiating forms are then conceived as completing this generic form; e.g., the form of one of the elements and the form of a mixture of these elements. Finally the lowest species is attained; e.g. man. On the metaphysical level, then, we can distinguish in man materiality, corporeity, life, animality, rationality. But these are not real forms or physical parts of man's being. They are simply conceptual notes or *intentiones* which the mind disengages from the essence *man*. This conclusion is valid, moreover, for every metaphysical composite; such a composite is simply one of "intentions", made by the reason (*compositum rationis ex intentionibus*). The composition of essence and existence, nature and supposit are of this sort.²⁵

The natural philosopher, on the other hand, considers the principles of which a thing is composed in its natural or physical being (*in esse naturae*). For example, he disengages, in a material thing, matter as the subject of natural change and generation, and form as the other part of the composite, brought about in the composite by natural generation.²⁶ The component parts with which he is concerned are not *intentionally*, but *really* distinct in the precise sense example, he disengages, in a material thing, matter as the subject of natural philosopher, then, will study man as a natural or physical composite (*compositum quoddam naturae*), and will define him in terms of soul and body, body signifying pure unformed matter and soul man's whole formal nature.²⁷

That man's formal nature is dual, admitting of two really distinct substantial forms, the rational soul and the form of the organic body, Henry attempts to prove by both reason and faith. He agrees with Aristotle that nature is always economical in her principles, and never does through several things what she can do through one. The question remains: is it possible for nature in the case of man to dispense with a plurality of forms?²⁸ It must be noted that the case of man is unique. All other natural things are brought into existence by way of natural generation, the term of which is a substantial form. Since but one generation is involved in their production, there is but one substantial form in the thing as its natural term or fruit. This is true in the case of inanimate things, plants and animals. The one substantial form contains virtually all the perfections of the lower forms and all their capacities of action. But in the case of man there is a twofold production. Both man and God have a part to play in the causation of

²⁴ Metaphysicus vero considerat principia, ex quibus res habet componi in esse intentionali et cognoscitivo, scilicet materia ut est quoddam potentiale imperfectum et perfectibile per formam secundum esse incompletum quod significatur nomine generis et completum quod significatur nomine speciei, quae complectitur secundum hoc, sub ratione formae, totum compositum ex materia et forma. *Quodl.* IV, 4, fol. 91^r. The level of intentional being, which is the level of metaphysics for Henry of Ghent, is situated between logical being (studied by logic) and real being (studied by physics). An *intention* is one of the principles really constitutive of a simple essence, capable of being conceived independently of every other constitutive principle of the same essence, but not capable of existing independently; e.g., *animality* and *rationality*. Cf. *Quodl.* V, 6,

fol. 161^r. Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-237.

²⁵ Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 4, fol. 91^r.

²⁶ Physicus enim intellectus considerat principia ex quibus res habet componi in esse naturae, scilicet materiam, ut est subiectum transmutationis et generationis naturalis, et formam, ut est altera pars compositi inducta per generationem naturalem in composito. *Ibid.*

²⁷ An intentional distinction is present between several principles of an essence, one of which can be precisely conceived without the other. A logical distinction is present between several things which are really the same and form the same concept, but in different ways; e.g., between man and rational animal. For these distinctions, cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-242.

²⁸ Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 4, fol. 91^r.

²⁹ Cf. *supra*, note 22.

a human being, man or nature generating man from matter, and God creating out of nothing the soul in the predisposed body, as Avicenna and the Faith tell us. Now, it is impossible that the term of these two productions be numerically the same; the proper term of the divine action is the rational soul. Hence, the term of the human action is some other substantial form. Consequently, there are two substantial forms in man, one drawn from the potency of matter by a natural agent, and the other produced from without by a supernatural agent. Before the infusion of the rational soul, then, there is in man a form, called the *forma mixti*, which gives to man his flesh and bones and the other parts of his organic body:

Sic ergo patet quod ante infusionem animae rationalis est ibi forma aliqua quam . . . vocavi formam mixti, quae dat esse carnis et ossis et aliarum partium ex quibus fit corpus organicum.³⁰

This duality of forms in man is shown even more clearly by faith. Christ's animated body was numerically the same as His dead body in the tomb. But this would not be true, Henry argues, unless there were in the man Christ a form which remained in matter after His death. In Christ, therefore, there were several substantial forms; and since He assumed perfect human nature, the same must be true for all men. Moreover, the words of Consecration, *Hoc est corpus meum*, lead Henry to conclude that there must be in Christ a substantial form different from His soul, which gives substantial being to His Body and which is the term of Transubstantiation.³¹

Thus, Henry of Ghent's physical analysis of man reveals him as a composite of pure matter and two substantial forms. The problem remains: what sort of unity has this composite? Is man simply an aggregate of three beings, or is he a substantial and essential unity? And if the latter is true, how reconcile this with Henry's conception of matter and the formal duality which he affirms in him? These are the questions to which we must now turn our attention.

IV. THE UNITY OF MAN IN ACTUAL EXISTENCE

However different the anthropologies of Plato and Averroes, in Henry of Ghent's eyes they agree fundamentally in teaching that a man is one simply *in operation*; the intellectual soul (or separate intelligence) and the sensible body merely share a common action. We have already seen why he considers such an explanation of man's unity erroneous.¹ Having rejected this explanation, it remains to be seen if man is one *in being*; and if so, precisely in what sense of the word *being* a man can be said to be one.

It might seem, at first, that Henry's analysis of man would lead him to deny that man is also one in being. For he has proved to his own satisfaction that in man there are three really distinct essences or natures: matter and two substantial forms. What is more serious, his denial of the real distinction between essence and existence compels him to posit in man three existences corresponding to the three essences.² Hence, man is threefold not only in his essential being,

³⁰ *Quodl.* IV, 13, 109^r. The *forma mixti* and *forma corporeitatis* seem to have been confused by M. DeWulf, *op. cit.*, p. 39, note 5, and J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 211. The form of corporeity is simply an intention, and it is common to every body as such. Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 4, fol. 91^r. On the other hand, the *forma mixti* is a real form which in man is appropriate to him, giving him his corporeity

and specifically human organic complexity and structure as a disposition for the rational soul. Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 13, fol. 113^r. For the form of corporeity as an intention, cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 16, note 2.

³¹ Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 13, fol. 109^r.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 4-5.

² Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 13, fol. 113^r. Quoted *infra*, pp. 16-17.

but also in his existential being. Is man, therefore, simply an accidental aggregate of several existing things, and not one existing substance or nature?

In *Quodlibet III*, q. 15 Henry tries to avoid this embarrassing conclusion which the requirements of his doctrine would seem to force upon him. He attempts to show that the composite man is one in *actual existence*, and that this suffices to save the substantial unity of man. He says that, according to Aristotle, it is impossible for several substances to form one substance if they are all actual, but that it is not an impossibility if they are potential.³ Two things in potency can form one composite which has one being (*esse*), belonging properly to neither of them but to the composite. For example, matter and form unite in one composite which has one complete *esse* to which both are in potency. It is true that in man there are three natures (*esse naturae*): the form which is the rational soul, the form which is drawn from the potency of matter, and unformed matter. But such a diversity in natures, Henry goes on to say, does not prevent the composite from being substantially one because of the one actual existence of the matter and the two forms in the composite, which existence is properly that of the composite, and through the composite belongs to those things which are substantially in it.⁴ Matter, as we have seen, is purely potential being.⁵ Although God can make it exist without form, in the present order of things it receives actual existence only from form. Moreover, the organic form in man is not naturally destined to actualize matter without the rational soul. It is in potency to that ultimate form which perfects and completes the specific nature of man. The subsisting and actually existing substance is, consequently, the fully informed and completed man. Consequently, just as in Christ there is only one actual existence although there is a twofold nature, divine and human,—the human nature being assumed to the actual existence of the divine and never actually existing by itself,—so in a man there is but one actual existence although there is a threefold nature.⁶

This explanation of the unity of man rests on the fact that, according to the ordinary course of nature, neither matter nor man's organic body actually exists without the soul. The soul is the perfection of the body, giving actual existence to it as to something which is of its very nature a being in potency. Hence, there are not two diverse beings in man—body and soul—but only one; and no difficulty arises, Henry assures us, as to how one man is formed from body and soul.⁷

It might be asked, however, whether this explanation does not run counter to his own principles. It presupposes that in man there are not two things diverse in *esse*, namely body and soul. He himself tells us that, if the body has one *esse* and the soul another, the composite of the two has simply the unity of an aggregate; and then man is not an animated body, but a body and a soul, or a soul using a body, or a soul clothed with a body.⁸ And it is just this absurdity which he wishes to avoid. But how is it possible for him to do so? We have seen him deny that man is one in being (*esse*), both in the sense of essential being (*esse essentiae*) and existential being (*esse existentiae*).⁹ In what sense, then, is

³ Cf. *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^v. The reference to Aristotle seems to be: *Metaphysics VIII*, 6, 1045a24.

⁴ Cf. *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^v.

⁵ Cf. *supra*, p. 10.

⁶ Dicendum secundum iam dicta hic, et supra de esse Christi, quod si loquamur de esse naturae, sic materia et forma in quolibet composito sunt diversa in esse, et similiter quaecumque re differunt in eodem, ut forma quae est anima rationalis, et forma in homine educta de potentia in materia, et

materia nuda. Et sic in homine puro sunt tria differentia re in esse naturae; sed talis diversitas secundum esse naturae non impedit quin compositum vere possit dici unum per se et substantialiter propter unicum esse actualis existentiae materiae et formae unius et alterius in composito. *Quodl. III*, 15, fol. 73^v. Cf. also fol. 74^r.

⁷ Loc. cit., fol. 74^r.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Cf. *supra*, note 2.

man one being? He tells us that man is one in actual existence (*esse actualis existentiae*); or, using a different vocabulary, man is one in subsistence (*esse subsistentiae*).¹⁰ If we are to understand his solution of the problem of man's unity, we must study more closely this special kind of existential being which is also subsistence.

In one of his later *Quodlibets* (X, q. 8) he clarifies the meaning of the expression *esse* and its various kinds. *Esse* in general is simply the participation of the created essence in the divine being. Hence, it is not something added to essence, but is simply the essence itself as related in a certain way to the divine being. Now, this relation is twofold: the essence is related to the divine being either as to its formal cause, and then it is called *esse essentiae*; or it is related to it as to its efficient cause, and then it is called *esse existentiae*. In neither case does *esse* add anything to the essence except its relation of participation in the divine being. *Esse diminutum*, in turn, is distinguished from true and perfect *esse existentiae* as being existing in the mind is distinguished from being existing outside the mind.¹¹

Both *esse essentiae* and true *esse existentiae* are further distinguished into absolute and subsstantial *esse essentiae* and *esse existentiae*. The first kind of essential and existential being is that which matter and forms (both accidental and substantial) have in the composite. The second kind is proper to a supposit.¹² Consequently, within the composite supposit, both matter and the various accidental and substantial forms are so many existing essences, but, unlike it, they do not exist separately and distinctly. The reason for this, as we have seen, is that they do not have the complete actuality of the composite; they are but potential beings awaiting the perfect actuality of the supposit in which they exist. The supposit alone exists separately and distinctly with that perfection of actuality which is called subsistence outside the intellect:

Per hoc enim quod in creaturis separate et distincte a quolibet alio in se existit, perfectionem actualitatis habet quae dicitur esse subsistentiae in existentia extra intellectum.¹³

It seems, then, that according to Henry of Ghent subsistence is the same as actual existence. This is confirmed by the following text which denies actual existence, in the proper sense of the term, of anything which does not subsist:

Si vero loquamur de esse actualis existentiae, de tali esse sciendum quod nulli proprie attribuitur nisi illi quod ipsum habet in se et absolute, tanquam ens distinctum ab alio, vel ex unione cum alio quod habet ipsum per se.

¹⁰ Cf. *supra*, note 6; and *infra*, note 13.

¹¹ Esse vero est in ipsa essentia participatio quaedam divini esse; qua ipsa essentia in seipsa est quaedam similitudo divini esse atque divinae essentiae, non autem in aliquo superaddito ei, nisi quoad respectum quem importat huiusmodi similitudo. Est autem ista participatio divini esse in essentia, esse essentiae, in quantum essentia illa exemplatum est divini esse secundum rationem causae formalis, quia per ipsum esse essentiae, ut per actum sibi proprium essentiale habet id quod res est ex ratione sui generis quod sit ens et natura et essentia proprie dicta, non solum figuramentum . . . Est vero dicta participatio divini esse in essentia esse existentiae, in quantum est similitudo producta a divino esse secundum rationem causae efficientis, quia per ipsum ut per actum suum accidentalem in quantum essentiae et ratione eius quod est et ratione

eius quo est, accidit esse productum, . . . Sed esse essentiae in quantum per essentiam entia sunt apud intellectum, est esse diminutum, esse vero existentiae verum et perfectum non habet nisi extra intellectum in rerum natura. *Quodl.* X, 8, fol. 422v. For Henry's doctrine of *esse essentiae*, cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-135. For the doctrine of *ens diminutum*, cf. Averroes, *In VI Meta.*, 2, t. c. 2, (Venice, 1574), fol. 152v.

¹² Et utrumque horum esse, tam essentiae, quam verae existentiae, duplex est. Quoddam enim est esse, tam essentiae quam existentiae, simpliciter dictum, quale esse habent materia et forma, sive substantialis, sive accidentalis in composito. Quoddam vero est esse, tam essentiae quam existentiae, quod dicitur subsistentiae, quod est suppositi et rei in se subsistentis. *Ibid.*

¹³ Loc. cit., fol. 423v.

Verbi gratia, forma et materia, quia non habent existentiam in actu nisi in composito quod se et in se absolute existit et subsistit.¹⁴

These distinctions are fundamental in the philosophy of Henry of Ghent, and they enable us to grasp precisely in what sense of the word man is one being. He is one, not simply in essence or existence, but in that special *esse* which Henry calls subsistence or actual existence:

... unicum est esse suppositi et eius quod est hoc aliquid in homine constituto in esse ex unica materia et dupli forma, quod quidem esse sub ratione existentiae absolutae triplex est, secundum quod sunt tres naturae re differentes.¹⁵

Perhaps the significance of this doctrine of the unity of man will be clearer if it is compared with that of St. Thomas Aquinas. Like Henry of Ghent, the Angelic Doctor bases the unity of man on actual existence, but the meaning of the statement is *toto caelo* different for the two philosophers. For St. Thomas, multiplicity is found in man in the order of essence, for he is composed, not of several substances or essences, but of several essential principles, namely prime matter and substantial form. The substantial form, in his view, is the formal principle of the substantial existence (*esse*) of matter. It is that by which the substance exists and is called a being. Of course, an efficient cause is also a principle of existence, for its role is to give existence to its effect. The difference between an efficient and formal principle is that the latter communicates existence to matter in such a way that the two, form and matter, share one existence, which is not true of an efficient principle and its effect.¹⁶ St. Thomas says that a substantial form such as the human soul, which can exist by itself apart from matter, has a complete existence (*esse*). When it informs matter, it shares with it its own existence, so that there is one existence of the whole composite. The body, then, does not contribute anything to the existence of the soul, for that is already complete. But the soul has not a complete specific nature, and the body comes to it for the completion of the species.¹⁷ Consequently, for St. Thomas, man's unity is fundamentally that of his *esse* or act of existing—that *esse* which in St. Thomas' metaphysics is considered to be most profound and central in any being.¹⁸

Since for St. Thomas the unity of man and, indeed, of any substance, is basically its act of existing or *esse*, any multiplication of *esse* in the substance destroys its unity:

... esse est id in quo fundatur unitas suppositi; unde esse multiplex praejudicat unitati essendi.¹⁹

It is this requirement of unity in *esse* which led St. Thomas to deny that there can be several substantial forms in one substance. A substantial form gives substantial existence to matter and to the composite, and, consequently, the very unity of the composite in substantial existence demands the unity of its substantial form. If there were several substantial forms in man, there would be several substantial existences, and his substantial unity would be destroyed:

¹⁴ *Quodl.* III, 2, fol. 49^v.

¹⁵ *Quodl.* IV, 13, fol. 113^r.

¹⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 68. Ad hoc; II, 56. Adhuc; *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, ad 13m, p. 371; *Summa Theologiae* I, 76, 1, ad 5m.

¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas *Qu. Disp. de Anima* 1, ad 1m, p. 370.

¹⁸ *Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt.* *Summa Theologiae* I, 8, 1. Cf. E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, p. 58.

¹⁹ St. Thomas, *Quodlibetum IX*, 2, 3, ad 2m, ed. Marietti (Rome, 1942), p. 186. Cf. *Summa Theologiae* I, 76, 2, ad 2m; III, 17, 2.

Impossibile est in uno et eodem esse plures formas substantiales, et hoc ideo quia ab eodem habet res esse et unitatem. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam, unde et per formam habet unitatem. Et propter hoc, ubicumque est multitudo formarum, non est unum simpliciter.²⁰

Unlike St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent can admit a plurality of substantial forms in man precisely because his doctrine of *esse* is compatible with it. When the objection is raised against his position: that if there are several forms in the same thing, there are several things different in act and in *esse*, Henry replies by distinguishing a twofold *esse*: *esse existentiae* and *esse subsistentiae*. The former, he says, is diversified in the same thing and in diverse things corresponding to the diversity of natures. Hence, in a composite of form and matter there are different *esse existentiae's* according to the different natures of matter and form. But there is only one *esse subsistentiae* in any one supposit—an *esse* which may be given by one form, or, as in the case of man, by several forms.²¹ Consequently, man is one, according to Henry of Ghent, not simply in *esse*, but rather in that special and privileged *esse* which he calls personal subsistence (*personalis subsistentia*).²²

Henry's doctrine of the unity of man, although foreign to the philosophy of St. Thomas, was shared by the majority of his contemporaries. Matthew of Aquasparta, writing in Henry's day, could say that it was the common teaching of the Parisian masters that there is a plurality of forms and *plura esse* in one man.²³ And Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, the two men whose philosophies dominate the fourteenth century, continued this prevailing tradition.²⁴ St. Thomas, however, was separated from it in principle, for he opposed its most fundamental presupposition—its notion of *esse*. For him, *esse* is the act of existing and it is that which is most profound and central in any being—more central, indeed, than the essence which determines and specifies it.²⁵ Consequently, if there is a multiplicity of principles composing that essence (e.g., matter and form), they can be unified in the *esse* which is at the centre of being. The primacy of *esse* over essence enables St. Thomas to explain how a multiplicity in the order of essence is reduced to unity in the order of existence. And, thus, in his anthropology he can explain the unity of man as a unity primarily in *esse*.

²⁰ St. Thomas, *Quodlibetum I*, 4, 6, ed. cit., p. 6. Cf. *Contra Gentiles*, II, 58. Praeterea. Ab eodem; *Summa Theologiae I*, 76, 4. Giles of Lessines, whom Henry of Ghent more directly opposed, also concluded the unity of form from unity of *esse*: . . . ubi erit tantum unum *esse*, ibi et tantum una forma. Sed unius entis simpliciter est unum *esse* simpliciter, quia *esse* est primus actus entis, et necesse est *esse* semper in unoquaque unum primum tantum illius generis, quare unius entis simpliciter tantum erit una forma. M. DeWulf, *Le Traité de l'Unité Formae* p. [61]. Giles of Rome, on the other hand, maintained that a plurality of forms does not necessarily posit a plurality of *esse's*, but only a plurality of modes of *esse*. Cf. Giles of Rome, *Theorematum de Esse et Essentia*, ed. Hochedez (Louvain, 1930), p. 112.

²¹ . . . duplex est *esse*, *existentiae* et *subsistentiae*. Primum diversificatur et in eodem et in diversis secundum diversitatem naturarum; et sic in composito ex una forma et pura materia habet in se diversa esse *existentiae* secundum quod diverse sunt naturae materia et forma existentes in com-

posito. Secundum vero *esse* est unum in quolibet ente uno ab eadem forma quae dat ei naturaliter rationem distinctam subsistendi in supposito; et est ab unica forma quando ipsa sola dat rationem subsistendi omnino, et a pluribus quando non datur composito nisi a pluribus: sicut contingit in homine quod inchoative habet ipsum compositum a forma naturali, completive vero a forma supernaturali, et hoc propter gradum dignitatis naturae humanae super caetera materialia. *Quodl. IV*, 13, fol. 113^r.

²² Loc. cit., fol. 113^r.

²³ Cf. *supra*, part III, note 19.

²⁴ . . . totius compositi est unum *esse*, et tamen includit multa *esse* partialia, sicut totum est unum ens, et tamen multas entitates partialias habet. Nescio enim istam fictionem, quod *esse* est quid superveniens *essentiae* non compositum, si *essentia* est composita. Duns Scotus, *IV Sent. XI*, 3. n. 46, ed. Vivès, vol. 17, p. 429. Dico quod hominis est tantum unum *esse* totale, sed plura *esse* partialia. William of Ockham, *Quodl. II*, 10 (Argentine, 1491).

²⁵ Cf. *supra*, note 18.

Henry of Ghent's notion of being is different from that of St. Thomas and, consequently, his explanation of the unity of man in being is also different. Deeply imbued with the Avicennian doctrine of the primacy of absolute essence (*esse essentiae*) over the various modes of existence, he looks upon being as fundamentally, not existence, but essence.²⁴ In this view, a being is fundamentally an essence, and a composite being is fundamentally a composite of several essences. Brought into existence by its efficient cause, such a being is a composite of several existing essences. Its unity, then, will be found neither in essence nor simply in existence. He must look for the unity of man in a special being called subsistence, which is simply the concrete condition of the whole man's distinct and incommunicable existence.

The foregoing analysis has revealed Henry of Ghent's eclecticism and his intermediate position among the different currents of thought in his day. We have seen him draw upon many sources, some of which are in conflict with each other, juxtaposing rather than reconciling them in an original synthesis. No wonder, then, that there are certain tensions and even contradictions in his thought. There is a conflict between his notion of the soul as essentially the form of the body (following Aristotelianism), and his notion of the soul as an autonomous spiritual substance ruling the body (following Augustinianism). This leads to a conflict between the soul as incomplete by itself and the soul as identical with itself, whether joined to the body or separated from it. There is also a conflict between his notion of matter as pure potency (following Aristotelianism, to assure the unity of man), and his notion of matter as having a distinct essence and existence (following Augustinianism, to assure its distinct creation). His position on the unity of the substantial form, except in the case of man, is also intermediate between Aristotelianism and Augustinianism.

There seems to be no doubt, therefore, that Henry of Ghent's doctrine of man contains conflicting theses which remain unreconciled. But, perhaps, this is inevitable, given the antithesis between his metaphysics and natural philosophy. M. Paulus has shown that Henry's metaphysics is of Platonic and Avicennian inspiration, moving on the level of pure intelligible essences which are grasped through innate ideas and with the help of divine illumination. His natural philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with individual things, grasped by the senses and intellect through a process of abstraction. Between these two levels of being and knowledge there is almost no common ground or communication. Henry juxtaposes without reconciliation an idealism of Platonic and Augustinian inspiration and a realism and empiricism which stem from Aristotle and Averroes.²⁵

It is only to be expected that this dualism should have repercussions in Henry's psychology. Indeed, he himself tells us that both the natural philosopher and the metaphysician are concerned with the intellectual soul. The natural philosopher studies it as the form and actuality of the body, acquiring knowledge from sensible things with the help of the senses. The metaphysician, on the other hand, studies it as a substance in itself, capable of subsisting apart from the body and having knowledge without the aid of the senses through species impressed on it from above.²⁶ In short, the soul which the natural philosopher discovers is the one described by Aristotle, whereas the soul discovered by the metaphysician is that of St. Augustine.

²⁴ Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

²⁵ Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-18.

²⁶ Et ideo consideratio de anima intellectiva ad duplum philosophum pertinet, ad naturalem, sc. in quantum est forma et actus corporis, acquirens actum intelligendi ex

sensibilibus adminiculo sensuum; et metaphysicum in quantum secundum se est aliquid potens actu subsistere et habere actum intelligendi per se separatum omnino per species a superiori impressas sine omni sensuum adminiculo. *Quodl.* III, 15, fol. 73^r.

We find, therefore, in Henry of Ghent a juxtaposition of Aristotelian and Augustinian ideas and terminology. Frequently, however, it is the formulae rather than the spirit of the Stagirite which Henry makes his own. This is true with regard to his use of such Aristotelian terms as matter and form, act and potency, substance and being. On the other hand, his conception of the soul as autonomous with regard to the body, his doctrine of matter as *prope nihil* and as created distinctly from form, as well as his thesis of the union of soul and body in the one person of man—all these reveal his fundamental allegiance to St. Augustine. The latter, of course, was not concerned with the abstract problem of man's metaphysical structure, but rather with the moral implications in anthropology and psychology.²⁹ Henry of Ghent belongs to another age—one that is intensely interested in metaphysics. It appears that, having inherited the Augustinian conception of man, he attempted to solve the problem of man's unity with metaphysical principles borrowed from Avicenna. If this is true, we can say with M. Paulus that his true masters are not Aristotle or St. Thomas, but St. Augustine, Avicenna and the *Liber de Causis*.³⁰

²⁹ Cf. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin*, p. 58.

³⁰ Cf. J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

L'Objet de la Métaphysique selon Duns Scot

ETIENNE GILSON

LE présent essai, outre les insuffisances dont son auteur est personnellement responsable, souffre de plusieurs autres pour lesquelles des excuses peuvent être invoquées. Duns Scot est un auteur moins obscur qu'on ne le dit, mais difficile. Ce que l'on nomme chez lui subtilité pourrait se nommer mieux encore précision; la difficulté, pour son lecteur de bonne volonté, est de ne pas se perdre dans ces précisions et de savoir quelle est la dernière. Faute de le savoir, on peut se tromper gravement sur sa pensée, en l'exposant correctement, et de la meilleure foi du monde, d'après un texte qui n'exprime que l'un de ses moments et non son point de vue final. Nous ne nous flattons pas d'avoir toujours évité cet écueil. Il existe un *Alphabetum Doctoris Subtilis*¹; ceux qui voudront bien le lire auront quelque idée du genre de difficulté auquel nous faisons ici allusion.

Une deuxième difficulté tient à l'état présent des textes. Il se pose des questions d'authenticité² et même pour une oeuvre aussi certainement authentique que l'*Opus Oxoniense*, nous manquons d'une édition critique. On sait qu'elle est en préparation et l'immense effort qu'elle exige explique assez le temps requis pour la préparer.³ Nous avons donc dû travailler sur un texte imparfait, sauf lorsque nous avons pu bénéficier de précieuses indications, que nous devions à l'inlassable bienveillance du R. P. C. Balić, O. F. M.⁴ Si généreuses qu'elles aient été, rien ne pouvait suppléer l'édition que nous attendons et que tout permet d'espérer prochaine. Il faudra donc, lorsqu'elle paraîtra, revoir tous les textes sur lesquels se fonde le présent essai et, le cas échéant, corriger leurs interprétations. Enfin, il n'est peut-être pas superflu de préciser que ceux qui nous attribuent une interprétation d'ensemble de la pensée de Duns Scot, même si c'est pour la critiquer, nous font un honneur que nous ne méritons pas. Il y a environ trente ans que nous avons commencé d'en chercher une, mais nous ne nous flattons pas de l'avoir trouvée. Le présent travail est un essai de plus pour trouver l'entrée de la doctrine, rien de plus. Il ne se sent lié par aucun de ceux de nos essais qui l'ont précédé et n'engage en rien ceux qui, *Deo volente*, le suivront dans l'avenir. Nous ne nous soucions nullement de ne pas nous contredire dans la suite de ces essais, dont nous ne relisons aucun avant d'en écrire un autre. Nous ne relisons que Duns Scot, chaque fois que nous en parlons ou écrivons à son sujet. Comme historien, notre seul désir est de le comprendre tel qu'il fut, et ce désir est bien loin d'être une garantie de succès, mais ceux qui nous prêtent d'autres desseins peuvent être absolument certains de se tromper sur nos intentions. De toute manière, s'ils veulent critiquer nos conclusions, ils ne feront rien d'autre que ce que nous ne cessons

¹ C. Balic, O.F.M., 'La Questione scotista', *Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica*, XVI (1938), 247-250.

² L'exposé le plus récent que nous connaissons sur l'état présent des problèmes d'authenticité et d'intégrité des textes attribués à Duns Scot, est l'excellent travail du P. Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., *Vent' anni di studi scotisti* (1920-1940). *Saggio bibliografico* (Milano, 1943). Voir surtout, P. II, *Discussioni intorno al' autenticità delle opere di Scoto*, pp. 14-30. Les notes de ce précieux exposé renverront le lecteur aux travaux antérieurement publiés sur chacun des écrits du Docteur Subtil, ou de ceux qui lui ont été attribués.

³ C. Balic, 'De critica textuali Scholasti-

corum scriptis accommodata', *Antonianum*, XX (1945), fasc. 1-4.

⁴ Chaque fois que les textes cités offriront des différences de rédaction avec les textes imprimés dont nous donnons les références, c'est que nous leur aurons substitué la rédaction recommandée par le R. P. C. Balić. Nous tenons à le remercier très vivement de la bonne grâce sans limites avec laquelle, lorsque nous avions des doutes sur le texte, il nous a permis de recourir à son érudition pour les lever. La reconnaissance de cette dette ne nous en laisse pas moins l'exclusive responsabilité de ces textes et, à plus forte raison, de leur interprétation.

de faire nous-même. La seule différence qui nous sépare, c'est que nous, du moins, sommes pleinement conscient de n'avoir pas encore exactement compris Duns Scot. C'est peu, mais ce n'est pas rien.

I. LIMITES DE LA METAPHYSIQUE

Pour un théologien, la métaphysique n'est pas la sagesse par excellence. Au-dessus de la connaissance naturelle suprême se trouve la théologie et toute définition précise de l'une ou de l'autre implique celle de leurs rapports.¹ La discussion de ce problème la plus complète que Duns Scot nous ait laissée, se trouve dans le Prologue de l'*Opus Oxoniense*. On sait que cet ouvrage est un commentaire sur le *Livre des Sentences* de Pierre Lombard.² Dans l'introduction qui précède le premier livre de son oeuvre, Pierre Lombard n'avait pas usé du mot "théologie", sauf sous la forme dérivée *theologicarum inquisitionum abdita aperire*. Même chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, et jusque dans la *Summa theologiae*, le mot *theologia* n'est pas d'usage courant pour désigner la *sacra doctrina* que le théologien professe.³ Chez Duns Scot, au contraire, *theologia* est le terme usuel en pareil cas; il est devenu le nom propre qui désigne le savoir révélé par Dieu à l'homme pour lui permettre d'atteindre sa fin.

La formule scotiste du problème mérite d'ailleurs de retenir notre attention: "Est-il nécessaire à l'homme, dans l'état où il est, que lui soit surnaturellement inspirée une doctrine spéciale, telle qu'il ne pourrait l'atteindre par la lumière naturelle de l'intellect?"⁴ La question se pose donc à propos de l'homme *pro statu isto*, c'est-à-dire dans son état présent, tel qu'il résulte du péché originel. Le fait même que le problème soit explicitement posé semble significatif. Saint Bonaventure, qui commentait Pierre Lombard vers 1250, n'avait pas jugé

¹ Nous avons déjà touché cette question dans "Metaphysik und Theologie nach Duns Scotus" *Franziskanische Studien*, 22 (1935), 209-231. Parmi les nombreuses contributions des scotistes anciens à l'étude du problème, on peut consulter avec profit Claudius Frassen, O.F.M., *Scotus Academicus*, nouvelle édition revue sur les corrections de l'auteur, (Rome, 1900), t. I, pp. 1-94; Hier. de Montefortino, *Ven. J. Duns Scoti Summa Theologica ex universis operibus ejus concinnata, juxta ordinem et dispositionem Summae Angelici Doctoris S. Thomae Aquinatis*, éd. nouvelle, (Rome, 1900), Pars I, qu. 1, t. I, pp. 5-73. Ce travail, dont il est malheureusement parfois difficile d'identifier la source exacte chez Duns Scot, n'en est pas moins très utile pour comparer, sur chaque point, la position scotiste à la position thomiste. A l'époque moderne, voir Parthenius Minges, O.F.M., *Joannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica quoad res praecipuas proposita et exposita* (Quaracchi, 1930), t. I, pp. 501-521; Déodat de Basly, O.F.M., *Scotus Docens*, supplément à *La France Franciscaine*, XVII (1934), 111-137. Sur l'ensemble de notre problème, voir C. L. Shircl, O.F.M., *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus* (Washington, 1942), étude très précise, exacte et excellente pour tout ce qui regarde la pensée de Duns Scot lui-même.

² Le texte en est reproduit avec la plupart des commentaires qui en ont été publiés, ceux de saint Bonaventure, de saint Thomas d'Aquin ou de Duns Scot par exemple. On en trouve une excellente édition, avec

identification des sources du texte, dans Petri Lombardi *Libri IV Sententiarum*, studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventuræ in lucem editi, 2^e éd., (Quaracchi, 1916), 2 vols.

³ Sur l'évolution qui aboutit, au XIII^e siècle, à poser la théologie comme une science, ou, du moins, une discipline, distincte de l'Écriture Sainte sur laquelle pourtant elle se fonde, voir M. D. Chenu, *La théologie comme science au XIII^e siècle* (2^e éd., Paris, 1943); C. Spica, *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyenâge* (Bibliothèque thomiste, XXVI, Paris, 1944), pp. 64-69. Le nom même a été lent à s'imposer. Saint Thomas d'Aquin lui-même, bien qu'il en use sans hésiter (*In 1 Sent., Prol., qu. 1, Resp.*) est loin de l'employer aussi souvent que ne font les interprètes modernes de sa doctrine. Chez Duns Scot, au contraire, *theologia* est le terme établi pour désigner la *sacra doctrina* comme distincte de la philosophie. Nous en rencontrons maint exemple.

⁴ *Utrum homini pro statu isto sit necessarium aliquam doctrinam specialem supernaturaliter inspirari, ad quam videlicet non posset attingere lumine naturali intellectus?* *Op. Ox.*, *Prol.*, qu. I, 1; t. I, p. 3. Nous citerons l'*Opus Oxoniense*, pour les livres I et II, d'après la réédition de M. F. Garcia, O.F.M. (Quaracchi, 1912 et 1914, 2 vols.) mais en conservant le numérotage des articles adopté par Wadding et en le corrigeant, chaque fois que cela nous a été possible, selon des indications que nous avons reçues.

nécessaire de lui consacrer un article spécial.⁵ En 1254-55, si le texte dont nous disposons remonte à cette date,⁶ saint Thomas d'Aquin jugeait au contraire opportun d'établir dans son commentaire la nécessité d'un savoir supérieur à la philosophie. La suffisance de la philosophie s'y trouvait soutenue, hypothétiquement mais en termes clairs, dans l'une des objections que lui-même s'opposait: *ad perfectionem hominis sufficit illa cognitio quae ex naturali intellectu potest haberi; ergo praeter philosophiam non est necessaria alia doctrina.*⁷ Dans le commentaire de Duns Scot, c'est-à-dire aux environs de 1300, ce ne sont plus seulement des thèses qui s'affrontent, ce sont des hommes: *In ista quaestione videtur esse controversia inter philosophos et theologos.*⁸ Ce changement de perspective n'est sans doute pas dénué de signification.

A quelque date que remonte le texte actuellement connu de l'*Opus Oxoniense*, les thèses qu'il formule sont postérieures à la Condamnation de 1277,⁹ qui implique l'existence d'un conflit entre philosophes et théologiens et de partisans d'une sagesse purement philosophique. En condamnant cette proposition scandaleusement hardie, *quod sapientes mundi sunt philosophi tantum*¹⁰ ou cette autre: que les vertus intellectuelles et morales dont parle Aristote suffisent à l'homme pour assurer son bonheur éternel,¹¹ Etienne Tempier avait bien entendu dénoncer des erreurs contemporaines, c'est-à-dire soutenues par des hommes qui vivaient de son temps. Il n'est pourtant pas nécessaire d'admettre que Duns Scot lui-même ait d'abord en vue certains de ses contemporains. Sans doute, il ne parle pas de "philosophie", mais de "philosophes". On verra pourtant, à la manière dont il en parle, que sa pensée se meut plutôt sur le plan, tout classique celui-là, de la distinction entre *sancti* et *philosophi*. Les philosophes auxquels il pense semblent être d'abord ceux de l'Antiquité, tout particulièrement Aristote. De tels hommes n'avaient jamais eu l'occasion de soutenir la suffisance de la philosophie contre une révélation juive qu'ils ignoraient ni contre une révélation chrétienne qu'ils ne pouvaient prévoir. Ils s'étaient contentés de la philosophie, parce qu'ils ne disposaient de rien d'autre. La position de Duns Scot marque le moment où, sous la pression de l'averroïsme contemporain et de ses revendications, la sagesse chrétienne se demande si la philosophie est vraiment capable de justifier en droit la suffisance dont elle se targue. Il s'agit donc pour lui de savoir si la connaissance philosophique seule, sans l'appoint d'une connaissance surnaturellement révélée, suffit à l'homme pour atteindre sa fin.

Si quelque chose peut rendre nécessaire une révélation surnaturelle, c'est l'insuffisance de la nature. Duns Scot réduit donc d'abord le débat à une divergence fondamentale touchant la perfection ou l'imperfection de la nature humaine: "Les philosophes soutiennent la perfection de la nature et nient

⁵ Les quatre questions du Prologue de saint Bonaventure portent sur la cause matérielle de la théologie, sa cause formelle, sa cause finale et sa cause efficiente (*In I Sent.*, *Praelatio*, [Quaracchi, 1934], t. I, pp. 6-12). Il ne semble pas avoir conscience que la nécessité de la théologie puisse être contestée au nom de la suffisance de la philosophie. Sur l'attitude de saint Bonaventure envers Aristote, voir E. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure* (1^e éd., Paris, 1924), p. 12-13. En sens contraire, F. Van Steenberghe, *Siger dans l'histoire de l'Aristotéisme* (Louvain, 1942), ch. II, p. 446 et suiv., ou, du même auteur, *Aristote en Occident* (Louvain, 1946), ch. VI, pp. 131-147.

⁶ Date d'ailleurs incertaine. On sait que Thomas d'Aquin a rédigé une deuxième fois, vers 1264, son commentaire sur le Livre I des *Sentences*. C'est probablement cette

seconde rédaction que nous lisons dans ses œuvres complètes. Il serait intéressant de savoir s'il a pris aussi nettement position dix ans plus tôt.

⁷ Thomas d'Aquin, *In I Sent.*, *Prol.*, qu. I, art. 1, obj. 3a.

⁸ *Op. Oz.*, *Prol.*, qu. I, art. 1, n. 3; t. I, p. 5. P. Callebaut, 'Le bienheureux Jean Duns Scot à Cambridge vers 1297-1300', *Archivum franciscanum historicum*, 21 (1928), 608-611.

⁹ Denifle - Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* I (Paris, 1889), p. 552, prop. 154.

¹⁰ *Quod homo ordinatus quantum ad intellectum et affectum, sicut potest sufficenter esse per virtutes intellectuales et alias morales, de quibus loquitur philosophus in Ethicis, est sufficenter dispositus ad felicitatem aeternam.* *Op. cit.*, I, p. 552, prop. 157.

la perfection surnaturelle; les théologiens, au contraire, connaissent la déficience de la nature, la nécessité de la grâce et la perfection surnaturelle".¹² Les termes mêmes dont use Duns Scot (*defectum naturae*), suggèrent qu'il pense ici, non à la nature prise *in statu hominis instituti*, mais à la nature humaine *pro isto statu*, c'est-à-dire dans l'état où elle se trouve par suite du péché originel. Ce qu'il se demande, c'est ce que dirait un philosophe, s'il entendait soutenir qu'une révélation surnaturelle est nécessaire à l'homme pour atteindre sa fin: "Un philosophe dirait que nulle connaissance surnaturelle n'est nécessaire à l'homme dans l'état où il est (*pro statu isto*), mais qu'il peut acquérir, par le simple jeu des causes naturelles, toute la connaissance dont il a besoin".¹³ C'est donc d'abord en fonction des suites du péché originel que Duns Scot s'interroge sur la nécessité d'une révélation.

Il est immédiatement évident que cette position du problème non seulement est théologique, ainsi qu'il se doit, mais suppose résolu un autre problème théologique auquel Aristote ne pouvait penser, celui de la condition présente de l'homme *in statu naturae lapsae*. Ce fait est remarquable car, à première vue, rien n'imposait au théologien comme tel cette position de la question. Il n'est *a priori* ni évident ni nécessaire que l'état de nature déchue doive être invoqué dans la discussion de ce problème. Cette nécessité ne s'impose que dans une théologie selon laquelle on peut au moins se demander si, au cas où le péché originel n'aurait pas été commis, l'homme aurait pu connaître distinctement sa fin sans qu'elle lui fût surnaturellement révélée. La position scotiste du problème invite donc à prévoir, sous réserve des vérifications ultérieures qui s'imposent, que l'état primitif de l'intellect humain n'est plus son état actuel et que son champ de vision peut s'être trouvé réduit en conséquence de la faute d'Adam. Si cette hypothèse devait se vérifier, la noétique et l'épistémologie des philosophes se trouveraient ici critiquées à partir de conclusions théologiques préalables concernant la portée de l'intellect humain *pro statu isto*. Ajoutons pourtant que Duns Scot lui-même ne commence pas par définir l'état de nature déchue. Il ne nous dit pas immédiatement en quoi cet état peut au juste affecter la solution de son premier problème. C'est sans doute que cette précision n'est pas immédiatement nécessaire et nous pouvons attendre avec lui le moment de la formuler.

Supposons donc qu'un philosophe, c'est-à-dire un homme ne disposant que de la raison naturelle seule, se demande si une révélation est nécessaire à l'homme, que répondrait-il? D'abord qu'elle lui est inutile, ensuite que la notion même en est contradictoire et impossible.

Dans un texte que déjà saint Thomas d'Aquin et, après lui, Duns Scot, ne se lassent pas de citer, Avicenne avait dit que les notions d'"être" et de "chose" sont les premières qui tombent sous les prises de l'entendement humain.¹⁴ C'est

¹² In ista quaestione videtur controversia inter philosophos et theologos. Et tenet philosophi perfectionem naturae et negant perfectionem supernaturalem; theologi vero cognoscunt defectum naturae et necessitatem gratiae et perfectionem supernaturalem. *Op. Ox.*, Prolog., qu. I, art. 1, 3; t. I, p. 5.

¹³ Diceret ergo philosophus quod nulla est cognitione supernaturalis homini necessaria pro statu isto, sed quod omnem cognitionem sibi necessariam posset acquirere ex actione causarum naturalium. Ad hoc adducitur simul auctoritas et ratio Philosophi ex diversis locis. *Op. Ox.*, Prolog., qu. I, art. 1, 3; t. I, p. 5. Qualis fuerit cognitione hominis instituti, quod usque alias differatur, saltem respectu viatoris pro statu isto est dicta cognitione supernaturalis, quia facultatem ejus

naturalem excedens: naturalem dico secundum statum naturae lapsae. *Op. cit.*, qu. I, art. 2, 13; t. I, p. 13. Nous interprétons *pro statu isto* comme désignant l'état de nature déchue. C'est ce que nous semble suggérer le contexte. Pourtant, ni Duns Scot ni Lychet dans son commentaire de ce passage, ne le disent expressément.

¹⁴ Dicemus igitur quod *ens* et *res* et *necessitas* talia sunt quae statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se. Avicenne, *Metaph.*, Tract. I, cap. 6; dans *Avicenne . . . Opera* (Venise, 1508), fol. 72^o. Noter, à propos de ce texte, que le "necessaire" est pour Avicenne une notion première, inséparable de celle d'"être" et immédiatement donnée avec elle.

donc que l'être est l'objet premier de notre intellect. Or toute faculté de connaître dont l'objet premier est un objet commun, c'est-à-dire inclut en soi d'autres objets, a naturellement prise sur tout ce qui rentre sous cet objet et l'atteint comme inclus par soi dans son objet naturel. La vue, par exemple, atteint non seulement son objet premier, qui est la couleur, mais tout ce qui, étant coloré, tombe par là sous ses prises. De même pour les autres facultés cognitives, et en voici la raison. Normalement, l'objet *premier* d'une faculté est aussi son objet *adéquat*. On nomme "adéquat" l'objet d'une faculté, lorsqu'il inclut tout ce qu'elle peut connaître, et qu'elle peut le connaître tout entier. En d'autres termes, l'objet adéquat d'une faculté lui est exactement coextensif, leurs aires respectives ne se distinguant en rien, ni par excès ni par défaut. Si l'objet premier et adéquat de l'intellect humain est l'être, l'homme peut naturellement connaître tout ce qui, en quelque sens que ce soit, mérite le titre d'"être". Or tout ce qui est connaissable est de l'être. Nulle révélation surnaturelle ne saurait donc être nécessaire à l'homme, puisque ce qu'elle révélerait serait encore de l'être, qui est l'objet premier, naturel et adéquat de notre intellect.¹⁵

Comme on le voit, l'argumentation s'appuie sur la nécessité d'une exacte proportion entre la faculté de connaître et son objet et c'est pourquoi la notion d'un savoir *surnaturel* reçu par une faculté *naturelle* de connaître peut être dénoncée comme non seulement superflue, mais contradictoire. Pour que la révélation d'une connaissance surnaturelle fût possible, il faudrait que l'intellect humain fût, *in puris naturalibus*, disproportionné à l'objet de cette connaissance et que, de manière ou d'autre, la proportion pût être rétablie. Or elle ne peut l'être, car si ce qu'on lui ajoute est naturel comme elle, le tout restera disproportionné à cet objet surnaturel; il faudra donc lui ajouter encore quelque chose, à propos de quoi se reposera le même problème, et ainsi de suite indéfiniment. Pour éviter d'aller ainsi à l'infini, il faut s'arrêter dès le début. Disons donc que l'intellect humain est, de soi, proportionné à tout objet connaissable selon quelque mode de connaissance que ce soit. Il n'est donc ni nécessaire ni possible qu'une connaissance surnaturelle lui soit inspirée.¹⁶

C'est toujours une entreprise risquée de faire dire à un philosophe ce qu'il aurait dit s'il avait posé un problème qu'il n'a pas posé. A première vue, rien ne semble plus légitime que de faire nier par un philosophe, au nom d'Aristote, la nécessité d'une révélation, et Duns Scot lui-même a pu facilement recueillir, dans le *De anima* comme dans la *Méta physique*, de quoi prouver la suffisance de l'intellect à connaître naturellement son objet.¹⁷ Pourtant, à la réflexion, rien n'est moins sûr et ce n'est peut-être pas par hasard que notre théologien part plutôt ici d'Avicenne que d'Aristote. En fait, ce qu'il critique est une thèse qui se

¹⁵ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, 1; t. I, p. 3. Voir le texte, heureusement corrigé, dans *Relatio a Commissione Scotistica exhibita Capitulo Generali Fratrum Minorum Assisi A.D. 1939 celebrando* (Rome, 1939), pp. 11-18. Un deuxième argument, *a fortiori*, est que "sensus non indiget aliqua cognitione supernaturali pro statu isto, ergo nec intellectus." *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, 1; t. I, p. 4.

¹⁶ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, 2; t. I, p. 4. Lychet commente ainsi la formule "secundum omnem modum cognoscibilis": scilicet abstractive, intuitive, intense, remisse et hujusmodi.

¹⁷ Dans *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 1, 3, Duns Scot allège Aristote, *De anima* III, 5, pour en conclure que l'intellect possible pouvant devenir tous les intelligibles et l'intellect agent pouvant les produire tous, l'homme est naturellement capable de tout

connaître. Au paragraphe 4 qui suit immédiatement, Duns Scot allège *Metaph.* E, 1, 1026a 19 (cf. K, 7, 1064b 2), où Aristote distingue les sciences spéculatives en mathématique, physique, métaphysique. En fait, Aristote ne dit pas métaphysique, mais théologique, et il est curieux que Duns Scot n'ait pas conservé ce terme, qui eût renforcé l'argument. Quoi qu'il en soit de ce détail, Duns Scot conclut de cette division des sciences, que puisque ces trois disciplines couvrent la totalité de l'être, il ne reste place pour aucune autre, telle que serait une connaissance révélée. Enfin, au paragraphe 5 (t. I, pp. 6-7), se fondant sur les *Secondes Analytiques* I, 2, 71b 16 sv., Duns Scot argue que, puisque nous connaissons naturellement les premiers principes, nous devons pouvoir connaître naturellement toutes leurs conséquences.

réclamerait d'Avicenne et tenterait de se justifier à l'aide d'arguments empruntés aux écrits d'Aristote. Le Philosophe n'a certes jamais enseigné qu'une révélation surnaturelle fût nécessaire à l'homme pour atteindre sa fin, mais il n'a pas prétendu non plus que l'intellect humain fût adéquat à l'être en tant qu'être et naturellement capable de le saisir. Il a même soutenu tout le contraire puisque, selon lui, l'être ne nous est directement accessible qu'à travers l'expérience sensible et que le seul être qui mérite pleinement ce titre, l'intelligible, nous échappe par sa pureté même. Il y aurait donc matière à révélation dans le monde d'Aristote et c'est pourquoi, en pratiquant les aménagements platoniciens nécessaires pour délester de son corps l'âme humaine, Alfarabi et Avicenne y ont fait circuler un large courant d'illuminations intelligibles. Ce ne sont pas là des révélations surnaturelles, mais elles peuvent passer pour surhumaines et, en tout cas, elles interviennent assurément pour dilater en fait l'intellect humain à la mesure de ce qui, dans ces doctrines, est en droit son objet adéquat: l'être. Ce salut complet de l'homme par la philosophie, qu'Aristote ne semble pas avoir jamais espéré, il semble, au contraire, que le néoplatonisme d'Avicenne nous l'accorde. Nous aurons à nous demander si Duns Scot n'a pas eu claire conscience de cette différence et même si l'une de ses préoccupations n'aurait pas été de réduire Avicenne à Aristote, en refusant à la philosophie pure des connaissances auxquelles elle prétend sans y avoir droit.

Exprimé en formules aristoteliennes, le premier argument que Duns Scot oppose à la thèse adverse n'est pourtant pas totalement aristotélicien: pour agir en vue d'une fin, il faut la désirer; pour la désirer, il faut la connaître; or, par ses seules ressources naturelles, l'homme ne peut avoir de sa fin aucune connaissance distincte; il est donc nécessaire qu'une connaissance surnaturelle lui en soit donnée.¹⁸ Tout le poids de l'argument réside manifestement dans sa mineure: l'homme est naturellement incapable de connaître *distinctement* sa propre fin, proposition qui n'a elle-même de sens que si celui qui la formule, déjà pourvu de cette connaissance distincte, s'en estime redévable à la révélation chrétienne.

Tel est précisément le cas de Duns Scot. Il ne conteste pas qu'Aristote, Averroès ou Avicenne n'aient eu quelque connaissance de la vraie fin dernière de l'homme, mais il nie que cette connaissance ait été suffisante pour assurer le salut. Autant dire que ce qu'il reproche à la philosophie en général, c'est son incapacité radicale à découvrir seule ce que nous ne savons que par le message de l'Evangile. Il ne le lui reproche pas en tant que philosophie. En tant que telle, elle a fait ce qu'elle a pu et on ne saurait attendre d'elle ce qu'il n'est pas dans sa nature de pouvoir faire. Le Dieu de l'Evangile n'est pas son objet. Duns Scot argumente ici comme un Chrétien, qui sait que la fin dernière de l'homme n'est pas une simple connaissance spéculative et abstraite de la nature divine, mais une vue directe et béatifiante de Dieu. Il raisonne donc en théologien qui s'appuie sur la foi et son intention n'est pas de reprocher aux philosophes de n'avoir pas su ce que la philosophie ne peut pas savoir, mais plutôt d'établir que la philosophie fut et demeure incapable de savoir par elle-même ce dont la révélation peut seule nous informer.

On pouvait penser, même en ne lisant que le texte de Wadding, que telle ait bien été l'attitude de Duns Scot, mais il est impossible d'en douter, depuis que les nouveaux éditeurs de l'*Opus Oxoniense* nous ont rendu la "note" capitale,

¹⁸ Omne agens propter finem agit ex appetitu finis, et omne per se agens agit propter finem; ergo omne per se agens suo modo appetit finem; ergo sicut agenti naturali est necessarius appetitus finis, propter quem debet agere, ita agenti per cognitionem . . . necessarius est appetitus sui

finis, propter quem debet agere, qui sequitur cognitionem. Patet ergo major. Sed homo non potest scire ex naturalibus finem suum distincte, ergo necessarium est sibi de hoc tradi aliqua cognitio supernaturalis. Op. Ox., Prol., qu. I, art. 2, 6; t. I, p. 7.

omise par Wadding, où le Docteur Subtil exprime le fond même de sa pensée. "Il n'y a rien de surnaturel, dont on puisse montrer, par la raison naturelle, que cela soit dans l'homme voyageur, ni que cela soit requis pour sa perfection. Celui qui le possède ne peut même pas savoir que c'est en lui. Il est donc impossible d'en appeler ici à la raison naturelle contre Aristote. Si l'on argumente à partir de ce que l'on croit, l'argument ne portera pas contre lui, parce qu'il ne concédera pas une prémisses qui soit objet de foi. Or dans les raisons ici alléguées, une des prémisses est objet de foi ou prouvée à partir d'un objet de foi; elles ne sont donc que des persuasions théologiques, qui vont de ce que l'on croit à ce que l'on croit (*ideo non sunt nisi persuasiones theologicae ex creditis ad creditum*)"¹⁹

La position de Duns Scot est donc celle d'un théologien qui, pour des raisons théologiques dont certaines prémisses sont objets de foi, entreprend de fixer les limites que la philosophie d'Aristote n'a jamais dépassées. Ce qu'Aristote a su se confond en fait pour lui avec ce que la philosophie peut savoir, mais, précisément pour cette raison, le Docteur Subtil ne songe pas un instant à prouver qu'elle aurait pu ou qu'elle devrait le savoir. Sa dénonciation de l'insuffisance de la philosophie se fonde donc ici sur un motif purement religieux: l'insuffisance de la connaissance naturelle à procurer à l'homme son salut.

Pour le prouver, observons d'abord que tout ce qui agit par soi, agit en vue d'une fin. C'est le cas des agents naturels, qui désirent nécessairement la fin pour laquelle ils doivent agir. C'est aussi le cas des êtres dont l'action est guidée par la connaissance, avec pourtant cette différence que, pour agir, ces derniers doivent connaître la fin en vue de laquelle ils agissent. Ajoutons que cette connaissance doit être distincte, car nul ne saurait atteindre une fin dont il n'aurait qu'une connaissance confuse. Etre doué de raison, l'homme ne peut rien désirer qu'il ne le connaisse, ni rien atteindre qu'il ne désire. Le problème est donc bien pour nous de chercher, si l'homme est naturellement capable de savoir que sa fin dernière est de voir Dieu face à face et de jouir éternellement de sa bonté.

Duns Scot établit que l'homme n'en est pas capable. Son argumentation présente cette remarquable particularité, qu'elle porte d'abord directement contre Aristote, comme si prouver qu'Aristote a ignoré la fin dernière de l'homme équivaut à prouver que la philosophie même est incapable de la connaître. Le Philosophe, qui suit la raison naturelle (*Philosophus sequens naturalem rationem*), semble dire, dans certains textes, que le bonheur de l'homme consiste en la connaissance acquise des substances séparées.²⁰ En tout cas, même s'il n'affirme pas expressément que telle soit la félicité suprême accessible à l'homme, il ne conclut, par raison naturelle, rien de précis à ce sujet. Ou bien donc il se trompe, ou bien il reste dans l'incertitude,²¹ il ne le "sait" en aucun cas.

Comment d'ailleurs une philosophie prouverait-elle que la connaissance des substances séparées, celle de Dieu par exemple, convient à une nature telle que la nôtre? La fin d'un être se juge à la nature de ses actes; or nous n'expérimentons en nous-mêmes et nous ne connaissons en notre nature, *in statu isto*, aucun acte d'où nous puissions conclure que la vision des substances séparées nous soit accessible et convienne à ce que nous sommes. En d'autres termes, un être dont, en son état présent, toute la connaissance presuppose l'expérience sensible, ne peut avoir naturellement la connaissance distincte que sa fin soit de

¹⁹ *Op. Ox.*, éd. critique, art. 12.

²⁰ Cf. Aristote, *Eth. Nic.* X, 7, 1177, 14-16. Allégué de nouveau par Duns Scot dans *Op. Ox.* IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 32; W. t. 3, col. 2, Duns Scot n'attribue pas ici formellement cette doctrine à Aristote (*videtur*). St. Thomas d'Aquin nie qu'Aristote l'ait enseignée: *Cont. Gent.* III, 44.

²¹ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, 6; t. I, p. 8. Le texte renvoie à Aristote, *Eth. Nic.* I, 9,

1099b 10-15. Rétablir ainsi le texte latin cité par Duns Scot: *Siquidem igitur et aliud aliquod deorum est donum hominibus, rationabile felicitatem quoque dei datum esse, et maxime humanorum quantum optimum.* Notre théologien semble plutôt s'en tenir ici à l'incertitude d'Aristote; en tout cas, il n'affirme pas positivement, comme on le lui a fait dire, qu'Aristote ait enseigné cette doctrine.

connaître des substances purement intelligibles. Et quand bien même on accorderait que la raison naturelle suffit à prouver que la vue directe et la jouissance de Dieu sont la fin de l'homme, elle ne prouverait jamais que cette fin doive être possédée par lui éternellement, dans son corps et dans son âme. Or que ce bien doive être éternel, et qu'il doive appartenir à l'homme pris dans sa nature complète, non à son âme seule, sont deux conditions qui ne l'en rendent que plus désirable.²² On en citerait d'autres, dont la découverte ne serait pas moins impossible à la raison naturelle et qu'une doctrine surnaturellement inspirée peut seule nous révéler.

Deux remarques s'imposent à ce propos. D'abord, Duns Scot se contente ici d'établir contre Aristote ce qu'Augustin avait jadis établi contre Plotin, à savoir, que la raison naturelle seule n'a jamais osé espérer la Bonne Nouvelle, qui constitue l'essentiel du message évangélique. Le décor philosophique a changé depuis le V^e siècle, mais la pièce qui se joue reste la même, et c'est d'ailleurs pourquoi les arguments dont use ici Duns Scot sont plusieurs fois confirmés par des autorités tirées de saint Augustin.²³ Ensuite, nous l'avons dit, Duns Scot argumente contre Aristote comme si ce qu'Aristote avait ignoré était de plein droit inaccessible à la connaissance philosophique. Tout se passe donc comme s'il acceptait implicitement l'identification effectuée par Averroès, entre Aristote et la philosophie. D'où cette inférence de longue portée, que ce qu'Aristote lui-même n'a pas su, la raison humaine ne peut pas le savoir et qu'il suffit d'établir qu'Aristote a ignoré quelque vérité métaphysique, pour établir que la raison naturelle ne saurait l'atteindre par ses propres forces. Cet état d'esprit, que certains commentateurs de Duns Scot ont exprimé de façon pittoresque,²⁴ implique cette conséquence importante qu'au lieu de considérer la philosophie comme une entreprise humaine toujours perfectible, notamment grâce aux suggestions de la révélation, on la traite comme une discipline achevée, ou, plutôt, finie, dans tous les sens du mot. Duns Scot ne semble pas s'être jamais demandé quelles seraient, dans l'avenir, les relations de la "philosophie" et de la "théologie". Il ne s'est pas demandé, sous cette forme tout à fait générale, si la philosophie n'allait pas entrer, grâce à son association avec la théologie, dans une nouvelle phase de son histoire, qui serait peut-être une phase de progrès. Il n'a pas non plus écrit, à notre connaissance du moins, que la théologie dispenserait désormais de la philosophie. Ce que nous essayons de décrire est moins une doctrine qu'une attitude et Duns Scot pense moins en termes de "philosophie" et de "théologie" qu'en termes de "philosophes" et de "théologiens". Il y eut jadis le Philosophe qui, ayant dit à peu près tout ce que la philosophie peut dire, ne lui laisse guère plus à dire que ce qu'il a déjà dit. Il y a présentement les théologiens qui disent ce que nulle philosophie n'a pu ni ne pourra jamais dire et ne permettent pas que la philosophie se prétende désormais capable de le dire ou se flatte de l'avoir jamais dit.

²² Sur la vue de Dieu par l'homme total, dans la vision béatifique, Duns Scot allègue Augustin, *De Genesi ad Litteram XII*, 36, 69, fin; PL 34, 484. Cf. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, 7; t. I, p. 8.

²³ Voir *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 4, 23; t. I, pp. 21-22, où Duns Scot allègue, touchant l'ignorance où les philosophes étaient de la vraie fin de l'homme, Augustin, *De Civitate Dei* XVIII, 41, 3; PL 41, 602: *Quamvis nescientes ad quem finem et quoniam modo essent ista omnia referenda...*

²⁴ Si finis ultimus hominis ab aliquo philosophantium solo rationis lumine detegi posset, eum haud dubie Aristoteles Philosopherum Aquila et Naturaे Genius, reprehendisset; sed ipsum non detexit. Claudius

Frassen, O.F.M., *Scotus Academicus*, t. I, p. 4. Cet Aristote posé comme la borne ultime de l'intelligence humaine, vient en droite ligne d'Averroès. A notre connaissance, Duns Scot lui-même n'a jamais usé de ces formules, mais Frassen est excusable, car Lychet l'avait précédé dans cette voie: *Si ergo Aristoteles princeps omnium philosopherum non cognovit distincte ultimum finem hominis propter quem ratio agit, stat ratio Doctoris quod sit ei necessaria aliqua cognitioni distincta de fine ultimo, quae via naturali haberi non potest. Op. Ox.*, *Commentarius*, Vivès édit, vol. VIII, p. 16.—Pour un état d'esprit analogue, voir Dante, *De Monarchia* III, 16: *quae (sc. humana ratio) per philosophos tota nobis innotuit.*

Un deuxième argument contre la prétendue suffisance de la philosophie s'inspire du même esprit. D'abord, il ne suffit pas de connaître distinctement la fin; pour l'atteindre, il faut connaître aussi les moyens. Or les philosophes enseignent que tout ce qui provient immédiatement de Dieu, en provient nécessairement, alors que le salut de chaque homme dépend de deux décisions de Dieu, dont l'une comme l'autre est libre: admettre certains actes comme méritoires en vue du salut, les admettre comme méritants. Ici encore nous assistons au conflit global de deux mondes irréconciliables: le monde de la nécessité naturelle qui est celui des philosophes, le monde de la liberté divine qui est celui de la théologie chrétienne. Aucune nuance n'est introduite dans le débat, sauf, peut-être, un *ut videtur*; a ce qu'il semble, la notion de liberté divine échappe à la philosophie, car les philosophes ne l'ont pas connue.²⁵

Ainsi l'homme ne saurait naturellement connaître ni sa fin dernière, ni les moyens de l'atteindre. Conclusion doublement dommageable à la philosophie, surtout à celle d'Avicenne qui prétend savoir que notre fin dernière est de connaître les Intelligences Séparées et par quels moyens y parvenir. L'opposition qui met ici Duns Scot aux prises avec les philosophes est si importante, on peut même dire si décisive, qu'il convient de s'y arrêter.

La thèse philosophique à laquelle s'en prend Duns Scot peut se décomposer en trois moments: 1° "la nature de l'homme est naturellement connaissable à l'homme, parce qu'elle n'est pas disproportionnée à sa faculté de connaître; d'où il suit que, cette nature une fois connue, la fin de cette nature peut être aussi connue de manière naturelle;" 2° si la nature de l'homme est connaissable à l'homme, l'homme doit connaître la fin qu'il désire naturellement, donc il doit en avoir une connaissance naturelle;²⁶ 3° "selon Avicenne, il est naturellement connaissable que Dieu possède parfaitement l'être; or la fin d'une faculté quelconque est le meilleur de ce qui rentre dans son objet premier, puisque c'est en cela seul qu'il peut trouver parfaitement joie et repos; on peut donc connaître naturellement que, quant à son intellect, l'homme est ordonné à Dieu comme à sa fin". Si l'on accepte cette conclusion, il en faudra accepter une autre. Connaître la nature humaine et connaître la fin de cette nature à partir de la science qu'on a de ce qu'elle est, c'est connaître du même coup le rapport nécessaire de cette nature à sa fin, donc aussi les moyens qui l'y relient.²⁷ La suffisance de la philosophie semble par là rétablie; c'est le problème entier qui se trouve remis en question.

Une âme humaine naturellement capable d'apprehender la nature purement spirituelle, et de l'apprehender dans une intuition directe, c'est une position qui

²⁵ *Istud non est naturaliter scibile, ut videtur, quia hic etiam errabant Philosophi ponentes omnia quae sunt a Deo immediate esse ab eo necessario. Op. Ox., Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 8; t. I, p. 9.* Duns Scot se souvient peut-être de la 53^e des Propositions condamnées en 1277: *Quod Deum necesse est facere, quidquid immediate fit ab ipso. Chart. Univ. Par. I, éd. cit., p. 546.* On notera d'ailleurs que la notion d'un salut achevé naturellement par les moyens de la philosophie est une des erreurs reprochées à Avicenne par Gilles de Rome, *Errores Philosophorum*, cap. VI, art. 18, ed. J. Koch et J. O. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1944), p. 34. Voici le texte: *Ulterius erravit circa beatitudinem nostram volens eam dependere ex operibus nostris. Et ex positione sua sequitur quod beatitudine nostra consistat in contemplando ultimam intelligentiam, ut patet ex X^o Metaphysicae suae capitolo De cultu Dei et utilitate ejus.*" (éd. cit., p. 34). Sur les sources hypothétiques de cette attribution à Avicenne, voir éd. cit., p. 37,

note 43. L'incapacité où nous sommes de connaître naturellement les *moyens* du salut est confirmée (*Op. Ox.*, loc. cit., n. 23; t. I, p. 22) par l'autorité d'Augustin, *De civitate Dei XI*, 3; PL 41, 318: *profecto ea quae remota sunt a sensibus nostris, quoniam nostro testimonio scire non possumus, de his alias testes requirimus, eisque credimus...*

²⁶ Item, homo naturaliter appetit finem illum quem dicis supernaturalem; igitur ad illum finem naturaliter ordinatur; igitur ex tali ordinatione potest concludi finis illa ut ex cognitione naturae ordinatae ad ipsum. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 9; t. I, p. 10. On résiste difficilement à l'impression que Duns Scot accroche ici au passage la célèbre thèse thomiste sur "le désir naturel de voir Dieu." Une fois de plus Duns Scot juge saint Thomas trop généreux envers la philosophie.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, n. 10; t. I, p. 11.

ressemble à celle d'Avicenne plus qu'à nulle autre.²⁸ Que le premier objet naturellement connaissable à l'intellect soit l'être, c'est une thèse que Duns Scot lui-même lie expressément ici au nom d'Avicenne. A ces deux positions le Docteur Subtil oppose de remarquables réponses, dont une partie au moins doit être retenue par nous comme intéressant l'idée qu'il se fait de la philosophie.

Concernant la connaissance que nous avons de la nature de l'âme, Duns Scot nie qu'elle nous permette d'y lire distinctement notre fin dernière. Elle ne nous permet particulièrement pas de deviner que notre nature soit capable d'une grâce suprême telle que la vision béatifique. Ce qui nous importe le plus est la raison qu'il en donne: "Notre âme ne nous est connue, ainsi que notre nature, *pro statu isto*, que sous une notion générale telle qu'on peut l'abstraire des choses sensibles", ce qui ne suffit pas à nous faire connaître que son objet le plus parfait soit Dieu.²⁹ Cet argument implique donc que l'état présent de l'homme affecte le jeu et la portée de son intellect. Dans un autre état, l'âme connaîtrait peut-être directement sa nature; elle se saisirait peut-être, comme le prétend Avicenne, dans une conscience immédiate de son intelligibilité pure et le problème de la connaissance naturelle qu'elle peut avoir de sa fin se poserait donc autrement. Pourtant, ne disposant que de la connaissance de l'âme qui nous est présentement accessible, nous ne saurions en conclure qu'elle soit essentiellement capable de voir Dieu.

Concernant l'objet de l'intellect, une réserve analogue s'impose: "On doit nier ce qui est ici assumé, savoir, que nous connaissons naturellement que l'être est l'objet premier de notre intellect, et cela selon son indifférence totale au sensible et à l'intelligible, et qu'Avicenne dise que cela soit connu naturellement. Il a, en effet, mélangé sa religion, qui fut celle de Mahomet, aux choses de la philosophie, et il a dit certaines choses comme philosophiques et prouvées par la raison, d'autres comme conformes à sa religion. C'est pourquoi lui-même affirme expressément, au livre IX (ch. 7) de sa *Métaphysique*, que l'âme séparée connaît la substance immatérielle en elle-même, et c'est pour cela qu'il lui faut soutenir que la substance immatérielle est contenue sous l'objet premier de l'intellect. Ce n'est pas ce que dit Aristote, selon qui l'objet premier de notre intellect semble être la quiddité de la chose sensible, connue soit dans le sensible même, soit dans son dérivé, c'est-à-dire dans la quiddité qu'on peut abstraire du sensible."³⁰

²⁸ Voir E. Gilson, 'Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicenniant', *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, IV (1929), 40, n. 1. Cf. Elle (sc. l'âme) se saisit alors elle-même, car il est de sa nature de se connaître directement. L. Gardet, 'Quelques aspects de la pensée avicennienne . . . , Revue thomiste', 45 (1939), 730.

²⁹ Non enim cognoscitur anima nostra a nobis, nec natura nostra pro statu isto, nisi sub ratione aliqua generali, abstrahibili a sensibilibus, sicut patebit infra, dist. 3. Et secundum tales generalem rationem non convenit sibi ordinari ad tales finem, nec posse capere gratiam, nec habere Deum pro objecto perfectissimo. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 11; t. I, p. 11. Nous aurons à revenir sur les textes de la dist. III, où le problème de la cognoscibilité de l'intelligible pur est directement abordé. Notons seulement que la formule *pro statu isto* se réfère bien ici à la distinction théologique classique entre l'état premier de l'homme et son état après la chute: *homo in statu innocentiae vel naturae institutae—homo in statu naturae lapsae*; voir loc. cit., n. 13; t. I, p. 13. Ce que Duns Scot envisage, c'est exactement

le pouvoir de connaître actuellement naturel à notre intellect: *naturalem dico secundum statum naturae lapsae*, *ibid.*

³⁰ Ad aliud negandum est illud quod assumitur, quod scilicet naturaliter cognoscitur ens esse primum objectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam indifferenciam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia, et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum. Miserit enim sectam suam, quae fuit secta Mahometi, philosophicis, et quaedam dixit ut philosophica et ratione probata, alia ut consona sue sectae. Unde expresse ponit, libro IX *Metaphysicae*, animam separatam cognoscere substantiam immateriale in se; et ideo sub objecto primo intellectus habet ponere substantiam immateriale contineri. Non sic Aristoteles; sed secundum ipsum videtur esse primum objectum intellectus nostri quidditas rei sensibilis, et hoc vel in se sensibilis vel in suo inferiori, et hoc est quidditas abstrahibilis a sensibilibus. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 12; t. I, pp. 12-13. Sur ce texte, voir C. Balic, *De critica textuali Scholasticorum scriptis accommodata* (Romae, 1945), p. 38, n. 1 (aussi dans *Antonianum*, XX (1945), 322, note 1).

Telle qu'il vient d'être traduit d'après ses nouveaux éditeurs, ce texte diffère en un point des textes antérieurs. L'édition Vivès donnait: *et sic quod dicit Avicenna, non concludit quod sit naturaliter notum*, ce qui donne un texte aisément intelligible. D'autres éditions avaient préféré: *et hoc quod dicit Avicenna non concludit quod sit naturaliter notum*, ce qui donne un sens également intelligible, et d'ailleurs le même. Dans les deux cas, Duns Scot ne nierait pas qu'Avicenne ait soutenu cette thèse, mais qu'étant donné la manière dont il l'a soutenue, en mêlant religion et philosophie, ce qu'il en dit ne prouve pas que sa thèse soit naturellement connue par la raison. Il en va de même si l'on accepte cette autre lecture qui fut aussi proposée: *et hoc quod dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum*, ce qui signifie: "on doit nier ce que dit Avicenne, savoir, que ce soit naturellement connu". Le sens immédiat devient autre si l'on admet le texte que les nouveaux éditeurs proposent, car il ne s'agit plus alors de nier que ce qu'Avicenne a dit soit vrai, mais qu'il l'aït dit: *et quod hoc dicit Avicenna quod sit naturaliter notum*, ce qui signifie: "on doit nier . . . aussi qu'Avicenne dise ceci, que cela soit naturellement connu". Le choix de cette dernière leçon se justifie par les règles critiques, tout objectives, que les éditeurs de Duns Scot se sont imposées.³¹ Ils ont donc eu tout à fait raison de la préférer aux autres et nous devons, à notre tour, nous incliner devant leur décision, pourvu seulement que le texte ainsi rétabli donne, fût-ce à la rigueur, un sens intelligible, comme c'est en effet le cas.

Reportons nous à l'objection dont ces lignes sont la réponse: "De même, il est naturellement connaissable que l'objet premier de l'intellect soit l'être, selon Avicenne, et il est naturellement connaissable que l'essence de l'être (*rationem entis*) ait en Dieu son suprême point de perfection". On remarquera que la première de ces deux propositions seule est expressément attribuée à Avicenne. Il est donc fort possible que Duns Scot ait écrit dans sa réponse: "On doit nier qu'il soit naturellement connu que l'être soit l'objet premier de l'intellect, et cela selon l'indifférence totale de l'être au sensible et à l'intelligible, et aussi qu'Avicenne dise que ce soit naturellement connu". Cela est possible du point de vue de l'objection, mais difficile du point de vue de la réponse, parce que, si tel est le texte, la réponse nie quelque chose que l'objection n'a pas affirmé. Dans l'objection, le nom d'Avicenne ne couvre que la première thèse: "il est naturellement connaissable que le premier objet de l'intellect soit l'être"; dans la réponse, les deux thèses se fondent en une seule: "il est naturellement connaissable que le premier objet de notre intellect soit l'être, et cela selon l'indifférence totale de l'être au sensible et à l'intelligible". Si l'on admet que la réponse doit correspondre à l'objection, il est difficile de douter que, dès l'objection, Avicenne soit tenu pour responsable de la thèse totale dont il sera tenu pour responsable dans la réponse. Le texte ne peut donc signifier: Avicenne a soutenu qu'il est naturellement connaissable que l'objet premier de l'intellect soit l'être, mais il n'a pas soutenu que Dieu soit inclus dans l'objet de ce concept.

Reste une autre interprétation: Avicenne aurait soutenu ces deux thèses, mais il n'a pas soutenu qu'elles soient naturellement connues. Cela non plus n'est pas impossible. En fait, ni dans l'objection ni dans la réponse, Duns Scot ne cite aucun texte où Avicenne soutienne cette thèse. Ajoutons que, s'il existe un texte de ce genre, nous ne le connaissons pas. Il est donc littéralement exact de dire: Avicenne n'a pas écrit qu'il nous soit naturellement connu que l'être, tant intelligible que sensible, est l'objet premier de notre intellect.

Cf. le reproche semblable adressé à Avicenne par Averroès, *In IV Metaph.*, com. 3: *cum quorum (sc. Loquentium) admiscuit ipse suam scientiam divinam. Bref, il a mêlé théologie et philosophie.* Cf. *In II Phys.*, com. 22: *Via autem qua processit Avicenna*

in probando primum principium est via Loquentium, et sermo ejus semper inventur quasi medius inter Peripateticos et Loquentes.

³¹ C. Balic, op. cit., p. 40 (*Antonianum*, XX, 304).

Mais est-ce là ce que Duns Scot veut dire? On peut en douter, car lui-même explique aussitôt comment Avicenne est arrivé à cette conclusion, c'est-à-dire en mélangeant religion et philosophie. Le seul sens qui reste possible est donc: Avicenne n'a pas dit que cette thèse nous soit *naturellement* connue. Bien entendu, puisque Avicenne n'a pas expressément formulé cette proposition, il ne peut s'agir ici que de celle que Duns Scot a construite, sous forme d'objection, à partir des textes d'Avicenne. Ce sens admis, on doit encore choisir entre deux interprétations différentes.

Voici la première: Avicenne lui-même n'a pas dit que cela soit naturellement connu. En effet, lorsqu'il s'exprime sur ce point, il en parle plutôt en homme qui s'inspire de sa religion. Ainsi, dans sa *Métaphysique*, tr. IX, ch. 7, Avicenne soutient expressément que l'âme séparée connaît la substance immatérielle en elle-même. Cette thèse, qui concerne l'état de l'âme après la mort, relève de la religion. Pourtant, c'est pour l'avoir soutenue qu'Avicenne a dû "inclure la substance immatérielle dans l'objet premier de l'intellect". Duns Scot ne doute donc pas qu'Avicenne n'ait enseigné cette doctrine, car lui-même nous explique ici pourquoi le philosophe arabe a dû l'enseigner. Ce que Duns Scot nie, c'est qu'Avicenne ait enseigné cette thèse comme connue par la raison naturelle, car puisque lui-même la soutenait sous l'inspiration d'une croyance religieuse, elle dépend tout entière de la religion.

Qu'Avicenne l'ait fait, c'est probable, mais qu'il l'ait fait consciemment ou ait voulu le faire, cela est bien difficile à croire. Si l'on se reporte au texte de la *Métaphysique* allégué par Duns Scot, on ne trouve qu'un mot pour justifier cette interprétation. Dans ce *Capitulum de promissione divina*, Avicenne dit de sa propre doctrine sur la fin dernière de l'homme, que la révélation l'approuve (*prophetia approbat*). Peut-être est-ce à ce mot que Duns Scot fait allusion, lorsqu'il écrit qu'Avicenne a dit certaines choses *ut consona suae sectae*. Rien ne serait plus correct, car lorsque Avicenne déclare que sa thèse est approuvée par la révélation, il se dit certainement d'accord avec sa religion. Il n'est donc pas impossible que, s'emparant de ce mot pour l'exploiter au maximum, Duns Scot ait voulu dire: vous voyez bien qu'Avicenne s'inspire ici d'un motif religieux, car lui-même dit qu'il le fait. On doit donc nier qu'Avicenne tienne sa thèse pour *naturaliter nota*, car lui-même la présente comme confirmée par la révélation.

Que telle ait été la pensée de Duns Scot, on ne prouvera jamais le contraire, mais avant de montrer quelles difficultés elle soulève, notons d'abord que, quelque leçon que l'on préfère, elle conduira finalement au même sens. Quoi qu'en ait pensé Avicenne, Duns Scot lui-même conteste qu'on puisse ici s'appuyer légitimement sur lui pour soutenir que l'être, y compris l'intelligible pur, soit naturellement connu *in statu isto*, comme le premier objet de l'intellect. Ou bien Avicenne l'a nié, ou bien, s'il l'a soutenu, c'est qu'il a inconsciemment mêlé sa religion à sa philosophie et enseigné, comme philosophe, ce qu'il devait soutenir pour satisfaire les exigences de sa foi. La preuve en est qu'Aristote, qui ne savait rien de la religion musulmane, n'a pas commis cette erreur. Ainsi, quelque leçon que l'on préfère, le choix ne change rien quant à l'interprétation de la pensée de Duns Scot lui-même. Sa propre thèse est et demeure celle-ci: nous ne savons pas, de connaissance naturelle, que l'être, y compris le pur intelligible, est l'objet premier de notre intellect; ceux qui affirment le contraire parlent, en fait, au nom d'une révélation.

Reste une dernière question qui n'est pas sans importance pour choisir entre les diverses leçons que les éditeurs de Duns Scot nous proposent: Avicenne a-t-il, oui ou non, considéré comme naturellement connue la thèse en question? Duns Scot lui-même nous renvoie à la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne, livre IX, ch. 7: qu'y lit-on? Dans ce *Capitulum de promissione divina*, Avicenne distingue deux

promesses: d'abord celle du Prophète, qui s'adresse à la foi et promet des joies ou des peines corporelles; ensuite, "et est alia promissio quae apprehenditur intellectu et argumentatione demonstrativa, et prophetia approbat, et haec est felicitas animarum, quae probatur argumentationibus, quamvis nostrae imaginationes debiles sint ad imaginandum eas nunc propter causas quas ego ostendam". Tout approuvée qu'elle soit par le Prophète cette deuxième félicité n'en est pas moins, aux yeux d'Avicenne, connaissable par la seule raison naturelle et réalisable par les seules forces de l'intellect. Les "théologiens" qui la recherchent, le sont au sens aristotélicien et philosophique du terme, qui tient "théologie" pour l'un des noms de la philosophie première, ou "métaphysique". C'est ce que l'on peut voir en lisant la suite immédiate du texte, où se trouve décrite, en détail, une méthode purement philosophique pour obtenir la bonté. Il est donc certain que la raison pour laquelle, selon Duns Scot, Avicenne s'est trouvé conduit à inclure l'intelligible dans notre notion de l'être comme premier objet de l'intellect, est, aux yeux d'Avicenne lui-même, une notion de la bonté essentiellement philosophique et naturelle. Pour admettre que Duns Scot lui fasse soutenir le contraire, il faut admettre aussi que le Docteur Subtil se soit mépris sur le sens obvie du chapitre d'Avicenne auquel lui-même nous renvoie.³² Ce n'est pas impossible, mais on place d'ordinaire plus haut le niveau de sa subtilité. C'est pourquoi, sans aucunement contester que, en bonne critique, la leçon et *quod hoc dixit* doive être maintenue, il y a au moins une raison philosophique d'estimer que la leçon et *hoc quod dicit* est préférable. Duns Scot ne peut guère avoir, dans un seul et même texte, écrit qu'Avicenne n'a pas dit qu'il soit naturellement connu que l'être, y compris l'intelligible, est l'objet premier de notre intellect, et cité à l'appui un texte d'Avicenne où tout implique que l'être intelligible soit naturellement accessible à notre intellect. On peut d'autant moins le croire que, selon Duns Scot lui-même, la raison pour laquelle Avicenne a dû soutenir cette dernière thèse est empruntée à un chapitre de sa *Méta physique* où, parlant en pur philosophe, il affirme que l'âme séparée connaît la substance immatérielle en elle-même, par une méthode qui, bien qu'elle s'accorde avec elles, ne doit rien à la foi ni à la révélation.

Le texte de Duns Scot est au contraire cohérent en lui-même et avec les faits, s'il a dit simplement que, croyant parler en pur philosophe, Avicenne était pourtant influencé par sa religion. S'il n'avait appris du Coran que l'âme est personnellement immortelle et que des récompenses ou des châtiments l'attendent dans une autre vie, aurait-il jamais pensé que l'âme trouvera sa fin dernière et sa bonté dans son union intelligible avec une Substance Séparée?³³ Pur philosophe, Aristote n'a rien pensé de tel et c'est aussi pourquoi, parlant de l'homme dans l'état même où l'homme se trouve, il a conclu que la quiddité de l'être sensible est l'objet naturel de notre intellect.

Duns Scot ne confondait pas la doctrine d'Avicenne avec l'enseignement du Coran,³⁴ mais il pensait que la religion d'Avicenne avait marqué sa philosophie.

³² Duns Scot cite plus loin la lettre même du texte, *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. II, n. 8.

³³ C'est la doctrine que nous avons vue attribuée à Avicenne par Gilles de Rome: Ulterius erravit ponens animam nostram esse beatam in eo quod intelligit intelligentiam ultimam (*Errores philosophorum*, éd. cit., p. 34, art. 18). Le même auteur l'attribue à Algazel dans les mêmes termes (*op. cit.*, p. 42, art. 12), ce qui se justifie par Algazel, *Metaphysics*, éd. J. T. Muckle (Toronto, 1933), p. 185. Chez Avicenne lui-même voir *Metaphysica*, tr. IX, cap. 7; (éd. Venise, 1508, fol. 107^a); et le texte très clair du *Metaphysices Compendium*, lib. II, tr. 1, cap. 1, n. 9; éd. Nematallah Carame (Rome,

1926), pp. 230-231. Contre cette thèse d'Avicenne, voir *Op. Ox.* I, d. 1, q. 1, n. 3; t. I, pp. 128-130 (où Dans Scot joint à Avicenne une thèse de Proclus, *Elem. theol.*, 35).

³⁴ Sur la doctrine de Mahomet lui-même, Duns Scot s'exprime sans ménagements. Par exemple: Quidam autem . . . ut Saraceni, quibus Mahometus immundus alias immunditatis innumeras immiscuit" (*Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 2, n. 2; t. I, p. 32; Quid Saraceni vilissimi porci, Mahometi discipuli, pro suis scripturis allegabant, expectantes pro beatitudine quod porcis convenit scilicet gulam et coitum? Quam promissionem despiciens philosophus, qui fuit quasi illius sectae,

Avicenne lui-même ne s'en serait peut-être pas trop défendu.³⁵ En tout cas, la pensée de Duns Scot reste claire, et comme il serait également dangereux d'en exagérer la portée et de la restreindre,³⁶ nous voudrions essayer de la mesurer.

Que l'objet immédiat de Duns Scot soit ici de procéder à une critique théologique des limites de la philosophie, c'est assez évident. Pour le Christianisme, il y allait de tout, car s'il est vrai, comme le pensait Avicenne, que l'homme peut naturellement voir Dieu, la philosophie suffit à sauver l'homme, toute révélation divine devient superflue, l'évangile est inutile et la religion chrétienne est enseignée en vain. A cet égard, les philosophes arabes étaient beaucoup plus dangereux qu'Aristote, à qui l'on pouvait reprocher de n'avoir apporté aucune doctrine du salut, mais non d'en avoir inventé une fausse. Il semble également certain que, pour nier que l'homme puisse naturellement savoir qu'il est capable de connaître directement l'intelligible, Duns Scot s'appuie sur l'ignorance où l'âme se trouve de sa vraie nature et de ses vrais pouvoirs. On admettra sans doute aussi que, pour Duns Scot, cette ignorance où l'âme est d'elle-même se trouve liée à son état présent, qui est l'état de nature déchue. Enfin, tous s'accorderaient probablement à résumer ainsi la conclusion de Duns Scot sur ce point: "Toute notre connaissance des essences est abstractive; il nous est donc impossible de nous éllever à l'espérance et, moins encore, à la certitude de connaître par intuition les essences séparées".³⁷ Nous le pourrions, si nous avions au moins une connaissance intuitive de l'essence de notre âme, mais comme nous ne la connaissons que par ses actes, qui sont des actes de connaissance abstractive, nous ne le pouvons pas.

Ceci dit, la question subsiste de savoir si, oui ou non, Duns Scot enseigne que notre inaptitude à connaître intuitivement l'intelligible est une suite du péché originel? A quoi l'on répond que Duns Scot a hésité sur ce point et que son hésitation ou imprécision est significative, puis qu'elle veut dire que: "le Docteur Subtil attribuait une importance secondaire à la question".³⁸ Passons, en attendant d'y revenir en son lieu, mais disons du moins que cela seul serait pour nous d'une extrême importance. Il est extrêmement important, pour apprécier l'attitude de Duns Scot envers la philosophie, de savoir qu'il attribuait une importance secondaire à une question qui, théologiquement parlant, est en effet secondaire, mais, philosophiquement parlant, est première, fondamentale, urgente. Il ne s'agit en effet de rien de moins que de savoir si la nature de notre intellect, prise dans sa condition originelle, a été tellement blessée par le péché originel, que ce qui, avant la faute, était inclus dans l'objet naturel de l'intellect humain, lui est devenu trop complètement inaccessible pour qu'il se sache naturellement capable de le connaître; si, enfin, et au cas où cet objet serait celui même de la métaphysique, la connaissance que nous en avons en fait, est celle que nous devrions en avoir. Tous ces problèmes se tiennent et même à supposer, ce que nous ne croyons pas, que Duns Scot n'ait attaché qu'une importance secondaire au premier, il ne se désintéresse certainement pas des autres. On serait donc conduit à conclure que Duns Scot est plus soucieux de limiter la compétence de

Avicenna, *IX Metaph.*, c. 7, alium finem, quasi perfectiorem et homini magis congruentem, asserit dicens: "Lex nostra, quam dedit Mahometh, ostendit dispositionem felicitatis et miseriae quae sunt secundum corpus, et est alia promissio quae apprehenditur intellectu". Et sequitur ibi: "Sapientibus magis cupiditas fuit ad consequendum hanc felicitatem quam corporum; quae quamvis daretur eis, non tamen attenderunt nec appetiunt sunt eam comparatione felicitatis quae est conjunctio primae Veritatis." *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 2, n.8; t. I, pp.

36-37. Un peu plus loin (*Loc. cit.*, n. 9; t. I, pp. 39-40), Duns Scot annonce qu'en l'an 1300, l'Islam est près de sa fin. (Sur ce texte, voir E. Gilson, 'Sur un texte de Duns Scot', *Revue d'histoire franciscaine*, I (1924), 106-107).

³⁵ Avicenne, *Metaphysics Compendium*, lib. II, tr. I, cap. 1, éd. Nematallah Caramé (Rome, 1926), p. 227.

³⁶ Efrem Bettoni, O.F.M., *L'ascesa a Dio in Duns Scot* (Milano, 1943), pp. 114-117.

³⁷ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

³⁸ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

la philosophie que d'en étendre les limites, ce qui ne serait aucunement absurde et serait historiquement important.

Un deuxième point, beaucoup plus précis, mérite de retenir l'attention. Quelle que soit la position ultime de Duns Scot sur l'ensemble d'un problème auquel nous devrons revenir, la position qu'il adopte envers Avicenne dans le Prologue de l'*Opus Oxoniense*, reste ce qu'elle est. Vouloir l'interpréter, comme on l'a fait, en fonction de l'ensemble de la doctrine est un décision certainement sage, mais moins facile à observer qu'elle ne paraît l'être, car il est vrai qu'"une doctrine philosophique doit résulter de l'ensemble de la pensée d'un maître donné",³⁹ mais l'ensemble de la pensée d'un maître donné résulte aussi des doctrines particulières qu'il enseigne. Entre les deux, s'interpose quelque chose de tout différent: l'idée communément reçue de ce qu'est l'ensemble de la pensée du maître. Or, pour l'historien, c'est elle qui est en question. Au début de son enquête, elle ne saurait être acceptée par lui comme une idée vraie, mais comme une idée dont il se demande si elle est vraie, et c'est une règle d'or qu'aucune idée d'ensemble d'une doctrine n'est complètement vraie si elle se heurte à une seule thèse particulière dûment établie. Or la thèse que nous discutons ici est philosophiquement fondamentale, puisqu'elle concerne l'objet naturel, premier et adéquat de l'intellect humain. Dans un texte dont, jusqu'à présent, l'authenticité n'a jamais été contestée, Duns Scot a dit, en termes si clairs qu'on ne peut que les répéter après lui: *negandum est . . . quod naturaliter cognoscimus ens esse primum objectum intellectus nostri, et hoc secundum totam indifferentiam entis ad sensibilia et insensibilia.* Nous ne saurons ce qu'est "l'ensemble de la pensée de Duns Scot" que lorsque nous aurons reconstitué un ensemble doctrinal capable d'accueillir cette thèse, telle que Duns Scot lui-même l'a formulée.

Or il est difficile de contester ce qu'elle implique en respectant l'ensemble des textes de Duns Scot sur ce point. Si l'être, pris selon toute son indifférence à l'intelligible et au sensible, est l'objet premier de l'intellect, et si l'on ne peut savoir, par la raison naturelle seule, que l'être ainsi conçu soit l'objet premier de l'intellect, on ne peut savoir, par la raison naturelle seule, quel est l'objet premier de l'intellect. La mineure est établie par le texte de Duns Scot lui-même qui vient d'être cité. La majeure ressort précisément de l'ensemble de sa pensée, car si ce n'est pas là ce que Duns Scot pense, que signifie sa critique de la thèse thomiste, selon laquelle l'objet premier de l'intellect est la quiddité de l'être sensible? Et que signifie sa propre doctrine de l'univocité? Car celle-ci ne signifie pas que nous ayons naturellement une connaissance intuitive de l'être intelligible, comme le pense Avicenne, mais un intellect incapable d'une connaissance abstraite et univoque de l'être, serait, aux yeux de Duns Scot, incapable de connaître intuitivement l'être intelligible en quelque état que ce soit. Ce ne serait donc pas un intellect humain. Ici, c'est Duns Scot qui revendique contre Thomas d'Aquin les droits de la nature. Comment Dieu lui-même peut-il rendre l'intellect capable d'intuition intelligible, si l'intellect en est *naturellement* incapable? Comment se fait-il que l'intellect en ait été jadis capable et puisse le redevenir? Mais s'il en est naturellement capable, à tel point qu'il le serait encore sans la faute, comment sa connaissance abstraite de l'être ne s'étendrait-elle pas, en vertu de sa nature même, à l'être tout entier?

On pourrait contester la conclusion et dire que Duns Scot précise ici qu'il s'agit d'une indifférence "totale", au point qu'elle inclut même Dieu. Rien ne serait plus exact, mais si Duns Scot nie que l'intellect humain, posé dans son état

³⁹ E. Bettini, *op. cit.*, p. 117, haut. L'auteur n'a aucun doute sur la conception du scotisme au nom de laquelle il argumente. D'où les mises en demeure auxquelles il s'adonne et les options qu'il impose à son

adversaire avec une assurance sympathique, mais un peu massive. Entre ses "ou bien . . . ou bien," l'humble vérité historique peut se frayer plus d'un passage.

présent et sans l'aide de la révélation, puisse se savoir capable de voir Dieu, il affirme énergiquement que cet intellect en est capable, si Dieu le veut. Pour que l'intellect humain en soit capable, il faut précisément que Dieu rentre dans son objet premier. Tout ce qui est contenu par soi dans l'objet premier d'une faculté, est connaissable par cette faculté. L'objet premier d'une faculté, souvenons nous en, est aussi l'objet adéquat à son emprise totale. Or il est hors de doute que, selon Duns Scot, Dieu soit inclus dans l'objet premier de l'intellect humain. "Non seulement l'être limité, mais aussi l'être illimité, est un objet naturellement capable de mouvoir l'intellect créé; ainsi donc, l'être en tant qu'indifférent à l'un et l'autre, sera son objet adéquat naturel".⁴⁰ Qu'est-ce que l'être indifférent à l'être limité et à l'être illimité, sinon l'être indifférent à la créature et au créateur? On souhaitera difficilement une indifférence plus "totale". Mais voici qui est plus explicite encore: "Tout ce qui est contenu par soi sous l'objet premier et naturel d'une faculté, cette faculté peut l'atteindre naturellement, autrement l'objet premier ne serait pas adéquat à la faculté, mais lui serait transcendant à titre d'objet. Or l'être, qui est l'objet premier naturel de l'intellect, convient en toute vérité à Dieu même".⁴¹ Que veut-on de plus? Si Dieu est compris sous l'objet premier et naturel de l'intellect, et si nous ne pouvons pas savoir *naturaliter* qu'il l'est, nous ne pouvons pas non plus savoir naturellement quel est l'objet premier et naturel de l'intellect. C'est ce que dit expressément Duns Scot. Sur quoi l'on demandera simplement: qu'en résulte-t-il pour notre métaphysique? Science de l'être en tant qu'être, elle ne peut pas savoir, *naturaliter*, la nature exacte de tous les êtres qui rentrent dans son objet premier et naturel. Pour voir qu'il en est ainsi, il suffit de regarder Aristote et ceux qui, trompés par lui, limitent au pouvoir de l'intellect *in statu naturae lapsae*, celui de l'intellect humain pris en soi. De quelque manière qu'on retourne le problème, la même conclusion s'impose. On ne peut pas savoir de quoi l'intellect est naturellement capable, si l'on ne bénéficie pas des lumières de la révélation.

Le troisième argument, dirigé par le Docteur Subtil contre la soi-disant suffisance de la philosophie, renforce d'ailleurs l'hypothèse générale que les deux premiers suggèrent. Là encore, Duns Scot semble considérer la philosophie comme une expérience déjà tentée, terminée et dont le bilan peut être établi parce qu'on en connaît désormais les résultats.

La connaissance des substances séparées, c'est-à-dire purement intelligibles, nous étant naturellement accessible, c'est à la métaphysique qu'il appartiendrait de nous la livrer. Or Aristote lui-même reconnaît que notre connaissance des substances séparées est très imparfaite, parce qu'obtenue *a posteriori* à partir de

⁴⁰ Après avoir rappelé que l'"objectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae non est specialius objecti angelici, quia quidquid potest intelligi ab uno, et ab alio," Duns Scot s'objecte à lui-même que, pour un philosophe ignorant du péché originel, la quiddité sensible, objet qu'il perçoit comme adéquat *pro statu isto*, doit apparaître comme absolument adéquat. Mais il répond: Contra ista arguitur quod ens non tantum limitatum, sed illimitatum sit objectum naturaliter motivum intellectus creati, et ita ens, ut est indifferens ad utrumque, erit objectum naturale, scilicet per actionem causae naturaliter agentis attingibile. Et arguitur primo sic: ejusdem objecti primi accepti secundum suam totam indifferentiam, ad potentiam quam primo respicit acceptam secundum suam totam indifferentiam, est idem modus se habendi

in movendo, scilicet naturaliter vel non naturaliter. *Quodlib. XIV*, 13; éd. Vivès, t. 26, p. 47. Le fait que Dieu ne soit pas naturellement présent à l'intellect créé, soit humain soit angélique, n'empêche pas qu'il soit un objet capable de mouvoir ces intellects, ni que ces intellects soient susceptibles d'être mus par lui. Dieu est donc inclus dans l'objet qui leur est naturel *ex natura potentiae*.

⁴¹ Contra istud, quidquid per se continetur sub primo objecto naturali alicuius potentiae, ad illud potentia potest naturaliter attingere, alioquin objectum primum non esset adaequatum potentiae, sed transcendens in ratione objecti; nunc autem ens, quod est primum objectum naturale intellectus, verisimile convenit Deo; igitur, etc. *Quodlib. XIV*, 11; éd. Vivès, t. 26, p. 40.

leurs effets sensibles, et, ajoute Duns Scot pour son propre compte, on peut prouver qu'il en est ainsi. La première des preuves qu'il allègue n'implique aucun problème métaphysique, car elle consiste à constater que, ne connaissant la Première Substance immatérielle qu'à partir de ses effets, nous ignorons fatallement cette propriété, qui appartient pourtant à sa nature: être communicable à trois (*quod sit communicabilis tribus*). Les effets produits par Dieu ne découvrent pas cette propriété, parce qu'ils ne proviennent pas de Dieu en tant que "trine". Au contraire, si l'on argumentait ici des effets à la cause, ils nous induiraient plutôt en erreur, car toute nature numériquement une causée par Dieu est celle d'un seul sujet.

La preuve suivante invite par contre à des réflexions proprement philosophiques. Préludant à l'un des thèmes directeurs de sa théologie, Duns Scot fait observer qu'une autre propriété de cette nature divine, propriété *ad extra* cette fois, est d'exercer une action causale contingente (*causare contingenter*). Nul n'insistera jamais plus fortement que ne l'a fait Duns Scot sur la liberté radicale de l'action divine hors de Dieu lui-même. Or, ajoute-t-il, raisonner à partir des effets divins induit ici plutôt en erreur, "comme on le voit aux opinions des philosophes, qui soutiennent que le Premier cause nécessairement".⁴² Dans une telle formule, *Primus* est une marque d'origine qui ne peut tromper: les philosophes en question sont des philosophes arabes. La thèse en question est une de celles qu'Etienne Tempier avait condamnées en 1277⁴³ et Gilles de Rome l'a classée parmi les "erreurs des philosophes".⁴⁴ Or c'est bien ainsi que Duns Scot lui-même considère cette proposition. C'est une erreur de philosophe, c'est-à-dire une de celles auxquelles la raison naturelle est exposée, lorsqu'elle cherche à connaître Dieu à partir de ses effets. Ne disons pas qu'elle y soit condamnée, mais les effets divins y conduisent plutôt qu'à la vérité: *magis deducunt effectus in errorem*. L'expérience que constitue le philosophie en témoigne assez clairement. Raisonnant sur les propriétés des substances créées, on en arrive naturellement à conclure qu'elles sont perpétuelles, éternelles et nécessaires, "plutôt que" contingentes et nouvelles dans l'être: *de proprietatibus etiam aliarum substantiarum patet hoc idem, quia effectus magis ducunt in sempiternitatem et aeternitatem et necessitatem earum, quam in contingentiam et novitatem*.⁴⁵

Qui ne reconnaîtrait aussitôt ces thèses? Qu'il soit impossible de réfuter les arguments d'Aristote en faveur de l'éternité du monde et que tout ce qui arrive soit nécessaire, c'étaient encore là deux erreurs condamnées en 1277.⁴⁶ Nous sommes ici à l'origine même de ce que Gilles de Rome venait de nommer les *errores philosophorum*, si du moins il est vrai de dire que la doctrine de l'éternité du monde est partout présente dans l'oeuvre d'Aristote et comme à la base de tout ce qu'il enseigne.⁴⁷ Duns Scot se meut donc en terrain déjà connu, et il continue de le faire lorsqu'il dénonce, comme suggérée par l'obser-

⁴² Proprietas etiam istius naturae ad extra est causare contingenter; et ad oppositum hujus magis deducunt effectus in errorem, sicut patet per opiniones philosophorum ponentium Primum necessario causare" *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 14; t. I, p. 15.

⁴³ Voir plus haut, note 25.

⁴⁴ Alkindi: *Quod omnia de necessitate contingunt*, dans Gilles de Rome, *Errores philosophorum* XI, 4; éd. cit., p. 36. Algazel: *Quod deus non potest facere nisi quod facit*, *op. cit.*, IX, 9, p. 44. Cf. art. 7, p. 40.

⁴⁵ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 14; t. I, p. 15.

⁴⁶ *Quod impossibile est solvere rationes Philosophi de aeternitate mundi, nisi dicamus, quod voluntas Primi implicat impossibilia*; *Prop. 39*, dans *Chart. Univ. Paris*.

I, p. 548. *Quod nihil fit a casu, sed omnia de necessitudine eveniunt, et quod omnia futura, quae erunt, de necessitudine erunt, et quae non erunt, impossibile est esse, et quod nihil fit contingenter*, considerando omnes causas; *Prop. 21, op. cit.*, I, p. 545.

⁴⁷ Gilles de Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, éd. cit., I, 1, p. 2, et II, p. 12. Surtout, cap. III, p. 14. Incidemment (*Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 4, n. 23; t. I, p. 22), Duns Scot reproche à Aristote d'avoir enseigné le polythéisme (même erreur attribuée à Cicéron, dans Prol., q. 2, n. 8; t. I, p. 39), ainsi que d'autres pratiques immorales. Il vise *Polit.* VII, ch. 9 concernant le polythéisme et VII, ch. 16; concernant les pratiques immorales.

vation du sensible, l'erreur des philosophes qui concluent, à partir des mouvements des astres, qu'il y a autant de substances séparées que de mouvements célestes: *similiter videntur philosophi ex motibus concludere quod numerusistarum substantiarum separatarum sit secundum numerum motuum coelestium.*⁴⁸ Nous repassons encore ici dans les pas de Gilles de Rome, ou, pour mieux dire, par un chemin connu de tous. Aristote n'a-t-il pas dit, au livre XII, 8 de sa *Métaphysique*, qu'il y a autant d'anges, ou d'Intelligences, qu'il y a de sphères célestes? Se fondant sur ce principe, il n'en compte que 55 ou 57; Avicenne en compte environ 40; Algazel se contente de 10 Intelligences pour 9 sphères, alors que tout théologien sait, sur la foi de l'Ecriture, que les anges sont innombrables.⁴⁹ Que dire enfin de cette thèse, pareillement soutenue par les philosophes, que les substances séparées sont naturellement bienheureuses et impeccables?⁵⁰

En entendant Duns Scot conclure que tout cela est parfaitement absurde, on résiste difficilement à lui attribuer une vue assez simple de la situation. Les philosophes n'ont pas su que l'état actuel de l'homme est un état de nature déchue. Ils ont donc pensé que le mode abstractif de connaître, qui est celui de l'homme *pro statu isto*, est aussi le seul mode de connaître dont il soit capable. De là à décrire l'être intelligible à partir de ses effets sensibles, il n'y avait qu'un pas; les philosophes l'ont franchi et, à partir de ce point, ils sont allés d'erreur en erreur. Ce qu'il faut savoir pour les éviter, c'est que, absolument parlant, l'intellect humain est capable d'intuition intelligible, mais c'est aussi ce dont, dans sa condition présente, l'homme ne saurait s'aviser. La religion seule le lui fait connaître en lui révélant sa fin dernière, qui est la vue de Dieu face à face, et si quelque philosophe prétend l'avoir trouvé de lui-même, il se flatte. Une théologie vient de s'insinuer à son insu dans sa métaphysique et c'est d'elle qu'il l'a appris.

Rien ne nous autorise à tenir ces premières impressions pour des certitudes définitives, mais elles sont, pour le moment, irrésistibles et nous pouvons provisoirement les accueillir, quitte à les rectifier plus tard s'il y a lieu. A supposer qu'elles soient au moins partiellement correctes, l'insuffisance de la philosophie à nous révéler notre fin dernière, selon Duns Scot, tiendrait à notre incapacité présente de saisir directement une essence intelligible comme telle et à la nécessité où nous sommes de substituer des abstractions aux intuitions intellectuelles qui nous manquent.⁵¹ A supposer qu'il n'y en eût pas d'autres, cette raison suffirait à prouver la nécessité d'une révélation surnaturelle. De toute manière, elle est la raison fondamentale que Duns Scot oppose à cette thèse précise: l'homme n'a pas besoin d'une révélation surnaturelle, *parce que la connaissance philosophique lui suffit pour atteindre sa fin.* Telle est en effet la position contre laquelle Duns Scot fait porter son effort et en vue de laquelle il le calcule. Reste pourtant à savoir si cette révélation, qui s'avère nécessaire, est en outre possible. Pour l'établir, c'est le rapport du naturel au surnaturel que nous devrons définir, et, tout d'abord, la notion même de surnaturel.

⁴⁸ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 14; t. I, p. 15.

⁴⁹ Gilles de Rome, *Errores philosophorum* I, 14; *ed. cit.*, p. 10; II, 14; p. 12. Sur Avicenne, VI, 15; p. 32. Sur Algazel, VIII, 5; pp. 38-40. Cf. *Daniel*, vii, 10: *Millia milium ministrabant ei et decies milies centena assistabant.*

⁵⁰ *Similiter quod illae substantiae sunt naturaliter beatae et impeccables, sicut philosophi posuerunt. Quae omnia sunt absurdia.* *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 14; t. I, p. 15. Cf. *Quod in angelis non potest esse malum*, Gilles de Rome, *Errores phil-*

osophorum, à Avicenne, VI, 15; *ed. cit.*, p. 36 et VI, 12; p. 30, où Gilles oppose *Job*, iv, 18.

⁵¹ Toutes les tentatives de justification que Duns Scot lui-même imagine en faveur des philosophes, échouent finalement pour cette raison. C'est l'argument décisif qu'il leur oppose. S'il s'agit de Dieu, "non concipimus Deum nisi in conceptu generali communisib[us] et sensibilis[bus];" c'est en ce sens précis que l'on doit dire: *conceptum, qui potest fieri de Deo virtute creaturae, esse imperfectum.* *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 2, n. 16; t. I, p. 17.

Est surnaturel, tout ce qui transcende absolument une faculté naturelle quelconque. Or une faculté réceptive peut être considérée dans son rapport soit à l'acte qu'elle reçoit, soit à l'agent dont elle le reçoit.

Dans le premier cas, elle peut être inclinée à cet acte naturellement, c'est-à-dire en vertu de sa propre nature; c'est alors une puissance réceptive "naturelle". Mais l'acte qu'elle reçoit peut être contraire à sa nature, c'est-à-dire qu'elle ne le reçoit que parce qu'elle le subit; c'est alors une faculté réceptive "violente". Enfin, l'acte qu'elle reçoit peut être indifférent à sa nature, c'est-à-dire ni désiré ni refusé par elle; c'est alors une faculté réceptive "neutre". Qu'elle soit en état naturel, violent ou neutre, elle n'est aucunement en état de surnaturalité. Mais il n'en va plus de même si l'on définit son rapport à l'agent dont elle reçoit sa forme. Ou bien la faculté en question subit l'action d'un agent qui, lorsqu'il lui imprime une certaine forme, le fait de manière naturelle, c'est-à-dire agit sur elle comme une nature sur une nature, auquel cas on est dans l'ordre de la "naturalité", ou bien cette faculté subit l'action d'un agent qui ne soit pas "naturellement" sa cause active, c'est-à-dire qui n'agisse pas sur lui comme une nature sur une nature, auquel cas on est dans l'ordre de la "surnaturalité".⁵² En bref, la surnaturalité d'une action tient au fait que l'agent n'est pas la cause naturelle destinée, en vertu de son essence même, à exercer cette action.⁵³

Appliquons cette conclusion au problème de la connaissance surnaturelle. Les philosophes disent de l'intellect possible, qu'il est capable de tout devenir, donc aussi de tout connaître. C'est exact. Il suit donc de là que, si l'on parle des connaissances actuelles que reçoit l'intellect possible, aucune n'est pour lui surnaturelle. En effet, il est une nature, et elles sont en lui; elles sont donc, quant à ce qui est de lui, "naturelles", car il lui est naturel d'être actualisé par toutes connaissances généralement quelconques et son inclination naturelle le porte vers toutes. Il n'en va plus de même s'il s'agit de la cause de ces connaissances. De ce deuxième point de vue, une connaissance est surnaturelle, "lorsqu'elle est engendrée par un agent auquel il n'appartient pas de mouvoir naturellement l'intellect possible à cette connaissance". A quoi Duns Scot ajoute cette remarque dont l'importance ne saurait échapper: "Dans l'état présent (*pro statu isto*), selon le Philosophe, il appartient à l'intellect possible d'être mû à connaître par l'intellect agent et le phantasme; est donc seule naturelle la connaissance que ces agents peuvent imprimer".⁵⁴

⁵² *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 3, n. 20; t. I, p. 19.

⁵³ M. F. Garcia (*Op. Ox.*, éd. cit., t. I, p. 19, note) précise que, selon Duns Scot, il existe des formes ou des *habitus* "intrinsèquement surnaturels," c'est à dire qui ne sont pas tels simplement par rapport à l'agent qui les produit. Il renvoie sur ce point, notamment, à *Op. Ox.* I, dist. 17, q. 3, n. 21 (t. I, p. 815). La remarque est fondée, mais elle n'est peut-être pas nécessaire. D'abord, il serait surprenant que Duns Scot ait oublié ce point au moment précis où il définissait le surnaturel comme tel. Ensuite, et surtout, la définition qu'il en donne implique la précision qu'on veut lui ajouter. Dans le texte allégué, Duns Scot enseigne précisément qu'aucune des conditions requises pour la perfection d'un acte, même lorsqu'elles sont toutes remplies, ne suffit pour le rendre acceptable à Dieu. L'analyse exhaustive de cet acte ne le révélera pas tel. Ce qui doit s'y ajouter, pour le rendre tel, c'est un "habitus supernaturalis gratificans naturam beatificabilem;" exactement, c'est l'*habitus* qui rend cet acte "acceptabilis Deo." S'il est surnaturel, n'est-ce pas pré-

cisément parce que rien, ni dans la nature de la puissance qui produit l'acte, ni dans aucune "nature" capable de le lui faire produire, ne saurait expliquer que cet acte soit accepté par Dieu comme méritoire? On verra d'ailleurs plus loin, que Duns Scot a expressément distingué une double surnaturalité, celle de la cause seule et celle de l'objet, la deuxième incluant nécessairement la première, mais non pas inversement.

⁵⁴ Ad propositum dico, quod comparando intellectum possibilem ad notitiam actualem in se, nulla est sibi cognitio supernaturalis; quia intellectus possibilis quacumque cognitione naturaliter perficitur, et ad quacumque naturaliter inclinatur. Sed secundo modo loquendi, sic est supernaturalis quia generatur ab aliquo agente quod non est natum movere intellectum possibilem ad talem cognitionem naturaliter. Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate; igitur sola illa cognitio naturalis est quae ab ipsis agentibus potest imprimi. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 3, n. 21; t. I, pp. 19-20. Sur le caractère "naturel" de la capacité qu'a

Duns Scot, on le voit, fait preuve d'une parfaite continuité de propos. Il s'agit pour lui de réfuter des philosophes, qui, se fondant sur la seule connaissance naturelle, se prétendent néanmoins capables d'assigner à l'homme sa fin dernière. Certains d'entre eux, notamment Avicenne, se font forts de prouver que cette fin consiste à connaître ces substances purement intelligibles que sont les Intelligences Séparées. Ce que Duns Scot leur oppose, c'est précisément qu'aucune connaissance de l'intelligible pur ne peut être pour nous naturelle. Elle ne peut pas l'être *pro statu isto*, le seul état qu'ait connu Aristote et qu'il a décrit correctement. La thèse centrale à laquelle Duns Scot s'oppose apparaît ici en pleine lumière. C'est qu'il n'y a pas de salut philosophique possible ou, en d'autres termes, que la philosophie seule est incapable de conduire l'homme à sa fin dernière parce que, *pro statu isto*, elle n'est même pas capable de la découvrir. Ici encore, et plus que jamais, son adversaire est Avicenne, le philosophe auquel on reprochait communément d'avoir enseigné cette erreur double mais liée, *quod beatitudo nostra dependet ex operibus nostris* et *quod beatitudo nostra consistit in cognitione ultimae intelligentiae*.⁵⁵ Naturalité de la béatitude et naturalité du salut, voilà donc ce qu'il s'agit avant tout d'exclure, si du moins on veut établir la nécessité d'une révélation. Or, d'une part, Avicenne s'est trompé en assignant à l'homme, comme fin dernière, la vision d'une créature intelligible, donc d'un autre intelligible que Dieu; d'autre part, il a eu raison de poser l'intellect humain comme capable d'une intuition intelligible pure; seulement comme rien, dans l'état présent de l'entendement humain, ne suggère qu'il en soit capable, Avicenne lui-même a dû prendre ici de la religion pour de la philosophie. Tout se passe comme si, aux yeux de Duns Scot, ce qu'un philosophe sait de plus qu'Aristote touchant la fin dernière de l'homme, ne pouvait lui venir que d'une révélation.

Ce que l'on nomme révélation, est donc la communication à l'homme d'un enseignement, dont la source est autre que les sources naturelles de sa connaissance *pro statu isto*, c'est-à-dire que son intellect agent et les phantasmes.⁵⁶ Ceci revient à dire que la révélation est une connaissance causée par un objet surnaturel, ou par un agent qui en tienne lieu et se substitue à lui pour nous le faire connaître. Par exemple, la proposition "Dieu est à la fois un et trine" pourrait être parfaitement connue de nous, si nous avions une connaissance directe de l'essence divine, qui est pour notre intellect un objet surnaturel. Mais tout agent, causant en nous la connaissance de vérités qui nous seraient évidentes si nous connaissions un tel objet, fait pour nous fonction de cet objet. Ainsi, dans le cas présent, celui qui révèle la proposition "Dieu est trine", fait fonction de l'essence de Dieu dont la vue nous échappe. Il cause par là en nous une certaine connaissance, obscure et imparfaite à la vérité, mais qui n'en est pas moins révélée; d'abord parce qu'elle est éminemment incluse, comme l'imparfait sous le parfait, dans la connaissance d'un objet surnaturel qui nous échappe, ensuite parce qu'aucun des objets qui nous sont naturellement connaissables, n'inclut virtuellement une telle vérité.

Ainsi, par un approfondissement progressif, Duns Scot vient d'ajouter à la surnaturalité de la cause de la connaissance, celle de son objet même. Il peut y avoir révélation surnaturelle d'une connaissance naturelle. Par exemple, si

l'intellect à donner son assentiment à une connaissance dont la cause est surnaturelle, *loc. cit.*, q. I, a. 5, n. 34; t. I, pp. 30-31.

⁵⁵ Gilles de Rome, *Errores philosophorum*, VII, 21, 22; *éd. cit.*, pp. 36 et 38. Cf., dans les termes que Gilles attribue à Algazel, VIII, 12-13: *Ulterius erravit ponens animam nostram esse beatam in eo quod intelligentia ultimam*. *Ulterius erravit ponens ultimam beatitudinem nostram esse na-*

turalem. Voluit enim quod naturaliter deberetur animae talis beatitudo," *ed. cit.*, p. 42. Sur ce qu'il y a de naturalisme jusque dans la mystique d'Avicenne, voir L. Gardet, 'Quelques aspects de la pensée avicennienne dans ses rapports avec l'orthodoxie musulmane', *Revue thomiste*, XLV (1939), 724-738.

⁵⁶ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. I, art. 3, n. 22; t. I, pp. 20-21.

quelque agent surnaturel lui révélait la géométrie, elle serait surnaturelle quant à sa cause, non quant à son objet; mais s'il lui révélait cette proposition: "Dieu est trine", ou toute autre du même ordre, le savoir qu'il en aurait serait surnaturel en l'un et l'autre sens. Car la surnaturalité de l'objet implique celle de la cause, au lieu que celle de la cause n'implique pas nécessairement celle de l'objet.⁵⁷

Lorsqu'on les envisage de ce point de vue, les propositions optimistes des philosophes sur la compétence universelle de l'intellect humain en matière d'être, subissent de sévères restrictions. Leur principal défaut est qu'elles négligent l'activité de l'objet. Que l'intellect possible puisse tout accueillir et l'intellect agent tout produire, c'est exact en ce qui concerne l'intellect même, mais encore faut-il que l'objet agisse pour que l'intellect ait quelque chose à produire et à recevoir. En d'autres termes, l'âme comporte tout ce qu'il faut de principe actif et passif pour être âme; mais, d'une part, son intellect agent n'est pas capable à lui seul d'actualiser parfaitement son intellect possible et, d'autre part, son intellect possible est naturellement capable, grâce à son excellence propre d'intellect, de recevoir une perfection si éminente qu'aucun agent *naturel* ne soit capable de la lui conférer. Sa puissance passive n'existe pourtant pas en vain, car à défaut d'agent naturel capable de la parfaire, un agent surnaturel peut la complètement actualiser.

On objectera peut-être, que requérir un agent surnaturel pour conduire l'intellect à sa perfection, c'est l'avilir. C'est tout le contraire: "Si notre félicité consistait dans cette connaissance spéculative suprême à laquelle nous pouvons atteindre naturellement ici-bas, le Philosophe ne dirait pas que la nature manque du nécessaire; or non seulement je concède que cette félicité nous est naturellement accessible, mais j'ajoute en outre qu'une autre, encore plus éminente, peut être naturellement accueillie par l'homme, en quoi l'on fait plus d'honneur à la nature, que si la bonté naturelle dont nous avons parlé était aussi la bonté suprême qui lui fût accessible."⁵⁸ La détermination du surnaturel à partir de sa cause prend donc ici tout son sens. La formule précise dont use Duns Scot ne permet pas d'en douter: *et ultra hoc dico aliam eminentiorem (felicitatem) posse naturaliter recipi*. En d'autres termes, la puissance passive de l'intellect humain s'étend *naturellement* bien au déjà de sa causalité active, car si l'homme a reçu une faculté de connaître "inorganique", en ce sens que son opération n'est liée à aucun organe corporel, il n'a pas reçu en même temps tout ce qui, outre cette faculté même, concourt à la production de l'acte. Il semble donc bien que Duns Scot refuse ici l'alternative: bonté naturelle ou bonté surnaturelle, pour lui substituer cette possibilité plus souple, une bonté surnaturelle dans sa cause et pourtant naturelle à l'intellect qui la reçoit. On ne peut donc considérer comme impossible, qu'une bonté naturellement inaccessible à l'homme dans un certain état soit naturellement reçue par lui dans un autre. Grâce à la notion complémentaire d'"état", les notions de "naturel" et de "nature" comportent ici une souplesse dont nous verrons qu'elle

⁵⁷ *Differentia autem istorum duorum modorum ponendi supernaturalitatem notitiae revelatae patet separando unum ab alio: puta, si agens supernaturale causaret notitiam objecti naturalis, ut si infunderet geometriam alicui, illa esset supernaturalis primo modo et non secundo modo; si autem infunderet notitiam hujus, Deus est trinus, vel similium, haec supernaturalis esset utroque modo, quia secundus infert primum, licet non e converso: ubi autem est primus tantum, ibi non est necesse quod sit sic supernaturalis, quia naturaliter possit haberi: ubi vero est secundus modus est neces-*

sitas ut supernaturaliter habeatur, quia naturaliter haberi non potest. Op. Ox., Prol., qu. I, art. 3, n. 22; t. I, p. 21.

⁵⁸ *Op. Ox., Prol., qu. I, art. 5, n. 26; t. I, p. 24.* La suffisance naturelle de l'intellect possible tient, il va de soi, à ce qu'il n'est pas "organique" (sc. lié à une organe). Il le dit en passant et le réaffirme plus loin. Toute faculté "organique" tient de la nature de l'organe dont elle a besoin, mais une faculté non "organique" ne tient pas nécessairement de la nature tout ce qui, outre elle-même, peut concourir à son acte; *op. cit.*, n. 26; t. I, p. 25.

est caractéristique du Scotisme et qui autorisent un certain jeu dans leurs applications.

Il ne faut procéder ici qu'avec prudence et ne pas se hâter de déduire soi-même des conclusions, par exemple celle-ci: que le Docteur Subtil tend à naturaliser la connaissance surnaturelle. C'est tout le contraire. Si l'on envisage le problème de son propre point de vue, il entend la surnaturaliser complètement et, en fait, beaucoup plus que d'autres théologiens ne l'avaient fait avant lui, seulement il la surnaturalise avant tout du point de vue de sa cause. Duns Scot obtient ainsi une science qui, naturelle chez le sujet qui la possède, est surnaturelle de par sa cause, donc aussi par son objet. Le résultat immédiat de cette attitude n'est pas de confondre théologie surnaturelle et métaphysique, mais plutôt d'en accentuer la distinction.

On le voit bien aux objections qu'il dirige contre la position thomiste du problème. Elles nous engagent au cœur d'une situation historique dont toutes les faces nous seront successivement présentées, mais qui est une et fondamentale pour le philosophe. Il s'agit de l'objet de la métaphysique en tant qu'elle est aussi théologie naturelle ou qu'elle prétend l'être. Il s'agit donc finalement de savoir si Dieu est inclus ou non dans l'objet de la métaphysique. L'option s'impose ici entre deux grandes traditions arabes, dont la présence latente domine le débat, celle d'Avicenne et celle d'Averroès. L'occasion s'offrira bientôt de les tirer au clair, mais la portée de la question incidente posée par Duns Scot échapperait complètement, si nous ne disions au moins que leur influence la domine.

Selon saint Thomas, auquel le Docteur Subtil s'oppose sur ce point, il n'est pas contradictoire que deux sciences distinctes, la métaphysique et la théologie par exemple, portent sur le même objet, pourvu qu'elles le considèrent sous deux raisons formelles distinctes.⁶⁰ Il n'est donc pas impossible que métaphysique et théologie portent l'une et l'autre sur Dieu, pourvu que la métaphysique le considère comme connaissable par la raison naturelle seule, au lieu que la théologie le considère en tant que connaissable par la révélation. L'objet est un, mais les raisons formelles d'objet sont deux: il y a donc deux sciences. Sur quoi Thomas d'Aquin recourt à l'exemple, rendu par lui célèbre, de la manière dont l'astronome et le physicien prouvent la rotundité de la terre. L'astronome le fait par la mathématique, c'est-à-dire abstrairement; le physicien le fait en recourant à des preuves concrètes, tirées de la matière même. Ce sont pourtant bien là deux sciences distinctes parlant de la même chose. D'où cette conclusion: "Rien n'interdit donc que ce dont les disciplines philosophiques traitent comme connaissable par la lumière de la raison naturelle, une autre science en traite aussi en tant que connu par la lumière de la révélation divine".⁶¹

Duns Scot cite expressément ce texte; il l'avait donc sous les yeux⁶¹ au moment même où il mettait à l'épreuve sa propre solution du problème. Sa critique est

⁶⁰ Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa theologica*, P. I, q. 1, a. 3, *Resp.*

⁶¹ Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa theologica*, P. I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2^m. Notons ici la complexité de la pensée thomiste: une "double vérité" relative au même objet, donc deux sciences distinctes du même objet, et dont l'une, la théologie révélée, peut traiter occasionnellement de ce dont traite l'autre (la théologie naturelle), sans perdre pour autant son unité: *Duplici igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponuntur.*" Thomas d'Aquin, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. I, cap. 4.

Ainsi, dans le thomisme, Dieu peut être objet de connaissance métaphysique ou de connaissance théologique, et pourtant certaines propositions métaphysiques peuvent être proposées à l'homme comme objets de foi.

⁶¹ Le premier article de la *Somme théologique* I, 1, 1, pose le même problème que reprend Duns Scot au début de l'*Opus Oxoniense*. Thomas d'Aquin se demande en effet: *Utrum sit necessarium, praeter philosophicas disciplinas, aliam doctrinam haberi.* Surtout, on notera que le texte de Duns Scot ne se contente pas de résumer *Sum. theol.*, I, 1, 1, ad 2^m, il en contient une citation littérale. Il discute ensuite le texte de *Sum. Theol.* I-II, q. 54, a. 2, *Resp.* Le cas

extrêmement précieuse pour qui veut comprendre exactement l'idée qu'il se fait de la théologie. Ce que Duns Scot entend définir, c'est une connaissance théologique qui soit exclusivement telle, c'est-à-dire dont l'objet lui soit exclusivement réservé: "Si la connaissance de ce que l'on peut connaître en théologie peut être ou est actuellement obtenue par d'autres sciences, fût-ce sous une autre lumière, c'est que la connaissance théologique n'en est pas nécessaire".⁶² Pour reprendre l'exemple de saint Thomas, il est vrai que celui qui connaît la rotundité de la terre par la méthode du physicien, peut aussi la connaître par celle du mathématicien, mais cette dernière méthode ne lui est pas strictement nécessaire. Ce n'est pas le cas du théologien tel que le conçoit Duns Scot. Il n'est pas un homme qui parlerait d'un objet dont, par une autre méthode, pourrait aussi parler le représentant d'une autre discipline; le théologien est un homme qui parle d'un objet dont, sous l'aspect où lui-même l'envisage, lui seul peut parler. Aucun doute n'est possible sur le point qu'il s'agit ici d'établir. Même en admettant, comme le veulent les philosophes, que la métaphysique, dont l'objet est l'être, soit en droit compétente pour traiter de tout ce qui est, on n'est pas tenu d'admettre qu'elle soit compétente pour traiter des objets de toutes les sciences en tant qu'ils sont *leurs objets propres*.⁶³ Manifestement, c'est l'objet propre de la théologie comme telle dont il s'agit ici d'assurer la spécificité distincte. L'opposition de Duns Scot à Thomas d'Aquin sur ce point exprime le refus d'admettre qu'il y ait une aire partiellement commune à la métaphysique et à la théologie. Elle suggère, sous réserve de vérification ultérieure, que si la métaphysique est la science de l'être, la théologie seule est compétente pour traiter directement de Dieu, considéré précisément en tant que Dieu.

L'opération qui consiste à prouver la nécessité d'une théologie fondée sur la révélation, en implique donc une autre qui consiste, si l'on peut s'exprimer ainsi, à remettre la métaphysique à sa place, car l'insuffisance radicale de la métaphysique à nous faire connaître Dieu d'une connaissance propre est la preuve la plus sûre qu'une révélation soit nécessaire à l'homme pour atteindre sa fin. Telle qu'elle nous apparaît, du moins provisoirement et sour l'angle de ce problème, la métaphysique est une science dont la portée n'est universelle que grâce à l'indétermination même de son objet. Du sujet commun à tous les autres dont elle traite, on ne peut affirmer que des prédictats communs à tout ce qui est. Sans doute il y a de tels prédictats, mais les êtres particuliers en ont beaucoup d'autres, qu'il est impossible de déduire des propriétés générales de l'être en tant que tel: *ergo sunt multae veritates scibiles quae non includuntur in primis principiis*. Rien n'est plus évident si l'on pense à la portée du principe de contradiction par exemple, car il nous apprend bien que, de deux contradictoires, l'une est vraie et l'autre fausse, mais laquelle est vraie, c'est ce qu'il ne dit pas. Que rire soit ou non le propre de l'homme, ne prouve pas qu'il le soit.⁶⁴ A bien plus forte raison en est-il ainsi lorsqu'il s'agit de connaître Dieu. Avicenne a raison de dire que l'être est ce qui tombe d'abord sous les prises de notre intellect, s'il entend par là que l'être est l'objet auquel notre intellect incline

n'est pas unique et l'on peut tenir pour vraisemblable que Duns Scot avait la *Summa theologiae* sous la main en rédigant l'*Opus Oxoniense*. La citation en question se trouve dans *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. I, a. 5, n. 27; t. I, p. 25. Ad rationem tertiam quaere respondensem Thomae in *Summa*, I parte *Summae* quaestione I ubi respondet sic, quod "diversa ratio cognoscibilis . . .". etc.

⁶² Si de cognoscibilibus in theologia est cognitio tradita vel possibilis tradi in aliis

scientiis, licet in alio lumine, ergo non est necessaria cognitio theologica de eisdem. *Op. Ox.*, loc. cit.; t. I, p. 25.

⁶³ Ideo ad argumentum respondeo, quod in illis scientiis speculativis etsi tractetur de omnibus speculabilibus, non tamen quantum ad omnia cognoscibilia de eis, quia non quantum ad propria eorum cognoscibilia. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. I, a. 5, n. 28; t. I, p. 26.

⁶⁴ *Op. Ox.*, loc. cit., n. 30 et 31; t. I, pp. 27-28.

d'une inclination naturelle, mais cela ne prouve pas que notre intellect connaisse naturellement tout ce qui est, ni même qu'il soit capable de le connaître à lui seul. Quoi qu'il en soit de ce point, le fait subsiste que rien, dans les objets de notre connaissance naturelle, ne nous permet de déduire de notre science de l'être en général, la science de cet être déterminé qu'est Dieu. Il faut que Dieu lui-même nous l'enseigne, que cet objet surnaturel se fasse connaître par une révélation surnaturelle, et puisque l'objet de cette révélation est disproportionné par excès à notre faculté de connaître, qu'il l'en rende capable, en causant lui-même dans l'intellect l'assentiment à cette vérité.⁶⁵

II. THEOLOGIE ET METAPHYSIQUE

L'aire de la connaissance métaphysique se définissant par rapport à celle de la théologie, c'est l'objet de cette dernière discipline qu'il convient d'abord d'établir. S'il ne s'agissait que de sa définition nominale, il n'y aurait point à cela de difficulté. De par son nom même, la théologie est la discipline qui parle de Dieu. C'est d'ailleurs ce que constatait déjà saint Augustin:¹ *theologiam . . . quo verbo graeco significari intelligimus de divinitate rationem sive sermonem.* Duns Scot résume cette formule en disant: *Theologia est sermo vel ratio de Deo.*²

Ce que désigne cette définition n'est pourtant pas un objet simple. Augustin lui-même avait observé qu'il y a bien des manières de parler de Dieu, celle des poètes et celle des philosophes par exemple, qui diffèrent l'une et l'autre de celle des Chrétiens. Il y a donc une *theologia naturalis*, et même si l'on s'en tient à ce que les philosophes disent de Dieu, le problème s'impose au Chrétien de déterminer en quoi sa propre théologie diffère de celle d'hommes, comme Platon par exemple, qui ne disposent, pour constituer la leur, que des ressources de la seule raison naturelle. Cette difficulté n'a jamais cessé d'être présente à l'esprit des grands penseurs chrétiens et le principe de sa solution est toujours resté le même, mais elle semble s'être posée avec une acuité particulière aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles, alors que des théologiens de profession, profondément versés dans la connaissance des philosophies antiques, s'efforçaient d'en formuler la solution avec une précision technique rigoureuse. Des diversités de tendances personnelles affectaient inévitablement la discussion du problème, car tous concédaient que la théologie chrétienne est une connaissance d'origine strictement surnaturelle, mais certains estimaient que la révélation inclut en fait des connaissances qui sont, en droit, naturellement accessibles à l'homme, ce qui, par contre coup, donnait au philosophique comme tel droit de cité dans la théologie; d'autres insistaient au contraire pour exclure le philosophique comme tel du théologique comme tel; d'autres enfin, timidement au début mais avec une hardiesse qui se déclarera au XV^e siècle, préparaient une sorte de rationalisation de la connaissance révélée, dont le terme serait de rendre un jour coextensives les aires de la raison et de la révélation. Des variations correspondantes se font jour dans l'attitude du théologien envers le philosophe: plus indulgente dans le premier cas, elle tend à la sévérité dans le deuxième et prend, dans le troisième, l'aspect d'une complète reddition. On oublie trop aujourd'hui jusqu'où certains théologiens devaient finalement pousser l'indifférence envers l'Écriture. Ecrivant beaucoup plus tard, un commentateur scotiste nous en a laissé un témoignage irrécusable.³ Venant de son école, ce témoignage attristé nous avertit que Duns

⁶⁵ *Op. Ox.*, loc. cit., n. 34; t. I, pp. 30-31. Noter, p. 30, l'intervention de la notion de "puissance obédielle." Cf. E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (2^e éd., Paris, 1944), pp. 359-364.

¹ *De Civitate Dei* VIII, 1; PL 41, 225.

² *Opus Oxoniense*, Prol., q. 33, a. 1, n. 2; t. I, p. 46.

³ *Loca autem Scripturarum, in quibus hae*

propositiones habentur, adducat Lector, quae hic omitto, coactus temporis augustia, et ne curiosis Scholasticis sacra verba nauseam generent, quod abhorreo dicere, et magis ita esse. Mauritius de Portu, Super D. Scoti Theorema XIV, 9; Vivès, t. III, p. 44. Il serait sans doute superflu de souligner l'importance de ce témoignage accablant.

Scot lui-même s'était probablement engagé dans une tout autre direction.

La théologie dont il parle est, nous l'avons vu, la connaissance que nous avons de Dieu grâce à une révélation surnaturelle. En dépit de son origine divine, c'est donc encore une connaissance humaine. Exactement, c'est la connaissance que l'homme peut acquérir de Dieu grâce à l'enseignement divin des Ecritures. On peut donc concevoir une autre connaissance de Dieu, peut-être même plusieurs autres, qui soient différentes et supérieures, ce qui revient à dire qu'on peut distinguer, avec Duns Scot, plusieurs théologies surnaturelles, dont chacune correspond à une connaissance surnaturelle de Dieu.

La première de ces distinctions est celle de la théologie "en soi" et de la théologie "en nous", c'est-à-dire de la connaissance que Dieu a de lui-même et de la connaissance que nous avons de lui. Nommons "connaissance en soi" la connaissance d'un objet telle qu'elle s'offre à un intellect qui lui est proportionné, et nommons "connaissance en nous" celle que notre intellect peut avoir du même objet. La "théologie en soi" sera donc la connaissance de l'objet de la théologie que peut en avoir un intellect à la mesure de cet objet, au lieu que la "théologie en nous" sera la connaissance du même objet, telle que notre intellect peut l'avoir. Par exemple, un homme incapable de comprendre les démonstrations géométriques pourrait néanmoins croire leurs conclusions. La géométrie serait donc pour lui une *foi*, non une *science*, ce qui n'empêche que la géométrie en soi ne soit une science, parce que l'objet de la géométrie est de nature telle qu'il engendre la science dans un entendement proportionné à cet objet.

L'objet (*objectum*) d'un savoir, c'est le sujet (*subjectum*) réel de ce savoir, mais appréhendé comme connu. Un sujet connaissable devient donc un objet connu grâce à la possession, par l'intellect, d'un savoir acquis (*habitus*) relatif à cet objet.⁴ De même que le sujet premier d'une science, c'est-à-dire le réel dont elle parle, contient en soi tous ses prédictats, de même aussi son objet premier, c'est-à-dire ce sujet premier comme connu, contient toutes les propositions, immédiates ou médiates, que l'on peut formuler à son égard. Il est donc de l'essence du sujet premier d'une science de contenir en soi, à titre virtuel, toutes les vérités de la science dont il est l'objet. Il ne les contient que virtuellement, mais de plein droit (*primo*), c'est-à-dire par lui-même et à lui seul, de telle sorte que, abstraction faite de tout autre, la connaissance qu'a l'entendement de cet objet suffise à les inclure. Notons enfin qu'un sujet ou objet ainsi premier est en même temps "adéquat", car c'est l'objet qui cause la science. Si, de plein droit et à lui seul, il contient totalement cette science, il en est la cause adéquate. L'objet premier est donc, en tant même que premier d'une primauté ainsi comprise, objet adéquat.⁵ Notons enfin, puisqu'il s'agit ici de cette science définie: la théologie, qu'elle comporte deux parties intégrales, celle qui contient les vérités relatives à l'essence même de Dieu, c'est-à-dire des vérités nécessaires, et celle qui contient les vérités relatives à l'action de Dieu hors de soi (*ad extra*), qui sont des vérités contingentes. "Dieu est trine", "le Fils est engendré par le Père" sont des vérités nécessaires; "Dieu crée", "le Fils s'est incarné", sont des vérités contingentes. Toutes ces vérités n'en sont pas moins

⁴ Le terme *habitus*, pris absolument, désigne souvent, chez Duns Scot, un savoir acquis, une science devenue possession d'un intellect. Aucune traduction française de ce terme latin ne s'est acclimatée dans notre langue. On peut regretter l'échec du joli mot "ayance", essayé sans succès au XVII^e siècle.

⁵ *Op. Oxon.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 2, n. 4; t. I, pp. 48-49. Duns Scot se réclame ici d'Aristote, *II Anal.* I, 4, où la notion de sujet

premier apparaît en effet à 73b39. On notera, à cette occasion, l'énergique affirmation de la passivité de la connaissance à l'égard de son objet: *objectum autem se habet ad habitum sicut causā ad effectū . . . loc. cit.*, p. 49. *Propriō motivi ad potentiam est prop̄tio motivi ad mobile, vel activi ad passivū; propriō subjecti ad habitum est sicut propriō causae ad effectū, loc. cit.* n. 5, p. 49.

théologiques, et elles le sont de droit égal, parce qu'elles ne relèvent d'aucune connaissance naturelle. Vérités nécessaires et vérités contingentes relatives à Dieu forment donc les deux parties de la théologie.⁶

Il suit de là que le sujet premier et adéquat de la théologie ne peut être que Dieu. Cette proposition est vraie de la théologie en soi et de la théologie en nous, de la théologie du nécessaire et de celle du contingent, mais elle ne s'applique pas exactement de même manière à tous ces cas.

S'il s'agit de la théologie en soi, la proposition est évidente. Pour être premier, un objet doit contenir virtuellement toutes les vérités incluses dans la science de cet objet. Or Dieu seul contient virtuellement toutes les vérités théologiques. Sujet absolument premier, il n'est prédicable d'aucun autre; il est le sujet à qui tout le reste est attribuable, mais qui n'est lui-même attribuable à rien; il est donc aussi la seule cause des vérités relatives à lui-même que lui-même puisse connaître. En outre, puisque la théologie "en soi" porte sur l'objet de la théologie saisi par une connaissance naturelle, son objet ne peut être que Dieu. En effet, Dieu seul connaît naturellement Dieu. Il s'agit donc bien ici d'une théologie qui porte sur un objet naturellement connaissable au seul entendement divin, c'est-à-dire qui ne soit naturellement connu que de Dieu seul, et comme il n'y a que Dieu qui soit tel, son objet ne peut être que Dieu. Bref, *soli intellectui increato est essentia increata naturaliter nota*,⁷ ce qui revient à dire que la théologie "en soi" est la science que Dieu a naturellement de Dieu à titre de premier objet connu.

Telle est la théologie que Duns Scot nomme "divine" et qui n'est autre que la connaissance que Dieu a naturellement de Dieu: *theologia divina, theologia Dei*. Or, pour Dieu, se connaître signifie connaître son essence, et comme il n'y a rien que Dieu ne soit, c'est du même coup connaître tout le connaissable. Ajoutons que Dieu ne connaît pas d'abord son essence, puis, à cause de cette connaissance, tout le reste. La "théologie de Dieu" n'est pas causée, dans l'entendement divin, par l'essence divine, comme si son essence en tant que telle causait en lui les connaissances qui forment sa théologie. Dieu est actuellement la totalité de son être et virtuellement la totalité du possible, et parce que son essence fonde le possible, elle suffit à causer la connaissance qu'il en a. D'où cette conclusion: "La théologie de Dieu porte sur tous les connaissables, parce que l'objet premier de sa théologie fait que tout le reste soit actuellement connu dans son entendement. Ainsi, ce qu'atteint d'abord naturellement sa connaissance, c'est son essence, immédiatement connue dans son entendement; ce qu'elle atteint naturellement en second, ce sont les quiddités, en qui leurs vérités propres sont incluses; puis, en troisième, les mêmes vérités, virtuellement incluses dans ces quiddités connues de lui. Et le rapport du deuxième moment au troisième n'est pas un rapport de causalité, comme si ces quiddités causaient quelque chose dans l'entendement de Dieu. Leur ordre n'est que celui d'effets essentiellement ordonnés par rapport à la même cause; en d'autres termes, l'essence de Dieu cause naturellement ces quiddités, qu'il connaît, pour ainsi dire, avant que ne se fassent connaître les vérités qui s'y rapportent".⁸

⁶ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 50.

⁷ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 3, n. 7; t. I, p. 51.

⁸ Dans le texte suivant, dont la traduction est malaisée, le terme *signum*, familier à Duns Scot, s'offre à nous pour la première fois. Duns Scot lui-même le remplace parfois par *instans* (cf. un peu plus loin, *si in tertio instanti naturae . . .*). On pourrait donc le traduire par "moment", étant bien entendu qu'il ne s'agit pas ici d'un moment du temps, mais de celui d'un ordre essentiel. Non toutefois d'un ordre simplement

idéal et abstrait que notre pensée introduirait dans le réel, mais d'un ordre intrinsèque à la réalité même de l'essence, qui est, en l'espèce, l'essence de Dieu. Ceci dit, voici le texte: Ideo dico aliter, quod divina theologia (sc. la théologie de Dieu lui-même), est de omnibus cognoscibilibus; quia objectum primum theologiae suea (sc. Dei) facit omnia alia actu cognita in intellectu suo, ita quod in primo signo naturae est essentia sua primo cognita in intellectu suo; et in secundo signo naturae

Il n'est pas ici très facile de traduire notre théologien et lui-même parle comme il peut, mais sa pensée n'en est pas moins claire. L'appréhension de tout le connaissable, tel que Dieu l'appréhende dans sa propre essence, est globale et simultanée. Pourtant, elle comporte un certain ordre. Pour user d'un exemple qui appartient à Duns Scot lui-même, supposons que le soleil illumine deux objets échelonnés dans l'espace à partir de lui, mais dont le premier serait opaque; l'illumination du premier ne serait pas cause de l'illumination du second, et pourtant le soleil les éclairerait selon un certain ordre, le plus proche d'abord, le plus éloigné ensuite. Il y aurait ici, entre deux effets d'une même cause, un ordre qui ne serait pas celui de cause à effet.

De même, dans la connaissance divine, l'essence de Dieu produit dans son entendement la connaissance actuelle des autres essences, de sorte que les vérités qui dépendent de leurs quiddités lui sont naturellement connues, en quelque sorte, après ces essences. Pourtant, ces quiddités n'ont aucunement pouvoir d'agir sur l'entendement divin ni, par conséquent, de se faire connaître de lui, car il est infini et elles sont finies, si bien qu'elles ne sont pas les objets naturels d'un tel entendement: *Infinitum a finito nullo modo perficitur*. Dans cette genèse idéale, où notre analyse distingue en étapes successives trois moments qui sont en fait simultanés, il y a donc d'abord l'essence divine, puis toutes les quiddités possibles, et il n'y aurait pas de troisième moment, si la nature divine elle-même ne mettait l'entendement divin en possession des vérités incluses dans ces quiddités, car rien d'autre que l'essence divine ne peut causer une connaissance quelconque dans l'entendement divin.

Concluons sur ce point. La seule connaissance que Dieu ait de tous les connaissables, est théologique, parce qu'il ne l'a qu'en vertu du premier objet théologique (sc. *haec essentia Dei*) actualisant son entendement. Ainsi donc la théologie de Dieu non seulement porte sur tout, mais est encore toute la connaissance que Dieu peut en avoir. Elle est, absolument parlant, toute la connaissance de tout, et elle n'inclut de soi nulle imperfection parce que, seule de tous les connaissables, l'essence de Dieu, qui est son objet, n'inclut aucune limite. Toute autre connaissance inclut au contraire nécessairement quelque limitation, parce que sa cause elle-même est limitée.⁹ C'est-à-dire qu'il n'y a qu'une seule "théologie divine", celle de Dieu, parce qu'en Dieu seul un objet infini trouve un entendement infini naturellement capable de le recevoir. Hors de Dieu, il n'y a que des créatures et que des entendements créés. Il peut donc y avoir d'autres théologies, plus ou moins parfaites les unes que les autres, dont aucune ne sera la "théologie de Dieu".

La première et plus haute de ces théologies imparfaites est celle que Duns Scot nomme *theologia beatorum*: la théologie des bienheureux. Toute théologie, qui n'est pas la "théologie de Dieu", s'en distingue en ceci, qu'un moyen s'y interpose entre la connaissance de Dieu et Dieu. Les bienheureux voient Dieu; pourtant leurs intellects restent des intellects créés. Le "sujet" de leur théologie est exactement le même que celui de la théologie divine, c'est-à-dire Dieu lui-même, connu, si l'on peut dire, dans la singularité de son essence ou, pour parler la

quidditates virtualiter continentur veritates proprias; in tertio autem signo sunt istae veritates virtualiter contentae in illis quidditatibus sibi notae. Et non est ordo secundi ad tertium secundum causalitatem, quasi illae quidditates causent aliquid in intellectu ejus; sed est tantum ordo effectuum essentialiter ordinatur respectu ejusdem causae: Puta quod essentia sua quasi prius natura causat illas quidditates sibi notas

quam veritates de eis fiant notae. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 8, n. 23; t. I, p. 68. On notera l'usage du terme *quidditates*, préféré par Duns Scot à *essentiae* sans doute parce qu'il s'agit ici de la connaissance absolue de Dieu, sans égard à la créabilité, qui fait de la quiddité une essence proprement dite.

⁹ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 8, n. 23; t. I, pp. 68-69.

langue plus technique mais plus exacte de Duns Scot lui-même, c'est *Deus sub ratione qua est haec essentia*.¹⁰

L'intellect des bienheureux ne le saisit donc pas, comme fait le nôtre, à travers une notion commune à son essence et à d'autres. Il ne le connaît pas non plus à partir d'effets accidentels à son essence, et ceci s'applique à la théologie des nécessaires comme à celle des contingents. C'est même pourquoi la théologie des bienheureux, que ce soit l'une ou l'autre, est une science parfaite. Pourtant, même la vue de Dieu face à face suppose une lumière surnaturelle, cause de cette vision surnaturelle d'où suit leur science théologique. Car la vue de Dieu face à face n'est pas elle-même théologie, elle en est la source, de même que notre appréhension de l'être n'est pas la métaphysique, mais sa source.¹¹ Il suit de là que la théologie des bienheureux n'est pas une science de tout le connaissable. Celle de Dieu seul est telle. Sans doute, en droit, les bienheureux pourraient tout savoir, puisqu'ils voient l'essence de Dieu en qui sont inclus tous les connaissables, et cela d'autant plus que, selon l'intéressante précision qu'apporte ici Duns Scot, le nombre des connaissables est fini (*scibilia omnia non sunt infinita*). Pourtant, l'essence divine demeure, pour leur intellect, un objet surnaturel. D'où cette double restriction: d'abord, les bienheureux ne connaissent dans l'essence de Dieu que ceux des connaissables que sa volonté leur fait connaître; ensuite, et pour ainsi dire inversement, les intellects créés des bienheureux restent naturellement sujets à l'action des quiddités créées, de sorte que si, d'une part, ils n'ont pas la connaissance théologique totale, ils peuvent avoir d'autre part des connaissances naturelles, donc aussi non théologiques. La théologie des bienheureux n'est donc pas chez eux une science totale ni exclusive.¹² La seule qui soit telle est la théologie de Dieu.

Au-dessous de ces deux théologies vient la nôtre: *theologia nostra*, dont le moyen n'est même pas la vision béatifique, mais la révélation. Plus encore que la précédente, elle est limitée. En effet, cette troisième théologie ne s'étend même pas à tout ce que nous serions capables de savoir de Dieu *pro statu isto*, s'il nous la révélait comme celle des bienheureux. Elle s'arrête au terme fixé par Dieu qui la révèle. En fait, elle se limite à ce que Dieu nous fait connaître de lui dans l'Ecriture et à ce qui peut être déduit de ce qu'il nous en révèle. De là ses deux limites: premièrement, elle ne saurait nous faire connaître tout le connaissable, parce que notre intellect est présentement astreint à tirer sa connaissance du sensible. Selon la loi commune, c'est-à-dire exception faite de certains états extraordinaires comme le ravisement mystique de saint Paul, la révélation ne porte que sur des propositions dont les termes peuvent être naturellement connus d'un intellect tel que le nôtre.¹³ La deuxième limite tient à ce que, selon certains, notre connaissance théologique d'un objet est incom-

¹⁰ Concedo igitur quartum membrum, scilicet, quod *Theologia* est de *Deo sub ratione qua est haec essentia*, sicut perfectissima scientia esset de homine si esset secundum quod homo, non autem sub aliqua ratione universalis vel accidentalis. *Op. Ox.*, *Prol.*, q. 3, a. 4, n. 11; *t. I*, p. 55. Cf. *Deitas autem est de se haec; ergo Deus est de se hic*. *Op. cit.*, *I*, d. 4, q. 1, n. 2; *t. I*, p. 485; et q. 2, n. 3; *t. I*, p. 491.

¹¹ Ex hic ad proporsitum dico, quod essentia divina, est primum subjectum theologiae contingentis, et hoc modo sumpta quo praedictum est ipsam esse subjectum primum theologiae necessariae (cf. note précédente); et hoc tam hujus theologiae contingentis in se, quam ut est in intellectu divino et beatorum. Totius igitur theologiae, in se et Dei et beatorum, primum subjectum

est essentia divina ut haec. Cujus visio in beatis est sicut in metaphysica cognitio entis; et ideo beata visio non est theologia, sed est quasi perfecta incompleta apprehensio subjecti, praecedens naturaliter scientiam theologiae. *Op. Ox.*, *Prol.*, q. 3, a. 5, n. 13; *t. I*, p. 57.

¹² *Op. Ox.*, *Prol.*, q. 3, a. 8; n. 23-24; *t. I*, p. 69.

¹³ *Op. Ox.*, *Prol.*, q. 1, a. 3, n. 21; *t. I*, p. 20. Cf. *Prol.*, q. 3, a. 8, n. 25; *t. I*, p. 70. Locke s'est souvenu de cette doctrine, ou d'une toute semblable (y compris la discussion du cas de saint Paul) dans *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* IV, 18, 3. La remarque est d'ailleurs classique. Saint Augustin enseignait déjà que l'Ecriture use d'un langage humain.

patible avec la connaissance évidente du même objet. Nous avons rappelé que, pour Thomas d'Aquin, du naturellement connaissable peut être révélé. Duns Scot semble penser différemment: *de naturaliter nobis cognitis non potest stare theologia nostra revelata*. Ici encore, toute inférence serait prématurée, mais on peut du moins prévoir sans témérité que la distinction du philosophique et du théologique sera particulièrement stricte chez Duns Scot.¹⁴ Quoi qu'il en soit de ce point, il reste que notre théologie ne s'étend à la totalité du connaissable, qu'en tant que toutes nos connaissances se rapportent à l'essence de Dieu comme tel. Pourtant, en cette vie, cette essence comme telle (*haec essentia ut haec*) ne nous est pas naturellement accessible, ce qui confirme notre première conclusion sur l'impossibilité où nous sommes de savoir naturellement que l'intellect créé soit, comme tel, capable d'une intuition intelligible de Dieu comme tel. Comment saurions nous que c'est là sa fin propre? Pour connaître un rapport, il en faut connaître les termes; or le terme qui dans ce cas nous échappe est précisément l'essence de Dieu.¹⁵

S'il en est ainsi, le sujet de notre théologie peut bien être en droit le même que celui des théologies supérieures, il ne peut être en fait saisi par nous que sous le plus haut concept qui nous soit ici-bas accessible. La limitation de l'intellect humain oppose ici une barrière normalement infranchissable *pro statu isto*. Le sujet réel, qui serait l'objet Dieu, est une essence intelligible infinie. Ne serait-ce que comme intelligible, elle ne peut être connue, *ut haec essentia*, que par mode d'intuition intellectuelle. Or la révélation elle-même ne nous donne pas cette intuition; elle ne nous parle qu'en termes de notions abstraites du sensible, si bien qu'elle ne saurait nous donner cette connaissance, dont la notion même est contradictoire: un concept abstrait d'une essence intelligible prise dans sa singularité même. Le sujet de notre théologie reste donc Dieu *ut haec essentia*, et cela qu'il s'agisse de la théologie des contingents comme de celle des nécessaires, mais son objet n'est pas l'essence de Dieu, prise en soi. En d'autres termes, alors que l'essence de Dieu est cause de l'évidence de la théologie des bienheureux, c'est seulement la révélation qui cause l'évidence de la nôtre. Or, nous l'avons dit, la révélation parle à l'homme le langage humain du concept abstrait. L'objet premier de notre théologie, en tant précisément qu'elle est "nôtre", ne peut donc être que le premier des objets abstraitemen connus, à partir duquel les vérités premières peuvent être immédiatement connues. Ce premier est le concept d'"être infini". Bref, le sujet de "notre théologie" est le même que celui de la "théologie en soi", mais l'objet de "notre théologie", même s'il s'agit de la théologie des nécessaires, n'est pas ce sujet; il n'est que le concept d'être infini, qui est le plus parfait concept que nous puissions avoir de ce sujet: *quia iste est conceptus perfectissimus quem possumus habere de illo quod est in se primum subjectum*.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 8, n. 25; t. I, p. 70. On notera pourtant que le texte, tel que nous l'avons, semble impliquer des restrictions qui ne sont pas clairement formulées: *tum propter defectum theologiae nostrae, quia non potest esse cum cognitione evidenti de eisdem cognoscibilibus, secundum aliquos, et per consequens de naturaliter nobis cognitis non potest stare theologia nostra revelata*. S'agit-il de séparer le révélé du naturellement connaissable ou du naturellement connu? Ce texte permet d'hésiter.

¹⁵ Duns Scot étend cette conclusion au rapport d'image entre l'âme et Dieu. Nous ne pouvons naturellement connaître que l'âme est l'image de la nature divine prise en soi: *sicut sancti loquuntur de imagine. Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 8, n. 25; t. I, pp. 70-71.

¹⁶ *Theologia nostra est habitus non habens evidentiam ex objecto; et etiam illa quae est in nobis de theologicis necessariis non magis, ut in nobis, habet evidentiam ex objecto cognito quam illa quae est de contingentiis; igitur theologiae nostrae, ut nostra est, non oportet dare nisi objectum primum notum, de quo noto immediate cognoscantur primae veritates. Illud primum est ens infinitum, quia iste est conceptus perfectissimus quem possumus habere de illo quod est in se primum subjectum, quod tamen neutram praedictam conditionem habet, quia non continet virtualiter habitum nostrum in se, nec multo magis ut nobis notum continet ipsum habitum. Tamen quia theologia nostra de necessariis est de eisdem de quibus est theologia in se, ideo sibi*

Imparfait, ce concept l'est doublement. En soi, il ne contient pas virtuellement notre théologie, et il la contient encore beaucoup moins tel que nous le connaissons. En d'autres termes, ni en soi ni en nous on ne peut déduire de la notion d' "être infini" tout ce que la révélation nous fait connaître de Dieu.¹⁷ Pourtant, imparfait parce qu'il n'est qu'un concept, il est le plus parfait des concepts dont nous disposons, parce qu'il est le plus simple. Beaucoup d'autres concepts ne s'appliquent en propre qu'à Dieu. Tels sont, en fait, les concepts de toutes les perfections prises absolument et au suprême degré, comme ceux d'être suprêmement vrai ou d'être suprêmement bon. Pourtant, les concepts de ce genre sont formés de deux autres, celui d' "être" et celui de la détermination, "vrai" ou "bon", qu'on lui attribue. Tout autre est le concept d' "être infini", car l'infinité n'est pas un attribut de l'être dont on l'affirme, elle en est un "mode intrinsèque". Le concept d' "être infini" n'est donc pas un de cette unité par accident qui convient aux concepts formés de deux autres, dont l'un est sujet et l'autre attribut; il est un de l'unité par soi d'un sujet, parce qu'il n'est que le concept de ce sujet *dans un certain degré de perfection*. L'être infini, ce n'est pas l'être plus autre chose, c'est l'être pur et simple pris sous la modalité de l'infini.

La notion de "mode intrinsèque" joue un rôle important dans la doctrine de Duns Scot. Elle y désigne toujours une détermination intrinsèque de l'essence, c'est-à-dire qui signifie seulement la manière dont le sujet est ce qu'il est. Si je dis qu'un être est vrai, ou qu'il est bon, j'attribue à l'être certaines propriétés transcendantes qui, bien qu'elles lui appartiennent de plein droit, s'en distinguent. L'être, pris en tant qu'être, n'est ni le vrai comme tel ni le bien comme tel. Le vrai et le bien sont donc des attributs de l'être, mais l'infinité n'en est pas un. Que l'être soit infini ou non, c'est toujours de l'être, pris en des degrés divers de perfection. Pour user d'un exemple allégué par Duns Scot lui-même, le concept de "blancheur visible" n'a pas d'unité par soi, car il est accidentel à une couleur blanche d'être actuellement visible, mais le concept de "blancheur intense" est un concept simple, parce que l'intensité d'une couleur n'est qu'un degré intrinsèque de cette couleur même; c'est-à-dire une certaine manière d'être blanc. De même dans le cas de l'être. Le concept d'"être infini" est simple, parce qu'il signifie seulement l'être en son suprême degré d'intensité.¹⁸

Ainsi l'infinité n'est pas un attribut mais la modalité d'un concept, et c'est le concept d'être ainsi modifié qui forme l'objet de notre théologie. Déclaration d'une importance capitale assurément et dont pourtant, une fois de plus, nous nous garderons de rien déduire. La plus extrême prudence s'impose lorsqu'il s'agit d'un esprit aussi délié que celui de Duns Scot et de relations aussi complexes que celles de savoirs qui portent tous sur le même sujet, mais ne

assignatur subjectum primum, quoad hoc quod est veritates continere in se, et hoc idem quod est primum subjectum theologiae in se; sed quia illud non est nobis evidens, ideo non est continens istas ut nobis notum, immo non est nobis notum. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 4, n. 12; t. I, pp. 55-56. Sur l'identité de "sujet" des deux théologies des contingents, *op. cit.*, a. 5, n. 13; t. I, p. 57: Subjectum vero . . .

¹⁷ L'essence de Dieu, intuitivement vue *ut haec essentia*, inclut en soi la science théologique, mais le concept d'*ens infinitum*, qui en est le substitut abstrait, ne la contient pas. Dieu, comme Dieu, est un singulier. Haec autem cognitio essentiae divinae distincta est, quia est objecti quod est de se hoc. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2; n. 6; t. I, p. 141.

¹⁸ Tamen conceptus perfectior et simplicior nobis possibilis est conceptus entis simpliciter infiniti. Iste enim est simplicior quam conceptus entis boni vel entis veri, vel aliquorum similium; quia infinitum non est quasi attributum vel passio entis sive ejus de quo dicitur, sed dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis: ita quod cum dico *ens infinitum*, non habeo conceptum quasi per accidens ex subjecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subjecti in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis: sicut albedo intensa non dicit conceptum per accidens sicut albedo visibilis, imo intensio dicit gradum intrinsecum albedinis in se. Et ita patet simplicitas hujus conceptus, scilicet *ens infinitum*. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 1 et 2, a. 4, n. 17; t. I, pp. 313-314.

l'atteignent pas tous sous la même raison d'objet ou, si elles le font, ne l'atteignent pas de la même manière. Répéter n'est pourtant pas déduire. Soulignons donc le fait, trop oublié semble-t-il, que l'objet de notre théologie, c'est-à-dire celui de la théologie de Duns Scot lui-même, est Dieu connu comme *ens infinitum*. Assurément, c'est bien de Dieu que cette théologie parle, mais elle estime que l'objet premier sous lequel ce sujet se fait connaître de nous, c'est-à-dire celui auquel tous les concepts sous lesquels il s'est fait connaître de nous peuvent se réduire, est celui d'"être infini".

Nous aurons à revenir sur la possibilité et le sens de ce concept. Pour le moment, c'est sa nature même qui nous intéresse et nous devons essayer de la préciser, bien qu'elle soit assez difficile à saisir. D'une part, on ne peut douter que ce concept ne soit accessible à la raison naturelle pure. C'est ainsi que l'ont ordinairement entendu les disciples de Duns Scot.¹⁹ Pour eux, le concept de Dieu le plus parfait que l'homme puisse former par la seule raison naturelle est le *conceptus entis infiniti*. Il est d'ailleurs clair que si ce concept n'était pas accessible à la raison naturelle, il n'y aurait pas de preuves rationnelles de l'existence de Dieu, du moins pour Duns Scot, aux yeux de qui c'est une seule et même chose de prouver l'existence de l'Etre infini et de prouver que Dieu existe. Ceci dit, il reste vrai que le sujet de notre théologie est Dieu conçu sous la notion d'être infini. Cette notion doit donc être, à la fois, accessible à la raison naturelle et incluse dans notre théologie, comme représentant Dieu sous l'aspect le plus parfait qui soit accessible à notre raison.

Suit-il de là que l'homme doive à la révélation le concept d'"être infini"? A notre connaissance, l'expression "être infini" ne figure pas dans l'Ecriture et Duns Scot lui-même n'a jamais dit qu'elle y fût ni, par suite, que la notion correspondante nous ait été révélée par Dieu. Elle pourrait l'avoir été et le fait que, prises à part, les notions d'être et d'*infiniti* nous soient naturellement connues, ne prouverait pas, à lui seul, que l'entendement humain soit capable d'effectuer leur combinaison. Duns Scot fait expressément observer que la révélation n'apporte à l'homme aucune notion qui, prise à part, ne puisse être tirée de l'expérience sensible. Nous connaissons naturellement "un" et "trois", mais nous ne savons pas naturellement qu'il y ait une "trinité".²⁰ La cas de l'"être infini" diffère pourtant du précédent, car, à la différence de celle d'un Dieu un en trois personnes, elle nous est directement intelligible. Il s'agit donc ici d'une notion accessible à la raison, dont rien ne nous autorise à dire qu'elle ait été révélée, mais qui relève pourtant de la théologie, parce qu'elle s'applique en propre au Dieu chrétien, et à lui seul. Duns Scot semble, en fait, la considérer comme exprimant le plus parfait des concepts accessibles à la raison naturelle, qui convienne au Dieu dont certains attributs, tels que la toute puissance absolue par exemple, nous sont connus par la révélation chrétienne. Si nous ne nous trompons sur ses intentions, Duns Scot userait donc ici de la notion d'être infini, non comme d'une notion directement révélée, mais comme de la plus parfaite des notions intelligibles qui convienne au Dieu chrétien.²¹

¹⁹ Par exemple, l'auteur des *Quaestiones miscellaneae de Formalitatibus* traditionnellement attribuées à Duns Scot, Qu. V, n. 24; éd. Vivès, t. V, p. 395-397.

²⁰ Op. Ox., Prol., q. 1, a. 3, n. 20-21; t. I, pp. 19-21.

²¹ La stricte distinction introduite entre théologie et philosophie n'interdit pas que la révélation soit source de connaissance rationnelle, elle implique seulement que, même rationnelle, celle-ci reste théologique. En fait, parmi les marques de vérité qu'il attribue à l'Ecriture Sainte, Duns Scot attache une grande importance à ce qu'il

nomme "la rationalité de son contenu". Principalement: Quid rationabilius quam Deum tamquam finem ultimum super omnia debere diligere et proximum sicut seipsum. Ex istis quasi ex principiis practicis alia practica in Scripturis sequuntur tradita, honesta et rationi consona, sicut de eorum rationabilitate patere potest singulatim cuiilibet perfractione de praecceptis, consilii et sacramentis, quia in omnibus videtur esse quasi quaedam explicatio legis naturae, quae scripta est in cordibus nostris. Les Chrétiens ne croient rien d'incroyable, sans quoi il serait incroyable que le monde croie

Le même problème paraît sous une autre forme, lorsqu'on se demande, avec Dunc Scot, quel est l'objet de la philosophie et spécialement de la métaphysique. Cette fois les philosophes ont qualité pour répondre et, même si leurs réponses ne doivent pas toujours être acceptées sans réserves, il convient au moins de les entendre. Or il se trouve précisément que, sur ce point, leur témoignage est quasi unanime: l'objet propre de la métaphysique est l'"être en tant qu'être", c'est-à-dire ce que c'est qu'un "être" et les propriétés qui lui appartiennent en tant précisément qu'il "est". Ceci posé et admis, tout reste à dire, car il est trop clair que la métaphysique ne peut parler de l'être que tel que nous le connaissons et il s'agit de savoir ce que nous en connaissons, ou peut-être même d'abord comment nous le connaissons. Sur ce problème capital, dont la présence se fait sentir dans toute l'œuvre de Duns Scot, nous ne rencontrons malheureusement aucune conclusion définitive. Essayons du moins de rassembler quelques indications précises à ce sujet.

La question de savoir comment nous connaissons l'être dépend de cette autre: quel est l'être que nous connaissons? Duns Scot prend d'ordinaire position sur ce problème à partir de celle qu'avait adoptée Thomas d'Aquin et, ici encore, il fait preuve d'une telle objectivité en rapportant la position de son adversaire, qu'on pourrait indifféremment l'exposer à partir de l'*Opus Oxoniense* ou de la *Summa Theologica*. En fait la discussion conduite par Duns Scot vise certainement d'abord deux passages de la *Summa Theologica*, dont il avait peut-être le texte sous les yeux en écrivant ou dictant le sien.

Selon la thèse thomiste, à laquelle il s'oppose, l'objet premier de l'intellect humain serait la quiddité de la chose matérielle. L'induction qui la prouve repose sur ce principe général, qu'il y a proportion entre la faculté de connaître et le connaissable. Or il y a trois facultés de connaître; il doit donc y avoir trois connaissables qui leur soient proportionnés. Premièrement, les facultés de connaître séparées de la matière dans leur être comme dans leur opération: elles ont pour objet la quiddité intelligible entièrement séparée de la matière. Deuxièmement, les facultés de connaître conjointes à la matière dans leur être comme dans leur opération, telles les facultés sensibles liées à des organes: leur objet est l'objet matériel singulier. Troisièmement, les facultés conjointes à la matière dans leur être, mais non dans leur opération: leur objet correspondant est la quiddité de la chose matérielle, qui, bien qu'elle existe dans la matière, n'est pourtant pas connue par une telle faculté de connaître comme étant dans une matière singulière.²² Bref, entre l'intellect de l'ange, qui a l'intuition directe

au Christianisme, comme pourtant il le fait. Inversement, on peut montrer le caractère "déraisonnable" du paganisme, de l'Islam, du judaïsme et le caractère asinaire du manichéisme. La Révélation peut même faire voir ce que certaines doctrines philosophiques ont de déraisonnable, car, jusque dans la politique d'Aristote, il y de la déraison. (*Op. Ox.*, Prol., qu. II, n. 8; t. I, p. 38). Ce caractère d'"explication" (i.e. développement) de la loi naturelle" permet sans doute de comprendre que, dans l'ordre théorique même, du "raisonnable" puisse être révélé. On aurait donc du "raisonnable" proprement théologique. Ainsi, la notion d'"être infini" serait essentiellement théologique, mais pourtant raisonnable, comme apportant à la raison naturelle une satisfaction à laquelle elle aspire confusement sans être capable, à elle seule, de se la donner. N'oublions pas qu'objet naturel a deux sens: 1. objet naturellement accessible; 2. objet de l'inclination naturelle d'une faculté, qu'elle puisse naturellement

l'atteindre ou non (*Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. II, a. 5, n. 33; t. I, p. 67). La révélation peut donner à la raison des satisfactions rationnelles, en la rapprochant d'un objet auquel elle tend naturellement bien que, seule, elle ne puisse l'atteindre. En d'autres termes, le raisonnable que la révélation découvre à l'homme entre de plein droit dans la théologie sans rien perdre de sa rationalité.

²² *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, n. 2; t. I, p. 330: In ista quaestione est una opinio quae dicit quod primum objectum intellectus nostri est quidditas rei materialis. Ratio ponitur ad hoc: quia potentia proportionatur objecto. Triplex autem est potentia cognitiva: quaedam est omnino separata a materia, et in essendo et in operando, ut intellectus separatus; alia conjuncta materiae ut in essendo et in operando, ut potentia organica, quae perficit materiam et non operatur nisi mediante organo corporali, a quo in operando non separatur, sicut nec in essendo: alia est conjuncta materiae in essendo, sed

de la quiddité intelligible, et la sensibilité de l'homme ou de l'animal, qui saisit la quiddité de la chose matérielle dans l'individu matériel même, s'interpose l'intellect humain, qui connaît la quiddité de la chose matérielle abstraction faite de cette chose même et de sa singularité.

Duns Scot s'est toujours opposé à cette doctrine, mais il importe de préciser le point sur lequel il a fait porter son opposition. Thomas d'Aquin avait soutenu que, notre intellect étant lié au corps, il lui est impossible d'exercer aucun acte de connaissance intellectuelle sans recourir au phantasme.²³ Duns Scot l'accorde sans hésiter pour tout acte de connaissance naturelle dans notre état présent: il n'y a donc aucune opposition entre Thomas d'Aquin et lui sur ce point. Ce que Duns Scot conteste, c'est que cette situation de fait soit aussi une situation de droit. En d'autres termes, le fait que la quiddité abstraite du sensible soit le seul objet naturellement accessible à l'intellect humain *pro statu isto*, n'autorise pas à conclure qu'elle soit l'objet premier de l'intellect.

L'argumentation de Duns Scot sur ce point procède généralement en deux temps, celui du théologien et celui du philosophe. Considérons d'abord le philosophe.

L'harmonieuse correspondance établie par Thomas d'Aquin entre les natures des sujets connaissants et les objets de leur connaissance, n'a aucunement touché Duns Scot. Au contraire, il l'estime nulle: *Congruentia etiam illa, quae adducitur pro illa opinione, nulla est*. Le rapport d'une faculté de connaître à son objet se réduit en effet à ceci, que l'objet peut mouvoir cette faculté et qu'elle peut être mue par lui. C'est donc un rapport de *motivum et mobile*, rien de plus. Or un rapport de ce genre n'implique nullement qu'il y ait ressemblance entre le degré d'être du sujet connaissant et celui de l'objet connu. Assurément, une certaine proportion entre eux est requise, mais les termes de cette proportion peuvent être dissemblables. Ils le sont même nécessairement, car l'un d'entre eux est acte, l'autre est puissance. On n'a donc aucune raison de conclure du mode d'être du sujet connaissant à celui de son objet. Si une similitude est requise entre la faculté de connaître et son objet, c'est donc seulement celle qui s'établit dans l'acte de connaissance même, car toute connaissance consiste précisément en cette assimilation, mais elle ne s'étend pas jusqu'au sujet connaissant. Soutenir le contraire est un simple sophisme. L'œil qui voit un objet, lui est assimilé par l'espèce sensible; il ne suit pas de là que le mode d'être de la vue soit semblable au mode d'être de son objet. Plus évidemment encore, l'idée de la pierre, dans la pensée divine, est une similitude de son objet; pourtant, une pierre est matérielle, son idée en Dieu est immatérielle. La correspondance que réclame Thomas d'Aquin n'est donc pas nécessaire. Elle ne saurait en tout cas nous obliger à astreindre l'intellect au seul objet sensible. Elle ne nous oblige pas à l'y astreindre, du moins, en raison de sa nature comme

non utitur organo materiali in operando, ut intellectus noster. Iстis correspondent objecta proportionata: nam potentiae omnino separatae, ut primae, correspondentem debet quidditas omnino separata a materia; secundae singulare omnino materiale; tertiae ergo correspondent quidditas rei materialis, quae etsi sit in materia, tamen cognoscitur non ut in materia singulari. Cf. dans le même sens, Duns Scot, *Quodl. XIV*, 12; Vivès, t. XXVI, p. 46. Comparer ces textes à Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa theologiae* I, 84, 7, Resp., à *Hujus autem ratio est . . .*, et I, 85, 1, Resp. Ce sont les deux passages dont s'inspire Duns Scot pour les résumer. Cf.

notamment, Duns Scot: primum objectum intellectus nostri est quidditas rei materialis et *Sum. theol.* I, 84, 7, Resp.: Intellexus autem humani . . . proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens. Et encore, Duns Scot: Ratio ponitur ad hoc, quia potentia proportionatur objecto, et *Sum. theol.*, ibid.: Hujus autem ratio est, quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Le tableau triparti des relations "faculté de connaître—objet" est emprunté à *Sum. theol.* I, 85, 1, Resp.: Est autem triplex gradus cognoscitivae virtutis . . . etc. ²³ Thomas d'Aquin, *Summa theologiae* I, 84, 7, Resp., début de la réponse.

faculté de connaître,²⁴ bien que, pour des causes que nous aurons à déterminer, l'intellect ne puisse peut-être pas, en fait, excéder les limites du sensible.

Du point de vue de la philosophie de Duns Scot le problème est d'une importance capitale, car il y va pour lui de la possibilité même de la métaphysique, telle, bien entendu, qu'il la conçoit, c'est-à-dire comme science de l'être commun. Puisque, comme nous le verrons, Duns Scot exclut l'analogie de l'être en métaphysique, il ne peut admettre que notre intellect soit incapable de s'élever de l'être matériel à l'être connu sous sa raison d'être immatériel; autrement, nous n'aurions pas de métaphysique, mais seulement une physique. Bref, "rien de plus particulier que l'être ne peut être l'objet premier de notre intellect, sans quoi l'être pris en soi ne serait aucunement connu de nous".²⁵ Avec l'objet de la métaphysique, la possibilité même de preuves métaphysiques —comme elles doivent l'être—de l'existence de Dieu, se trouve ici en cause. La doctrine est rigoureusement cohérente; on ne peut l'accepter ou la rejeter qu'en bloc.

Mais si notre intellect peut, *ex natura potentiae*, excéder le sensible, pourquoi s'y trouve-t-il astreint en fait? Nous le saurons en examinant l'argument théologique massif qui décide de la question contre Thomas d'Aquin. Il importe de l'examiner de près, parce qu'il affecte nécessairement la notion que Duns Scot lui-même s'est faite de la métaphysique, de ses limites et de la connaissance que nous avons de son objet.

La question de savoir quel est l'objet naturel et premier de notre intellect est philosophique. C'est une de celles que Platon et Aristote avaient posées et chacun d'eux l'avait résolue à sa manière. On ne voit d'ailleurs pas en quoi la solution d'un problème, qui porte sur le rapport naturel d'une faculté de connaître naturelle à son objet naturel, devrait nécessairement requérir une révélation surnaturelle. Ce n'en est pas moins un *veto* théologique que Duns Scot lui oppose d'abord: *istud non potest sustineri a theologo*. La théologie enseigne en effet que le même intellect, qui ne connaît actuellement que par mode d'abstraction à parti du sensible, connaît naturellement plus tard la quiddité de la substance immatérielle. Ceci ressort clairement de ce qu'enseigne la foi touchant le mode de connaître de l'âme bienheureuse. Or une faculté de connaître ne saurait, sans changer de nature, apprêhender quelque chose qui ne soit pas contenu dans son objet premier. Il est donc théologiquement insoutenable que la quiddité de la chose matérielle soit l'objet premier de l'intellect.²⁶

Cette réponse est chargée d'implications, dont la plupart sont propres à la théologie de Duns Scot. Il s'agit en effet de rendre concevable une vision béatifique où *le même intellect* qui ne connaît ici-bas naturellement que le

²⁴ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 4; t. I, p. 332.

²⁵ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 3; t. I, p. 332.

²⁶ Contra: *istud non potest sustineri a theologo: quia intellectus, existens eadem potentia, naturaliter cognoscit per se quiditatem substantiae immaterialis, sicut patet secundum fidem de anima beata: potentia autem manens eadem non potest habere actum circa aliquid quod non continetur sub suo primo objecto.* *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, n. 2; t. I, p. 330. L'objet premier et *par soi* se définit ainsi: Et vocatur hic objectum primum totum illud ad quod terminatur actus potentiae, et objectum per se illud quod includitur per se unitive in objecto terminante primo. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, n. 7; t. I, p. 142. Or, ainsi entendu, l'objet premier de notre intellect, qui est l'être, n'inclut pas Dieu en tant que Dieu. Cela est si vrai que Duns Scot interprète

en ce sens la glose de Grégoire le Grand sur Ezéchiel, II, 3 (PL 76, 956): *Quantumcumque mens nostra in contemplatione Dei profecerit, non ad illud quod ipse est, sed ad illud quod sub ipso est attingit* (*Op. Ox.* I, p. 304). Oui, observe Duns Scot, même la connaissance contemplative ne pénétre pas plus loin que l'être: *Contemplatio autem, de lege communi (c.-à.-d., sauf dans le *raptus* paulinien) stat in tali conceptu communi (sc. conceptus divinae essentiae sub ratione entis), et ideo stat in aliquo conceptu qui est minoris intelligibilitatis quam Deus in se ut haec essentia et ideo debet intelligi ad aliquid quod est sub Deo, hoc est, ad aliquid in ratione intelligibilis cuius intelligibilitas est inferior intelligibilitate Dei in se ut haec essentia singularis.* *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 5, n. 20; t. I, p. 318.

sensible, connaîtra, dans la vie future, l'intelligible pur. Pour y parvenir, Duns Scot doit nécessairement maintenir que, en droit sinon en fait, l'intellect humain n'a pas la quiddité sensible pour objet premier. Si tel était son objet premier, ou bien l'intellect humain devrait changer de nature pour jouir de la vision béatifique, ou bien elle lui serait interdite. Nous ne savons donc pas encore quel est le premier objet naturel de l'intellect humain, mais il est d'ores et déjà certain qu'il ne peut être ni la quiddité de la chose sensible, ni, *pro statu isto*, celle de la substance immatérielle et intelligible.²⁷ Il se trouvera donc sans doute dans l'entre-deux.

Ainsi se précise la première critique théologique de la philosophie que nous avons déjà signalée dans la doctrine de Duns Scot. On voit assez quel en est le principe. Jusqu'au point où nous l'avons suivie, cette critique semble inspirée par le souci du problème théologique de la vision béatifique, c'est-à-dire par le problème chrétien du salut. Duns Scot ne pense pas que l'homme ait pu naturellement découvrir que la vision béatifique est sa fin dernière: nous ne devons pas cette connaissance à la raison, mais à la révélation. En revanche, une fois informés par la révélation que la vision béatifique est notre fin dernière, notre raison doit concevoir l'intellect humain de telle manière que la vision béatifique soit pour lui possible. C'est pour sauver cette possibilité que Duns Scot s'oppose ici à Thomas d'Aquin et l'erreur fondamentale qu'il reproche au thomisme sur ce point, est précisément de concevoir l'intellect humain d'une manière telle que la vision béatifique devienne inconcevable. Car dire que Dieu peut éléver l'intellect humain à la connaissance des substances purement intelligibles, c'est ne rien dire. Assurément, la "lumière de gloire" peut le faire, mais si l'essence même de l'intellect humain est de connaître l'intelligible par abstraction à partir du sensible, Dieu lui-même ne saurait l'élever à l'intuition de l'intelligible; il pourrait seulement le remplacer par une autre faculté de connaître,²⁸ ce qui revient à dire que, pour l'intellect humain tel qu'il est, la vision béatifique serait en effet impossible. Voilà pourquoi, tout en accordant à Thomas d'Aquin que l'homme n'a, en fait, aucune connaissance qui ne soit abstraite du sensible, Duns Scot maintient fermement que la connaissance abstractive n'est pas exigée par la nature même de l'intellect humain, comme s'il devait nécessairement en être ainsi *ex natura potentiae*, mais qu'elle nous est imposée seulement en fait et d'un manière qui peut donc n'être que provisoire. L'intellect humain est condamné au mode abstractiv de connaître, qui est ici-bas le sien, non par sa nature, mais *propter statum aliquem*, c'est-à-dire—et le vague même de la formule est ici chargé de sens—en raison d'"un certain état".²⁹

Essayons de préciser les raisons de cet état, et, tout d'abord, ce que c'est qu'un "état". Duns Scot désigne de ce nom une permanence stable assurée par les

²⁷ Le scotiste *De anima* (qu. XI, n. 2-4; éd. Vivès, t. III, pp. 599-600) expose avec encore plus de clarté la doctrine de l'*Opus Oxoniense*. Noter, art. 2: *Ergo Deus saltem continetur sub objecto viatoris, non autem sub quidditate materiali; igitur, etc.*; art. 3: *igitur Deus non excedit potentiam intellectivam nostram.* La seule existence de la métaphysique, science de l'être en tant qu'être, suffirait d'ailleurs à prouver ce point: *Praeterea intellectus noster, etiam in via, potest cognoscere ens sub ratione entis, quae est universalior quam ratio quidditatis sensibilis; igitur quidditas sensibilis non est objectum adaequatum intellectus nostri.* Authentique ou non, ce texte (*loc. cit.*, art. 4, p. 600) exprime exactement la pensée de Duns Scot. C'est dire que nous sommes entièrement d'accord avec la note où C. L. Shircei (*The Univocity of the Concept of*

Being, p. 60, n. 1) se croît en désaccord avec nous. La phrase qu'il discute a un autre sens que celui qu'il lui attribue. Elle signifie que l'univocité, pas plus que l'analogie, ne permet à l'intellect d'atteindre naturellement la vision béatifique. L'auteur sera sans doute d'accord avec nous pour laver ici Duns Scot de tout soupçon d'ontologisme.

²⁸ *Op. Ox.* 1, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, n. 2; t. I, p. 330.

²⁹ *Ibid.* On observera que, dès ce moment, Duns Scot s'engage dans la voie qui conduit à sa doctrine métaphysique de l'être. De même que l'intellect humain est une faculté capable à la fois d'abstraction et d'intuition intelligible, l'être, qui est son objet premier, doit pouvoir se dire au même sens de l'être sensible et de l'être intelligible. L'objet propre de la métaphysique est donc *l'ens commune*, au sens proprement scotiste qui sera précisé plus loin.

lois de la sagesse divine: *status non videtur esse nisi stabilis permanentia legibus divinae sapientiae firmata*. Dire que notre connaissance de l'être est déterminée par un certain état, c'est donc dire que Dieu, dans sa sagesse, a soumis notre connaissance intellectuelle à une loi stable. Que nous connaissons l'être selon cette loi, cela ne résulte donc pas seulement de la nature de l'intellect humain, mais aussi de conditions imposées par Dieu pour régler son exercice. L'existence de telles conditions, et, par suite, celle des états qu'elles déterminent, permet de comprendre que l'objet premier et adéquat d'une faculté de connaître pris en elle-même ne coïncide pas avec l'objet premier et adéquat de cette faculté prise dans un état déterminé. Dans le cas de l'intellect, il est exact de dire que son objet premier est l'être pris sous sa raison la plus commune, mais il est non moins exact d'ajouter que tout ce qui relève de l'être n'est pas apte à mouvoir naturellement notre intellect. En d'autres termes, et comme nous l'avons déjà laissé prévoir, le mot "naturel" peut désigner deux objets apparentés mais pourtant distincts: d'abord, ce qui est conforme à une nature en raison de son essence même; ensuite, ce qui est conforme à cette nature en raison de son "état". Le second sens ne contredit jamais le premier, car rien ne peut être dans un "état" incompatible avec sa nature (tout état est, au contraire, celui d'une nature), mais il précise la mesure selon laquelle une certaine nature actualise en fait ses virtualités. Du point de vue de ce deuxième sens, ce qui est naturel dans un certain état peut ne pas l'être dans un autre. Assurément, la volonté divine elle-même ne saurait imposer à une faculté des conditions d'exercice contraires à son essence, mais elle peut lui imposer librement toutes celles qui respectent cette essence, si bien qu'à la naturalité définie par l'essence s'ajoute la naturalité définie par l'état. Il est donc compatible avec la nature de l'âme bienheureuse d'avoir l'intuition directe de la réalité intelligible, comme il est en cette vie "naturel" à l'homme de ne saisir de l'être que ce que son intellect peut en abstraire du sensible. En assignant à l'intellect, pour objet premier, la quiddité de la chose matérielle, Thomas d'Aquin a donc pris pour l'objet premier de cette faculté de connaître, ce qui n'est en réalité que l'objet capable d'agir sur elle dans son "état" présent.³⁰

Quelle est la raison de cet état? Question importante entre toutes, que Duns Scot n'esquive pas, mais à laquelle il conçoit que plusieurs réponses soient possibles: "Il a été établi par les lois de la sagesse divine, que notre intellect ne conçoive, dans son état présent, que ce dont les espèces brillent dans le phantasme, et cela soit en punition du péché originel, soit à cause de la solidarité naturelle des facultés de l'âme lorsqu'elles opèrent, puisqu'on voit la faculté supérieure s'occuper de la même chose que la faculté inférieure, lorsque

³⁰ Sed restat unum dubium: si ens secundum rationem suam communissimam sit primum objectum intellectus, quare non potest quodcumque contentum sub ente naturaliter movere intellectum, sicut fuit argutum in prima ratione ad primam quaestione in Prologo? Et tunc videtur quod Deus naturaliter posset cognosci a nobis, et substantiae omnes immateriales, quod negatum est; imo negatum est de omnibus substantiis et de omnibus substantiarum partibus essentialibus, quia dictum est quod non concipiuntur in aliquo conceptu quidditativo, nisi in conceptu entis. Respondeo: objectum primum potentiae assignatur illud quod adaequatur potentiae in ratione potentiae, non autem quod adaequatur potentiae ut in aliquo statu. Quemadmodum primum objectum visus non ponitur illud quod adaequatur visu existenti in medio illuminato lumine candelae praecise, sed quod natum est

adaequari visui ex se, quantum est de natura sui. Nunc autem . . . nihil potest adaequari intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae in ratione primi objecti nisi communissimum. Tamen pro statu isto ei adaequatur in ratione motivi quidditas rei sensibilis; et ideo pro statu isto non naturaliter intelliget alia quae non continentur sub illo primo motivo. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, n. 24; *t. I.* p. 351. Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 7, n. 28; *t. I.* pp. 422-423.

La notion scotiste de "nature" combine donc celles d'Augustin et de Thomas d'Aquin. Est naturel à la fois ce qui est conforme à une nature et ce qui est conforme à une nature étant donné son état; le fait que le sensible soit devenu notre objet naturel *pro statu isto*, n'empêche pas que l'intelligible soit aussi, en droit, l'objet de notre intellect.

l'opération de l'une et de l'autre est parfaite. Et, en fait, les choses se passent en nous de telle sorte que quelque universel que notre intellect conçoive, notre imagination s'en représente actuellement le singulier. En tout cas cette solidarité, qui existe en fait dans notre état présent, ne tient pas à la nature de notre intellect en tant qu'intellect, ni même en tant qu'il est dans un corps, puisque, s'il en était ainsi, la même solidarité le lierait au corps glorieux, ce qui est faux.³³

Ce texte est remarquable à bien des égards. On y voit d'abord s'opérer une fois de plus l'annexion, par la théologie, d'un problème que d'autres réservaient à la philosophie. A vrai dire, la chose devient inévitable à partir du moment où la description de la connaissance humaine se donne pour celle d'un "état" dont la cause prochaine échappe à la connaissance philosophique. On notera jusqu'où la théologie pousse ici son intervention: même si la nécessité de la connaissance abstractive s'expliquait en nous par une *naturalis concordia potentiarum animae in operando*, cette solidarité naturelle ne serait pas exigée par la nature de notre intellect en tant que tel, puisque, la théologie l'enseigne, l'intellect de l'homme ressuscité ne dépendra pas, pour connaître, du corps glorieux auquel il sera réuni. Le dogme religieux agit ici à la manière d'une expérience cruciale qui tranche sans appel un problème que d'autres tiendraient pour essentiellement philosophique. Pourtant, remarquons le, il ne prétend pas du tout parler ici en philosophe, mais en théologien. Si les philosophes se trompent sur ce point, ils ont des excuses et l'on ne doit pas s'étonner que la philosophie s'exprime selon les lumières dont elle dispose. Au contraire, le théologien qui se trompe sur le point est sans excuses, à moins qu'on n'en voie une dans la séduction qu'exercent sur lui les philosophes. L'indépendance de l'intellect à l'égard du corps glorieux établit, sans discussion possible, que la collaboration de fait qui règne actuellement entre cet intellect et son corps n'est pas requise par la nature même de l'intellect.

Mais le plus remarquable n'est pas là. En présence de ce problème, qu'il a lui-même soulevé, Duns Scot propose deux solutions qui ne sont pas exactement comparables ou, du moins, qui ne nous semblent pas telles, et qui semblent pourtant se définir chez lui sur le même plan. C'est sans doute que, dans sa pensée, elles sont en effet de même ordre. De quelque manière qu'on le conçoive, ce qu'il s'agit ici d'expliquer reste un "état", et l'explication dernière d'un état ne saurait se trouver dans l'essence des êtres placés dans cet état, mais dans la volonté de Dieu qui les y place.

La première des deux solutions envisagées voit dans l'asservissement de l'intellect à la connaissance abstractive une punition infligée par Dieu à l'homme en conséquence du péché originel: *propter poenam originalis peccati*. Il s'agit donc alors d'un pur décret de justice punitive: *ex mera justitia punitiva*. Cette solution suppose manifestement que, dans la pensée de Duns Scot, l'intellect humain soit capable d'intuition intellectuelle, et qu'il l'exercerait peut-être encore aujourd'hui si, par suite de la faute d'Adam, Dieu ne lui en avait ôté le pouvoir. Réponse tout à fait satisfaisante à la question posée, car ce que Duns Scot entend sauvegarder, c'est précisément l'aptitude de l'intellect humain à l'intuition intellectuelle, sans laquelle l'homme serait incapable de la vision béatifique en quoi sa fin dernière consiste. Elle se recommandait d'ailleurs

³³ *Stabilitum est autem illis legibus sapientiae, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto nisi illa quorum species reluent in phantasmate, et hoc sive propter poenam originalis peccati, sive propter naturalem concordiam potentiarum animae in operando, secundum quod videmus quod potentia superior operatur circa idem circa quod inferior, si utraque habeat operationem perfectam; et de facto ita est in nobis, quod*

*quocumque universale intelligimus ejus singulare actu phantasiamur. Ista tamen concordia, quae est de facto pro statu isto, non est ex natura nostri intellectus unde intellectus est, nec etiam unde in corpore est; tunc enim in corpore gloriose necessario habetur similem concordiam, quod falsum est. Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, n. 24; t. I, pp. 351-352. Cf. E. Bettoni, *L'ascesa a Dio* in *Duns Scoto* (Milano, 1943), pp. 83-84.*

auprès de lui de l'autorité théologique à ses yeux la plus haute, celle de saint Augustin. On ne saurait guère exagérer l'importance de ce fait pour la formation de la pensée scotiste. Ce qu'il restait de néoplatonisme chez Augustin, tout refoulé qu'il soit dans la pensée de Duns Scot, y conserve pourtant une certaine influence, comme si, limité par celle de l'aristotélisme médiéval, il la limitait à son tour. De Platon à Plotin et de Plotin à saint Augustin, se transmet l'idée que le corps empêche l'entendement humain de connaître et qu'il y a de la faute de l'homme à l'origine de ce fait. Duns Scot occupe une position différente, car il ne pense pas que le corps soit nécessairement une gêne pour l'intellect, mais il cite du moins Augustin pour expliquer que le corps soit devenu une gêne pour l'entendement de l'homme dans son état présent.³²

La deuxième explication possible de cet "état" en appelle purement et simplement à la volonté de Dieu: *ex mera voluntate Dei*. En droit, c'est-à-dire en vertu de sa nature, l'intellect humain pourrait connaître intuitivement les êtres purement intelligibles; en fait, Dieu a voulu que notre intellect fût ici-bas capable de connaissance abstractive et c'est pourquoi, naturellement (quoique non en raison de sa nature d'intellect mais en raison de la nature de son état) il ne peut connaître en cette vie qu'en coopérant avec la sensibilité. Il importe d'ailleurs de noter que ces deux explications ne sont pas inconciliables. Ce que le péché originel peut expliquer, c'est que, depuis la faute, la connaissance abstractive soit la seule dont l'homme dispose encore. Pourtant, avant la faute, l'homme disposait déjà de ce mode de connaissance. S'il n'y était pas astreint, comme nous le sommes, il pouvait déjà l'exercer, mais même alors il ne l'exerçait pas en vertu de sa nature d'intellect, car il est de la nature d'un intellect de connaître directement l'intelligible sans passer par le sensible. S'il y a un élément stable dans la doctrine de Duns Scot, c'est la nature de l'intellect, qui demeure une et la même à travers toute la doctrine, dans toutes les conditions concrètes et tous les "états" qu'elle traverse. Un lecteur habituel de Thomas d'Aquin peut avoir l'impression que l'intellect scotiste ne cesse de changer de nature, mais c'est le contraire qui est vrai, car jamais l'intellect scotiste ne perd la naturalité de son essence, en dépit des naturalités diverses qu'il doit à ses états successifs.

De soi, un intellect a à peu près le même objet qu'une Intelligence angélique; il est donc une faculté d'intuition intelligible et il n'est essentiellement que cela. Si, avant la faute, il pouvait recourir en outre à la connaissance abstractive, ce ne pouvait être ni en punition du péché originel, qui n'avait pas été commis, ni en vertu d'une exigence intrinsèque de sa nature qui, étant celle d'un intellect, ne comporte aucune inclination vers le sensible. Ce ne pouvait donc être que de par une pure volonté de Dieu qui, ayant uni cet intellect à un corps pour créer l'homme, a voulu que le corps puisse contribuer à la connaissance de l'homme en vue de sa perfection. Si, aujourd'hui encore, la solidarité naturelle des puissances de l'âme continue de jouer, c'est par suite de la volonté divine qui l'a établie, pour le bien de l'homme, dès avant la faute. Elle n'est donc pas une suite du péché originel. Ce qui est une suite du péché originel, c'est que, désormais, l'homme ne puisse plus connaître sans recourir à son corps; il est donc condamné, par sa faute, à ne plus user que de la connaissance abstractive, dont son intellect est capable par un décret de la volonté divine. Notons pourtant

³² Utcumque igitur sit iste status, sive ex mera voluntate Dei, sive ex mera justitia punitiva, sive ex infirmitate, quam causam Augustinus innuit XV De Trinitate cap. ult.: *quae causa, inquit, cur ipsam lucem acie fixa videre non possis, nisi utique infirmitas? et quid eam tibi fecit, nisi utique iniquitas?* Sive, inquam, haec sit tota causa, sive

aliqua alia; saltem non est primum objectum intellectus, unde potentia est, quidditas rei materialis, sed est aliiquid commune ad omnia intelligibilia, licet primum objectum adaequatum sibi in movendo, pro statu isto, sit quidditas rei sensibilis. Op. Oz. I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 4, n. 24; t. I, p. 352. Cf. Augustin, De Civ. Dei XV, 27, 50; PL 42, 1097.

que, tout en subissant cette limitation, son intellect n'a pas changé de nature. Il reste toujours cet intellect, de peu inférieur à l'ange, dont l'acte normal, si l'on peut dire, serait l'intuition intelligible. Il a d'abord exercé ce pouvoir en vertu de sa seule nature, plus celui de connaître par abstraction à partir du sensible qui, simplement compatible avec sa nature, lui fut ajouté par la volonté de Dieu. Le péché originel ayant lié le premier, l'homme ne peut plus exercer que le second, mais la nature de l'intellect reste la même, et c'est précisément pourquoi, à la mort du corps, l'intellect se retrouve capable d'intuition intelligible sans que, tandis qu'il traversait ces divers états, sa nature ait subi la moindre atteinte.

Les deux explications données par Duns Scot de notre état présent sont donc moins alternatives que complémentaires: la *naturalis concordia potentiarum animae* fut voulue par Dieu dès la création de l'homme et reste, aujourd'hui encore, un effet de sa volonté; ce que la peine du péché originel lui ajoute, c'est l'incapacité présente de l'homme à l'intuition intellectuelle. Que la nécessité d'abstraire soit accidentelle à la nature de l'intellect humain, est un fait dont les répercussions peuvent se faire sentir dans maintes parties de la doctrine. Qu'il s'agisse de notre connaissance des essences en général, de l'être commun ou de l'être infini lui-même, l'abstraction scotiste reste toujours l'œuvre d'un intellect dont le mode normal de connaître serait l'intuition intelligible. L'abstraction, où l'intellect thomiste se plaint comme dans son état normal, est visiblement pour l'intellect scotiste une gêne, dont il tend sans cesse à se délivrer. S'il ne le peut tout à fait, il refuse du moins qu'on ne la fasse plus lourde qu'elle ne l'est. Son objet n'est plus l'essence intelligible; soit, mais on ne lui fera pas croire qu'il soit la quiddité de la chose sensible. Sa noblesse native et sa dignité d'intellect lui interdisent de s'en contenter.

Que l'on accepte ou non cette interprétation de la doctrine, l'effet du vouloir divin a été d'établir cette *concordia* entre l'intellect et la sensibilité, que nous observons en fait par introspection. Elle apparaît clairement, comme le dit Duns Scot, lorsque les opérations de ces deux facultés sont parfaites, car elles le sont dans tous les cas où leurs opérations sont une coopération; on ne conçoit bien par la pensée que ce que l'on imagine en même temps qu'on le pense, comme, inversement, on ne perçoit bien que ce que l'on conçoit par l'intellect en même temps qu'on le perçoit par les sens. Duns Scot a donc maintenu les deux réponses. Pourtant, redisons-le, les deux solutions n'ont pas pour objet de résoudre la même partie d'un problème, à la solution totale duquel elles sont l'une et l'autre nécessaires. Le recours au péché originel s'inspire d'Augustin et il a pour objet d'expliquer que la connaissance abstractive soit la seule dont nous puissions user désormais. Le recours à la simple volonté de Dieu a pour objet d'expliquer que notre intellect, naturellement capable d'intuition intelligible, ait pourtant recours à l'abstraction. Dieu l'a d'abord voulu, semble-t-il, dans l'intérêt de l'homme même qui, formé d'âme et de corps, peut trouver avantage à user de son corps pour mieux connaître. En tout cas, la *concordia potentiarum animae*, dont l'idée n'est pas propre à Duns Scot,²³ représente un état de fait, qui n'est pas lié à l'essence même de notre intellect en tant qu'intellect. Cette position sert parfaitement l'intention principale de Duns Scot: sauver l'aptitude essentielle de l'intellect humain à l'intuition intelligible, tout en permettant de poser la connaissance abstractive comme *naturelle* à l'homme, d'une naturalité liée, sinon à son essence, du moins à son état. Et pourquoi l'état naturel présent de l'homme connaissant résulterait-il de la *pure* volonté qu'eut Dieu d'établir cet état, ou de sa *pure* justice punitive? Le péché peut

²³ Voir, notamment, la doctrine d'Olieu, dans Bernhard Jansen, S. J. *Die Erkenntnis-lehre Olivus* (Berlin, 1921), chap. IX: *Die Colligantia der Seelenkräfte*.

être cause de cet état sans en être la cause totale.³⁴ En d'autres termes, notre mode présent de connaître peut avoir été d'abord voulu par Dieu dans l'intérêt de l'homme, mais être devenu pour l'homme, par la faute de l'homme lui-même, le moyen de son châtiment.³⁵

Ce problème est d'une importance telle qu'on ne peut le quitter sans avoir tenté d'obtenir de Duns Scot une réponse aussi précise que possible. La valeur de notre mode actuel de connaître est ici en jeu. Il ne s'agit en effet de rien moins que de savoir si le caractère exclusivement abstractif de notre connaissance de l'intelligible est lié à l'essence même de notre intellect, ou s'il n'est qu'une suite accidentelle du péché originel. Selon qu'on admet l'une ou l'autre réponse, la métaphysique apparaîtra soit comme la science de l'être accessible à un intellect que son changement d'état n'empêche pas d'opérer encore selon sa nature première, soit comme la science de l'être accessible à un intellect que le péché rend désormais incapable d'opérer selon tout le pouvoir de cette nature première. En d'autres termes,—et l'on s'excuse d'insister sur ce point mais, encore une fois, il y va des limites présentes de la philosophie,—il s'agit de savoir si, sans le péché originel, notre connaissance intellectuelle serait ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui devenue: une connaissance de l'être acquise exclusivement par mode d'abstraction.

Les réponses de l'*Opus Oxoniense* à cette question nous ont conduits à penser que Dieu ait primitivement voulu, comme convenable à la nature humaine, la *concordia potentiarum animae* dont nous n'expérimen tonis aujourd'hui que trop l'infrangible rigueur. Cette solidarité n'est en effet qu'un cas particulier de l'union de l'âme et du corps. Or Duns Scot est à plusieurs reprises revenu sur cette idée que Dieu a voulu l'union de l'âme et du corps, non pour le bien du corps ni pour celui de l'âme, mais pour le bien de l'homme. Le Docteur Subtil se tient ici, non moins fermement que le Docteur Angélique, sur un terrain non point platonicien, mais chrétien. C'est précisément pourquoi, si nous ne nous trompons sur ses intentions, il n'a jamais éliminé la doctrine de la *concordia*. L'aide mutuelle que se prêtent encore l'intellect et la sensibilité, même dans l'état de nature déchue où nous sommes, atteste que leur solidarité est inscrite dans la nature de l'homme *prout natura isto modo instituta est*. Pourquoi Duns

³⁴ Rep. Par., l. IV, d. q. 4, n. 2; Vivès, t. 24, p. 578.

³⁵ Le problème s'est posé de nouveau pour Duns Scot, à propos de la connaissance que l'âme a d'elle-même. Sur quoi il répond, exactement dans le même esprit: *quod anima de se actu intelligibilis est et praesens sibi*. Mais alors pourquoi ne s'appréhende-t-elle pas toujours? C'est, dit Augustin, qu'il y a à cela un empêchement. Puis il continue: *Sed quod est istud impedimentum?* Respondeo: *intellectus noster pro statu isto non est natus moveri immediate, nisi ab aliquo imaginabili vel sensibili extra prius moveatur. Et quare hoc? Forte propter peccatum, sicut videtur Augustinus dicere XV Trinit. cap. ult.: Hoc tibi fecit infirmitas. Et quae causa infirmitatis nisi iniurias?* Idem dicit Comment. VI Ethic., et Lincolnensis ibidem et Super I. Poster. similiter. *Vel forte ista causa est naturalis, prout natura isto modo instituta est, non absolute naturalis: puta si ordo iste potentiarum de quo dictum est in I (cf. plus haut, note 31) diffuse, necessario hoc requirat, quod quodcumque universale intellectus intelligat, oportet phantasiam actu phantasiare singulare ejusdem: sed hoc non est ex natura, nec ista causa est absolute*

naturalis, sed est ex peccato, et non solum ex peccato, sed etiam ex natura potentiarum pro statu isto, quidquid dicat Augustinus. Op. Ox. II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 13; t. II, p. 298. Le commentateur du lib. VI de l'*Ethique* auquel renvoie ici Duns Scot est identifié par le texte des Qu. *de anima* cité plus loin pp. 61-62, note 37, où les références sont plus complètes. Cavellus (*Commentaire sur le De anima*, qu. XVIII, n. 11, Dubium; éd. Vivès, Vol. III, p. 598) conclut qu'on ne peut rien affirmer sur la pensée finale de Duns Scot: nihil, ut certum, occurrit dicendum. Lui-même semble pourtant préférer l'explication par le péché originel, et comme il s'aperçoit que, si cette explication est bonne, la Sainte Vierge doit avoir été capable de penser sans images en vertu de son immaculée conception, Cavellus conclut sans hésiter: *Cum igitur potissimos effectus justitiae originalis habuerit B. Virgo, juxta sententiam tenentem quod in statu innocentiae non esset conversio ad phantasmatum, hoc tribuendum est Virginim, cum sit perfectius, neque constet de opposito.* Sur la position de R. Grosseteste, voir E. Gilson, 'Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin', *Arch. d'hist. litt. et doct. du moyen âge* I (1926), 96, note 1.

Scot ajoute-t-il pourtant, parlant de la *causa naturalis* de ce fait, qu'elle n'est peut-être pas *absolute naturalis*? C'est que, si cette solidarité est naturelle, la manière dont elle joue depuis le péché originel ne l'est plus. Elle ne joue plus uniquement au profit de l'homme, mais aussi à son détriment. Une véritable insurrection de la sensibilité contre l'intellect semble s'être produite, qui interdit désormais à l'intellect de connaître sans phantasme et le réduit au seul mode abstraitif de connaissance, qui est désormais le sien en cette vie. Voilà son état présent d'infirmité et, pour le redire avec Augustin, "quelle est la cause de cette infirmité, sinon l'iniquité"?

Si telle est la pensée de Duns Scot, toute la connaissance accessible à un être, que la quiddité de la chose matérielle est désormais seule capable de "mouvoir", est donc bien une connaissance "déchue" par rapport à elle-même, et la métaphysique élaborée par un tel sujet connaissant doit différer aussi profondément de celle qu'il serait, en droit, capable de connaître, que l'intuition intellectuelle elle-même diffère de l'abstraction. C'est ainsi que le scotisme a interprété Duns Scot.³⁸ L'histoire littéraire hésite à considérer comme authentiques les *Quaestiones de Anima* traditionnellement attribuées à Duns Scot. Les anciens scotistes n'ont du moins jamais hésité à y reconnaître sa pensée et la critique littéraire semble elle-même, au moins pour le moment, redevenir favorable à leur authenticité. Attendons qu'elle en décide. Quel que doive être finalement son verdict, on ne peut refuser de voir dans cet écrit l'expression d'une doctrine si semblable à celle de Duns Scot qu'elle se confond pratiquement avec elle. Avec Duns Scot, son auteur considère comme possible cette solution du problème (dont il ne se donne d'ailleurs pas pour l'inventeur) qui rend le péché originel responsable du mode purement abstraitif de notre connaissance intellectuelle dans l'état présent de l'homme. Connaître sans recourir au phantasme n'est pourtant pas incompatible avec la nature de l'intellect humain, puisque l'âme séparée du corps peut le faire; ce n'est pas non plus incompatible avec l'union de l'âme et du corps, puisque l'intellect pourra le faire une fois réuni à son corps désormais glorieux; enfin, et surtout, ce n'est même pas incompatible avec l'état d'*homo viator* puisque, sans le péché originel, l'homme aurait préservé la pleine domination de son âme sur son corps et de son intellect sur ses sens, c'est-à-dire serait resté capable de connaître intellectuellement, avec ou sans phantasme, comme bon lui eût semblé. C'est donc une punition du péché que l'homme doive désormais en passer par le phantasme. Sur quoi notre auteur ajoute cette suggestive remarque: "Ne sachant rien du péché originel et trouvant la nature en tel état, Aristote a pris son point de départ dans le sens et crû que cet usage de l'intellect nous était naturel. C'est pourquoi il a affirmé sans restriction que la connaissance intellectuelle exige le recours au phantasme".³⁹ Le dernier trait vise Aristote, mais si l'on pense que la seule excuse

³⁸ Par exemple: *Respondeo dicendum primo, objectum motivum nostri intellectus pro praesenti statu naturae lapsae, esse quiditatem rei materialis, vel forte specialius quidditatem rei sensibilis, intelligendo non de sensibili proprie solum, sed etiam de inclusio essentialiter vel virtualiter in sensibili.* Hier. de Montfortino, *Summa Theologica* I, 12, art. incidunt, Resp.

³⁹ Ideo, omisis aliis necessitatibus, dicunt alii, quod non est contra rationem actus intelligenti intellectus nostri absolute intelligere sine phantasmate, quia recursus ad phantasma esset necessarius animae separatae ut dictum est, nec contra rationem ejus ut est corpori unitus absolute, quia hoc etiam esset necessarium sibi unito corpori glorioso post resurrectionem, quod falsum est; nec contra

rationem ejus ut viator est, vel conjunctus corpori in via, quia hoc etiam esset necessarium homini in statu innocentiae, qui tunc fuit viator; hoc autem falsum est, cum anima ejus, quantum ad actum ejus proprium in nullo fuisset corpori subjecta, sed super ipsum et sensus suos, tam quoad apprehensionem quam quoad appetitum, habuisse plenum dominium, ita quod potuisse intellexisse sine phantasmate vel cum phantasmate, sicut sibi placuisse. Sed dicunt quod necessitas recurrenti ad phantasmata est nobis inficta propter peccatum. Unde sequitur ad ignorantiam nobis inflictam, et hoc juste, quia ex eo quod anima se ordinavit, dimittendo divinum dominium et se ab ejus subtrahendo subjectione, rationabile fuit in poenam hanc incidere, et amit-

d'Aristote est ici l'invincible ignorance où il était du péché originel, combien plus cruellement ce trait n'atteint-il pas les théologiens chrétiens qui soutiennent la même thèse sans avoir la même excuse? De toute manière, il reste absolument certain que Duns Scot lui-même, parlant en son nom propre, a expressément assigné le péché originel comme l'une des causes possibles du mode exclusivement abstractif de connaître imposé en cette vie à l'intellect humain.³⁸ Bref, celui qui connaît les conditions de fait dans lesquelles s'élabore notre philosophie, ce n'est pas le philosophe, c'est le théologien.

Une telle position ne saurait manquer d'avoir des répercussions aussi profondes qu'étendues sur le contenu même de la philosophie première qu'elle domine. Nous aurons occasion d'en constater un certain nombre à mesure qu'elles se présenteront, mais on peut dès à présent prévoir que l'influence de cette thèse s'exercera sous deux formes différentes, tantôt pour restreindre les prétentions de la métaphysique prise en son état présent, tantôt, au contraire, pour rappeler à l'intellect la noblesse de sa vraie nature. Duns Scot ne cessera jamais d'assigner à la raison naturelle ses limites présentes, pour lui interdire d'empêtrer sur le terrain de la foi et de la révélation. Lorsqu'il s'exprime en ce sens, la métaphysique est et reste pour lui la science de l'être tel que nous le connaissons *pro statu isto*, avec la lourde hypothèque dont est grevée notre connaissance par suite du péché originel; bref, une métaphysique qui, sans la révélation, ignorerait jusqu'à l'état où elle est. En revanche, il n'acceptera jamais pour l'intellect des limitations que certains lui imposent gratuitement, et d'ailleurs à tort, parce qu'ils prennent sa condition présente pour son état naturel. Toute bornée qu'elle

tere dominium proprium quod habebat super corpus suum et super sensum. Et haec est sententia beati Augustini in pluribus locis, et Hugonis, super antiquam Hierarchiam. Eustathii super librum Ethicorum et Lincolniensis super librum Posteriorum, super illud verbum: *Deficiente nobis uno sensu, necesse est nobis deficere scientiam secundum illum sensum.* Aristoteles autem, quia nihil scivit de peccato illo et invenit naturam taliter dispositam, procedens ex sensu tantum, credidit hoc nobis esse naturale sicut intelligitur; et ideo hoc posuit absolute, quia necesse est ad phantasmatum recurrere volentem intelligere. *De anima*, qu. 18, n. 4; éd. Vivès, vol. III, p. 594-595. C'est pourquoi, selon Duns Scot, aucun sacrement n'était nécessaire à l'homme en état d'innocence originelle, car les sacrements sont des signes sensibles, or "tunc non indiget homo sensibilibus, ut cognoscat intelligibilia pertinientia ad salutem suam". Assurément, "tunc homo potuerit ex sensibilibus cognoscere intelligibilia", mais il pouvait aussi s'en passer: *Op. Ox.* IV, d. 1, q. 3, n. 7; t. 16, p. 130. Cette position confirme pleinement le texte du *De anima*.

³⁸ Saint Thomas avait soutenu (*Sum. theol.* I, 89, 1, Resp.) qu'il est aussi naturel à l'âme de connaître en usant du phantasme que ce l'est pour elle d'être unie à son corps: unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmatum est animae naturalis sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatum a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmatum est ei praeter naturam. L'intuition de l'intelligible est naturelle à l'ange, non à l'homme. Pour Duns Scot, c'est le contraire qui est vrai: Dico igitur quod objectum naturale, hoc est

naturaliter attingibile, adaequatum intellectui nostro, etsi pro statu isto sit quidditas rei materialis, vel forte adhuc specialius quidditas rei sensibilis, intelligendo non de sensibili proprie solum sed etiam de incluso essentialiter vel virtualiter in sensibili, tamem objectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae non est aliquid specialius objecto intellectus angelici, quia quidquid potest intelligi ab uno, et ab alio; et hoc saltem concedere debet theologus qui ponit istum statum non ei naturalem nec istam impotentiam intelligendi multorum intelligibilium esse naturalem, sed poenalem, juxta illud XV *De Trinitate*, 27 . . . Tamen philosophus qui statum istum diceret simpliciter naturalem homini, nec alium expertus erat nec ratione conclusit, diceret forte illud esse objectum adaequatum intellectus humani simpliciter ex nature talis potentiae, quod percepit sibi esse adaequatum pro statu isto. *Quodl. XIV*, 12; t. 26, pp. 46-47. Même remarque à propos de l'aptitude de l'âme à se connaître elle-même: *Ista causa quae est ex parte angelii est sufficiens ad hoc quod essentia angelii sit sufficiens ratio intelligibilis seipsum, etiam ipsa talis est ex parte animae, sed in anima sunt impedimenta, in angelo non, non enim intellectus angelii habet talem ordinem ad imaginabilia, sicut habet intellectus noster pro statu isto.* Et propter istam impotentiam intelligendi immediate intelligibilium in actu, quae impotentia non est ex impossibilitate intrinseca sed extrinseca, quam etiam experiebatur Philosophus et non aliquam possibilitem, ideo dixit Philosophus quod intellectus non est aliquid intelligibilium ante intelligere, id est: non possible intelligi a se ante intelligere aliorum. *Op. Ox.* II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 14; t. II, p. 298.

soit, notre métaphysique est l'œuvre d'un intellect dont, en tant qu'intellect, l'objet propre n'est en rien moins étendu que celui de l'intellect angélique. De cette noblesse et perfection essentielles, même notre métaphysique déchue garde la trace et, si elle les oublie, il convient de les lui rappeler. Ainsi, la connaissance métaphysique doit être à la fois retenue et encouragée, et cette double nécessité dérive d'une même source: notre métaphysique, telle que nous pouvons ici-bas la concevoir, est l'œuvre d'un intellect sommis à des limitations de fait dont, parce qu'il en est naturellement ignorant, tantôt il oublie la présence, et tantôt il imagine, qu'essentielles à sa nature, elles sont des limitations de droit.

De là découle un caractère général de la pensée scotiste, que l'on verra se préciser progressivement mais auquel il est pratiquement impossible de ne pas dès à présent s'attendre. Peut-être le meilleur moyen de l'anticiper sous la forme imprécise qui seule convient au point où nous en sommes, est-il de recourir à quelque comparaison. Disons donc, si l'on y tient, que si la métaphysique thomiste est celle d'un intellect dont le péché originel n'a altéré ni la nature ni le fonctionnement, la métaphysique scotiste est celle d'un intellect dont le péché originel a profondément altéré le fonctionnement, mais dont la nature primitive, toujours intacte, se sent encore à la manière dont, même blessé, il fonctionne. En d'autres termes, l'abstraction, dont l'intellect scotiste doit en fait se contenter, reste pourtant l'opération d'un intellect naturellement capable d'intuition intellectuelle, et cela se sent si bien, dans la métaphysique de Duns Scot, que nombre des différences qui la séparent de celle de Thomas d'Aquin nous semblent venir de là. Derrière l'homme de Duns Scot il y a celui d'Augustin, dont le *paulo minuisti eum ab angelis* s'accorde d'une assez forte dose de platonisme, de ce même platonisme rémanent que le Docteur Subtil retrouvera si volontiers chez Avicenne. Assurément, même avant la chute, l'homme de Duns Scot n'était pas un ange, mais le composé humain d'une âme et d'un corps; la métaphysique scotiste ne s'en ressent pas moins d'être l'œuvre d'un intellect déchu d'aptitudes qu'il partageait jadis partiellement avec l'ange, mais dont on continue de sentir la présence latente, alors même qu'il ne peut plus les exercer.

Qu'est-ce en effet que la métaphysique? Science première, elle doit avoir pour objet la premier connaissable: *prima scientia scibili primi*.³⁰ Ce connaissable est premier parce que, tombant en premier sous les prises de l'intellect, il est impliqué dans tous ses autres objets. Nous l'avons déjà rappelé avec Avicenne, cet objet premier est l'être, et c'est précisément pourquoi, science première du connaissable premier, la métaphysique est la science de l'être en tant qu'être, ainsi que de toutes les propriétés qui lui appartiennent comme tel.³¹ Elle se présente donc, par là même, comme la science de ce que l'on doit savoir et que

³⁰ *Qu. in Metaph.* VII, q. 4, n. 3; Vivès, t. VII, p. 364. Ce premier connaissable est, rappelons-le, l'*ens commune*. C'est pourquoi la métaphysique n'a pas Dieu pour objet direct et premier, car la seule science qui porte directement sur Dieu est la théologie. Science de l'être commun et de ses propriétés, la métaphysique est à la théologie dans le même rapport qu'à la physique. Tout ce qui est vrai de l'être en général est vrai de l'être physique en tant qu'il est être; tout ce qui est vrai de l'être en général est vrai de Dieu en tant qu'il est être, plus ce qui est vrai de l'être premier et nécessaire. La métaphysique est donc présupposée par la théologie, comme la science de l'être en général l'est par toute science d'un être particulier. Cf. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 7, n. 20; t. I, p. 65. Notons enfin que l'être est le premier connaissable dans l'ordre de la

connaissance. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi la métaphysique est la dernière des sciences dans l'ordre de l'enseignement, l'intellect procédant du plus particulier confusément connu au plus commun distinctement connu. Voir *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 6, n. 22; t. I, pp. 319-321.

³¹ *Primus habitus potentiae habet pro objecto objectum primum potentiae primi habitus; ut metaphysicae objectum primum est ens inquantam ens.* *Qu. in Metaph.* II, q. 3, n. 21; Vivès, t. VII, p. 111. Ce qui se déchiffre ainsi: le premier savoir acquis par une faculté a pour objet l'objet premier de la faculté dont relève ce savoir; ainsi, dans le cas présent, la métaphysique relevant de l'intellect, dont l'objet premier est l'être, l'objet premier de la métaphysique est aussi l'être.

l'on sait avant tout le reste parce que, si on l'ignore, rien ne peut être connu. Bref, transcendante à tous les objets particuliers, elle ne s'occupe que des objets universellement "communs" à tous les autres, ce que Duns Scot nomme les *communissima*.⁴¹ En soi, une telle science devrait donc pouvoir tout définir par son essence et tout démontrer par les causes essentielles premières, c'est-à-dire les plus hautes et les plus évidentes. En fait, ce n'est pas ainsi que nous la possédonns ni qu'Aristote l'enseigne et l'on chercherait en vain dans toute sa Métaphysique une seule démonstration par la cause, c'est-à-dire déduite *a priori* d'une essence intelligible. Nous savons d'ailleurs pourquoi il en est ainsi. L'impuissance de notre intellect nous oblige à remonter vers l'intelligible à partir du sensible, au lieu de redescendre de l'intelligible au sensible comme il se devrait.⁴² Ainsi l'objet de la métaphysique, telle que notre intellect nous permet de la connaître *pro statu isto*, est *l'ens commune*, au sens précis de ce terme que nous aurons plus tard à déterminer.

Ainsi entendue, la connaissance métaphysique est à la fois dernière et première: dernière dans l'ordre de la connaissance confuse, qui est celui de la définition nominale; première dans l'ordre de la connaissance distincte, qui est celui de la définition réelle.

Il est certain que l'intellect ne commence pas par saisir distinctement le concept commun d'être pris dans son indétermination totale. La connaissance commence par des concepts confus, dont chacun représente l'un des objets d'expérience auxquels nous donnons des noms. Ces objets eux-mêmes sont des individus, des êtres "singuliers", dont l'espèce sensible agit sur l'ouïe, la vue ou le toucher. Si leur action sur le sens est assez forte, leur *species* se fait immédiatement reconnaître de l'intellect. Il se produit alors en nous un concept de l'individu en question, car le singulier nous est connaissable; mais ce concept reste confus, parce que nous ne connaissons pas le singulier—*pro statu isto*—sous sa raison propre de singulier. Ce qui vient d'abord dans l'ordre d'acquisition du savoir, c'est donc bien le singulier confusément connu.

On comprend par là pourquoi, bien qu'il dise que l'être commun est ce qui tombe en premier sous les prises de l'intellect, Avicenne enseigne aussi que la Métaphysique, science de l'être ainsi entendu, vient dernière dans l'ordre de l'enseignement.⁴³ En effet, avant d'arriver à la conception distincte de l'être commun, il faut que les principes et les termes des sciences antérieures aient été conçus, d'abord confusément, puis distinctement. S'il en était autrement, nous commencerions spontanément par le plus commun, comme "être", "chose", et autres notions de ce genre, pour redescendre de là vers le particulier, et l'enseignement des sciences commencerait par celui de la métaphysique, ce qui

⁴¹ Ce sont aussi les *maxime scibia*, précisément "quia primo omnium sciuntur, sine quibus non possunt alia sciri". Or, ajoute Duns Scot: maxime scibia primo modo sunt communissima, ut est ens in quantum ens et quaecumque sequuntur ens in quantum ens. Dicit enim Avicenna I *Metaph.*, cap. 5, quod *ens* et *res* imprimuntur in *anima prima* impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se. Et infra: quae priora sunt ad imaginandum per seipsa, sunt ea quae communia sunt omnibus, sicut *res* et *ens* et *unum*, et ideo non potest manifestari aliquod horum per probationem quae non sit circularis. Haec autem communissima pertinent ad considerationem metaphysicae secundum Philosophum in IV hujus in principio: *Est enim scientia quae speculator ens in quantum est ens . . .* Qu. in *Metaph.*, Prologus, n. 5; Vivès, t. VII, p. 4.

⁴² *Hoc modo est metaphysica secundum*

*se scibilis, non tamen sic eam scimus, nec sic inventur ab Aristotele tradita: quaere si in toto libro invenias unam demonstrationem metaphysicam propter quid, quia propter impotentiam intellectus nostri ex sensibilibus et minus notis secundum se, devenimus in cognitionem immaterialium, quae secundum se notiora sunt et tanquam principia cognoscendi: alia in metaphysica essent accipienda. Qu. in *Metaph.*, Prol., n. 9; Vivès, t. VII, p. 6.* Ce n'est donc pas seulement dans notre théologie, mais aussi dans notre métaphysique, telle que nous l'avons *pro statu isto*, que nos démonstrations, quoique nécessaires, ne sont pas évidentes. Si l'homme était encore dans son état premier, elles pourraient l'être, et elles ne seraient pas des démonstrations *quia*, mais *propter quid*. C'est simplement un fait qu'elles ne le sont pas.

⁴³ Avicenne, *Metaph.*, tr. I, cap. 3.

est exactement le contraire de ce qu'Avicenne dit qu'il faut faire et de ce qui se fait.

D'ailleurs, si nous concevions d'abord le plus commun, l'allure générale de notre connaissance serait bien différente de ce qu'elle est. Nous ne choisissons pas à volonté l'ordre selon lequel nous formons nos concepts. C'est l'intensité avec laquelle la sensation nous impose tel objet, qui fait que nous concevons celui-là avant tel autre.⁴⁴ Il en serait tout autrement si, au lieu d'aller du singulier au commun, notre intellect allait du commun au singulier. Nos concepts sont les effets naturels et déterminés du concours de ces deux causes naturelles, l'objet singulier et l'intellect; c'est pourquoi nos premiers concepts sont ceux d'objets singuliers, connus dans l'ordre où la sensation même nous les impose, et si de tels concepts contiennent cet élément "commun" qui formera l'objet de la connaissance distincte du métaphysicien, ce n'est pas lui qui nous est donné en premier.

Il en va tout au contraire de la connaissance actuelle des concepts distinctement conçus. Ce qui est premier dans l'ordre de la connaissance distincte, c'est "le plus commun", les autres concepts s'étageant comme antérieurs et postérieurs selon qu'ils sont plus ou moins proches de l'être: le plus commun des concepts distinctement connus.

Pour qu'un concept soit distinctement connu, il faut que soit connu tout ce qui est inclus dans la notion de son essence; or l'être est inclus, à titre d'élément essentiel, dans la notion de tout ce qui est; il n'existe donc pas un seul concept, de quelque objet que ce soit, dans la notion essentielle duquel le concept commun d'être ne soit pas inclus. Lui-même peut être conçu à part de tout autre et sans aucune détermination ultérieure, mais aucun autre ne peut être conçu sans lui. En d'autres termes, l'être est objet d'un concept distinct absolument simple et il est le seul concept qui soit tel; l'être est donc le premier concept distinctement concevable et distinctement conçu. Nous retrouvons d'ailleurs ici la même confirmation par l'autorité d'Avicenne, car si ce philosophe enseigne que l'une des fonctions de la métaphysique est d'établir les principes des autres sciences, c'est précisément parce que les objets dont traite cette science sont les premiers qui soient distinctement connus. Savoir absolument premier dans l'ordre de la distinction, elle est aussi le dernier savoir dans l'ordre de certitude et de l'enseignement, parce que la métaphysique seule atteint une connaissance distincte de l'essence signifiée par les termes dont une connaissance confuse suffit aux autres sciences. On peut savoir toute la géométrie sans savoir au juste ce qu'est une "grandeur", ni même ce que sont un "solide" ou une "ligne"; savoir la métaphysique, c'est avoir une connaissance distincte de l'objet dont cette connaissance confuse suffit au géomètre, et, en ce sens, dernière acquise, elle est première connue.

On voit par là quel ordre général suit la pensée dans l'acquisition du savoir. Elle ne commence ni par l'ignorance ni par la connaissance distincte, mais par cette sorte de moyen terme entre l'une et l'autre qu'est la confusion. C'est de là que la connaissance se dirige vers sa perfection et c'est pourquoi toute connaissance distincte d'un concept en présuppose la connaissance confuse. Qu'il s'agisse de la connaissance actuelle distincte de l'universalité d'un concept ou de la connaissance distincte de la totalité d'une essence, le confus passe toujours le premier.

Un point de vue toute différent est celui de la connaissance habituelle et de la connaissance virtuelle,⁴⁵ car il s'agit alors d'une connaissance déjà acquise et

⁴⁴ On ne soupçonnerait pas, sans un autre passage, que Duns Scot se laisse ici conduire par Augustin, *De libero arbitrio* III, 25, 74; PL 32, 1307. Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 6,

n. 17; t. I, p. 412, où il cite le "non est in potestate nostra quin visis tangamur".

⁴⁵ Définitions de ces termes: *Habitualem notitiam* voco, quando *objectum* sic est

habituellement présente à l'intellect (comme un savoir que l'on possède même aux moments où l'on n'y pense pas), ou d'une connaissance virtuellement incluse dans une autre. En pareils cas, ce sont les concepts les plus communs qui précèdent les autres. Le raison en est la même que dans le cas précédent: l'intellect allant du moins parfait au plus parfait, il part des concepts les plus communs et les moins déterminés pour procéder de là, comme par degrés, à ceux qui le déterminent ou qu'il inclut. Ici, c'est le concept d'"être" qui passe le premier, puisqu'on ne peut rien connaître que comme sa détermination particulière ou comme inclus dans sa notion.⁴⁶

Un troisième et dernier point de vue sur l'objet de la connaissance est celui de sa perfection. Le plus parfait connaissable en soi n'est pas nécessairement le plus parfaitement connaissable pour nous. Ainsi, le soleil est de soi éminemment visible; nous le voyons pourtant moins aisément qu'une chandelle, dont la lumière, moins visible de soi que celle du soleil, est mieux proportionnée à notre vue. De même ici: ce qui est de soi le plus parfait et le premier connaissable, c'est Dieu. Il importe de noter que ceci est vrai, même dans l'ordre de la connaissance naturelle, et c'est même pourquoi le Philosophe avait situé notre beatitude naturelle dans la connaissance de Dieu;⁴⁷ après Dieu, les connaissables premiers en perfection sont les individus de l'espèce la plus parfaite qu'il y ait dans l'univers; puis ceux de l'espèce suivante par ordre de perfection, et ainsi de suite jusqu'aux individus de l'espèce la moins parfaite. Après les individus viennent les espèces, puis les genres proches que l'intellect peut abstraire des espèces, en commençant de nouveau par le genre le plus proche que l'intellect puisse abstraire de l'espèce la plus parfaite et en redescendant vers ceux qu'il abstrait des espèces les moins parfaites. Mais il ne s'agit là que de la priorité de perfection qui appartient au connaissable pris en lui-même. Par rapport à nous, il n'en va pas de même. Nous connaissons plus parfaitement ce qui est en soi moins parfaitement connaissable, et c'est pourquoi, science de l'être en tant qu'être, notre métaphysique ne saurait s'élever à un objet de connaissance plus parfait que l'être commun conçu sous les déterminations modales dont il est susceptible.

C'est dire que, inférieure à la métaphysique en soi, la métaphysique telle que nous la connaissons est beaucoup plus inférieure encore à notre théologie, dont l'objet est Dieu connu par nous grâce à la révélation, et elle l'est infiniment davantage à la théologie en soi, science que Dieu a de Dieu. En tranchant ainsi la question, Duns Scot prenait parti dans une controverse bien connue de lui-même et de ses contemporains, celle qu'Averroès avait menée contre Avicenne touchant l'objet de la théologie. Rien ne la résume mieux que le titre de la première des Questions de Duns Scot sur la Métaphysique: "le sujet de la métaphysique est-il l'être en tant qu'être, comme l'a soutenu Avicenne, ou

praesens intellectui in ratione intelligibilis actu, ut intellectus statim possit habere actum elicium circa illud objectum. Voco virtualem, quando aliquid intelligitur in aliquo ut pars intellecti primi, non autem ut primum intellectum sive ut totale terminans intellectuonem: sicut cum intelligitur homo, intelligitur animal in homine ut pars intellecti, ut non intellectum primum sive totale terminans intellectuonem. Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 2 a. 6, n. 28; t. I, pp. 323-324.

⁴⁶ *Op. Ox., loc cit., n. 28; t. I, p. 326. Cf. De anima, qu. XVI, 3-5; éd. Vives, vol. III, pp. 568-570.*

⁴⁷ *Loquendo ergo de ordine perfectionis simpliciter, dico quod perfectissimum cognoscibile a nobis etiam naturaliter est Deus; unde in hoc etiam ponit Philosophus felici-*

*tatem naturalem, X. Ethic; et post ipsum species specialissima perfectior in universo; et deinde species proxima illi, et sic usque ad ultimam speciem; et post omnes species specialissimas genus proximum abstrahibile a specie perfectissima, et sic semper resolvendo. Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 6, n. 29; t. I, p. 325. Le plus connaissable par rapport à nous, *pro statu isto*, est l'intelligible abstrait du sensible, *loc. cit.*; n. 30, t. I, p. 326. Quant à Dieu, Aristote a raison de le poser comme l'objet connaissable le plus parfait en soi, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'il soit l'objet "adéquat" de notre intellect, *loc. cit.*; t. I, p. 327. Sur Dieu premier connaissable en ordre de perfection, voir De anima, qu. XVI, n. 6; éd. Vives, vol. III, pp. 570.*

Dieu et les Intelligences, comme l'a soutenu le Commentateur, Averroès"?⁴⁸ Sur ce problème, d'apparence purement académique, s'affrontent deux métaphysiques et, à vrai dire, deux conceptions inconciliaires de l'univers.⁴⁹ Pour Averroès, Dieu ainsi que les substances séparées, qui sont autant de divinités, font partie de l'univers. Clef de voûte du cosmos, le Premier lui-même est engagé dans la voûte, c'est-à-dire dans le cosmos. Dans un tel univers, la divinité est la cause métaphysique de l'ordre physique; il est donc naturel que la science physique y démontre l'existence de Dieu et de tous les autres êtres divins, qui deviennent ainsi l'objet propre de la métaphysique. Ainsi conçu, Dieu est immanent au monde et la science de Dieu, ou métaphysique, est nécessairement la science suprême au delà de laquelle il ne s'en trouve plus aucune. L'univers d'Avicenne est tout différent. Dieu n'y est pas, comme dans celui d'Averroès, la première des Intelligences motrices qui meuvent l'univers, c'est-à-dire, quoique la première, l'une d'entre elles. Le Dieu d'Avicenne est transcendant et situé au delà des Intelligences motrices, dont la plus haute est sa première et seule émanation. A ces deux conceptions différentes du monde, correspondent nécessairement deux notions différentes de la métaphysique et de son objet. Si, comme le veut Averroès, Dieu est l'Intelligence motrice de la première sphère, la preuve de l'existence d'un premier moteur immobile, telle qu'Aristote la fonde sur l'analyse du mouvement au livre VIII de sa *Physique*, est une preuve de l'existence de Dieu. Si, comme le veut au contraire Avicenne, Dieu transcende l'Intelligence motrice de la première sphère, la preuve de l'existence de cette Intelligence n'est pas une preuve de l'existence de Dieu. Chez Averroès, les preuves de l'existence de Dieu sont physiques; chez Avicenne, puisque la physique n'atteint que le premier moteur immobile, c'est à une science ultérieure, la métaphysique, qu'il appartient de prouver l'existence de Dieu.

De là, deux conséquences importantes, dont l'une concerne l'objet de la métaphysique, l'autre celui de la théologie. Averroès et Avicenne accordent pareillement qu'aucune science ne saurait prouver l'existence de son propre objet. Elle reçoit cet objet d'une science immédiatement antérieure, qui en prouve l'existence. Or, selon Averroès, la physique prouve l'existence de Dieu; la métaphysique, science qui suit la physique, a donc la nature de Dieu pour objet, et comme il n'y a pas d'objet au dessus de Dieu, il n'y a pas de science au dessus de la métaphysique. On peut alors dire indifféremment, soit que la métaphysique est théologie, soit que la théologie est métaphysique. En tout cas, lorsque le métaphysicien finit de parler de Dieu, personne n'a plus rien à dire après lui. Il n'en est pas ainsi dans la doctrine d'Avicenne où le physicien prouve l'existence d'un simple Intelligence motrice, laissant au métaphysicien la tâche de prouver l'existence de Dieu. Si la métaphysique en prouve l'existence et peut, jusqu'à un certain point, en connaître la nature en tant que Dieu est être, elle laisse pourtant place à une connaissance de Dieu comme Dieu qui relève soit de la révélation, soit même de la mystique. Ainsi, alors que les preuves averroïstes de l'existence de Dieu sont physiques, celles d'Avicenne sont métaphysiques; alors que la métaphysique d'Averroès est une science de Dieu au delà de laquelle

⁴⁸ Duns Scot a repris la question d'ensemble dans *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1; Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 46-47. Prenant le parti d'Avicenne contre Averroès, il y prouve successivement: que nulle science ne prouve l'existence de son propre sujet; que la métaphysique peut prouver l'existence de Dieu comme être premier; que Dieu n'est donc pas le sujet de la métaphysique, mais de la théologie: igitur nulla scientia naturaliter acquisita

potest esse de Deo sub aliqua ratione propria. En sens contraire, Averroes, *Epitomes in libros Metaphysicorum*, tract. I, (Venetiis, apud Juntas, 1574), vol. VIII, p. 357.

⁴⁹ Voir les remarquables pages de H. A. Wolfson, 'Notes on Proofs of the Existence of God in Jewish Philosophy', *Hebrew Union College Annual*, I, 575-596.

il n'y a plus de science, celle d'Avicenne est une science de l'être en tant qu'être⁵⁰ au delà de laquelle il peut y avoir place pour d'autres manières de connaître Dieu.

Entre ces deux mondes, il faut choisir. Pour savoir quel fut le choix du Docteur Subtil, il suffit de rappeler sa décision tranchante: "Avicenne avait raison et Averroès avait tort".⁵¹ Par cette option, Duns Scot s'engage sur la voie d'une métaphysique où l'être soit conçu de telle manière que l'atteindre ne soit pas immédiatement atteindre Dieu, mais où l'on puisse atteindre Dieu à partir de l'être en tant qu'être. Le Docteur Subtil l'a fait en claire conscience des suites que comportait un tel engagement philosophique. A l'objection fondamentale d'Averroès: comment prouverons nous l'existence de Dieu autrement qu'en physiciens, c'est-à-dire *a posteriori* et à partir de ses effets, Duns Scot a mainte fois répondu: oui, nous prouverons Dieu *a posteriori* et à partir de ses effets, mais à partir de ses effets *métaphysiques*, qui sont les propriétés métaphysiques de l'être. Dieu peut donc être démontré comme cause nécessaire des propriétés qui appartiennent nécessairement à tout être, en tant même que cet être est.⁵²

La portée de cette décision ne doit échapper à personne qui se soucie vraiment de comprendre l'esprit du scotisme, en tant du moins que le scotisme comporte une métaphysique. Pour qu'une métaphysique ainsi conçue soit possible, il faut que l'être, qui en est le sujet, soit posé par elle comme une nature commune, dont l'essence sera celle même de l'être en tant qu'être, et qu'on puisse en outre attribuer à cette nature des propriétés ou déterminations (*passiones*) telles que l'"un" ou le "multiple", l'"antérieur" ou le "postérieur", l'"acte" ou la "puissance", qui ne soient pas nécessairement incluses dans l'essence, ou quiddité, de l'être en tant précisément qu'il est être.⁵³ Allons plus loin, et la décision qu'il s'agit ici de prendre aura des répercussions incalculables sur la philosophie et sur plusieurs siècles de son histoire; — il faut que l'existence actuelle elle-même soit une de ces propriétés. Assurément, pour attribuer à un sujet des propriétés quelconques, il faut d'abord lui attribuer l'être: comment attribuerait-on quoi que ce soit au néant? Seulement, comme le dit Duns Scot lui-même en une formule dont la précision ne laisse rien à désirer, l'"être" dont part le métaphysicien et sur lequel porte en fait toute la métaphysique, ce n'est pas existence, c'est l'essence: "Si l'on présuppose que le sujet est, il ne s'agit pas

⁵⁰ Constat autem quod omnis scientia habet subjectum suum proprium. Inquiramus ergo quid sit subjectum hujus scientiae, et consideremus an subjectum hujus scientiae sit ipse Deus excelsus. Sed non est: imo ipse est unum de his quae quaeruntur in hac scientia. Dico ergo impossible esse ut ipse Deus sit subjectum hujus scientiae, quoniam subjectum omnis scientiae est res quae conceditur esse et ipsa scientia non inquirit nisi dispositiones illius subjecti et hoc notum est ex aliis locis. Sed non potest concedi quod Deus sit in hac scientia ut subjectum, imo quaeasit est in ea . . . Postquam autem inquiritur in hac scientia an sit, tunc non potest esse subjectum hujus scientiae; nulla enim scientiarum debet stabilire esse suum subjectum. Avicenne, *Metaph.*, Tract. I, cap. 1; fol. 70^b.

⁵¹ Item Commentator, *I Physicorum*, commento ultimo, dicit quod Avicenna multum peccavit ponendo metaphysicam probare primam causam esse, cum genus substantiarum separatarum sit ibi subjectum, et nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse; ratio autem non valeret, nisi intellegiteret quod ipsa esset ibi primum subjectum; ergo, etc. . . . Ad Commentatorem *I Physicorum* dico, quod Avicenna, cui contradixit, bene dixit, et Commentator male". *Op. Ox.*,

Prol., q. 3, a. 1, n. 3; t. I, p. 47 et a. 7, n. 21; t. I, p. 65. Cf. Sed videtur milii Avicennam melius dixisse quam Averroem. *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 46.

⁵² Contra Averroem: ex quolibet effectu ostenditur causam esse, quia impossibile est effectum esse nisi a causa tali, sive nisi talis causa sit; hujus modi sunt multae passiones metaphysicae, *prius* et *posteriorius*, *unum* et *multa*, *actus* et *potentia*; quomodo enim haec causatis insunt, nisi sit aliquid unum primum? *Qu. in Metaph.* VI, q. 4; Vivès, t. VII p. 348. Per omnem conditionem effectus potest demonstrari de causa quia est, quam impossibile est inesse effectum nisi causa sit: sed multae passiones considerantur in metaphysica quas impossibile est inesse nisi ab aliqua causa prima talium entium; ergo ex illis passionibus metaphysicis potest demonstrari aliquam primam causam istorum entium esse. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. III, a. 7, n. 21; t. I, p. 66. Cf. *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1, Vivès, t. XXII, pp. 46-47.

⁵³ Ens inquantum ens potest habere passionem aliquam, quae est extra essentiam ejus inquantum est ens; sicut esse *unum* vel *multa*, *actus* vel *potentia* est extra essentiam cujuslibet inquantum est ens sive *quid* in se. *Qu. in Metaph.* I, q. 1, n. 23; Vivès, t. XII, p. 22.

de son existence actuelle, mais de son être quidditatif, qui consiste en ce que sa notion n'est pas fausse en elle-même. Voilà l'est que le métaphysicien démontre du premier être à partir de ses effets, car il démontre qu'il y a un être à qui *premier* convient".⁵⁴ L'être que l'intellect du métaphysicien conçoit nécessairement comme premier, c'est celui que le théologien nommera Dieu, et il y a un être que l'intellect conçoit nécessairement comme premier, parce qu'il y a de l'être et que, s'il n'y avait aucun être qui fût premier, rien ne serait.

Conçue comme science de l'être et de ses propriétés, la métaphysique voit ainsi son statut propre, en tant que science, défini par son sujet propre, et elle trouve sa place distincte entre la physique qu'elle transcende et la théologie qui la transcende.

Son sujet propre, c'est l'*ens commune*, c'est-à-dire l'être pris dans son indétermination totale, comme prédicable de tout ce qui est. C'est parce que l'être nous est concevable sous cette forme qu'il y a une métaphysique⁵⁵ et c'est parce que la métaphysique a pour objet l'être en tant qu'être qu'elle se trouve requise, au dessus de la physique, pour établir le sujet de la théologie. Car la physique a pour objet propre l'être en mouvement; si donc, comme elle peut le faire, elle établit l'existence d'une première cause, elle s'arrêtera nécessairement à "la première cause de l'être en mouvement" qui est précisément le Premier Moteur d'Aristote et d'Averroès. Or être premier à titre de "moteur", c'est une perfection toute relative. Si haute soit-elle, ce n'est pas encore cette primauté dans l'ordre de l'être, qui requiert seule la perfection et l'infiniété propres à l'essence de Dieu.⁵⁶ Assurément, le Premier Moteur est en fait le

⁵⁴ *Tenetur igitur Avicenna (sc. quod metaphysica sit de ente). Prima ratio ejus sic declaratur: si est praeponitur de subiecto, non de actuali existentia, sed quod habet esse quidditativum, scilicet quod ratio ejus non est falsa in se. Tale si est ostenditur demonstratione quia a metaphysico de primo ente. Ostenditur enim, quod primum convenit enti alicui, et ita quia ille conceptus, ens primum, qui est perfectissimus subjecti, si esset hic subjectum, non includit contradictionem. Ergo si aliqua scientia supponeret istum conceptum pro subjecto, alia esset prior de ente, quae probaret praecedentem, de primo ente, quia conclusio demonstrationis illius esset prior tota scientia de primo ente. Quaest. in Met. VI, qu. 4, n. 3; éd. Vivès, vol. VII, p. 349. Cf. Avicenne, *Metaph.*, Tract I, cap. 2; fol. 70^{vb}: Igitur ostensum est tibi ex his omnibus quod ens in quantum ens communis est hirs omnibus (texte cité par les scotistes pour justifier l'attribution de l'univocité de l'être à Avicenne) et quod ipsum debet poni subjectum hujus magisterii, et quod non eget inquiriri an sit et quid sit, quasi alia scientia praeter hanc debeat assignare dispositionem ejus, ob hoc quod inconveniens est ut stabiliter suum subjectum an sit et certificet quid sit scientia cuius ipsum est subjectum, sed potius debet concedere tantum quia est et quid est. Ideo primum subjectum hujus scientiae est ens in quantum est ens, et ea quae inquirit sunt consequentia ens in quantum est ens sine conditione aliqua.*

⁵⁵ Nulla potentia potest cognoscere objectum aliquod sub ratione communiori quam sub ratione sui primi objecti; . . . sed intellectus cognoscit aliquid sub ratione communiori quam sit ratio entis materialis, quia cognoscit aliquid sub ratione entis in communi, alioquin metaphysica nulla esset

scientia intellectui nostro. Praeterea . . . quidquid per se cognoscitur a potentia cognitiva vel est objectum primum, vel continetur sub illo objecto: ens autem, ut est communius sensibili, per se intelligitur ab intellectu nostro, alias metaphysica non esset magis scientia transcendens quam physica; ergo non potest aliiquid esse primum objectum intellectus nostri quod sit particularius ente, quia tunc ens in se nullo modo intelligeretur a nobis. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, n. 3; t. I, pp. 331-332.

⁵⁶ Item perfectior conceptus de Deo possibilis physico est primum movens, possibilis autem metaphysico, est primum ens; secundus (*scil.* conceptus) est perfectior, tum quia absolutus, tum quia requirit perfectionem infinitam: nam primum perfectissimum (car être premier dans l'ordre de l'être, c'est être absolument parfait). Sed si enti non repugnat infinitas, non est perfectissimum quod non est infinitum; sed enti non repugnat infinitas. Primum movens tantum respectum dicit et non necessario ex formalis ratione sui requirit infinitatem. Qui autem habet perfectiorem conceptum de subjecto, potest perfectius de ipso ostendere, quia per illa in effectibus quae ducunt ad cognoscendum esse de tali conceptu. *Qu. in Metaph.* VII, q. 4, n. 1; éd. Vivès t. VII, p. 348. Multo etiam perfectius ostenditur primam causam esse ex passionibus causatorum consideratis in metaphysica quam ex passionibus naturalibus ubi ostenditur primum movens esse; perfectior enim cognitio et immediatior est de primo ente cognoscere ipsum ut primum ens, vel ut necesse esse, quam cognoscere ipsum ut primum movens. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 7, n. 20; t. I, p. 66. Observons une fois de plus la gradation des connaissances de Dieu accessibles aux diverses sciences: physique,

Premier Etre, mais Dieu n'est premier moteur que parce qu'il a créé le monde, ce qui est contingent par rapport à son essence; on ne conclura donc jamais le premier être à partir du premier moteur par voie d'inférence nécessaire, car le premier être pourrait être sans être premier moteur.⁷⁷ Aussi, comme le dit Duns Scot en un de ces raccourcis énergiques dont il a le secret, lorsque le physicien prouve qu'un certain moteur est premier, comment le ferait-il à moins d'être "plus métaphysicien pour le prédicat que physicien pour le sujet"?⁷⁸ Bref, la métaphysique transcende la physique comme la science de l'être en tant qu'être transcende celle de l'être en mouvement, et c'est pourquoi, transcendance à la physique, c'est bien la métaphysique, non la physique, qui doit établir l'existence de l'être premier.

En revanche, cet être premier, dont elle établit l'existence, n'est pas son propre sujet, mais celui de la théologie,⁷⁹ car s'il appartient à la théologie de traiter de Dieu comme de son sujet propre, la métaphysique se voit par là même interdire le droit de le revendiquer aussi comme sien. Elle ne l'atteint qu'indirectement. La métaphysique est pour l'homme la science naturelle suprême, parce que le sujet dont elle traite est le sujet suprême ici-bas accessible à l'intellect humain, mais ce sujet n'est pas Dieu, c'est l'être. D'où cette double conséquence: aucun savoir naturel humain ne peut parler de Dieu connu sous quelque notion qui lui soit propre,⁸⁰ et la métaphysique est un savoir qui tend vers l'objet de la théologie comme vers son terme. Telles sont la dignité et la limite de ce savoir naturel suprême: la dignité, parce qu'il tend vers la connaissance de Dieu comme vers sa cause finale et que, science de l'être en tant qu'être, ce savoir constitue la connaissance de Dieu la plus haute qui soit naturellement accessible à l'homme, en tant que Dieu est l'être premier, donc "un certain être";⁸¹ la misère parce qu'incapable d'outrepasser les limites de son

primum movens; métaphysique, *primum ens*; théologie, *ens infinitum*. La théologie pré-suppose la métaphysique, mais on passé de celle-ci à celle-là dès qu'on use du *primum ens* et *necessere esse* du philosophe pour atteindre l'*ens infinitum* du théologien.

⁷⁷ Nec etiam ratio ista primi moventis, ut sit de aliqua ratione ad quam pervenit naturalis, quia quamvis in eodem concurrent primitas movendi et essendi, tamen ex ratione ipsorum non includitur contradicatio quod non necessario eidem inessent, et ita nunquam naturalis ostendit primum ens esse, nisi per accidens; ita quod non ostendit aliquod ens esse primum, sed aliquod movens esse primum: sic nec aliquod ens esse ultimum, sed aliquod ultimum motum. *Qu. in Metaph.*, q. 1, n. 44; éd. Vivès, vol. VII, p. 34.

⁷⁸ Confirmatur: si metaphysicus non consideret esse de Deo nisi sicut demonstratur a physico, non cognosceret nisi de primo movente et ita non haberet aliquam notitiam quod subjectum suum est, quia primum movens non est suum subjectum, nec sequitur: primum movens, ergo primum ens, sicut non sequitur: prima nigredo, ergo primus color; nec physicus potest per ipsum ostendere de primo ente, amota ratione primi moventis. Quomodo autem de movente ostenderetur physicus primum, nisi in hoc sit magis metaphysicus propter praedicatum, quam physicus propter subjectum? *Qu. in Metaph.*, VII, q. 4, n. 2: éd. Vivès, vol. VII, p. 348. Ne se plaçant pas, comme avait fait Thomas d'Aquin, au point de vue de l'existence même du mouvement, Duns Scot a le droit d'admettre que le "premier moteur"

n'est pas nécessairement le "premier être".

⁷⁹ Ideo dico quantum ad istum articulum, quod Deus non est subjectum in metaphysica, quia sicut probatum est supra q. I, de Deo tanquam ut primo subjecto tantum est una scientia, quae non est metaphysica. *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 47. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, contrairement à Thomas d'Aquin, Duns Scot refuse de "subalterner" la métaphysique à la théologie. Pour qu'il y ait subalternation proprement dite, il faudrait que notre science métaphysique de l'être pût être déduite *a priori* de notre connaissance théologique de Dieu, ce qui n'est pas le cas: *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 10, n. 29; t. I, p. 74. *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, quaest. 4; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 53.

⁸⁰ Sed nulla ratio propria Dei conceptibilis a nobis statim apprehenditur ab intellectu viatoris; igitur nulla scientia naturaliter acquisita potest esse de Deo sub aliqua ratione propria. *Rep. Par.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 1; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 47. Cf. *op. cit.*, Prol., q. 3, quaestiuclia 3; Vivès, t. XXII, p. 52.

⁸¹ Cum vero probatur quod (metaphysica) est scientia de Deo per Philosophum VI *Metaph.*, dico quod ratio ejus sic concludit: nobilissima scientia est circa nobilissimum genus, vel ut primum objectum, vel ut consideratum in illa scientia perfectissimo modo quo potest considerari in aliqua scientia naturaliter acquisita. Deus vero non est subjectum primum in metaphysica, est tamen consideratum in illa scientia nobilissimo modo quo potest in aliqua scientia considerari naturaliter acquisita. *Op. Ox.*, Prol., q. 3, a. 7, n. 20; t. I, p. 65. Même la contemplation spirituelle (sauf l'exception

objet propre, elle ne saurait concevoir Dieu comme Dieu, mais seulement comme être. La métaphysique tourne, si l'on peut dire, autour de Dieu.⁶² En s'efforçant de le cerner à partir de la notion la plus commune qui nous soit ici-bas accessible, la science première atteint le sommet du savoir naturel humain, mais aussi sa limite.⁶³ Elle se distingue sur ce point de la théologie, comme la connaissance confuse de Dieu et de ses attributs saisis à travers la notion d'être premier et nécessaire se distingue de la connaissance de l'être infini, qui est le Dieu même du théologien chrétien.

Telles sont les relations authentiquement scotistes de la métaphysique à la théologie. Elles sont clairement déterminées par la délimitation mutuelle de leurs objets respectifs. Ajoutons qu'elles sont parfaitement franches quant à leur principe, bien que le jeu de leurs combinaisons possibles y introduise nécessairement une certaine complexité. Leur fermeté n'en est pourtant pas moins telle que, même dans les combinaisons de fait où elles s'engagent, elles ne demeurent intactes. Oeuvre d'un intellect réduit à la connaissance abstractive, notre métaphysique est une science faite de démonstrations *quia*, c'est-à-dire *a posteriori* et des effets aux causes. Nous n'avons pas d'autre science de l'être que celle-là et, quel que soit l'objet dont elle parle, elle n'en parle jamais qu'en tant qu'être ni d'autre manière que celle qui vient d'être définie. Inversement, dès qu'on parle de Dieu, on sort de la métaphysique pour entrer en théologie. On y est, même si c'est le métaphysicien qui en parle, car il parle alors, à l'aide d'une méthode *a posteriori* qui n'est pas celle de la théologie, d'un objet qui n'est pas le sien. Car l'objet de la théologie est Dieu. Toutes les vérités relatives à Dieu qui, de soi, sont connaissables *propter quid* et par la cause, relèvent donc de cette science qui traite de Dieu pris en soi et sous sa raison même de divinité. C'est pourquoi, dit expressément Duns Scot, toutes les vérités que le métaphysicien prouve au sujet de Dieu, relèvent simplement de la théologie. Elles en relèvent *simpliciter*, parce que Dieu est l'objet de la théologie et que dès qu'on établit, par exemple, l'existence d'un être premier, nécessaire, indépendant ou infini, puisque ce dont on parle ne peut être que Dieu, on parle de théologie même si on le fait en métaphysicien.

Pourquoi le fait-on en métaphysicien? Parce que le genre de démonstrations qu'on en donne n'est pas celui, *propter quid* et par la cause, qui convient à la science théologique en vertu de la nature même de son sujet. Dans l'état présent où il se trouve, l'homme ne peut atteindre ces conclusions, relatives à Dieu, que par des démonstrations *quia*, qui vont des effets à la cause. Lorsqu'il argumente ainsi sur l'être premier, indépendant, nécessaire ou même infini, celui qui le fait est donc un théologien qui parle de théologie en usant de la

du *raptus*): stat in tali conceptu communi, et ideo stat in aliquo conceptu qui est minoris intelligibilitatis quam Deus in se ut haec essentia. Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, n. 20; t. I, p. 318.

⁶² A propos de la thèse d'Aristote, que la métaphysique enquête *circa causas altissimas*: Unde *circa* proprie notat circumstantiam causalae finalis sicut et causalae materialis: unde metaphysica est *circa altissimas causas finaliter*, ad quarum cognitionem terminatur scientia metaphysicalis. Rep. Par., Prol., q. 3, a. 1; W. t. XI, pp. 20-21. Les causes suprêmes, non pas cette cause suprême qui est Dieu *ut hic*.

⁶³ Omne attributum ut hoc (sc. comme attribut de cette essence singulière qui est Dieu) potest per se scriri theologice de Deo, licet aliquod ut confuse cognitum sit metaphysice cognitum de ipso; sicut enim Deus ut sic et sic, id est ut hic (sc. comme essentia haec ut singularis), et ut confuse

cognitum, pertinet ad theologicum et metaphysicum, ita etiam quodlibet attributum sicut sumptum est quasi consideratio attributorum naturaliter a nobis intelligibilium est consideratio metaphysica; non sic autem attributa tantum convenientia huic essentiae ut haec, et non ei ut a nobis nunc naturaliter intelligitur, scilicet confuse. Op. Ox., Prol., q. 3, a. 7, n. 18; t. I, p. 63. Notons que cette connaissance confuse de Dieu par le métaphysicien relève vraiment de la métaphysique, mais seulement à titre secondaire (*secundum quid*), parce que l'objet propre de la métaphysique est la connaissance distincte et *a priori* de l'être, non la reconnaissance confuse et *a posteriori* de Dieu: Rep. Par., Prol., q. 3, quæstiuncula 1, nn. 10 et 11; W. t. XI, p. 22. C'est même pourquoi, science d'un objet distinct commun de manière distincte, le savoir métaphysique n'a pas sa cause dans le savoir théologique et ne lui est pas proprement subalterné.

méthode du métaphysicien. Ainsi, *simplement théologiques* parce qu'elles portent sur l'objet de la théologie, toutes les connaissances sur Dieu que nous prouvons à partir de ses effets sont *relativement métaphysiques*, parce qu'elles empruntent à la métaphysique son mode de démonstration.⁴ Duns Scot a complètement pris au pied de la lettre la définition classique de la théologie: *Sermo de Deo*.

III. L'ETRE COMMUN

L'Objet propre de la métaphysique scotiste est l'être, ce qui ne poserait aucun problème spécial si l'être dont il s'agit ici n'était l'être tel que le conçoit Duns Scot. Nul n'ignore que l'"univocité" constitue le caractère distinctif auquel on le reconnaît parmi les autres. Comprendre la doctrine scotiste de l'être, c'est donner un sens exact à la notion d'univocité de l'être. Pour y parvenir, nous nous proposons d'user d'un détour et de passer d'abord par la doctrine avicennienne de l'essence, dont la connaissance est en tout cas trop nécessaire à l'intelligence du scotisme pour que le temps voué à son étude puisse être complètement perdu.¹

Pour Avicenne, l'essence est la réalité même et la logique est la science qui enseigne à formuler correctement l'essence afin de la faire connaître telle qu'elle est.² Les essences se rencontrent sous deux états, dans les choses ou dans l'intellect, mais elles présentent en réalité trois aspects, parce que l'intellect lui-même peut les concevoir de deux manières différentes, soit dans leur essentialité pure et sans rapport avec quoi que ce soit d'autre, soit avec les caractères d'universalité ou de singularité que la prédication logique leur confère.³ En résumé, l'essence peut être considérée dans la chose même, car "tout ce qui est a une essence, par laquelle il est ce qu'il est, à laquelle il doit sa nécessité et par laquelle il existe".⁴ Elle peut être considérée dans l'intellect avec les déterminations d'universalité ou de singularité que la pensée lui attribue, et qui lui sont accidentielles, puisque, d'elle-même, elle n'est ni universelle ni singulière. Elle peut être enfin considérée en elle-même, auquel cas tout ce que l'on en peut dire est qu'elle est juste ce qu'elle est.

C'est sous ce dernier aspect qu'elle mérite de retenir l'attention, non seulement parce qu'il est caractéristique de l'ontologie d'Avicenne, mais aussi parce qu'il a profondément influencé celle de Duns Scot. Ainsi conçue, l'essence se présente en effet comme neutre à l'égard de toutes ses déterminations possibles. On la reconnaît à ce signe, qu'elle forme un objet distinct de pensée, dont la définition se suffit et qui peut être conçu à part. Prenons en exemple un genre quelconque: "Animal est en soi quelque chose qui reste le même, qu'il s'agisse de l'animal sensible ou de l'animal intellectuellement connu dans l'âme. Or, pris en soi, il n'est ni universel ni singulier. En effet, s'il était de soi universel, de telle sorte que l'animalité fût universelle en tant qu'animalité, aucun animal ne pourrait être singulier et tout animal serait universel. Que si, au contraire, animal était singulier en tant qu'animal, il serait impossible qu'il y eût plus d'un seul singulier,

⁴ Sur l'ensemble de ce problème, voir le travail de R. P. J. Owens, C. SS. R., publié plus loin, notamment les pages où cette question complexe nous semble discutée avec une remarquable précision. Nous lui devons d'avoir attiré notre attention sur le précieux texte des *Reportata Parisiensia* que nous venons de citer.

¹ Nous nous permettons de renvoyer sur ce point à notre étude: "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot", *Arch. d'hist. doct. et litt. du moyen âge*, II (1927). Sur l'ensemble de la question, voir C. L. Shircl,

O. F. M., *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus* (Washington, 1942).

² Avicenne, *Opera* . . . (Venise, 1508). Cf. *Logica*, Pars I; fol. 2rd.

³ Avicenne, *Logica*, Pars I; éd. cit., fol 2rd: *Essentiae vero rerum aut sunt in ipsis rebus aut sunt in intellectu; unde habent tres respectus.*

⁴ *Dicemus ergo quod omne quod est essentialium habet, qua est id quod est, et qua est ejus necessitas, et qua est ejus esse.* Avicenne, *Logica*, Pars I; éd. cit., fol. 3rd.

savoir ce singulier même à qui l'animalité appartiendrait de droit, et il serait impossible qu'un autre singulier fût animal." Ainsi, *animal* est en soi quelque chose que la pensée conçoit comme animal, et, en tant qu'il est conçu comme étant animal, il n'est rien d'autre qu'animal (*non est nisi animal tantum*). Mais si, outre cela, il est conçu comme étant universel ou singulier, ou quelque autre chose, ou conçoit alors, outre cela même qu'est *animal*, quelque chose d'autre qui survient à l'animalité comme un accident.⁵

Avicenne ne s'est pas lassé de revenir sur cette notion de l'essence conçue comme indifférente en soi aux déterminations logiques de la pensée. L'essence du cheval prise en elle-même est l'"équinité" et rien d'autre: *ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum.*⁶ On peut dire, en gros, que cette division tripartite des états de l'essence avicennienne préfigure les trois états scotistes de l'être: l'essence dans le réel singulier constitue son état physique; l'essence conçue par la pensée comme universelle ou singulière constitue son état logique; l'essence prise en elle-même et sans aucune autre détermination constitue son état métaphysique. Si cela est exact, on peut dès à présent prévoir, au moins comme hypothèse de recherche, que l'être dont Duns Scot fait l'objet de sa métaphysique, bien qu'il ne soit peut-être pas exactement une essence, est néanmoins connu par l'intellect comme s'il en était une: l'"être" pris en tant que tel et sans aucune autre détermination.

Oublions cette hypothèse pour aborder le même problème par un autre biais, celui de la notion d'"univocité".⁷ Aucune partie de la doctrine scotiste n'a fait

⁵ Animal est in se quiddam, et idem est utrum sit sensible aut sit intellectum in anima. In se autem hujus nec est universale nec est singulare. Si enim in se esset universale, ita quod animalitas, ex hoc quod est animalitas, esset universale, oportet nullum animal esse singulare, sed omne animal esset universale. Si autem animal, ex hoc quod est animal, esset singulare, impossibile esset esse plus quam unum singulare, scilicet ipsum singulare cui debetur animalitas, et esset impossibile aliud singulare esse animal. Animal autem in se est quiddam intellectum in mente quod sit animal, et secundum hoc quod intelligitur esse animal non est nisi animal tantum. Si autem praeter hoc intelligitur esse universale aut singulare aut aliquid aliud, jam intelligitur praeter hoc quiddam, scilicet id quod est animal, quod accedit animalitati. Avicenne, *Logica*, Pars III; éd. cit., fol. 12^a. Cf. Nam ipsum (sc. animal) ex animalitate sua tantum est animal. Intentio vero animalis, ex hoc quod est animal, est praeter intentionem proprii et communis, nec sunt intrantia in suam quidditatem. Cum ergo ita sit, tunc animal ex hoc quod est animal, nec est proprium nec commune ex sua animalitate, sed est animal, non aliud aliquid a se de dispositionibus, sed consequitur ipsum esse proprium vel commune. Avicenne, *Metaphysica*, tract. V, cap. 1; éd. cit., fol. 86^a. Duns Scot verra dans les "natures" de ce genre le résultat d'une *abstraction ultimata*: quando aliquid est abstractum ultimata abstractione, ita quod est abstractum ab omni eo quod est extra rationem ejus... Op. Ox. I, d. 5, q. 1, n. 7; t. I, p. 508. Cf. note suivante.

⁶ Individuum vero est hoc quod non potest intelligi posse praedicari de multis, sicut substantia Platonis hujus designati. Impossibile est enim intelligi hanc esse nisi ipsius tantum. Ergo universale ex hoc quod est

universale est quiddam, et ex hoc quod est quiddam cui accedit universalitas est quid-dam aliud; ergo de universalis ex hoc quod est universale constitutum, signatur unus praedictorum terminorum; quia cum ipsum fuerit *homo* vel *equus*, erit haec intentio alia praeter intentionem universalitatis, quae est *humanitas* vel *equinitas*. Definitio enim equinitatis est praeter definitionem universalitatis, nec universalitas continetur in diffinitione equinitatis. Equinitas etenim habet diffinitionem quae non eget universalitate, sed est cui accedit universalitas, unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum. Ipsa enim ex se nec est multa nec unum, nec est existens in his sensibilibus nec in anima, nec est aliquid horum potentia vel effectu, ita ut hoc contineatur intra essentiam equinitatis". Avicenne, *Metaphysica*, Tract V, cap. I; éd. cit., fol. 86^a. Cf. Duns Scot, Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 5, n. 7; t. I, p. 389, où il est fait allusion à ce texte. Voir aussi n. 13, p. 394; et plus loin, I, d. 5, q. 1, n. 6; t. I, p. 507, où ce concept est présenté comme un cas d'*abstraction ultimata*, c'est-à-dire *maxima*, où la quiddité formelle de la substance ou nature, est abstraite de ses supports.

⁷ Consulter sur ce point l'utile travail de Timotheus Barth, O.F.M., *De fundamento univocationis apud Joannem Duns Scotum* (Romae, 1939). Du même auteur, "Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit. Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis ihrer Entwicklung von Aristoteles über Porphyrius, Boëthius, Thomas von Aquin nach Duns Skotus. Philosophisches Jahrbuch, LV (1942), 300-321. Sur Duns Scot lui-même, art. cit., 310-321. La "nouveauté" que l'auteur attribue à Duns Scot (p. 312) apparaît peut-être comme une innovation moins radicale, si on la compare à la doctrine d'Avicenne sur le même point. Peut-être l'évolution qu'on cherche à déceler dans la pensée de Duns Scot est-elle

l'objet de plus d'études, dont un grand nombre se proposent d'ailleurs moins de l'exposer pour elle-même que de l'attaquer ou de la défendre. Essayons donc de la comprendre telle qu'elle est. A l'origine de la notion d'"univoque" se trouve celle de "synonyme". Tel qu'Aristote le définit au début des *Catégories*,⁸ le synonyme n'est pas un mot, mais une chose. Les choses sont "synonymes", lorsqu'elles portent le même nom pris dans le même sens. Ainsi, tous les "animaux" sont synonymes, et de même tous les "hommes", ou tous les "boeufs", parce que le même nom s'applique uniformément à l'intérieur de chacune de ces classes, avec le même sens tel qu'il ressort de sa définition. Pour que l'être fût univoque, au sens aristotelien du terme, il faudrait donc que tout ce qui porte le nom d'"être" fût être au même sens et en vertu de la même définition. Autrement dit, de même qu'un "animal" ne se distingue en rien d'un autre "animal", en tant du moins que l'un et l'autre appartiennent au genre "animal", ou de même qu'un "homme", pris en tant qu'homme, ne diffère en rien d'un autre individu de même espèce, de même faudrait-il qu'un "être" ne différât en rien d'un autre "être", en tant précisément que l'un et l'autre ont droit à ce nom.

C'est un fait bien connu que Duns Scot a enseigné l'univocité de l'être et l'on sait aussi à combien de controverses cette doctrine a donné naissance. Or, ici encore, Avicenne peut rendre service. Presque toutes ces controverses semblent présupposer que l'être en question soit celui d'Aristote. On se demande d'abord de quelle espèce philosophique d'"être" il s'agit. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple illustre, thomistes et scotistes se livrent à des joutes dialectiques interminables sur l'univocité de l'être, sans se douter, au moins la plupart du temps, que l'"être" dont ils parlent n'étant pas le même, il se peut en effet que l'un soit analogue et que l'autre soit univoque, parce que l'un est celui d'Aristote approfondi par Thomas d'Aquin et l'autre celui d'Avicenne. Nous voudrions essayer ici une deuxième hypothèse. Supposons que l'être dont parle Duns Scot ait été conçu par lui comme une de ces essences dont Avicenne disait que, prises en elles-mêmes, elles ne sont que ce qu'elles sont.⁹ Si tel était le cas, l'être, pris

ici plus apparente que réelle. Si l'univocité est l'état métaphysique de l'être, il est naturel qu'elle apparaisse à peine en logique, où les déterminations de l'essence à la singularité et à l'universalité engendrent plutôt des relations d'équivocité ou d'analogie. Cette réserve n'a pas pour objet de nier que Duns Scot ait évolué sur ce point, mais, simplement, de limiter la valeur de l'argument *ex absentia* tiré des écrits sur la logique. On peut voir (*art. cit.*, 314-315) combien une édition critique des textes serait nécessaire pour qu'il fût simplement possible de poser des problèmes d'évolution.

⁸ Aristote, *Catégories*, I, 1.

⁹ L'antériorité de l'essence pure, dans l'être concret lui-même, est clairement enseignée par Avicenne: Repetemus autem ea a capite et recolligemus ad declarandum ea alio modo, tanquam rememorantes quae prius dicta sunt. Dicemus ergo quod hoc est quiddam sensibile, quod est animal vel homo cum materia et accidentibus, et hoc est homo naturalis, et hoc est quiddam quod est animal vel homo consideratum ita seipso, secundum hoc quod est ipsum non accepto cum eo hoc quod est sibi admixtum sine conditione communis aut proprii, aut unius aut multi, nec in effectu nec in respectu etiam potentiae secundum quod est aliquid in potentia. Animal enim ex hoc quod est animal, et homo ex hoc quod est

homo, scilicet quantum ad diffinitionem suam et intellectum suum absque consideratione omnium aliorum quae comitantur illum, non est nisi animal vel homo; sed animal commune, et animal individuum, et animal secundum respectum quo est in his sensibilibus vel intellectum in anima, est animal et aliud non animal consideratum in se tantum. Manifestum est autem, quod cum fuerit animal et aliud quod non est animal, animal tunc erit in hoc quasi pars ejus; similiter et homo. Poterit autem animal per se considerari, quamvis sit cum alio a se; essentia enim ejus est cum alio a se, ergo essentia ejus est ipsi per se. Ipsum vero esse cum alio a se est quiddam quod accidit ei, vel aliiquid quod comitantur naturam suam, sicut haec animalitas et humanitas. Ergo haec consideratio, scilicet ex hoc quod est animal, praecedit in esse et animal quod est individuum propter accidentia sua, et universale quod est in his sensibilibus et intelligibile, sicut simplex praecedit compositum et sicut pars totum. Ex hoc enim esse nec est genus nec species nec individuum nec unum nec multa, sed ex hoc esse est tantum animal et tantum homo, nec comitatur illud sine dubio esse unum vel multa, cum impossibile sit aliiquid esse et non esse alterum istorum, quamvis sit comitans ipsum extrinsecus. Avicenne, *Metaph.*, tract. V, cap. 1; *éd. cit.*, fol. 87^{ra}.

précisément en tant qu'être, ne serait ni singulier ni universel, ni fini ni infini, ni premier ni second, ni parfait ni imparfait; bref, il ne posséderait aucune de ces déterminations "accidentielles" à son essence qui le définissent comme tel ou tel être. Ne serait-il pas, cet être qui n'est rien d'autre qu'être, fort semblable à l'être univoque de Duns Scot? Rien ne semble *a priori* plus vraisemblable, si du moins on admet, sous réserve de vérification, que chez Duns Scot comme chez Avicenne, la quiddité pure est la réalité propre dont traite la métaphysique.¹⁰ Que l'être de l'essence engagée dans des singuliers divers soit et ne puisse être qu'analogue, Duns Scot ne le contestera aucunement. En d'autres termes, l'univocité scotiste de l'être ne contredit pas l'analogie de l'être thomiste. Tel que le concouvent Aristote, Averroès et Thomas d'Aquin, l'être est en effet analogue, et il le restera pour Duns Scot lui-même, chaque fois du moins que cet être sera aussi celui dont parlera le physicien. Le vrai problème sera pour lui de savoir si, outre son état physique d'analogie, l'être ne comporte pas un état métaphysique d'"univocité", qui serait précisément son état d'"être en tant qu'être", celui où, pour parler le langage d'Avicenne, on pourrait dire de l'*ens* ce que le philosophe arabe disait de l'*equinitas*: *ipsum ens non est aliquid nisi ens tantum*? Voilà, semble-t-il, comment se pose chez Duns Scot le problème. Il se pose donc sur un terrain qui n'est plus celui d'Aristote ni de Thomas d'Aquin puisque, pour y pénétrer, il faut d'abord sortir du dilemme qu'imposait l'aristotélisme entre le singulier et l'universel, le "premier" et le "second", échapper du même coup à la nécessité de choisir entre l'analogie et l'univoque, ce que l'on ne peut faire qu'en isolant une notion d'être en quelque sorte métaphysiquement pure de toute détermination.¹¹

Rappelons d'abord à quelle occasion Duns Scot aborde le problème dans le texte le plus étendu qu'il lui ait consacré. Théologien, le commentateur de Pierre Lombard se demande si Dieu existe. Pourtant, l'objet de *notre théologie* n'est pas directement Dieu connu dans sa déité même, mais Dieu connu sous le concept

¹⁰ Un texte du traité scotiste *De Anima*, cité par Thim. Barth (*art. cit.*, p. 320) ne peut d'ailleurs qu'encourager à tenter cette voie: *Est enim duplex univocatio, una est logica, secundum quam plura convenient in uno conceptu tantum communi; alia est naturalis, secundum quam convenient in una natura reali. Exemplum ut in specie atoma de qua loquitur Philosophus VII Phys. text 24 . . . Praeter utramque univocationem est una metaphysica, secundum quam aliqua in genere propinquo. Et est media inter utramque, est enim minor prima et major secunda*" *De anima*, q. 1, n. 6; éd. Vivès, t. III, p. 477. Lorsqu'il s'agit de l'être, objet propre de la métaphysique, l'univocité en question ne peut être que métaphysique: c'est celle de l'essence pure. Il est vrai, que, selon Duns Scot lui-même, l'être n'est pas un genre, mais c'est précisément pourquoi nous le verrons formuler des réserves sur sa totale univocité. En tout cas l'être "habet quid; tum habet essentiam; tum quia alias non praedicaretur de aliquo in quid". *In Metaph.* I, q. 1, n. 23; éd. Vivès, t. VII, p. 22. L'être commun a donc bien une essence, même s'il n'a pas de définition.

¹¹ Nous acceptons entièrement la position du P. T. Barth, qui nous semble historiquement irréprochable: Alors qu'Aristote et la scolastique influencée par lui envisageaient toujours l'être sous l'aspect de la multiplicité et de la particularité, Duns Scot a entrepris, au moins partiellement, d'élaborer un concept pur de l'être, le concept du purement être (*den Begrif des reinen Soseins*). Dans

le premier cas, l'être inclut donc en soi ses modes concrets, mais non dans le deuxième cas. La conséquence qui en découle est inévitable et elle décide du destin de l'analogie et de l'univocité. L'être pris sans ses modes comme purement être est univoque, l'être avec ses modes est analogue." Thim. Barth, "Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit," 321. Le P. Barth a vu, à travers A. Forest (*La structure métaphysique du concret selon S. Thomas* [Paris, 1931], p. 154) que des suggestions en ce sens se trouvaient déjà chez Avicenne (*art. cit.*, 316, n. 89). Si, comme nous le proposons, on met la doctrine avicennienne de l'être en rapport avec celle de l'essence, les suggestions en question deviennent moins vagues qu'on ne les dit. Rappelons seulement la thèse d'Avicenne citée par Scot lui-même: *In ista questione videtur opinio Avicennae I Metaph. sua, cap. 2 et cap 5, quod ens dicitur per unam rationem de omnibus de quibus dicitur . . . Qu. in Metaph. lib. IV, q. 1, a. 5; éd., Vivès, t. VII, p. 147.* Le Docteur Subtil attribue l'univocité de l'être à Avicenne sur la foi d'un autre texte, qu'il travaille savamment à cette fin: *Op. Ox. I. d. 8, q. 3, a. 2, n. 22; t. I, p. 609.* On ne saurait nier que la doctrine soit conforme à l'esprit authentique de l'avicennisme, mais, jusqu'à présent, nul ne l'a encore trouvée, *ipsissimis verbis*, dans les écrits d'Avicenne. Notons, à titre de curiosité, que Duns Scot s'est plu à la déduire de certains textes d'Aristote: *Op. Ox. I. d. 8, q. 3, a. 2, n. 24; t. I, p. 610.*

le plus parfait qui nous en soit ici-bas accessible, c'est-à-dire celui d'"être infini". D'où la formule proprement scotiste du problème de l'existence de Dieu: *Utrum in entibus sit aliquid actu existens infinitum?*¹² Il s'agit donc de savoir si, entre les êtres, il en existe actuellement un qui soit infini. Sur quoi il ajoute aussitôt cette deuxième question: l'existence d'un infini, c'est-à-dire de Dieu, est-elle connue par soi? Et sa position générale sur ce point tient en deux citations, l'une de l'Ecriture (*Ps xii, 1*): "L'insensé a dit dans son coeur: Il n'y a pas de Dieu!", ce qu'il ne pourrait dire si le contraire était évident; l'autre d'Avicenne: "L'existence de Dieu n'est ni connue par soi, ni telle qu'on doive désespérer de la connaître".¹³ Comment l'existence de Dieu peut être établie, nous le chercherons ultérieurement. Le problème qui doit retenir d'abord notre attention est celui que posera Duns Scot lui-même immédiatement après avoir prouvé l'existence d'un être infini: Dieu nous est-il connaissable, comment et à quelles conditions? C'est en répondant à cette question qu'il va se trouver conduit à définir la notion proprement scotiste de l'être, celle qui, dans l'histoire de la philosophie, mérite de rester attachée à son nom.

Tout élément philosophique intégré à un problème théologique soulève pour l'historien la même difficulté: de ces deux disciplines, laquelle conditionne l'autre? La tentation la plus forte est normalement d'attribuer à la théologie une influence prépondérante. Mais plus on réfléchit, moins on y cède, car s'il est vrai qu'un théologien digne de ce nom est toujours avant tout théologien, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître en même temps que, s'il y a eu des théologies scolastiques diverses, c'est dans une large mesure parce que leurs auteurs y ont usé de techniques philosophiques différentes. Tel est du moins ici le cas. Pour atteindre son objet, qui est "l'être infini", notre théologie doit disposer de deux notions philosophiques, celles d'infini et d'être, et comme l'être est l'objet de la métaphysique, tout se passe comme si notre théologie présupposait une certaine métaphysique. Ne l'oubliions pas plus que ne l'oubliait Duns Scot lui-même: si la théologie seule a Dieu pour objet, elle doit du moins user d'une méthode métaphysique pour établir l'existence d'un être premier, nécessaire, indépendant et même infini. Il nous faut donc, à la fois et d'une nécessité pareille, une métaphysique de l'être qui s'oriente vers l'objet de la théologie et une théologie qui s'approprie ou s'annexe cette métaphysique de l'être. Métaphysique et théologie scolaire, en tant précisément que scolaire, sont à la fois distinctes et complémentaires.

Pour justifier sa propre conception de l'être, Duns Scot invoquera donc parfois des raisons philosophiques, dont une au moins est à elle seule suffisante et décisive. Nous l'avons déjà rencontrée, mais c'est ici le moment de la rappeler. L'être, objet premier de notre intellect, doit être quelque chose de plus que la quiddité de la chose matérielle, non seulement parce que, s'il était tel, le théologien devrait avouer que la vision beatifique est impossible, mais encore parce que le philosophe disposerait en pareil cas d'une physique, mais non d'une métaphysique. L'objet propre qu'étudie le physicien, c'est bien la *quidditas rei materialis*, mais en faire pareillement l'objet propre du métaphysicien, ce serait admettre que la métaphysique n'aît pas d'objet propre. Assurément, on pourrait alors se tirer d'affaire par quelque artifice, tel que recourir à une métaphysique de l'analogie, mais il faudrait ensuite accepter toutes les conséquences qui en découlent. Or la première de ces conséquences est que la métaphysique porte sur un objet que l'intellect humain est incapable d'atteindre. De là un agnosticisme métaphysique incurable, puisque cette science enseigne à la fois qu'elle porte

¹² Op. Ox. I, d. 2, q. 1, a. 1; t. I, p. 179.
Dans la formule de la question qui suit, l'équivalence des deux expressions est manifeste: *An aliquod infinitum sive an Deum*

¹³ esse sit per se notum; t. I, p. 180.

¹³ Item, Avic. I *Metaph.* *Deum esse non est per se notum nec desperatum cognosci.* Op. Ox. I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 2; t. I, p. 181.

sur "l'être en tant qu'être" et que, le seul être accessible à notre intellect étant "l'être du sensible", elle n'atteint jamais le premier en lui-même, mais doit se contenter d'en parler par analogie avec le second. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, dès qu'une telle métaphysique aborde l'être purement intelligible, elle se réfugie dans ce qu'elle nomme la "connaissance négative", comme si dire ce qu'une chose n'est pas nous conférait une connaissance quelconque de ce qu'elle est. Duns Scot s'est toujours vigoureusement élevé contre une pareille attitude.¹⁴ En lui, le philosophe et le théologien ici se rejoignent, car si la métaphysique est la science de l'être, le philosophe n'aura pas de métaphysique à moins d'avoir un concept propre de l'être en tant qu'être, et si la théologie dont nous disposons est la science de l'être infini, le théologien n'aura pas de théologie s'il n'a aussi une métaphysique de l'être. Il faut pouvoir connaître l'être pour pouvoir connaître Dieu.

Le connaissons nous? Oui, sans doute, mais avec des réserves qu'il faut préciser. Etablissons d'abord le fait, quitte à formuler plus tard les réserves.

L'établir, pour Duns Scot, c'est le constater. Il y a un concept de l'être, mais comment savons nous que nous le possédons? Usant d'une méthode qui s'inspire directement d'Avicenne, et qui annonce étrangement celle dont usera plus tard Descartes, Duns Scot propose cette règle générale pour s'assurer de l'existence de tout concept distinct: est distinct d'un autre tout concept dont on peut être certain sans être certain de l'autre.¹⁵ Ce qui n'est pas immédiatement inclus dans la certitude que l'on a du contenu d'un concept, n'appartient pas à ce concept. Ajoutons, puisque le concept atteint ici directement l'essence, que ce qui n'est pas inclus dans le concept que nous avons d'un être n'appartient pas à son essence.

Il suffit d'appliquer cette règle à l'"être" lui-même pour s'assurer que nous en avons un concept. Nous en avons un si, en fait, il nous est possible de concevoir "être" sans addition d'une détermination quelconque. Or nous le pouvons: "Nous expérimentons en nous, que nous pouvons concevoir être sans le concevoir comme un être en soi ou un être en autrui".¹⁶ Cette expérience subjective se double d'ailleurs d'une expérience objective: il y a une science de l'être en tant qu'être, qui est la métaphysique; Aristote lui-même le reconnaît.¹⁷ Or comment existerait-elle, si nous ne pouvions concevoir l'être en tant qu'être, indépendamment de toute détermination?

Comment le concevons nous? Lorsqu'il expose sa réponse à cette question, Duns Scot argumente comme si ce qui est vrai des essences l'était de l'être lui-même.¹⁸ Pris en tant que tel, c'est-à-dire comme ce qui tombe d'abord sous

¹⁴ Les scotistes ont souvent attaqué ce qu'ils nomment, en langage moderne, l'"agnosticisme" thomiste, et qui est lié pour eux à la métaphysique de l'analogie. Duns Scot lui-même a pris les devants: *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 2, n. 1; t. I, pp. 304-305.

¹⁵ Ille conceptus de quo est certudo est alias ab illis de quibus est dubius. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 12; t. I, p. 340. Omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de diversis, habet conceptum, de quo est certus, alias a conceptibus de quibus est dubius. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 1 et 2, a. 4, n. 6; t. I, p. 309. Nullus idem conceptus est et certus et dubius. *Ibid.* Deux concepts ainsi distincts correspondent à deux essences distinctes. Cf. Avicenne, *Metaph.*, tract. I, cap. 6; éd. cit., fol. 72^{ra}: Cum enim dixeris . . .

¹⁶ Experimur in nobis ipsis, quod possumus concipere ens, non concipiendo hoc ens in se vel in alio, quia dubitatio est, quando concipimus ens, utrum sit ens in se vel in alio. *Qu. in Met.*, lib. IV, q. 1, n. 6; éd.

Vivès, t. VII, p. 148.

¹⁷ Et hoc habemus per experientiam . . . quod est quaedam scientia, quae speculator ens in quantum ens, quae est metaphysica. *Rep. Par.* IV, d. 49, q. 7, n. 5; éd. Vivès, t. 24, p. 655.

¹⁸ Nous retrouvons ici la notion avicennienne de l'essence pure: *Animal enim, consideratum secundum quod est animal et secundum ejus animalitatem, non est proprium, nec imprimum quod est commune; utrumque enim removetur ab eo. Nam ipsum ex animalitate sua tantum est animal. Intentio vero animalis ex hoc quod est animal est praeter intentionem proprii et communis, nec sunt intrantia in suam quiditatem. Cum igitur hoc ita sit, tunc animal, ex hoc quod est animal, nec est proprium nec commune ex sua animalitate sed est animal, non aliquid aliud a se de dispositionibus, sed consequitur ipsum esse proprium vel commune. Avicenne, Metaph.*, tract. V, cap. 1; éd. cit., fol. 87^{ra}. L'indif-

les prises de l'intellect, l'être est antérieur à toutes les déterminations concevables. Il est donc aussi ce qu'il y a de plus commun. En effet, "les premières choses à connaître sont les plus communes, car c'est toujours le plus commun que l'on connaît en premier et l'on ne peut aller à l'infini dans les intelligibles. Ce qui est absolument le premier intelligible, est donc aussi ce qui est absolument le plus commun. Or rien n'est tel, sinon l'être, car aucun des dix genres de l'être n'est absolument le plus commun, puisque aucun d'eux n'est prédicable d'un autre genre (la quantité n'est pas qualité, etc.); un concept commun de l'être est donc possible". C'est précisément celui que nous avons. L'être est le premier objet de l'intellect parce que, le plus commun et même le seul absolument commun de tous, c'est par lui et en lui que nous connaissons tout le reste.¹⁹ Tel est l'"être en tant qu'être" de la métaphysique, science première parce que science du premier connaissable. Le propre de l'être ainsi conçu, c'est qu'il est *unius rationis*,²⁰ ce qu'Avicenne avait dit en affirmant, dans sa *Métaphysique*, tr. I, ch. 2 et 6, que l'être se dit en un seul sens de tout ce dont il se dit: *ens dicitur per unam rationem de omnibus de quibus dicitur*,²¹ et ce que Duns Scot répète à son tour, sous l'autorité d'Avicenne, en posant l'être métaphysique comme un concept un, premier et le plus commun de tous (*communissimum*) parce qu'il n'y en a qu'un seul qui soit plus commun que les catégories elles-mêmes, et c'est lui.²²

La notion d'"être commun", appuyée par l'autorité d'Avicenne, est fondamentale dans la doctrine de Duns Scot, aussi importe-t-il d'en mesurer à la fois l'étendue et les limites. La meilleure manière de faire l'un et l'autre est de préciser le caractère d'objet "premier" de l'intellect humain, qui vient d'être attribué à cette notion.

L'objet "premier" d'une faculté cognitive est de plein droit son objet propre, et lorsque cet objet propre est pris dans son indétermination totale, c'est-à-dire sans aucune condition restrictive, il en est l'"objet adéquat".²³ Dans le cas en question, si l'être est l'objet premier de l'intellect humain, cet intellect doit être naturellement capable de connaître tout ce qui "est", en tant du moins que

férence de l'essence n'est pas une exclusion, sans quoi elle ne serait plus indifférence. De soi, elle n'implique ni n'exclut la singularité ni l'universalité. C'est précisément cette indétermination foncière de l'essence qui permet de la concevoir tantôt comme "propre" à un individu, tantôt comme "commune" aux individus de même genre ou de même espèce. Ce qui est vrai d'"animal" est vrai d'"être".

¹⁹ In ista quaestione videtur opinio Avicennae I Metaph. suae, c. 2 et 6, quod ens dicitur per unam rationem de omnibus de quibus dicitur, sed non aequo primo, quia quedam sunt communia genera, sive species entis, quaedam vero passiones etc. Ad hoc est ratio illa: quae prima sunt ad intelligendum, sunt communissima, quia semper communius prius intelligitur et non est processus in infinitum in intelligibiliibus; ergo illud quod est primum intelligibile simpliciter, est communissimum simpliciter. Sed nullum est tale nisi ens, quia nullum decem generum est communissimum simpliciter, quia nullum praedicatur de alio genere; ens ergo potest habere unum conceptum communem. Q. in Metaph., 1. IV, q. 1, n. 5; éd. Vivès, t. VII, p. 147.

²⁰ Qu. in Metaph., 1. II, q. 3, n. 22; éd. Vivès, t. VII, p. 112.

²¹ Igitur ostensum est tibi ex his omnibus quod ens inquantum est ens commune est

omnibus his, et quod ipsum debet ponи subjectum hujus magisterii, et quia non eget inquiri an sit et quid sit, quasi alia scientia praeter hanc debet assignare dispositionem ejus ob hoc quod inconveniens est ut stabiliat suum subjectum an sit et certificet quid sit scientia cuius ipsum est subjectum, sed potius oportet concedere tantum quia est et quid est. Ideo primum subjectum hujus scientiae est ens inquantum est ens, et ea quae inquirit sunt consequentia ens inquantum ens sine conditione aliqua. Avicenne, Metaph., tract. I, cap. 2; éd. cit., fol. 70^{vb}. Quae autem promptiora sunt ad imaginandum per seipsa sunt ea quae communia sunt omnibus rebus, sicut res et ens et unum etc. Op. cit., tract. I, cap. 6; fol. 72^{tb}. Postquam autem una intentio est ens secundum hoc quod assignavimus, sequuntur illud accidentalia quae ei sunt propria, sicut supra docuimus, et ideo eget aliqua scientia in qua tractetur de eo, sicut omni sanativo necessaria est aliqua scientia. Loc. cit.; fol. 72^{vb}.

²² Qu. in Metaph., 1. IV, q. 1, n. 5; éd. Vivès, t. VII, pp. 147-148.

²³ Objectum proprium secundum totam suam indifferentiam est adaequatum objectum et respicit potentiam suam secundum totum genus suum ut proprium extrellum. Quodlib. XIV, n. 13; éd. Vivès, t. 26, p. 47.

cela est. Pour qu'un tel objet existe, encore faut-il qu'il soit un, c'est-à-dire, que ce soit bien le même objet que l'intellect conçoive en quelque être que ce soit. Or dire que l'intellect conçoit toujours *le même objet* lorsqu'il pense l'être, c'est dire que l'existence d'un objet premier, propre et adéquat de l'intellect exige que notre connaissance de l'être soit "univoque". Il reste à voir en quel sens et dans quelle mesure elle l'est.

Nommons "univoque" un concept suffisamment un, pour qu'il soit contradictoire de l'affirmer ou de le nier de la même chose, ou encore, si on le prend comme moyen terme d'un syllogisme, pour que les deux autres termes soient reliés par lui sans équivoque sophistique;²⁴ bref, un terme est univoque lorsque, dans tous les emplois qu'on en fait, il signifie véritablement la même chose. A quoi l'univocité de l'être s'étend-elle?

Absolument à tout ce qui est, en quelque sens qu'on puisse lui attribuer l'être, mais non pas à tout de la même façon. Car tout ce qui est intelligible inclut l'être, mais il peut l'inclure de deux manières différentes, soit, directement, en vertu de la "primaute de communauté" de l'être, soit, indirectement, en vertu de la "primaute de virtualité" de l'être. Ceci revient à dire que l'être est premier non seulement par rapport à tout ce à quoi il est commun, mais aussi à tout ce qu'il implique. Or il est commun à tout ce qui "est", à quelque degré et en quelque sens que ce soit; en tant que cela est précisément de l'être. Tels sont les individus, les espèces et les genres. Lorsqu'on leur attribue l'être, on le leur attribue *in quid*, c'est-à-dire comme étant de leur essence. D'autre part, il y a des dénominations de l'être, qui, prises en elles-mêmes, ne sont pas, mais le qualifient, en ce sens que ce qui est implique nécessairement l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles. Ainsi, "acte" ou "puissance", ne sont pas des êtres, mais tout être est nécessairement l'un ou l'autre. Les déterminations, de ce genre comprennent, soit des différences ultimes de l'être telles que celles que nous venons de désigner (*differentiae ultimae*), soit ses propriétés ultimes (*propriae passiones entis*) que l'on nomme encore "transcendantaux", comme le bien, le vrai ou le beau. L'être est univoque à tout l'intelligible de l'une ou l'autre de ces deux manières, mais il n'est univoque d'une univocité de communauté qu'à tout ce dont il se dit *in quid*, comme désignant une essence qui est. Quant aux différences ultimes et aux transcendantaux, qui déterminent l'essence de l'être en la qualifiant, il ne leur est univoque que d'une primaute de virtualité, parce qu'il les implique, bien qu'eux mêmes, pris précisément en tant que tels, ne "soient" pas.²⁵

L'être n'est pas univoquement prédictable de ses différences ultimes parce que, s'il l'était, elles ne pourraient être ses "différences". Cela est évident. De l'être en tant qu'être ne saurait servir à différencier de l'être en tant qu'être. Si les différences ultimes de l'être étaient elles-mêmes essentiellement de l'être, il faudrait leur ajouter des déterminations ultérieures qui, n'étant pas elles-mêmes de l'être, puissent servir à le différencier. A moins de remonter ainsi à l'infini, ce qui reviendrait à nier de l'être toute détermination ultime et à nous intendre

²⁴ Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, conceptum univocum dico qui ita est unus, quod ejus unitas sufficit ad contradictionem affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem: sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 5; t. I, p. 309. Plus simplement: univocum est, cuius ratio est in se una, sive illa ratio sit ratio subjecti, sive denominet subjectum, sive per accidens dicatur de subjecto. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 14; t. I, p. 600.

²⁵ Quantum ad primum dico quod ens non

est univocum dictum in quid de omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis nec propriis passionibus entis. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 335. *Dicere in quid*, ou *praedicare in quid* est attribuer à un sujet quelconque son essence comme telle, c'est-à-dire à titre d'essence; au contraire, dénommer un sujet par sa différence spécifique ou par quelque accident, c'est *praedicare in quale*. Cf. C. L. Shircl, *The Univocity of the Concept of Being*, pp. 31-34. Sur la notion de "differentia ultima", *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77.

par conséquent d'en prédiquer quoi que ce soit, il faut donc admettre qu'il y ait de l'intelligible qui ne soit pas directement l'être, mais sa qualification ou sa détermination.

C'est ce que Duns Scot exprime en faisant observer que, pour être univoques à l'être, il faudrait que les différences fussent à la fois différentes de l'être et identiques à lui. On aurait ainsi "divers êtres identiques", ce qui est absurde.²² A supposer d'ailleurs qu'on admît cette absurdité, elle conduirait à ceci, que rien ne pourrait plus être dit de l'être, sauf qu'il est l'être. Pour sortir de cette indétermination totale, il faut user d'un concept qui ne soit plus simple, comme l'est celui d'être, mais composé. Un tel concept sera donc formé de deux concepts. Pour que ce concept soit néanmoins doué par soi d'unité, il faudra que l'union des deux concepts dont il est formé soit celle de deux éléments dont l'un soit à l'autre dans le rapport de la puissance à l'acte. En d'autres termes, l'un des deux concepts en question devra jouer le rôle de déterminable, l'autre celui de déterminant. Le concept qui n'est ici que déterminable, c'est précisément celui d'être qui, en vertu de sa communauté universelle, n'inclut de soi aucune détermination. L'être correspond à la potentialité absolue dans l'ordre du concept. Pour que ce pur déterminable cesse d'être tel, il faut nécessairement le composer avec de purs déterminants, qui soient immédiatement actes comme lui-même est immédiatement puissance. Ainsi, "dans l'ordre des concepts, tout concept qui n'est pas absolument simple (*simpliciter simplex*) mais est pourtant un par soi (c'est-à-dire, non par accident), doit se résoudre en un concept déterminable et un concept déterminant. Cette résolution devra donc s'arrêter à des concepts absolument simples, savoir, un concept seulement déterminable, qui n'inclue rien de déterminant, et un concept seulement déterminant, qui n'inclue aucun concept déterminable. Le concept seulement déterminable est le concept d'être et le concept seulement déterminant est celui de sa différence ultime. Ces deux concepts seront donc immédiatement distincts (*primo diversi*), de sorte que l'un n'inclue rien de l'autre."²³ Bref, comme le dit parfaitement Duns Scot: *nulla differentia simpliciter ultima includit ens quidditative, quia est simpliciter simplex*.²⁴ Grâce à cette première réserve sur l'étendue de l'univocité, le métaphysicien pourra obtenir des concepts de l'être qui soient simples, bien que non absolument simples, et pourtant distincts.

Posons la même question à l'égard des propriétés transcendantes de l'être.²⁵ Chaque fois que l'on veut définir l'une d'entre elles, l'un ou le vrai par exemple,

²² Si differentiae includant ens univoce dictum de eis, et non sunt omnino idem (sans quoi elles, ne seraient pas des différences), ergo sunt diversa entia. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 335.

²³ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 336. Le concept est dit *simpliciter simplex* lorsqu'il ne peut se résoudre en d'autres concepts; il est seulement *simplex*, lorsque, résoluble en plusieurs concepts, il est néanmoins concevable par une intellection simple. Cf. Alius est *conceptus simpliciter simplex* et alius est *conceptus simplex*, qui non est *simpliciter simplex*. *Conceptum simpliciter simplicem voco*, qui non est resolutibilis in plures conceptus, ut *conceptus entis vel ultimae differentiae*. *Conceptus simplex*, sed non tamen *simpliciter simplex*, est quicunque potest concipi ab intellectu actu *simplicis intelligentiae*, licet possit resolutio in plures *conceptus scorsum conceptibiles*, sicut est *conceptus definiti vel speciei*. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 6, n. 21; t. I, p. 319. Ou encore: *Voco autem conceptum simpliciter simplicem qui non est*

resolutibilis in aliquos conceptus simplices, quorum quilibet possit actu simplici distincte cognosci." *Op. Ox.* I, d. 2, q. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 187.

²⁴ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3; q. 3, a. 2, n. 14; t. I, pp. 343-344. Cf. *Op. Ox.* IV, ii, 47; t. 17, p. 430.

²⁵ Duns Scot distingue deux groupes de *passiones entis*: celles qui correspondent aux transcendantes classique, et qui sont convertibles avec l'être: ce sont les *passiones convertibiles simplices*; celles qui, allant par couples de contraires, ne sont attribuables à un être que disjonctivement: ce sont les *passiones disjunctae* (nécessaire—possible; infini—fini, etc.). Les propriétés du deuxième groupe ne sont pas moins transcendantes que celles du premier, parce qu'elles ne sont pas des déterminations génériques. Tout ce qui est fini, rentre dans un genre quelconque, mais la "finitude" n'est pas elle-même un genre de l'être, elle en est une modalité. C'est pourquoi Duns Scot dit: *utrumque membrum illius disjuncti est transcendens, quia neutrum determinat*

on est obligé d'ajouter l'être pour formuler la définition. Si l'être s'ajoute alors au transcendental, c'est donc qu'il n'est pas inclus immédiatement et de soi dans l'essence ou quiddité de ce transcendental. L'un, c'est "l'être un", c'est-à-dire l'être lui-même plus quelque chose d'autre, qui est précisément l'unité. D'ailleurs, si "un" ou "vrai" incluaient essentiellement l'être, on devrait les rencontrer comme nécessairement inclus dans l'une des divisions essentielles de l'être. Or l'être se divise, en tant qu'il s'agit de ce qui l'inclut essentiellement (*quid-ditative*), en être incréé et être créé. Pourtant ce transcendental, le "vrai", n'est pas, de soi, de l'être incréé, car il y a de l'être créé qui est vrai; il n'est pas non plus, de soi et par essence, de l'être créé, car, s'il l'était, il serait un des dix genres de l'être, ce qu'il n'est pas; il n'est pas même de soi différence spécifique dans un genre quelconque d'être créé, car, s'il l'était, il serait de soi détermination limitative de l'être et ne pourrait donc plus s'appliquer à l'être infini. Or rien n'est plus faux que ne le serait cette dernière conséquence, car tous les transcendantaux, du fait même qu'ils expriment des perfections pures et simples, non seulement conviennent à Dieu, mais lui conviennent au suprême degré.³⁰

Cette double restriction est d'une grande importance pour une interprétation correcte de la métaphysique scotiste de l'être. Il suit en effet de là que la "communauté", à laquelle l'être doit son caractère "univoque", s'y applique à toute essence quelconque, mais non pas directement à ses déterminations. Si l'on cherche un concept désignant un objet premier de notre intellect qui soit quidditativement commun à tout intelligible, il n'y en a pas, car rien n'est en ce sens objet premier de l'intellect.³¹ La métaphysique doit donc se contenter de moins, si elle veut sauver "de quelque manière" l'existence d'un objet premier de l'intellect.³² Or il le faut absolument, puisque son existence même est à ce prix.³³ Pas de premier connaisable, pas de science première. A défaut d'une intuition intellectuelle de l'Etre infini qui nous manque, et dans laquelle d'ailleurs nous ne connaîtrions encore le reste que comme "virtuellement" contenu, nous devons ou bien renoncer à poser un objet premier et adéquat de l'intellect humain, ou bien le poser comme premier à titre d'objet "commun" et seulement en tant que tel.³⁴

On peut du moins affirmer qu'en tant que tel, l'être est vraiment premier, car il appartient à l'essence de tout ce qui est, en quelque sens que ce soit. Il y est donc "essentiellement", ou, ce qui revient au même, "quidditativement" contenu, c'est-à-dire qu'on peut l'en prédiquer *in quid*, parce qu'en effet cela est essentiellement un être. La connotation vaut pour tout l'être fini et pour tout ce

suum determinabile ad certum genus. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 2, n. 19; t. I, p. 606, Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 39, a. 3, n. 13; t. I, p. 1214, où l'on voit qu' à partir du terme inférieur de chacun de ces couples de transcendantaux, il est possible de démontrer l'autre terme, ce qui sera la méthode préférée de Duns Scot pour établir l'existence de Dieu: si aliquod ens est finitum, ergo aliquod ens est infinitum, et si aliquod ens est contingens, ergo aliquod ens est necessarium; quia in talibus non posset enti particulariter inesse imperfectius extreum, nisi alicui enti inessest perfectius extreum a quo dependerer.

³⁰ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 7; t. I, pp. 336-337.

³¹ Cum nihil possit esse communius ente, et ens non possit esse commune univocum dictum in quid de omnibus per se intelligibiliis, quia non de differentiis ultimis nec de passionibus suis, sequitur quod nihil est primum objectum intellectus nostri propter communitatem in quid ipsius ad omne per se intelligibile. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2,

n. 8; t. I, p. 337.

³² Quod si ens ponatur aequivocum creato et increate, substantiae et accidenti, cum omnia ista sint per se intelligibilia a nobis, nullum videtur posse poni primum objectum intellectus nostri, nec propter virtualitatem, nec propter communitatem. Sed ponendo illam positionem quam posui in prima quaestione hujus distinctionis de univocatione entis, potest aliquo modo salvari aliquod esse primum objectum intellectus nostri. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 335.

³³ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, n. 5; t. I, pp. 333-334. Ce pluralisme radical de l'être réel, qui rend impossible l'existence d'un objet de l'intellect premier dans l'ordre de la quiddité, trouvera sa justification lorsqu'il sera traité du rapport des êtres finis à l'être infini.

³⁴ Vel igitur nullum ponetur primum objectum, vel oportet ponere primum adaequatum propter communitatem in ipso. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 6; t. I, p. 335.

qui lui appartient à titre de partie constitutive: l'individu, l'espèce, le genre même sont de l'être, car il y a toujours un sens où il est vrai d'en dire que cela est. De même, on le verra bientôt, pour l'être incrémenté, car s'il est, il est de l'être. Tels sont les *prima intelligibilia*: genres, espèces, individus, avec les parties essentielles de tous ces êtres, et Dieu. Quant aux différences ultimes, comme acte ou puissance, causé ou incausé, contingent ou nécessaire par exemple, elles ne sont pas essentiellement incluses dans l'être commun, mais elles sont toutes essentiellement incluses dans certains de ces êtres: "nécessaire" dans l'être incrémenté, "causé" dans l'être créé. Elles se disent donc "essentiellement" de toute chose dont l'être se dit "essentiellement". Restent les transcendantaux, comme "un", ou "vrai"; or, s'ils ne se prédiquent "essentiellement" ou quidditativement de rien, et s'ils ne sont pas eux-mêmes de l'être, ils sont des propriétés de l'être (*passiones entis*) et, à ce titre, "virtuellement" inclus sous lui. Ainsi, remarque Duns Scot, "ce à quoi l'être n'est pas quidditativement univoque est inclus dans ce à quoi l'être est quidditativement univoque".²⁵ Bref, si on le prend dans sa communauté absolue, l'être se dit au même sens de l'essence de tout être; quant aux différences ultimes et aux transcendantaux qui le déterminent, ils ne sont pas directement inclus dans son univocité, mais les premiers sont toujours essentiellement inclus et les seconds virtuellement inclus dans un être qui relève lui-même de l'univocité.

Si la doctrine de la *communitas entis in quid* ne valait que pour le domaine de l'être fini, elle n'aurait sans doute que l'importance d'un incident, tout au plus d'une curiosité, dans l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale, mais on voit qu'elle s'étend à l'être divin lui-même, ce qu'elle ne pouvait faire sans engager la théologie dans une voie où plusieurs ont hésité à la suivre. Duns Scot lui-même n'y est pas entré sans hésitations, peut-être même pas sans scrupules, certainement pas sans avoir claire conscience de ce qu'il y avait d'inusité dans sa démarche,²⁶ mais on ne peut douter qu'il s'y soit enfin résolu.²⁷

Prouver que l'univocité de l'être s'étend même à l'être incrémenté c'est, ici comme dans le cas de tous les concepts, prouver qu'il y a un tel concept, et la seule manière de le prouver est de le faire voir. Un concept existe, rappelons-le, lorsqu'il peut être conçu à part de tout autre et un tel concept n'inclut que ce dont l'intellect est certain en le concevant, tandis qu'il demeure ignorant ou incertain du reste. Un sujet distinctement concevable sans un prédicat n'inclut pas ce prédicat et un tel prédicat n'appartient donc pas au concept d'un tel sujet. Or l'intellect de l'homme, dans sa condition présente, peut concevoir l'être sans le concevoir comme fini ou comme infini, comme créé ou incrémenté, donc le concept d'"être" est un concept distinct de ces derniers. Sans doute, lui-même est inclus dans l'un et l'autre, mais ni l'un ni l'autre ne sont inclus en lui. De lui-même, il n'est ni l'un ni l'autre: *et ita neuter ex se* ou, comme nous dirions nous-mêmes, il est "neutre" à leur égard; bref, il leur est "univoque".²⁸

²⁵ Op. Ox. I, a. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 8; t. I, p. 338.

²⁶ Secundo, non asserendo, quia non consonat opinioni communi, dici potest, quod non tantum in conceptu analogo conceptui creaturae concipitur Deus, qui scilicet sit omnino aliud ab illo qui de creatura dicitur, sed in conceptu aliquo univoco sibi et creaturae. Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 5; t. I, p. 309.

²⁷ En l'absence d'une édition critique de l'œuvre de Duns Scot, il est prématûr de poser le problème d'une évolution possible de sa pensée sur ce point. La tradition manuscrite ne s'accorde pas toujours avec l'imprimé de Wadding (E. Gilson, 'Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot', 160, n. 1) et les notes marginales de ms. Z. 291, de

l'Ampioniana d'Erfurt, peuvent s'interpréter comme lui attribuant un changement d'opinion (Thim. Barth, 'Zum Problem der Eindeutigkeit', 314-315). Le IV livre des *Quaest. in Metaph.* existerait en deux rédactions, l'une où Duns Scot tiendrait encore pour l'analogie, l'autre où il enseignerait l'univocité. Le texte de Wadding-Vives aurait mélangé les deux: *art. cit.*, 315. Personnellement, pour des raisons trop provisoires pour mériter d'être exposées, j'incline à admettre que la pensée de Duns Scot s'est au moins progressivement précisée sur ce point.

²⁸ Intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo quod sit ens, dubitando de ente finito vel infinito, creato vel increate; ergo con-

Une expérience impersonnelle et objective peut d'ailleurs venir ici en aide à l'expérience personnelle et subjective, c'est celle de l'histoire de la philosophie. Duns Scot excelle à jouer de cette "preuve par les philosophes", dont la métaphysique moderne est encore loin d'avoir tiré tout le parti possible. En fait, observe-t-il, certains philosophes ont admis que le premier principe des choses est le feu, d'autres l'eau, mais tous étaient du moins certains que c'était un "être". Pourtant, ils ne pouvaient pas être en même temps certains que cet être fut créé ou incrémenté, premier ou non. Ils ne pouvaient pas être certains qu'il fut premier, car ni l'eau ni le feu ne sont l'être premier; cela est faux et, en tant que faux, ce ne peut être objet de connaissance, moins encore de certitude. Ils ne pouvaient pas non plus être certains que le feu ou l'eau ne sont pas l'être premier, car s'ils l'eussent été, ils n'eussent pas soutenu le contraire. Il ressort de cette discorde philosophique, qu'on peut être certain que le principe premier est l'être, sans avoir pour autant aucune certitude touchant la nature de l'être en question.³⁰ Il existe donc un concept de l'être comme tel qui, en raison de sa communauté à tout ce qui est, vaut pour l'être incrémenté comme pour tout le reste.

Le deuxième argument qui justifie l'extension de l'univocité à l'être divin, est de la plus haute importance historique, car il nous introduit au dialogue intérieur que Duns Scot poursuit avec Thomas d'Aquin. L'objection qu'il s'adresse à lui-même revient en effet à se demander: pourquoi poser le concept d'être comme univoque au créé et à l'incréé, puisqu'il suffirait de le poser comme analogue?

Ce qui permet aux dialogues philosophiques de se prolonger, chaque partie restant contente d'elle-même mais surprise par l'obstination de l'adversaire, c'est que les interlocuteurs ne parlent pas la même langue. La doctrine thomiste de l'analogie est avant tout une doctrine du *jugement d'analogie*. C'est en effet grâce au jugement de proportion que, sans en altérer la nature, on peut faire du concept un usage tantôt équivoque, tantôt analogique, tantôt univoque. Dans une telle noétique, où le concept reste inséparable de l'expérience sensible dont l'intellect humain l'abstrait, il n'y a pas d'espoir qu'aucune manipulation lui fasse "représenter" l'être intelligible. L'usage thomiste de tels concepts dans le jugement ne vise donc aucunement à produire une analogie qui serait une "ressemblance" d'image à objet. On ne pense jamais sans image même ce dont il ne peut y avoir d'image et c'est pourquoi le jugement d'analogie cherche à poser, à partir du sensible qui nous est représentable, des rapports correspondants entre des intelligibles qui ne le sont pas. L'analogie à laquelle pense Duns Scot est beaucoup plutôt une analogie du concept. Or, sur le plan du concept et de la représentation, l'analogie se confond pratiquement avec la

ceptus entis de Deo est alius conceptus a conceptu isto vel illo, et ita neuter ex se, sed in utroque illorum includitur; ergo univocus. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 6; t. I, p. 309. Noter la précision: "intellectus viatoris", car ce qui est vrai de l'état présent de l'homme ne l'est pas nécessairement d'un autre. Rappelons enfin que fini et infini sont des modalités de l'être, incluses sous lui comme attributs essentiels d'êtres déterminés. Ajoutons que ce qui est "neutre", c'est le concept, car l'être réellement existant ne l'est pas: *Op. Ox.* I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, n. 11; t. I, p. 598. Le concept commun d'être est formellement neutre au fini et à l'infini, mais un être réel est nécessairement l'un ou l'autre.

³⁰ *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 6; t. I, pp. 309-310. Le même argument est formulé

ailleurs en termes plus abstraits: De quo cumque enim praedictorum conceptuum (sc. creatum, increatum) quidditativorum contingit intellectum certum esse ipsum esse ens, dubitando de differentiis contrahentibus ens ad talem conceptum, utrum sit tale ens vel non: et ita conceptus entis, ut convenit illi conceptui, est alius ab illis conceptibus inferioribus de quibus intellectus est dubius. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 9; t. I, p. 338. Nous entendons ainsi le sens du texte: l'intellect ne peut penser "créé" ou "incrémenté" sans les rapporter à l'être, mais il peut penser "être" sans le déterminer par l'une ou l'autre de ces deux différences; donc le concept d'être est autre que ceux de ces différences et il est concevable à part. Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, n. 6-7; t. I, pp. 593-595.

ressemblance. Il ne s'agit plus alors de savoir si deux termes jouent un rôle analogue dans un jugement de proportion, mais si le concept désigné par un terme est ou n'est pas le même que le concept désigné par l'autre. Dans une doctrine où la connaissance de l'être inclut nécessairement le rapport d'une essence à un individu existant, puisque tout individu existant est par définition "un autre", l'être réel est toujours connu comme analogue; mais dans une doctrine où l'être est défini par le concept, il est nécessairement univoque dans les limites de ce concept, puisque autrement il n'y aurait pas de concept. C'est pourquoi, lorsqu'il rencontre l'analogie thomiste, on ne peut pas dire exactement que Duns Scot la réfute, on dirait plutôt qu'il ne peut pas y croire: "si l'on dit que le concept d'un être est analogue" à celui d'un autre être, parce que ces deux concepts sont en effet tout proches, ne faudra-t-il pas dire qu'aucun concept n'est univoque? Car si vous dites qu'il existe un concept unique d'*homme*, qui soit le même pour Socrate et pour Platon, on le niera. On répondra qu'il y en a deux, mais qu'ils ont l'air de n'en faire qu'un à cause de leur grande ressemblance.⁴⁰ Evidemment, ce serait perdre son temps que de vouloir concilier les deux doctrines et, tout autant, de réfuter l'une par l'autre. L'origine de leur divergence est antérieure au conflit qui les met ici aux prises. On aurait sans doute beaucoup surpris Duns Scot en lui disant que l'analogie thomiste ne se réduit pas à la ressemblance formelle, que deux concepts qui se ressemblent étroitement peuvent en effet n'être qu'analognes et que l'analogie peut se rencontrer au contraire, comme c'est le cas lorsqu'on étend à Dieu la notion d'être, entre des concepts qui désignent des objets infiniment différents.

Un malentendu bien compris peut être une source de clarté, du moins en histoire, et celui-ci permet de donner leur sens plein à certains arguments dont use Duns Scot contre la position de Thomas d'Aquin. Ils sont si intimement liés à sa propre doctrine, qu'ils l'éclaircissent bien qu'ils obscurcissent plutôt celle de son adversaire. Ce que Duns Scot entend prouver, c'est en effet qu'un concept de l'être, qui ne serait qu'"anologue" à celui que nous en avons, est pour nous impossible. Pour l'établir, il fait voir qu'un concept de l'être qui ne serait qu'analogue au nôtre, serait *un autre concept*. Or nous ne pouvons pas en former d'autre, et si nous n'en avons qu'un, il est nécessairement univoque. Que nous ne puissions pas en former d'autre, rien n'est plus certain. C'est un fait, et Thomas d'Aquin lui-même ne cesse de le rappeler, que tous nos concepts sont abstraits, par l'intellect agent, du phantasme ou de l'objet connu dans le phantasme. Notre concept de l'être n'est pas soustrait à cette loi, car il est tel et nous n'en avons pas d'autre. Par où l'on tient déjà la conclusion. Si nous ne pouvons saisir l'être que dans ce concept tiré du sensible, comment pourrions nous former *un autre concept* de l'être, analogue au premier, et qui s'appliquerait à l'être de Dieu?⁴¹ Manifestement, nos deux philosophes ne parlent pas de la même chose, Thomas d'Aquin en appellant ici aux usages analogiques d'un même concept qui, lui-même ne cesse de le redire, est le seul que nous ayons de l'être tant que notre âme est unie à son corps, alors que Duns Scot

⁴⁰ Quod si non cures de auctoritate ista accepta ex diversitate opinionum philosophantium, sed dicas quod quilibet habet conceptus in intellectu suo propinquos, qui propter propinquitatem analogiae videntur esse unius conceptus, contra hoc videtur esse quia, ex ista evasione, videretur destructa omnis via probandi unitatem alicujus conceptus univocam; si enim dicis hominem habere unum conceptum ad Socratem et Platonem, negabitur, et dicetur: sunt duo, sed videntur unus propter magnam similitudinem. *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 7; t. I, p. 310. Cf. *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, n. 7;

t. I, pp. 594-595.

⁴¹ *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 8; t. I, p. 310. Dans un passage ultérieur, Duns Scot élargit sa critique en montrant que, pour la même raison, la doctrine thomiste nous interdirait en fait de former une notion de l'être assez commune pour se dire au même sens de la substance et de l'accident: *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 9, *Secundam rationem*; t. I, pp. 338-339. Sur l'impossibilité de former aucun concept propre à Dieu sans recourir à l'univocité: *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, n. 4; t. I, p. 591.

entend exiger de lui qu'il en forme d'abord un deuxième avant de le déclarer "analogique" au premier.

Le troisième et dernier argument en faveur de l'univocité pourrait être omis comme exprimant plutôt un souci de théologien si, précisément, il n'intéressait dans une certaine mesure la possibilité de toute théologie naturelle. Si l'on refuse d'étendre univoquement à Dieu le concept d'être, fait observer Duns Scot, on devra pareillement refuser de lui appliquer aucun de nos concepts, car ils sont tous formés de la même manière: "Toute enquête métaphysique sur Dieu procède de la manière suivante: on considère la raison formelle de quelque chose, on ôte de cette raison formelle l'imperfection qu'elle aurait dans les créatures, on pose cette raison formelle à part en lui attribuant la perfection absolument suprême, et on l'attribue à Dieu sous cette forme". C'est ce que fait le métaphysicien, en attribuant par exemple à Dieu la sagesse, l'intelligence ou la volonté. Il considère d'abord chacune d'elles en elle-même et pour elle-même, ce qui suffit à les purifier de ce qu'elles ont d'imperfections dans les créatures, puisque, prises en elles-mêmes, elles n'incluent formellement ni imperfection ni limites. On obtient ainsi une sagesse, une intelligence et une volonté dont chacune n'est que cela même qu'elle est, et rien d'autre, et qu'il ne reste plus qu'à attribuer à Dieu en la portant au supreme degré de perfection: "Toute enquête sur Dieu suppose donc que l'intellect y ait le même concept univoque, qu'il tire des créatures". Et si on le conteste, il faudra donc conclure qu'aucun des concepts que nous tirons des créatures ne s'applique véritablement à Dieu, ou, si l'on préfère, que n'importe quel concept tiré des créatures peut indifféremment s'appliquer à Dieu. Car s'il s'agit de concepts univoques, Dieu est "sage", mais Dieu n'est pas "pierre" et il est vrai de dire l'un, mais non pas l'autre, parce que ce sont bien les raisons formelles de sagesse et de pierre, telles que nous les concevons, qui sont alors en question. Que si, au contraire, il ne s'agit plus que de concepts analogiques, il se peut qu'il y ait en Dieu quelque chose d'analogique à ce que nous nommons sagesse, mais il peut bien y avoir aussi en lui quelque chose d'analogique à ce que nous nommons pierre, son idée en Dieu par exemple, et, en ce sens, pourquoi ne dirions nous pas "Dieu est pierre" comme nous disons "Dieu est sage"?⁴² Sur le plan de l'analogie pure, on ne peut rien dire de Dieu à partir des créatures, où l'on peut tout attribuer à Dieu à partir des créatures, indifféremment.

Théologie et métaphysique sont donc liées, dans leur possibilité même, à celle de concevoir l'être comme univoque et par conséquent comme "commun". Cette conclusion donne pourtant naissance à un dernier problème; celui de savoir si l'être ainsi conçu est ou non un "genre". Nul ne saurait manquer de voir la portée de cette question dans une doctrine où l'être est posé comme univoque. D'une part, Duns Scot ne peut admettre que l'être commun soit un genre, car ce serait inclure dans le même genre le créé et l'intré, l'être fini et l'être infini. D'autre part, Aristote semble éviter cette difficulté en recourant à l'artifice de l'analogie; plusieurs de ceux qui se réclament de sa doctrine lui attribuent du moins cette thèse, et elle semble en fait résoudre le problème puisque, si l'on admet que l'être ne se dit de tout qu'analogiquement, il peut se dire de toutes choses sans être proprement leur genre. En rejetant l'analogie de l'être, Duns Scot s'interdit cette facilité. Il lui faut donc élaborer la notion d'un être qui soit

⁴² *Op. Ox. I, d. 3, q. 2, a. 4, n. 10; t. I, pp. 311-312. Cf. Op. Ox. I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 1, n. 8; t. I, pp. 595-596: Contra illud etiam est tertium argumentum. . . Comme on verra plus loin, les attributs sont des perfections qui se disent de Dieu formaliter: attributa autem, sunt perfectiones simpliciter dictae de Deo formaliter. (Op. Ox. I, d. 8, q. 3,*

a. 1, n. 10; t. I, p. 597). C'est pourquoi Duns Scot n'admet pas qu'il suffise d'attribuer des perfections à Dieu considéré comme cause des perfections créées; un attribut divin n'est conceivable que si un même concept, selon la même raison formelle, est "commun" à Dieu et aux créatures.

absolument "commun", qui le soit en un sens "univoque" à tous les êtres et qui ne soit pourtant pas leur "genre". Comment trouver réponse à cette question?

Le Docteur Subtil l'a trouvée dans cette communauté même de l'être, d'où naissait la difficulté. L'être ne doit pas être posé comme un genre parce qu'il est commun; au contraire, il est trop commun pour être un genre. Aucun genre ne se prédisse de ses différences, sans quoi celles-ci ne pourraient le déterminer: une âme peut être raisonnable, mais elle n'est pas la rationalité; s'il l'était, on ne lui ajouterait rien en l'en prédiquant. Il est vrai que les différences ultimes n'incluent pas l'être, puisqu'elles en sont précisément les différences, mais c'est le seul cas où il en soit ainsi. Quelles que soient les autres différences dont on parle, elles incluent l'être et elles l'incluent exactement au même sens que les genres qu'elles spécifient. La communauté de l'être est donc telle qu'elle déborde et, pour ainsi dire, inonde le domaine entier de l'intelligible. Tout baigne dans l'être, et puisque l'intellect connaît tout comme "étant", il ne peut traiter comme un genre ce hors de quoi rien ne reste pour le déterminer. On ne saurait objecter ici ces différences ultimes dont l'être ne se prédisse pas. Ce qui importe, c'est qu'il *y ait des différences dont l'être soit directement prédicable, comme il l'est de leur genre*, car cela seul suffit à prouver que lui-même n'est pas un genre.⁴³ S'il y a des cas où il ne peut pas être genre, c'est qu'il ne l'est pas.

Tel étant l'être qui constitue l'objet de la métaphysique, il reste à le situer dans l'immense domaine de ce qui est ou, plus exactement, par rapport à l'être ou aux modes de l'être qui ne relèvent pas directement de la compétence du métaphysicien.

La première distinction de l'être est entre l'être réel et l'être pensé, ou, pour user du langage de Duns Scot lui-même (car le terme "réel" peut avoir chez lui bien des sens), entre l'être hors de l'âme et l'être dans l'âme. L'être hors de l'âme peut être acte ou puissance, être d'essence ou être d'existence. Quel qu'il soit, tout être hors de l'âme peut être aussi dans l'âme, à titre de connu. Il s'agit pourtant là de deux êtres distincts, et à tel point qu'on ne saurait jamais conclure validement de l'être dans l'âme à l'être hors de l'âme.⁴⁴ L'être hors de l'âme est celui qui, posé hors de sa cause, possède toutes les déterminations requises pour être, ou participe à l'être comme l'une de ses déterminations. Est donc être réel, tout composé complet existant par soi ou toute partie de ce composé existant par et dans ce composé.⁴⁵ Où devrons nous situer l'être métaphysique et, d'abord, le situerons nous dans la pensée?

⁴³ Sed removet (sc. argumentum) rationem generis propter nimiam communitatem, qui videlicet praedicatur per se primo modo de differentia aliqua et per hoc possit concludi quod ens non sit genus. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 14; t. I, p. 343. L'argumentation est la suivante: les différences ultimes sont absolument simples, et elles sont les différences ultimes de l'être, donc elles ne peuvent l'inclure; mais toute autre différence (l'âme *raisonnable* par exemple) fait partie d'une chose autre que la nature dont elle emprunte son genre (l'espèce "*raisonnable*" est autre que le genre "*âme*"). Une telle différence n'est pas absolument simple (*simpliciter simplex*), et elle inclut quidammativement l'être, car s'il est vrai de dire: *anima intellectiva est ens*, il l'est également de dire: *rationalitas est ens*, et c'est le même concept d'*ens* dont on use dans les deux cas. Conclusion: Et ex hoc quod talis differentia est ens in quid, sequitur quod ens non est genus propter nimiam communitatem entis; nullum enim genus dicitur de aliqua differentia inferiori in quid. *Op. Ox.*

I, d. 3, q. 3, a. 2, n. 15; t. I, p. 343-344.

⁴⁴ Prima distinctio entis videtur esse in ens extra animam et ens in anima; et illud extra animam potest distinguiri in actum et potentiam, essentiae et existentiae. Et quodcumque istorum esse extra animam potest habere esse in anima, et illud esse in anima aliud est ab omni esse extra animam. Et ideo de nullo ente, nec de aliquo esse sequitur, si habet esse diminutum in anima, quod propter hoc habeat esse simpliciter, quia illud esse est secundum quid absolute, quod tamen accipitur simpliciter in quantum comparatur ad animam ut fundamentum illius esse in anima. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 36, q. un., n. 9; t. I, p. 1176. La formule *ens diminutum* signifie l'"être qui n'est que dans la pensée", c'est-à-dire l'être objectif.

⁴⁵ Uno modo esse potest intelligi illud quo formaliter aliquid recedit a non esse. Primo autem receditur a non esse per illud per quod aliquid est extra intellectum et potentiam suae causae. Hoc modo cuiuslibet entis extra intellectum et causam est proprium esse. Alio modo dicitur esse ultimus

Il importe ici de distinguer. En un premier sens tout à fait général, tout ce qui est concevable par la pensée est de l'être pensé, même si, comme il arrive, ce qui est ainsi pensé ne peut pas exister en réalité. En ce sens, même les genres sont des êtres, mais de simples "êtres de raison", incapables d'exister actuellement *extra animam*. La seule chose qui ne puisse pas exister, même dans l'âme, c'est le contradictoire,⁴⁶ dont on peut bien dire qu'incapable d'être soit dans l'âme, soit hors de l'âme, il est le néant absolu. L'être n'est assurément pas de cette sorte, car il est le type même de la possibilité; il existe donc dans l'âme comme quelque chose qui peut exister en réalité.

Quelles relations y a-t-il entre l'être dans la pensée et l'être hors de la pensée? Nous l'avons dit, tout ce qui est hors de la pensée peut être aussi dans la pensée sous forme d'"être de raison". Il existe une science qui traite de l'être de raison en tant que tel, c'est la logique. Par être de raison en tant que tel, nous entendons l'objet de pensée qui, quels que puissent être d'ailleurs ses rapports à la réalité, n'est considéré précisément qu'en tant que tel. Avec la grammaire et la rhétorique, la logique a en commun ce caractère de spéculer, non sur le réel, comme font la mathématique, la physique et la métaphysique, mais sur de simples contenus de la raison.⁴⁷ En fait, elle traite des "universaux", c'est-à-dire de ce qui peut se prédiquer d'une pluralité d'invidus. L'universel ainsi entendu est avant tout *l'unum de multis*. Assurément, pour pouvoir se dire *de multis*, il doit d'abord être *in multis*, mais comment il y est, ce n'est pas au logicien de le dire. L'universel du logicien consiste essentiellement en sa prédictabilité. Les universaux sont au nombre ce cinq: le genre, l'espèce, la différence, l'accident et le propre, ce qui revient à dire que, quel que soit le concept particulier dont il traite, le logicien le considère uniquement en tant que prédictable à l'un de ces cinq titres. Or nous avons dit que l'être commun, dont traite la métaphysique, n'est pas un genre; il n'est donc pas non plus un être de raison du type étudié par la logique. En d'autres termes, l'être du métaphysicien n'est pas un "universel logique".

Les interprètes de Duns Scot, qui se réclament en philosophes de sa doctrine, ont donc entièrement raison de protester contre ceux qui attribueraient au Docteur Subtil une confusion quelconque entre le métaphysique et le logique. Rien n'était plus contraire à ses intentions que de faire de l'*ens rationis* le sujet de la métaphysique. Lui-même a clairement affirmé que, bien qu'en un sens le logicien considère la totalité de l'être tout autant que le métaphysicien, ce n'est pas du même être que l'un et l'autre parlent, car le logicien ne parle que de l'*ens rationis*, au lieu que le métaphysicien parle de l'*ens reale*. Ainsi, non seulement Duns Scot ne confond pas les deux ordres, il interdit de les confondre.⁴⁸ Il ne suit pourtant pas de là que ceux qui, parlant en philosophes et non plus en historiens, lui reprochent de l'avoir fait, commettent nécessairement une erreur inexcusable. S'ils se trompent, c'est en philosophes et non pas en historiens, car ce qu'ils disent n'est pas que Duns Scot lui-même ait considéré

actus, cui scilicet non advenit aliquis alias dans esse simpliciter, et ipsum dicitur simpliciter habere esse cui primo convenit esse sic dictum: primo, inquam, sic quod non sit alicui alteri ratio essendi illo esse. Isto modo compositum perfectum in specie dicitur esse et solum illud; pars autem eius dicitur esse per accidens tantum modo, vel magis proprie participative isto esse totius. Sic igitur solum compositum est per se ens accipiendo esse secundo modo. *Quodlib. IX.* n. 17; éd. Vivès, t. XXV, p. 390.

⁴⁶ Verissime enim illud est nihil quod includit contradictionem, et solum illud, quia

illud excludit omne esse extra intellectum et in intellectu; quod enim est sic includens contradictionem, sicut non potest esse extra animam, ita non potest esse aliquid intelligibile, vel aliquid ens in anima. *Quodl. III.* n. 2; éd. Vivès, t. XXV, p. 114.

⁴⁷ *Op. Ox. III.* d. 34, n. 8; éd. Vivès, t. XV, pp. 493-494.

⁴⁸ *Op. Ox.*, I, d. 3, q. 5, n. 10; t. I, p. 393. Cf. les textes cités dans A. B. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, 1946), p. 69.

l'être métaphysique comme identique à l'être logique, mais que, du point de vue d'une autre philosophie que la sienne et qu'eux-mêmes tiennent néanmoins pour vraie, le métaphysique tel que Duns Scot le conçoit, n'est, en fait et quelles qu'aient été ses intentions, rien d'autre qu'un être logique. Ce sont là deux points de vue distincts. Celui de l'histoire, qui est ici le nôtre, envisage la doctrine de Duns Scot telle que lui-même l'a conçue: il serait donc historiquement faux de dire que, dans sa doctrine, l'être dont parle le métaphysicien soit un être de raison; mais l'objet de la philosophie est la vérité philosophique, qui est indépendante de l'histoire, et si quelque philosophe estime que l'être de la métaphysique scotiste est, en fait, un être de raison, on peut lui reprocher une erreur philosophique, mais non "une perversion inexcusable de la conception que Duns Scot s'est faite de l'être". On sait très bien comment Duns Scot lui-même a conçu l'être métaphysique et l'on ne dit pas qu'il l'ait conçu d'autre manière; on dit que, pour réussir à distinguer effectivement l'être métaphysique de l'être logique, il aurait fallu le concevoir autrement.

Pour que Duns Scot lui-même ait conçu *l'ens commune comme* réel, et non pas logique, il faut manifestement qu'il ait admis une communauté autre que celle de l'ordre logique ou, en d'autres termes, que du "commun" puisse être en même temps pour lui du réel. C'est pourquoi il y a lieu de distinguer, dans sa doctrine, entre la généralité proprement dite du concept (universalité) et la communauté réelle de l'essence. Tout ce qui est métaphysiquement "commun" est universellement prédictable, mais tout l'universellement prédictable n'est pas métaphysiquement et réellement commun. Le métaphysiquement commun est bien un être dans la raison, comme l'universel logique, mais il n'est pas un "être de raison", car la métaphysique ne le considère pas sous cet aspect, mais comme un objet réel. Le métaphysiquement commun est ce qu'il y a d'actuellement commun dans la réalité. Il est une communauté réelle saisie par un acte de l'intellect.

C'est pourquoi la métaphysique est elle-même une science du réel, beaucoup plus semblable en cela à la physique qu'elle ne l'est à la logique, bien qu'elle risque de dégénérer précisément en logique, chaque fois qu'elle se détourne du "commun" de la réalité vers l'"universel" de la prédictabilité. Tentation constante et parfois quasi irrésistible, car logique et métaphysique travaillent souvent sur les mêmes concepts: le genre "animal" ou l'espèce "homme" par exemple, sans qu'il y ait entre elles d'autre distinction que les deux aspects sous lesquels elles les considèrent et les usages qu'elles en font.

La vérité qui, mal comprise, induit ici en erreur, est que, telle que Duns Scot la conçoit, la métaphysique est une connaissance abstraite. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi, étant une connaissance générale par mode de concepts, elle est vraiment science. Mais dans tout ce dont elle fait abstraction, il convient de placer l'existence au premier rang. L'intuition seule saisit le réel comme existant. Dans son état présent, l'homme n'a que des intuitions sensibles, celles mêmes sur lesquelles travaille le physicien. Quant aux intuitions intellectuelles de l'être immatériel, bien que, de par sa nature, notre intellect en soit capable, c'est un fait qu'il ne l'est plus présentement, soit en conséquence du péché originel, soit pour toute autre raison. Il suit de là que notre connaissance abstraite porte aussi bien sur ce qui n'existe pas que sur ce qui existe, à tel point que, même si son objet existe, elle ne nous le représente pas comme existant. "Toute science", dit Duns Scot, "porte sur un objet, mais non pris précisément en tant qu'existant". Comme diront plus tard ses disciples, elle "prescinde" l'existence. En d'autres termes, "l'existence elle-même, bien qu'elle soit une notion (*ratio*) connaissable dans l'objet ou à part de l'objet, n'est pourtant pas nécessairement requise comme convenant actuellement à l'objet

en tant qu'il est objet connaissable" plus brièvement encore: *existentia non est per se ratio objecti, ut scibile est.*⁴⁹

C'est donc à titre de science abstractive, la seule à laquelle nous puissions prétendre en notre état présent, que notre métaphysique fait abstraction de l'existence dans la détermination de ses objets. *Metaphysica quae est de quidditatibus*, dit Duns Scot. Son univers est celui des essences; elle y est chez elle comme dans son domaine propre et elle se sent pleinement compétente pour en traiter. Seulement, il ne faut pas se hâter d'en conclure que, pour Duns Scot lui-même, ses objets ne soient que des êtres de raison. Correcte en d'autres philosophies, cette conclusion ne le serait pas dans la sienné, parce que la "quiddité" prise en tant que telle n'y est nécessairement connue ni comme incluse dans une expérience sensible, ni comme un simple universel logique dont la généralité se réduit à sa prédictabilité.

Il n'en est que plus nécessaire de ne commettre aucune erreur sur la réalité dont parle le métaphysicien. Afin de la concevoir exactement, il suffit de se demander ce qui lui confère son unité et, d'abord, quelle sorte d'unité elle possède. Pour aller droit à l'essentiel, disons que ce "commun" jouit, dans la chose même, d'une unité réelle qui lui appartient "hors de toute opération de l'entendement". C'est en quoi le "commun", ou "universel métaphysique", se distingue immédiatement de l'universel logique, dont la prédictabilité, même si elle doit se fonder en réalité pour être valable, n'en reste pas moins l'oeuvre de l'intellect. *Intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus*, dit la formule souvent citée d'Averroès. Oui, sans doute, en logique, ou même dans la métaphysique d'Averroès et de ceux qui le suivent, mais non pas dans la métaphysique de Duns Scot, où la première chose à comprendre, touchant son objet, est que, s'il lui confère sa généralité logique, ce n'est pas l'intellect qui lui confère sa communauté réelle.⁵⁰ Elle est dans les choses et l'intellect l'y trouve, il ne la produit pas.

De ce que nous avons rencontré jusqu'ici, qu'y a-t-il que l'on puisse concevoir comme commun, et pourtant comme doué d'une unité propre qui ne doive rien à l'intellect? On ne voit qu'une chose qui soit telle, la nature commune d'Avicenne, prise dans son indifférence essentielle à l'universalité comme à la singularité. On peut d'autant moins douter que ce soit bien à elle que pense ici Duns Scot, qu'il se réfère expressément à Avicenne pour appuyer sa thèse: *Qualiter autem potest hoc intelligi, potest aequaliter videri per dictum Avicennae V Metaph. ubi vult quod equinitas sit tantum equinitas, nec ex se una, nec plures, nec universalis, nec particularis.*⁵¹ Telle est en effet la *natura*: non pas un être singulier et doué d'une unité numérique; non pas davantage un universel sans autre unité que celle de sa prédictabilité, mais un entre-deux qui ne se confond ni avec l'un ni avec l'autre. Considérée à titre d'être, la "nature" n'est pas "un être" existant a part, comme le singulier, mais elle n'est pas non plus un simple "être de raison", comme l'universel logique; elle est, non un *esse* singulier au sens plein du terme, mais une "entité", une "réalité" ou encore, et il y aura lieu de s'en souvenir, une "formalité". Disons, pour choisir, qu'il s'agit ici de cette "entité" de la nature (*entitas naturae*) que l'intellect appréhende, mais ne produit pas.⁵² Considérée du point de vue de l'unité qu'elle comporte, cette

⁴⁹ *Quodlibet VII*, 8-9; éd. Vivès, t. XXV, pp. 289-290.

⁵⁰ *Aliqua est unitas in re realis, absque omni operatione intellectus, minor unitate numerali sive unitate propria singularis, quae unitas est naturae secundum se; et secundum istam unitatem propriam naturae, ut natura est, natura est indifferens ad unitatem singularem; non ergo de se est sic una unitate illa, scilicet unitate singulari-*

tatis. *Op. Ox. II*, d. 3, q. 1, n. 7; t. II, p. 228. Duns Scot admet que la parole d'Averroès (*In de Anima I*, Comm. 8) est vraie en ce sens que l'intellect confère à la "nature" son universalité *logique*, mais non sa communauté métaphysique: *Op. Ox. II*, d. 2, q. 1, nn. 8 et 9; t. II, pp. 230-232.

⁵¹ *Op. Ox. II*, d. 3, q. 1, n. 7; t. II, p. 228.

⁵² *Op. Ox. II*, d. 3, q. 6, n. 9; t. II, p. 264. Toute quiddité métaphysique résulte d'une

entité sera jugée moins une que l'individu, mais plus une que l'universel,⁵³ et, surtout, d'une unité autre que celle de l'universel, précisément parce qu'il s'agit d'une universalité réelle, et non pas d'une simple unité de raison. Duns Scot a si fortement insisté sur ce point, qu'on ne peut douter de l'importance qu'il lui attribue. Je le prouverai, dit-il, de "cinq ou six manières",⁵⁴ et il tient parole.

Quelle est cette unité, dont Aristote dit que, dans chaque genre, elle sert de mesure pour tout ce qui rentre dans le genre? On ne mesure pas des êtres réels avec un être de raison. C'est donc une unité réelle: *ergo est realis, quia mensurata sunt realia et realiter mensurata: ens autem reale non potest realiter mensurari ab ente rationis*.—Deuxièmement, considérons le concept du genre. Il a une certaine unité, mais cette unité ne saurait être simplement de raison, car on voit qu'elle lui appartient en propre, comme celle du concept de l'espèce à la sienne. La preuve en est qu'un seul concept, celui du genre, peut s'attribuer à une pluralité d'espèces.—Troisièmement, sur quoi fonderait-on la ressemblance qui apparaît les individus d'un même genre ou d'une même espèce, si la nature commune n'y jouissait d'une unité, non pas numérique (car rien ne ressemble à soi-même) mais réelle?—Quatrièmement, comment expliquerait-on autrement l'opposition réelle des 'contraires'? Dans toute "contrariété" réelle, cette opposition est elle-même réelle et sa réalité n'est pas l'œuvre de l'intellect. Nous ne faisons pas que le blanc soit le contraire du noir, ils le sont. Comment ces termes seraient-ils réellement opposés s'ils n'avaient eux-mêmes une unité réelle?—Cinquièmement, chaque faculté sensitive possède un objet distinct de celui des autres facultés sensitives, la couleur ou le son par exemple; or elle connaît cet objet comme distinct des autres; il a donc une unité; mais cette unité n'est pas numérique, puisque l'objet d'une faculté de sentir n'est pas cette couleur ni ce son particuliers numériquement distincts, mais la couleur comme telle, le son comme tel et ainsi du reste; reste donc que cette unité soit une autre unité réelle que l'unité numérique: *unius actionis sensus est unum objectum secundum aliquam unitatem realem; sed non numeralem; ergo est aliqua alia unitas realis quam unitas numeralis*. Ceci peut se prouver de la manière suivante: l'objet de chaque sens est un, au moins d'une certaine unité; pourtant, la vue ne perçoit pas telle couleur comme numériquement distincte de telle autre, et cela est tellement vrai que, si Dieu créait deux couleurs blanches identiques, la vue seule ne serait pas capable de les distinguer. Il faut donc que la couleur, le son et les autres objets des sens aient une unité réelle, qui ne soit pourtant pas une unité numérique.⁵⁵—Sixièmement, si toute unité réelle était

"abstraction ultime", c'est-à-dire "quidditatis absolutissime sumptae ab omni eo quod est quocumque modo extra rationem quidditatis". *Op. Ox.* I, d. 5, q. 1, n. 65; t. I, p. 508.

⁵³ *Op. Ox.* II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 2; t. II, p. 224.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* C'est en ce sens que nous avons parlé d'un reste de "platonisme" chez Duns Scot. A. B. Wolter (*op. cit.*, pp. 67-68), préfère y voir de l'aristotélisme. Ce n'est pas absolument contradictoire; car il reste bien du Platon chez Aristote lui-même, moins pourtant que chez Avicenne et que chez Duns Scot. On ne peut expliquer par Aristote ce que Duns Scot a de plus platonicien que lui.

⁵⁵ Nous simplifions la démonstration, qu'il vaut pourtant mieux lire en détail pour ce qu'elle enseigne sur l'objet du sens dans le scotisme: *Potentia cognoscens objectum sic, in quantum scilicet hac unitate unum, cognoscit ipsum in quantum distinctum a*

*quolibet quod non est hac unitate unum; sed sensus non cognoscit objectum in quantum est distinctum a quolibet quod non est unum ista unitate numerali; quod patet, quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium solis differre numeraliter ab illo radio, cum tamen sint diversi per motum solis, si circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia, puta diversitas loci vel situs; et si ponerentur duo quanta simul omnino per potentiam divinam, quae essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine et quantitate, visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba; si tamen cognosceret alterum istorum, in quantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum in quantum distinctum numeraliter a quolibet alio. *Op. Ox.* II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 4; t. II, p. 227. Cf.: de uno objecto unius actus sentiendi, non videtur vere posse negari quin necessario habetur unitatem realem et minorem unitate numerali; *loc. cit.*, n. 5; t. II, p. 227.*

numérique, toute diversité réelle serait numérique, ce qui est faux, car toutes les diversités numériques, en tant qu'elles sont purement numériques, sont de même nature; or, s'il en était ainsi, on ne pourrait abstraire de deux individus quelconques qu'un seul et même concept. En effet, si Platon et Socrate, ou deux lignes, ne différaient que numériquement, on ne pourrait abstraire de Platon et de Socrate le concept d'homme, ni de ces deux lignes le concept de ligne. En d'autres termes, il y a des espèces, et à chaque espèce doit répondre une réalité une, qui justifie le concept correspondant. Cette unité de l'espèce n'est pourtant pas numérique, il reste qu'une unité non numérique doit exister dans la réalité.⁵⁰

Duns Scot a manifestement assimilé, sous l'influence d'Avicenne, une plus forte dose de réalisme platonicien qu'Aristote ou que saint Thomas d'Aquin. Il ne lui semble pas impossible qu'une espèce, disons une "nature", jouisse d'une unité et d'une réalité qui lui soient propres. Si l'on considère cette nature comme une substance première, il est évident qu'elle ne saurait être, à la fois et sous le même rapport, elle-même et la substance de Socrate ou de Platon. Aristote aurait ici raison contre Platon, si Platon avait vraiment enseigné pareille chimère. Il est vrai qu'Aristote la lui attribue, mais Duns Scot doute que ce soit à bon droit. Quoi qu'il en soit de ce point, revenons en toujours à la position d'Avicenne, dans sa *MétaPhysique*, tr. V, ch. 1: de soi, la nature n'est ni numériquement une ni numériquement multiple; l'espèce "homme" n'est donc ni la substance de Socrate ni celle de Platon, parce qu'elle n'est de soi appropriée ni à l'un ni à l'autre. Il est de son essence même d'être ainsi commune: *non quaerenda est causa communitatis alia ab ipsa natura.*⁵¹

Ainsi conçue, dans l'unité de son indifférence à toute détermination ultérieure et comme n'étant ni singulière ni universelle, la nature est l'objet propre de l'intellect. Elle est donc aussi l'objet propre du métaphysicien, à égale distance du physicien qui la considère dans ses déterminations concrètes et du logicien qui la considère comme déterminée à l'universalité. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi les propositions métaphysiques vraies, sont vraies *primo modo*, c'est-à-dire immédiatement, d'une vérité fondée sur l'essence des natures prise en elle-même et indépendamment de toutes déterminations ultérieures: *Non solum autem ipsa natura est de se indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc ad esse universale et singulare, sed et ipsa habens esse in intellectu, non habet primo ex se universalitatem; licet enim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate, ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars conceptus ejus primi, quia non conceptus Metaphysici, sed Logici. Logicus enim considerat secundas intentiones applicatas primis, secundum ipsum Avicennam.*

Ce qui est vrai de la nature dans l'intellect, est vrai de la même nature dans l'individu concret, *in re extra*. Elle y est avec la singularité, mais elle n'y est pas singulière. Elle y est comme antérieure par nature à la singularité qui la contracte. Bref, que ce soit dans la pensée ou hors de la pensée, elle possède un *esse* propre, correspondant à chacune de ces deux manières d'êtres (*entitates*). Dans l'intellect, la nature a un *verum esse intelligibile*; hors de l'intellect, et *etiam in rerum natura, secundum illam entitatem, habet verum esse extra animam reale*. Telle est l'entité à laquelle répond une unité qui lui est propre, ce *quod quid* est antérieur à toutes ses déterminations, que le métaphysicien considère et qu'il exprime par la définition.⁵² Cette communauté appartenant à la nature en tant que telle, il n'y a pas lieu de lui chercher une cause; ce dont il y a lieu de chercher la cause, c'est la singularité.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., à *Item sexto*. Cf. *Qu. in Metaph.*, Lib. VII, q. 13, n. 10; éd. Vivès, t. VII, p. 410. Duns Scot renvoie sur ce point à Avicenne, *Metaph.*, Tract. V, cap. 1; éd. cit., fol. 87^{ra}.

⁵¹ Op. Ox. II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 10; t. II, p. 232.

⁵² Op. Ox. II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 7; t. II, p. 229.

⁵³ Op. Ox. II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 10; t. II, p. 232.

Telle est aussi, nous semble-t-il, la manière la plus simple de concevoir, avec le sens de l'être univoque, l'objet propre de la métaphysique scotiste. L'espèce est univoque aux individus et elle peut l'être en vertu de sa communauté même, qui subsiste intacte sous les déterminations qu'elle reçoit. Si l'être est le premier intelligible, il est ce qu'il y a de plus commun: *illud quod est primum intelligible simpliciter, est communissimum simpliciter; sed nullum est tale nisi ens.* Communauté métaphysique de nature, mais non communauté physique de substance ni communauté logique de prédication, l'être univoque de Duns Scot, que les *Questions sur la Métaphysique* mettent expressément sous le patronage d'Avicenne, apparaît comme caractérisé d'abord par l'"indifférence" de la nature avicennienne à ses déterminations actuelles ou possibles. Il semble donc n'être que la plus commune et la plus indifférente de toutes, mais une expérience mentale suffit à prouver que sa notion n'est pas une chimère: "Nous éprouvons en nous-mêmes, que nous pouvons concevoir l'être sans le concevoir comme telle substance ou tel accident que voici, car on ne sait pas, quand on conçoit l'être, s'il s'agit d'un être en soi ou dans un autre . . . ; nous concevons donc d'abord quelque chose d'indifférent aux deux, et nous trouvons ensuite que l'un et l'autre sont immédiatement inclus dans un terme tel, que le premier concept, celui d'être, y soit compris".⁶⁰

Lorsqu'on les envisage de ce point de vue, la plupart des controverses entre scotistes et thomistes apparaissent vaines. On les dirait même frivoles, si elles étaient plus amusantes. Ceux qui ne s'accordent pas sur la nature de l'être, sur quoi s'accorderaient-ils? C'est sur ce point fondamental qu'il leur faudrait d'abord s'entendre, non seulement pour s'accorder, mais ne serait-ce même que pour se réfuter. Si l'être est ce que dit Duns Scot, on ne prouvera jamais qu'il faille le concevoir comme analogue. S'il est ce que dit Thomas d'Aquin, on ne prouvera jamais qu'il faille le concevoir comme univoque. Selon que l'on admettra l'un ou l'autre, on préférera un point de départ métaphysique pour les preuves de l'existence de Dieu ou, au contraire, on jugera nécessaire de les appuyer sur une base physique. Si l'objet premier de la connaissance n'est pas le même dans les deux doctrines, leurs noétiques seront nécessairement différentes. Bref, il deviendra désormais impossible de réfuter un point quelconque de l'une de ces doctrines à partir du point conjugué qui lui répond dans l'autre doctrine; le décalage initial dû aux ontologies différentes sur lesquelles elles reposent leur interdit à jamais de se rencontrer. *Principiis obsta . . .*; c'est en raison de ses principes qu'on peut et doit choisir l'une d'entre elles, mais la philosophie seule peut choisir, non l'histoire, dont la seule fonction est ici d'aider à comprendre, pour permettre le choix.

⁶⁰ *Qu. in Metaph.*, lib. IV, qu. 1, n. 6-7; éd. Vivès, t. 7, pp. 147-148. Les discussions sur l'univocité et l'analogie souffrent parfois de cette confusion. Selon Duns Scot, la logique ne connaît pas de milieu entre l'univoque et l'équivoque; pour le logicien, l'analogie est un cas particulier de l'équivoque. L'analogie n'a de sens propre que par rapport à des êtres réels. Il ne peut donc y avoir de rapports d'analogie que pour des sciences du réel, telles la métaphysique et la physique. En fait, il y en a,

mais leur existence ne saurait interdire au métaphysicien de transcender la "diversité réelle" des êtres engagés dans ces rapports, pour en abstraire un concept un et commun à tous, celui de l'être. Cf. *Op. Ox.* I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 17; t. I, p. 343. D'ailleurs, observe-t-il avec une pointe d'humour: *Hoc etiam magistri tractantes de Deo et de his quae cognoscuntur de Deo, observant univocationem in modo dicendi, licet vox hoc negent.* *Rep. Par.* I, d. 3, q. 1, n. 7; éd. Vivès, t. XXII, p. 95.

Some Notes on King Alfred's Circular Letter on Educational Policy Addressed to His Bishops

FRANCIS P. MAGOUN, Jr.

THE PRESENT paper is a commentary on certain aspects of a circular letter by King Alfred the Great (848-899), written in Old English and addressed to the bishops of his realm (Wessex and English Mercia) on the occasion of sending to each in 893 or shortly after a copy of his version of St. Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*. This letter, of interest for the cultural history of late ninth century Wessex, has long been one of the most familiar and widely read documents in Old English and is included in virtually all OE primers.¹ It is closely knit and rich in ideas and facts. The general tenor is clear and generally speaking completely understood, but there is place for some comment designed to bring out certain smaller points that the king had in mind, points which doubtless were obvious to the recipients though not necessarily so to one living a thousand years later.

The letter is commonly entitled or referred to as Alfred's "Preface" (*Vorrede* of the Germans) to St. Gregory's *Cura Pastoralis* ("Pastoral Care") or the like,² though the document is not a true preface nor is *Cura Pastoralis* the proper title of St. Gregory's work (see § IIId, pp. 102-103, below). As an introduction to a book, a preface contains an explanation of the subject with some indication of its purpose, scope, and method of treatment.³ Alfred's letter has virtually none of this; only briefly does he discuss his translation technique and acknowledge indebtedness to those churchmen who helped him with his task (§IIIc, pp. 103-104, below). As Plummer puts it (p. 152), it is a preface to "a whole series of translations".⁴

¹ For older editions and prints of the letter (from 1574 on) see Richard Wölker, *Grundriss zur Geschichte der angelsächsischen Literatur*, etc. (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 401-02 (§460). For later literature see A. H. Heusinkveld and E. J. Bashe, *A Bibliographical Guide to Old English* ([State] University of Iowa Humanistic Studies IV, 5, Iowa City, 1931), p. 106 (bibliography closes with 1930); F. W. Bateson, *The Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature I* (New York, 1941), p. 86, §3a (abbreviated CBEL). The most recent edition, based on Bodleian Library Ms Hatton 20, is by Fernand Mossé, *Manuel de l'anglais du moyen âge des origines au XIV^e siècle. I. Vieil-Anglais* (Paris, 1945), Vol. I, pp. 219-22 (headnote and text), Vol. II, pp. 366-68 (notes). For some discussion of this item and its date see Charles Plummer, *The Life and Times of Alfred the Great* (Oxford, 1902), pp. 151-55, and for valuable comment on various points Friedrich Klaeber, 'Zu König Aelfreds Vorrede zu seiner Uebersetzung der *Cura Pastoralis*', *Anglia*, XLVII (1923), 53-65. On the manuscripts of the letter see n. 5, below.

² Mossé I, 219, sensibly uses the caption "Alfred Educateur" and emphasizes the fact that this is a letter. Plummer 152 betrays uneasiness over the title "Preface" ("as we have learnt to know it"). In his reprint of the text according to one of the Cambridge

manuscripts in which the name of Bishop Wulfseige of Sherborne appears in the salutation L. F. Klipstein, *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica I* (London, 1849, also New York, 1856), 242, gives as a heading "King Alfred's Epistle to Bishop Wulfseige."

In Ms Junius 53 and the Cambridge manuscripts containing the letter (on which see n. 5, below) the following heading occurs: *This seo forespræc hu S. Gregorius thas boc gedihte the man Pastorealem nemnath*, but this, it should be noted, refers not to the letter but to Gregory's own preface addressed to Ioannes, Patriarch of Constantinople.

³ The true OE preface to Gregory's work is the so-called *Metrical Preface* of which the text and a translation are given pp. 106-107, below. Such a true preface in OE is, for example, Aelfric's letter to Ealdorman Aethelweard of Wessex, prefatory to his translation of *Genesis* I-XXII, ed. S. J. Crawford, *The Old-English Version of the Heptateuch* (EETS, Orig. Ser. No. 160, London, 1922), pp. 76-80, and conveniently accessible to most American students in the late James W. Bright's *An Anglo-Saxon Reader*, pp. 107-12. In Anglo-Latin one might similarly mention Bede's preface to his *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, addressed to Cœlwulf, king of the Northumbrians 728-737.

⁴ On this series see §IIIc, pp. 101-102, below.

The text of the letter is here presented in numbered sections (§§) for convenience of reference, each section being followed by a modern English translation and certain commentary. The translation aims to be as literal as possible within the limits of idiomatic English; where present-day English idiom departs significantly from that of OE, a closer, more explanatory rendering has been added parenthetically. In the footnotes *th* has been substituted for OE thorn and eth, and *ae* for the ligature *æ*; in the main text *P* substituted for capital *ð*.

ALFRED'S CIRCULAR LETTER⁵

§I. *The Salutation*⁶

Ælfréd kyning háteð grétan (N. N.) biscep his' wordum luflice 7 fréondlice.

"With his words King Alfred bids Bishop N. N. to be greeted affectionately and in friendly fashion."

The salutation is cast in the conventional terms of semi-official language with the stock formula *háteð grétan* of respectful address. In OE this alternates with the simple *grét, gréteþ* "salutes" "greets" (as at the beginning of Ælfric's letter to Æthelwold, cited n. 3, above); numerous examples are listed in Toller's Supplement under *grétan* VI, 5. In the Cambridge manuscripts the expression is *háteð grétung*, perhaps elliptical for *háteð grétung sendan* or the like (this

⁵ The standard, though inadequate edition of the letter and of Alfred's version of Gregory's work is that by Henry Sweet, done in his youth (aet. 27), *King Alfred's West-Saxon Version of Gregory's Pastoral Care with an English Translation, the Latin Text, Notes and an Introduction* (EEETS, Orig. Ser. No. 45, London, 1871-72); the Latin text, announced in the title, was never published (cp. ed. cit. p. [xliv]). On p. 1, preceding the OE text, there appears as a half-title "The Anglo-Saxon Version of Gregory's Pastoral from the Hatton MS and the Cotton MSS"; this statement, too, is partly wrong; for, while the Hatton manuscript is properly edited on the odd pages, the text on the even pages, described as "Cotton MSS.", is in fact Junius' transcript (Bodleian Library Ms Junius 53) of the now ruined Brit. Mus. Ms. Cotton *Tiberius* B XI (Sweet, p. xiii). On the relative inaccuracy of Junius' copy see Karl Jost, "Zu den Handschriften der Cura Pastoralis," *Anglia*, XXXVII (1913), esp. 64-67. Furthermore, Sweet learned too late (Sweet, p. ix, Jost 68) of the existence of Ms Cotton *Otho B II* (Sweet, p. xiv) to make any real use of the same. It may be noted that Sweet's references to "Wanley" for descriptions of the now damaged Cotton manuscripts refer to Humphrey Wanley, *Catalogue Historico-criticus*, forming Bk. II or Vol. III of George Hickes, *Linguarum Veterum Septentrionalium*, etc. (London, 1705), p. 217, col. 2.

In his introduction (p. xiii) Sweet mentions three manuscripts of later (eleventh century) date which he promises to describe in an Appendix; there is no such Appendix. The manuscripts in question are Corpus Christi College Ms XII, Cambridge University Library Ms II. ii. 4, and, lacking the letter, Trinity College Ms R. 5. 22 (No. 117);

see E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems* (The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records VI, Columbia Univ. Press: New York, 1942), pp. cxiv-xv. Jost 68 promised an edition based on all manuscripts but this has unfortunately never appeared.

The present text follows that of the Hatton manuscript according to Mossé. As for the letter, it is the Cambridge version that long was most familiar and is represented in Parker (1574), Vulcanius (1597), William Camden (1603), John Spelman (1678), Wright (1842), Klipstein (1849, 1856), Ottomar Bensch (1853), cited by Wüller, op. cit., p. 401. It contains a number of interesting readings; for the moment perhaps most generally accessible in Thomas Wright, *Biographia Britannica Literaria*, etc. I (London, 1842), pp. 397-400, with a translation at the foot of the pages. I hope before long to be able to publish an edition of the letter from these manuscripts.

For a full-sized facsimile of the Hatton manuscript answering to Sweet, p. 3, 1-16 (*areccian*) see W. W. Skeat, *Twelve Facsimiles of Old (i.e. Old and Middle) English Manuscripts* (Oxford, 1892), Plate I, with facing transliteration on p. 14, and for reduced facsimiles see R. H. Hodgkin, *A History of the Anglo-Saxons* II (2d ed., Oxford, 1939), Plate 75, facing p. 610 (transliteration and translation), answering to Sweet, p. 3, (ll. 1-14 (*jēawa wærōn*) and Mossé I, Plate facing p. 220, answering to Sweet, p. 3, ll. 1-13 (*Swæ*).

⁶ On the superscription in Ms Junius 53 see Sweet p. xiv and n. 5, above. Hatton (H) has a superscription: *Théos hoc seal to Wiogoracestre* (This book is intended for, or shall go to, Worcester), i.e. to the see of Bishop Wærferth, whose name appears in the text.

phrase does not seem to have got into the dictionaries). The expressions answer to, and presumably look back to, Lat. *salutem* (*dicit*), *salutat*, used in the superscriptions of letters. The formula from the well-known will of Ealdorman (Dux) Ælfric of Sussex and other documents adduced by Klaeber and cited by Mossé II, 366, is not really parallel, nor is Wigláf's relay of Béowulf's dying injunction (*ond éowic grétan hét, Béowulf* 3095b).

As noted in §IV, p. 104, below, copies of this letter were sent to all Alfred's bishops. In *H* we have a copy with the name of Wærferth filled in and in two of the Cambridge manuscripts that of Wulfsige; in all others a blank is left. To exhibit the structure of this circular letter I have dropped Wærferth's name from the text of *H* and have substituted in brackets "N.N." for the name of any given bishop receiving a copy of the book with attached letter.

§II. On the Former Ascendancy of English Scholarship and its Subsequent Decline

a. The Former High State of Morality and Learning

7 ðé cýðan háte ðæt mé cóm swiðe oft on gemynd, hwelce wiutan iú wáeron giond Angelcynn ægðer ge godcundra háda ge woruldcundra; 7 hú gesæligica tída ðá wáeron giond Angelcynn; 7 hú ðá kyningas, ðe ðone onwald hæfdon ðæs folces on ðám dagum, Gode 7 His ærendwrecum hérsumedon; 7 [hú] híe ægðer ge hiora sibbe ge hiora siðo ge hiora onwald innanbordes gehioldon 7 éac út hiora édel gerýmon, 7 hú him ðá spéow ægðer ge mid wíge ge mid wísdóme, 7 éac ðá godcundan hádas, hú giorno híe wáeron ægðer ge ymb láre ge ymb liornunga ge ymb ealle ðá ðíowotdómas ðe híe Gode scoldon; 7 hú man útanbordes wísdóm 7 láre hieder on lond sóhte; 7 hú wé híe nú sceoldon úte begietan, gif wé híe habban sceoldon.

"And (I) bid be made known to you (i.e. the bishop addressed) that it has very often come to my mind what (kind of) scholars there formerly were throughout England, both in (*lit. of*) holy and secular positions; and what happy times were then throughout England; and how the kings who (formerly) exercised authority over (*lit. of*) the people were obedient to God and to His ministers (Cambridge manuscripts: written messages); and [how] they maintained their peace and their morality and their authority at home and also extended their domain(s); and how at that time they prospered both in war and in wisdom; and also the holders of Divine office, how eager they were concerning both teaching and learning and all those services which was their duty to (*lit. which they should*) perform for God; and how abroad one looked here in England for wisdom and learning; and how now we should have to get it (i.e., wisdom and learning) from abroad if we were to have it."

Alfred begins his letter with reflections on the great days of cultural supremacy which especially in the seventh and the eighth centuries England shared with Ireland, *insula sanctorum et doctorum*. In the realm of letters and scholarship he would have had in mind the great Benedictine schools of Jarrow and Monkwearmouth and York in the north and the school of Canterbury in the south, also such distinguished scholars as Theodore and Hadrian and such Anglo-Latin writers as Aldhelm of Malmesbury in Wiltshire (639-709), Bede of Jarrow near Newcastle (?673-735) and Alcuin(us) (OE Ealhwine) of York (?735-804), and perhaps such rare literate rulers as Aldfrith ("Acircius"), king of Northumbria (685-705), to whom Aldhelm addressed his *Epistola ad Acircium*. Vernacular poetry, either secular or religious, would scarcely come into question here. For surveys of the flowering of this culture lamented by Alfred see R. H. Hodgkin, *A History of the Anglo-Saxons* I (2d ed., Oxford, 1939), pp. 303-66 ("The Golden

Age"), II, pp. 416-46; F. M. Stenton, *Anglo-Saxon England* (Oxford, 1943), pp. 130-99; and for a sympathetic study of a number of the most important men of learning of this period see E. S. Duckett, *Anglo-Saxon Saints and Scholars* (New York, 1947). See also V. H. Galbraith, 'The Literacy of Medieval English Kings,' British Academy, *Proceedings XXI* (1935), 8-12, on Kings Sigeberht of East Anglia, Aldfrith of Northumbria, and Alfred of Wessex. For what is in effect almost a catalog of the holdings of English monastic libraries see J. D. A. Ogilvy, *Books known to Anglo-Latin Writers from Aldhelm to Alcuin (670-804)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1936), also the metrical catalog of the library at York in the time of Alcuin, available in English translation with some annotations by A. R. Benham, *English Literature from Widstith to the Death of Chaucer* (Yale Univ. Press, 1916), pp. 63-68.

Much of the first part of this section seems to echo Bede's comments on the happy and prosperous times prevailing ca. 670 (*HE IV*, 2, esp. *neque umquam . . . feliciaora fuere tempora*, noted by Klaeber 55). On the point that scholarship must now be imported see W. H. Stevenson, *Asser's Life of King Alfred*, etc. (Oxford, 1904), pp. 225-26, on one Felix, Frankish secretary of Alfred's father, Æthelwulf.

On Alfred's and, in general, the standard early use of *Angelcynn* and the like for England as a whole vs. the later *Englaland*, whence ultimately mod. England, see Max Förster, 'Zur Geschichte des Reliquienkultus in Altengland', Bavarian Academy of Sciences, *Sitzungsberichte*, phil.-histor. Abtlg. No. 8, 1943, pp. 63-64. Attention is called to the initial anaphoric *7 hú* used in six successive clauses; Alfred's fondness for anaphora appears similarly in §IIe., §III, pp. 98 ff., and elsewhere in his writings, e.g., near the end of his *Boethius* (Bk. V, pr. 6) where six successive clauses are introduced rhetorically with *Ne*, with the next six introduced by *Simle hé bið* (see Bright's *Anglo-Saxon Reader*, p. 60, ll. 14-26). Klaeber 54, n. 2, calls attention to the alliterating phrase *mid wíge ge mid wísdóm*, matched by Wulfgrá's *wíg ond wísdóm* of *Béowulf* 350a.

A word of comment on the unusual form *árend-wrecum*, commonly understood as equivalent to *árend-racum* (*árend-raca*, m. "messenger" "apostle" "ambassador"): Mossé II, 366, note 7, makes the reasonable suggestion that we have here a reverse or hypercorrect spelling, under the influence of cases where *r-* appears for *wr-*. But the presence of *árend-writum* "written messages" of the Cambridge manuscripts makes one wonder whether this latter is perhaps not the right reading and that the word refers to obedience to God's instructions as given in books, e.g. the Bible. Mossé's emendation (*ed. cit.* I, 220, l. 7), "hérsmedon; 7 [hú] híe," is supported not only by Junius' transcript but also by the Cambridge text.

IIb. *The Decline of Learning (cont'd in "d" below)*

Swé clæne hío [i.e. lár] wæs oðfeallenu on Angelcynne ðæt swiðe féawa wæron behionan Humber ðe hiora ðéninga cùðen understandan on Englisc oððe furðum án árendgewrit of Lædene on Englisc áreccean; 7 ic wéne ðæt nóht monige begiondan Humber náeren. Swé féawa hiora wæron ðæt ic furðum ánne ánlépne ne mæg gedéncean besúðan Temese ðá ðá ic tó rice féng. Gode Ælmihtegum síe þonc ðæt wé nú ænigne onstal habbað láréowa!

"So completely had it (i.e., learning) lapsed in England that there were very few persons this (south) side of the Humber who could understand their (Latin) service-books in (terms of) English or even translate a single written communication from Latin into English; and I believe that there were by no means many (such) beyond (i.e. north of) the Humber. There were so few of them

that I cannot think of even one single person south of the Thames, when I succeeded to the (West-Saxon) throne (in A.D. 871). Thanks be to God Almighty that we now have any store of teachers!"

§IIb is the first of two sections (see §IId) devoted to a discussion of the decline of learning (already alluded to in §IIa). This first section reports in general and in a sense somewhat exaggerated terms on the lapse in a knowledge of Latin, particularly and specifically among the clergy. Alfred's failure to recognize the survival of learning in western Mercia, to which he was much indebted for his distinguished assistants Wærferth and Plegmund, has been the subject of comment (see Plummer 136-37, Stenton 268 and cp. 178, 190). The section ends with the implication that things have picked up (cp. §§IIIa-d, IV) in the years between 871 and *ca.* 894, the approximate date of the composition of the letter.

This discussion of the decline of learning is resumed in §IIe after the brief interruption of §§IIC, d.

IIc. A Bishop should foster Scholarship

Ond for þon ic ðé [N.N. biscepe] bebíode ðæt ðú dó swáe ic geliefe ðæt ðú wille, ðæt ðú ðé ðissa woruldðinga tó ðæm geæmetige swáe ðú oftost mæge, ðæt ðú ðone wísdóm ðe ðé God sealde ðær ðær ðú hiene befæstan mæge, befæste.

"And, therefore, I enjoin you (Bishop N.N.) to do what I believe you will (do), (namely,) as often as possible (*lit.* as often as you can) to free yourself from affairs of this world to the end that you may implant that scholarship that God has given you where you can implant it" (cp. Matt. xxv:14-30, the parable of the talents).

This brief exhortation to the bishop addressed is in general content an obvious thought; it may well have been immediately suggested, however, by two sections of the *Regula Pastoralis*, viz., Alfredian chap. I (*Poëtte unlærede ne dyrren underfón láréowdóm:* "That the unskilful presume not to assume the office of teacher;" Sweet 24-29, Bright 31-33) and chap. XXII (*Hú swíðe sé reccere sceal bión on his sméagunga ábisgod ymb ðá Hálga[n] AE:* "How much a ruler (of a diocese) ought to be concerned with his meditations on the Sacred Law;" Sweet 168-73, Bright 35-37).⁷ For further parallels to these thoughts see Klaeber 57-59, especially for the equation of O.E. *geæmtigan* and Latin *vacare*.

IId. On the Neglect of the Christian Virtues

Geðenc hwelc wítu ús ðá becómon for ðissem worulde, ðá ðá wé hit nóhwæðer ne selfe ne lufodon ne éac óðrum monnum ne léfdon; ðone naman ánne wé lufodon ðæt we wé Crístne wáren 7 swíðe féawe ðá ðéawas.

"Think of what miseries as far as this world (is concerned) befell us at the time when we neither loved it (i.e. Christian virtues) ourselves nor even allowed it to other men (cp. Matt. xxiii:13); we loved only the title of being (*lit.* that we were) Christians and (loved) very few of the virtues (of Christianity)."

The exhortations of bishops of the preceding section is here followed by a brief reminder of the disastrous effects of the neglect of Christian virtues, in a measure a providential interpretation of history. On the phrase *for ðissem worulde* see Bosworth-Toller under *worold* II, last paragraph. The neuter *hit*, object of

⁷ These two Alfredian chapters answer to Gregory's Part I, chap. I and Part II, chap. XI, in PL 77, 13-15 and 48-50, Bramley, op. cit., pp. 7-11, 124-27.

lufodon is technically ambiguous, but on the basis of the concluding sentence of the section evidently refers to the idea of Christian virtues (*ðéawas*), to which the English are charged with paying only lip-service. On the apositional construction *swiðe féawe ðá ðéawas* see Klaeber 56, n. 2. Klaeber's comparison of this thought with Penda's pious words in Bede's *HE* III, 21 (*Quin potius . . . oboedire contemnerent*) is apposite.

IIe. *The Decline of Learning* (cont'd from IIb)

Pá ic ðá ðis eall gemunde, ðá gemunde ic éac hú ic geseah, áér-ðæm-ðe hit eall forhergod wære 7 forbærned, hú ðá circean giond eall Angelcynn stódon máðma 7 bóca gefyldæ—ond éac micel menigeo Godes ðíowa 7 ðá swiðe lýtle fiorme ðára bóca wiston, for-ðæm-ðe híe hiora nán-wuht ongiotan ne meahton, for-ðæm-ðe híe næron on hiora ágen geðiode áwritene. Swelce híe cwæden, “Ure ieldran, ðá ðe ðás stówa áer hioldon, híe lufodon wísdóm 7 ðurh ðone híe begéaton welan 7 ús læfdon. Hér mon mæg giet gesión hiora swæð, ac wé him ne cunnon æfterspyrigean, 7 for ðæm wé habbað nú áegðer forlæten ge ðone welan ge ðone wísdóm, for-ðæm-ðe wé noldon tó ðæm spore mid úre móde onlútan.”

“When I recalled all this, then I recalled also how I had seen before everything (lit. it all) had been utterly ravaged and burned, how the churches throughout England were full of (lit. stood filled with) treasures and books. (There was) a great number of monks (lit. servants of God), too, yet (lit. and) the latter got little benefit from those books, for they could not understand any part of them because they were not written in their own language. (It was) as if they might have said, ‘Our forebears who occupied these positions, they loved (Christian) scholarship and through it they acquired riches and left (it) to us (cp. 1 Kings iii:11 and Matt. vi:31-33). Here (in the monasteries) one can still see their traces, yet we do not know how to follow their path (lit. the track after them), for we have now forsaken both the riches and the scholarship, because we would not incline our mind(s) to that path’.”

In IIb Alfred deplored the state of ignorance prevailing at the time of his ascent to the throne of Wessex in 871. Now he first lets his memory play back over the years of his boyhood, say, the 50's and early 60's, before the Danish raids had worked the full force of their physical destruction, referred to directly and indirectly in the *Old-English Annals* over the years in question. Noteworthy examples are the ravaging of Kent in 865, the destruction of York in 867, and the destruction of monasteries in East Anglia in 870 (*E-text*). On the Danish raids, invasions and settlements (ON *landnám*) see Hodgkin II, esp. 510-72, Stenton, esp. 240-55.

The latter part of this section, resuming the thought of §IIb, laments the decline of an effective knowledge of Latin and the loss of material as well as of intellectual wealth, the former with special reference to church treasures and books destroyed by the Danes.

The section opens with a new example of initial anaphora: *Pá ic ðá ðis eall gemunde*, repeated with small variations in §§IIIa, b, below, and may be compared with the anaphoric 7 *hú* in §IIa, above.

III. *The Significance of Foreign Language Study and the Value of Translations*

IIIa. *Foreign Languages a Key to Scholarship*

Pá ic ðá ðis eall gemunde, ðá wundrade ic swiðe-swíðe ðára gódena wiötana

ðe giú wáeron giond Angelcynn 7 ðá béc eallæ be fullan gelornod hæfdon, ðæt híe híora ðá nánne dæl noldon on híora ágen geðiode wendan. Ac ic ðá sóna eft mé selfum andwyrde 7 cwæð, "Híe ne wédon ðætte áfre menn sceoldon swáe recceléase weorðan 7 sio lár swáe oðfeallan; for ðære wilnunga híe hit forléton 7 woldon ðæt hér ðý mára wísdóm on londe wære ðý wé má geðéoda cúðon."

"When I recalled all this, then I was very greatly astonished at those good scholars who formerly were throughout England and (who) had fully mastered all those books (and I wondered at the fact) that they had not at that time wanted to translate any portion of them into their own (English) language. However, I straightway in turn answered myself and said, 'They did not imagine that men would ever become so negligent and (that) that scholarship (should) lapse to such an extent; they left it (i.e. translation) undone for this reason, (namely,) that they wished (*lit.* and wished) that scholarship might be the greater in the country according as we knew more languages'."

With §III (i.e. §IIIa-d) Alfred turns from regrets concerning the former neglect of learning (§II) to hope for the present and future. Discussion of the importance of foreign language study leads him to a consideration of translation in general, then to translations of the Bible, and finally to a few words concerning his own version of St. Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*.

§IIIa, opening with the anaphoric formula *Pá ic ðá ðis eall gemunde*, raises the question here fundamental for Alfred, why earlier scholars had not made English translations of, let us say, key-works. He would be thinking of such distinguished Anglo-Latin writers as those mentioned under §IIa, above, and a host of others.⁸ But he answers his own question⁹ with the imaginary statement *Swelce cwéden* (as if Lat. *ac si dicerent*; see Klauber 59) to the effect that scholars of old consciously discouraged the making of translations in order to assure on the part of the clergy a solid mastery of Latin. (For an explanation of the paratactic construction *hie hit forléton 7 woldon* see Klauber 59, n. 3). This former emphasis on Latin learning in England reflects in good measure Irish tradition, in turn going back to St. Patrick, who for just the reasons given by Alfred discouraged Irish translations of the Psalter, Missal, Breviary, etc. See J. B. Bury, *The Life of St. Patrick and His Place in History* (London, 1905), pp. 217-18.

IIIb. *Translations of the Bible*

Pá gemunde ic hú sío Æ wæs árest on Ebréisc-geðiode funden 7 eft, ðá híe Créacas gelornodon, ðá wendon híe híe on híora ágen geðiode ealle 7 éac

⁸ Before Alfred there is, of course, very little OE prose. One thinks first of the Laws and of the presumed existence of annalistic notations, sparse no doubt, various legal instruments, commonly referred to as Charters, i.e., land grants, wills, estate boundaries, and the like, appearing both in OE and in Latin; for a convenient sampling of the latter see John Earle, *A Hand-Book to the Land-Charters, and other Saxon Documents* (Oxford, 1888), pp. 1-158. Cuthberht, abbot of Jarrow-Wearmouth in the eighth century, reports in his *Epistola de Obitu Bedae* that at the time of his death Bede was engaged in an English translation of the *Gospel according to St. John* and of excerpts from the writings of Isidore of Seville (ca. 560-636), but none of this has survived; for texts of this letter see E. V. K.

Dobbie, *The Manuscripts of Cædmon's Hymn and Bede's Death Song, etc.* (Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 1937), p. 122, ll. 44-47 and p. 123, ll. 39-41. There it will be noted that the Continental version states that Bede had reached *John vi:1*, while the insular version implies that he had translated the whole of the fourth Gospel. The Insular version also differs from the Continental in specifying "*libri rotarum Ysidori*," evidently referring to Isidore's *De Natura Rerum* (Dobbie 101-02), whose manuscript title *Liber Rotarum* "Book of Circles, or Circular Designs" is well attested. Alfred would appear not to have known of this activity of Bede (Klauber 60, n. 3).

⁹ On the transition formula here employed see Klauber 59, n. 2.

ealle óðre béc, 7 eft Lædenware swáe-same, siððan híe híe gelornodon, híe híe wendon ealla ðurh wise wealhstódas on híora ágen geðíode. •Ond éac ealla óðræ Críst(e)na ðóðra sumne dæl híora ágen geðíode wendon.

"When I recalled how the (Old) Law was first known (lit. met with) in the Hebrew language and in turn, when the Greeks mastered (lit. learned) it, then they translated it all into their own language and also all other books. And in turn the Latin-speaking people similarly after they had mastered it, they translated them all through learned interpreters into their own language. And also all other Christian peoples translated a certain portion of them (i.e. books of the Bible) into their own language."

§IIIb on Bible translations is digressive and is only most incidentally connected with what precedes and with what follows. Yet it contains much of interest as to what Alfred knew or may have known about current translations of the Old and New Testaments. When he speaks of the Law, he presumably is referring to the first of the three main divisions of the Old Testament, *viz.*, the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings (i.e. the Hagiographia or "Sacred" Writings of Greek terminology) and thus be alluding specifically to our Pentateuch comprising the first five books of the Old Testament. With the phrase "and all other books" he would mean the rest of the Old Testament, ultimately included under the term Septuagint. From his remarks about the Bible in Latin it is not possible to know what particular text he had in mind; very likely he knew some form of St. Jerome's translation, presumably with some penetration of so-called Irish readings.¹⁰ The concluding statement, sweeping in character, is the most uncertain to interpret. Through travellers and emissaries it is by no means inconceivable that he knew of some of the Oriental translations¹¹ of the Septuagint (in Syriac, Coptic, Ethiopian, and Arabic) and of the New Testament (Syriac in the Gospel harmony or *Diatessaron* of the Mesopotamian Christian Tatianus, Coptic, Ethiopian and Arabic). From the West he may have heard of the missionary activities and the Macedonian-Slavic translations of the brothers Constantine (died in Rome in 869, having assumed the monastic name Cyril) and Methodius, busy in Moravia after 863;¹² also he may have known of the Gothic version of Bishop Wulfila. The Gothic language and Gothic traditions, including Arianism, lived on in Visigothic Spain into the tenth century and the Wulfilan Bible was the Bible of the Germanic peoples of southern Europe; it is not impossible that the great Codex Argenteus came to Werden on the Ruhr late in the eighth century thanks to the Visigoth Theodulfus, bishop of Orleans; the abbot and founder of Werden was one Liudger, pupil of Alcuin of York.¹³ Various Old-High-German items, too, might be taken into account: fragments of translations of the Psalms, the fairish-good Monsee-Vienna translation of parts of the *Gospel according to St. Matthew*, and the slavish, often outlandish translation of a Latin translation

¹⁰ See Hans H. Glunz, *The History of the Vulgate in England from Alcuin to Roger Bacon* (Cambridge, 1933), esp. pp. 113ff.

¹¹ His interest in the Orient is discussed by Plummer 134, Stevenson 286-90, Klaeber 54.

¹² That Alfred knew a good fair bit about Slavic Europe is clear from statements in his version of Paulus Orosius' early fifth century *Historiae adversum Paganos*, ed. Henry Sweet, *King Alfred's Orosius* (EETS, Orig. Ser. No. 79, London, 1883), p. 14, l. 36-p. 16, l. 22, *passim*, esp. the *Morava* or Moravians (p. 16, ll. 10, 16, 18). This same material is conveniently edited by A. J.

Wyatt, *An Anglo-Saxon Reader* (Cambridge, 1919), p. 11, l. 11—p. 12, l. 35. For an excellent map of Alfred's Europe see Kemp Malone, 'King Alfred's North, etc.,' *Speculum*, V (1930), 139-67, at end facing 140.

¹³ See Otto von Friesen and Anders Gräpe, *Om Codex Argenteus: dess tid, hem och öden* (Uppsala, 1928), pp. 122-26; for a Neo-Latin version of the same by C. A. Brodén, see *Codex Argenteus Upsaliensis*, etc. (Uppsala and Malmö, 1927), pp. 83-85 (the Latin introduction has also been printed separately).

of Tatian's *Diatessaron* mentioned above.¹⁴ It would seem that Alfred did not reckon here the OE versifications of Bible stories.¹⁵

It may be noted that *Créacas* (also OE *Crécas* "Greeks") corresponds exactly to Goth. *Kreks*, pl. *Krekos*, OHG *Chrēchi*, *Chreachi*, *Kriachi*, MHG *Krieche*, pl. *Kriechen*, transmitted to the West-Germanic world through Arian-Christian channels; all look back ultimately to Lat. *Graecus* with monophthongal *e* and with the Gothic sound-substitution of *K-* for *G-*; see Hermann Flasdieck, *Beiblatt zur Anglia*, XL (1929), 342-43, and further *Mediaeval Studies* VI (1945), 103 under "Kriechen". For a discussion of *wealh-stód* "interpreter" see Max Förster, *Der Flussname Themse und seine Sippe, etc.* Bavarian Academy of Sciences, *Sitzungsberichte, phil.-histor. Abtlg.*, 1941, Vol. 1, p. 157, n. 1; the literal meaning of the word is "prop or helper of Britons or Welshmen" (Förster's *Briten-Stütze, -Helfer*) and must have come into being early in the invasion period.

IIIc. A Program of Translation and of Popular Education

For-ðý mé ðyncð betre, gif íow swáe ðyncð, ðæt wé*éac sumæ béc, ðá ðe niedbeðearfosta sien eallum monnum tó wiottonne, ðæt wé ðá on ðæt geðiðe wenden ðe wé ealle gecnáwan mægen.

7 gedón swáe wé swiðe éaðe magon mid Godes fultume, gif wé ðá stilnesse habbað, ðætte eall sío gioguð ðe nú is on Angelcynne fríora monna, ðára ðe ðá spéda hæbben ðæt híe ðæm beféolan mægen, sien tó liornunga oðfæste, ðá-hwile-ðe híe tó nánre oðerre note ne mægen, oð ðone first ðe híe wel cunnen Englisc gewrit árædan. Léere mon siððan furður on Læden-geðiðe ðá ðe mon furðor láran wille 7 tó hieran háde dón wille. .

"Therefore, it seems better to me, if it seems so to you (bishops), that we (i.e. you and I), too, (should translate) certain books which may be most essential for everybody to know, that we should translate them into that language that we can all understand.

And (it seems good to me that we) should bring (it) about—as with God's assistance we very easily can if we have peace and quiet—that all children (*lit.* youth) which are (*lit.* is) now in England (who are children) of freemen with (*lit.* of those who have) the means so that they (i.e. their children) may be able to apply themselves to it (*i.e.* learning), be set to studying as long as they are not capable of any other employment until such (*lit.* that) time as they properly know how to read an English document. Let further instruction in the Latin language be given those whom one may wish to instruct further and (whom one) may wish to place in a higher office."

§IIIc is perhaps the most important paragraph in the letter and is of very particular interest in connection with the true beginning of Old-English prose.¹⁶ To remedy the critical deficiency in Latin learning Alfred proposes a series of

¹⁴ Suggested by Klauber 60; on these various OHG works see Gustav Ehrismann, *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur*, etc. I (2d ed., Munich, 1932), 270-73, 282-83, 286-90.

¹⁵ E.g. the OE *Genesis A* and *Genesis B*, *Exodus*, *Daniel*, and the Old-Low-German *Héliand* and *Genesis*, were the latter known to him; such pleasing poems, stemming from a fine old tradition of Latin Biblical poetry, he would surely have regarded more or less as Sunday-school retellings and paraphrases. On the tradition of Latin Christian narrative poetry see H. O. Taylor, *The Classical Heritage of the Middle Ages* (3d ed., New York, 1911), pp. 280-84, and on the individual

authors mentioned by Taylor see Martin Schanz, *op. cit.* n. 23, below, pp. 360-97.

¹⁶ On vernacular prose before Alfred see n. 8, above. Yet Alfred cannot be thought of as starting any steady or substantial stream of prose writings which really only starts in the latter part of the tenth century and in connection with the reforms of St. Dunstan and Aethelwold and expressed in the *Regularis Concordia*. (See J. Armitage Robinson, *The Times of St. Dunstan* (Oxford, 1923), *passim*). On this point cp. R. W. Chambers, *On the Continuity of English Prose from Alfred to More and his School* (EETS., London, 1932), pp. ix-xi.

translations, English renderings of important books, a "Five-Foot Shelf," as it were. In §IIIId it will appear that this series was initiated with St. Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*. The fruits of this project resulted in the production of at least five works variously by Alfred himself and by members of what may be called his "circle." To be counted here are the *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*, Orosius' *Historiae adversum Paganos*, Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum* (whose place in the Alfredian canon is by no means secure; see Stenton 270), Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae* and perhaps the metrical rendering of the meters of the same,¹⁷ and Bk. I of St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo's *Soliloquia* (Alfred's *Blóstman* or "Blooms," as if a florilegium of sorts).¹⁸ Other works have been considered Alfred's, e.g. the "First Fifty" of the prose portion of the *Paris Psalter*, though uncertainty beclouds this matter. As strictly native products neither the *Laws* nor the *Old-English Annals*, in whose original organization Alfred was almost surely concerned and interested, are to the point here.

After announcing his program of translation, Alfred turns to the less immediate but more basic problem of building for the future. His plan here is ambitious: the children of all freemen¹⁹ shall be taught to read their mother-tongue; this would presumably include children from about seven to twelve or fourteen.²⁰ Older children with special promise are to go on to the study of Latin in preparation of a church career. Until relatively recent times such a broad educational program could scarcely be more than a pious hope. Alfred may have found inspiration from certain statements by Bede which suggest some extension of the educational process in the better days of the past; such passages are *HE* III, 3, *ad fin.*, on the instruction of English children (*parvuli*) by Irish monks and *HE* III, 27, where one is told of the flocking to Ireland for study of *multi nobilium simul et mediocrum* "many of the nobility and of humbler folk," a point also emphasized by Aldhelm of Malmesbury in his *Epistola ad Ehfridum*.²¹

On the formula of politeness *gif iow swé ðyncð* (cp. OHG *ob hiu rát thuhti*) see Klauber 64-65. The opening sentence is in part elliptical with no verb after the first *ðæt*; one is probably to understand here *wenden* from the next *ðæt*-clause; for other varieties of elipsis after *ðæt*, conj., see Bosworth-Toller s.v. IV, VI.

IIId. *The Translation of the Regulae Pastoralis Liber*

Pá ic ðá gemunde hú sío lár Læden-geðíodes ár ðíssum áfeallen wees giond Angelcynn—7 ðeah monige cúðon Englisc gewrit árádan—ðá ongan ic ongemang óðrum mislicum 7 manigfealdum bisgum ðísses kynerices ðá bóc wendan on Englisc ðe is genemned on Læden *Pastoralis* 7 on Englisc *Hierdebóc*, hwilum word be worde, hwilum andgit of andgiete, swæ-swæ ic híe geliornode æt Plegmunde mínum ærcebiskepe 7 æt Assere mínum biscepe 7 æt Grimbold mínum mæssprioste 7 æt Ióhanne mínum mæssepréoste. Siððan ic híe ðá geliornod hæfde, swæ-swæ ic híe andgit fullicost áreccean meante, ic híe on Englisc áwende.

¹⁷ See G. P. Krapp, *The Paris Psalter and the Meters of Boethius*, (The Anglo-Saxon Poetic Records V, Columbia Univ. Press: New York, 1932), Introduction pp. xxxv ff.

¹⁸ For bibliographies of these works see HB 104-08, *CBEL* I, 86-88.

¹⁹ See Stevenson 300, n. to 75.16; on the status of the West-Saxon ceorl, probably the humblest type envisaged here by Alfred, see Stenton 275.

²⁰ See A. F. Leach, *The Schools of Medieval England* (London, 1915), esp. p. 74.

²¹ Ed. by Rudolf Ehwald, *Aldhelmi Opera in MGH, Auctores Antiquissimi* XV (Berlin, 1913-14), pp. 490-91, also with an English translation by G. F. Browne, *St. Aldhelm: His Life and Times* (London, 1903), esp. pp. 262-63; for bibliography of the letter Duckett 65, n. 169.

"When I then recalled to what extent before this (time) instruction in the Latin language had declined throughout England—and yet many knew how to read an English document—then among the other various and manifold pre-occupations of this kingdom (of Wessex), I proceeded to translate into English that book which is called in Latin *Pastoralis (Liber)* and in English *Herde-Book*, sometimes word for word, sometimes sentence for sentence, as I mastered it from Plegmund my archbishop (of Canterbury) and from Asser my bishop (of Exeter?) and from Grimbold my mass-priest and from Iohannes my mass-priest. And after I had mastered it then so that I understood it and so that I could expound it quite clearly, I turned it into English."

§III^d on translation concludes with a statement concerning Alfred's method in rendering the *Regulae Pastoralis Liber* and an acknowledgement of help received. At the beginning he again (cp. §§II^b, II^d, III^a) alludes to the decline of Latin learning, then speaks encouragingly of the fact that many persons are able to read English.²² With this last fact in mind he starts out, accordingly, on his present translation. As noted p. 93, above, the proper title of the work in question is *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*, the title in all modern editions.²³ What one may describe as a false title, *De Cura Pastoralis*, occurring in some of the later manuscripts and earlier printed editions and somehow favored by students of Alfred's translation, stems from a phrase early in Gregory's own preface: *fugiens pondera curae pastoralis*, with reference to the latter's extreme reluctance to assume the high papal office. This phrase is rendered by Alfred: *flion ðá byrðenne ðære hirdelecan giemenne* "to flee the burden of the pastoral care" (Sweet 23, l. 11); had Alfred thought of the title in such terms, he would scarcely have referred to the work merely as *Herde-bóc* here in the letter. The statement that the translation is now literal (*word be worde*), now sentence by sentence (*andgit of andgiete*; see Mossé II, 368, n. to 77), i.e. by free paraphrasing, described his method well enough (cp. Sweet, Introduction, p. xli; Plummer 152).

Of the four churchmen to whom Alfred acknowledges indebtedness in fulfilling his task Plegmund and Asser are well-known in their own right. The former, a representative of Mercian culture (p. 97, above) was archbishop of Canterbury from 890 to 914 (see further *The Dictionary of National Biography*, s. n.); Plegmund is also apparently remembered in the names of the Cheshire ecclesiastical district of Plemonstall and the village of Plemstall (earlier *Pley-mundestów* "Plegmund's place or hermitage") on which see Eilert Ekwall, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Place-Names* (2d ed., Oxford, 1940), p. 351. Asser is famous as the author of the *De Rebus gestis Alfredi Magni* (see Stevenson, ed. cit. supra). He was a monk of St. David's (Pembrokeshire) and at a later date (ca. 895 X 900 -910?) bishop of Sherborne, Dorset. At the time of the writing of the letter he may well have been by special appointment bishop of Exeter (Stevenson 321-23 and §IV, below). Iohannes, perhaps a monk of the Westphalian monastery of Korvey on the Weser (between Höxter and Holzminden), was a Continental or "Old" Saxon, imported by Alfred to head the

²² Evident from the very existence of the OE *Laws*, *Annals*, *Charters* in the vernacular, and the vernacular poetry; see p. 99, n. 8, and p. 101, above.

²³ E.g. J. P. Migne et al., edd., PL 77, 12 ff. The PL text is reprinted with a facing English translation by H. R. Bramley, S. *Gregorii Magni Regulae Pastoralis Liber-S. Gregory on the Pastoral Charge*, etc. (Oxford, 1874); in his introduction, p. viii, Bramley comments half-apologetically for making the false title the basis for his English title "on the Pastoral Charge." For other editions and translations see Martin

Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, Pt. IV, ii (completed by Carl Hosius and G. Krüger, Munich, 1920), p. 618, and *ibid.* p. 617 (under *Verbreitung*) for the title. Alfred himself, it will be noted, uses the short title *Pastoralis*, presumably for *Pastoralis Liber*, rendered in full by his *Herde-bóc*; here he may be following common custom, as does Bede in *HE* II, 1 (ed. Charles Plummer, I, 76): *Alium quoque librum compositum egregium, qui vocatur Pastoralis*; see further Plummer II, 70, n. ad loc.; note Plummer's curious *Regulae Curae Pastoralis*.

desolate monastic community at Athelney (Somerset) (see Hodgkin II, 613); Grimbald, an aged Frank, was brought from the Frankish monastery of St Bertin near St. Omer (dép. Pas-de-Calais), France. On Grimbald see Stevenson 307-311, Hodgkin II, 616-17, Stenton 268 and n. 1.

§IV. *On the Distribution and Care of the Copies*

Ond tó álcum biscepstóle on mínum ríce wille áne onsendan; 7 on álcere bið án æstel, sé bið on fíftegum mancessa. Ond ic bebiode on Godes naman ðæt nán mon þone æstel from ðære béc ne dó ne ðá bóc from ðæm mynstre. Uncúð hú longe ðær swá gelærede biscepas sien, swæ-swæ nú, Gode ðonc, wél-hwær siendon. For-ðý ic wolde ðæt híe ealneg æt ðære stówe wæren, búton sé biscep híe mid him habban wille oððe hío hwær tó læne síe oððe hwá óðre bíwrite.

"And (I) intend to send one (copy) to each episcopal see in my kingdom and on each there will be an *æstel* which will be of the value of fifty mancuses. And in God's name I command that no one take the *æstel* from the book nor the book from the cathedral. No one knows (*lit. unknown*) how long there may be such learned bishop's there (in those sees) as now, thanks to God, there are in nearly all (*lit. everywhere*). For that reason I should like it (*i.e.* each copy) always to be in that place (*i.e.* the cathedral) unless the bishop wishes to have it with him or (unless) it is somewhere on loan or someone is making a copy from (it)."

This concluding section of the letter is practical in nature and makes provision for the distribution of the books and their subsequent care and protection; as will be seen, they were of great value.

The opening sentence provides a rough key to the size of the original edition. One copy was to go to each see in Wessex and English Mercia; hence one may assume that the following received copies: the archiepiscopal 'see' of Canterbury under Archbishop Plegmund (see §III^d, above), Dorchester (Oxfordshire) under Bishop Ealhheard (ca. 878-ca. 897), perhaps Exeter under Asser,²⁴ Hereford under Bishop Eadgár (880 X 901-ca. 931), Lichfield (Staffordshire) perhaps under Bishop Wulfréd (ca. 877-ca. 894), London under Bishop Héahstán (ca. 880-898), Rochester under Bishop Swiðwulf (ca. 874-ca. 895), Sherborne (Dorset) under Bishop Wulfsige (ca. 885-ca. 895), and Worcester (Mercia) under Bishop Wærferth (873-915). Copies containing the names of Wærferth and Wulfsige in the salutation have, as we have seen, survived. Furthermore, in his discription of the now ruined *Ms Tiberius B XI* Wanley, quoting from a note on fol. 3, mentions copies given to Plegmund, Swiðulf, and Wærferth,²⁵ and states that *Ms Otho B II* was addressed to Héahstan (Hehstanus).²⁶ The first edition may well have run to a dozen or more copies.

Whatever else may emerge from the remarks that follow, it will be clear that Alfred attached great importance to this first volume of his series of translations with its particular significance for bishops and that he spared no expense in making the copies sent to his bishops handsome and impressive. This point comes out in his statement that connected with each copy thus sent is an *æstel* worth fifty mancuses. Whatever an *æstel* may be, its value was enormous. The gold

²⁴ Asser certainly ultimately became bishop of Sherborne but at the time of the writing of the letter and the distribution of copies it would seem to be more than likely, if not certain, that the incumbent of Sherborne was Wulfsige, whose name appears in the salutation of two of the three Cambridge manuscripts (see note 5, above). Much uncertainty surrounds the chronology and events of Asser's life (see Stevenson, pp.

lxv-xxviii) but there seems to be a case for the notion that Alfred created some sort of a diocese for him from out of the western part of the see of Sherborne, perhaps centering on Exeter (see Stevenson 321-23).

²⁵ See Sweet, p. xiii, and Wanley, *op. cit.* under n. 5, above, p. 217, col. 2.

²⁶ See Sweet, p. xiv, and Wanley, p. 217, col. 2.

mancus piece weighed 70 grains.²⁷ Reckoning ca. 27 grains to the ounce, 1 mancus would weigh 2.6 oz., which with gold valued at US \$35 per oz. would amount to \$81. Multiplied by fifty this would make each *œstel* formally equal to ca. US \$4050, answering approximately to the 1916 figure of £900 of E. F. Thomas,²⁸ accepted by Mossé (*op. cit.*, II, 368 n. 84, *ad fin.*). But these sums must be far under the true value of the object according to present-day standards. The determining of a conversion-rate for money over the centuries is notoriously difficult and it is probably impossible to arrive at any really accurate figure. I have been told that for the present situation a conversion-rate of 50 to 1 would be conservative and that 100 to 1 is by no means out of the question. Alfred's evaluation of the *œstels* presumably refers to the actual gold used in its manufacture, and the considerable amount of gold involved may, thus, have had a value of \$200,000 or more, prodigious as this sum may seem, especially if further multiplied by the number of copies of the books distributed to bishops!²⁹ In any event, it is obvious that Alfred's *œstels* were exceedingly valuable objects.

Many attempts at the identification of this object have been made but the meaning of *œstel* is more than disputed. Suggestions have included "gold filigree clasp (for a binding)," "writing tablets," "page-weight," "ruler for guiding a pen," and "book-mark;" on understandable but not very solid grounds the meaning "book-mark" has been especially favored.³⁰ Two ultimate etymologies have been urged, Lat. *hastula* "little spear" (almost surely wrong) and VLat. *astula*, var. *astella*, Lat. *assula*,³¹ "splinter" "chip of wood" (almost certainly right). Now VLat. *astula* or the variant *astella* was borrowed into Old Irish as *astal*³² and is explained by Cormac in his *Glossary* (as if from a Lat. *astilia*) to mean "chip of wood or the spear of a book."³³ Students, encouraged by the

²⁷ See H. M. Chadwick, *Studies on Anglo-Saxon Institutions* (Cambridge, 1905), pp. 10 ff, confirmed by F. E. Harmer, *Select English Historical Documents*, etc. (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 77-78, 133, n. to p. 78, and F. L. Attenborough, *The Laws of the Earliest English Kings* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 201, n. to A and G 3.2.

²⁸ In a paper given in resumé in the *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* CIII-CV (Cambridge, 1917), 12-13.

²⁹ There is one other possible key to the value of the *œstels*, coming, to be sure, from the reign of Aethelstan a bit later than Alfred, namely the fact that in Aethelstan's Laws (Attenborough, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-61) an ox is valued at 1 mancus (7 *oxan* to *mancuse*). At this rate an *œstel* would be worth an enormous, unwieldy herd of 50 oxen! My friends among the cattle-dealers tell me that today a first-rate ox weighing, say 1500 lbs. sells at about 25c per lb. live weight, i.e. for ca. \$400; fifty such would run to \$20,000. At face-value this would represent a conversion-rate of 5 to 1, undoubtedly far too low, especially since an ox was unquestionably much more valuable in Anglo-Saxon England than here today. After all oxen cannot be expected to compete with tractors.

³⁰ In his edition Sweet gives "clasp," later in his *Reader* changing to "book-mark?"; Bosworth-Toller gives only "writing tablets"; Clark-Hall has "some thin kind of board?" In Additions and Corrections to his Supplement (p. 755, col. 2) Toller seems, under the influence of Thomas' paper *cit. surra.*, to incline to the meaning "book-binding". Ferd. Holthausen, *Altenglisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg, 1934), holds

to "book-mark" (Buch-, Lesezeichen), as does Max Förster in "Zur Geschichte des Reliquienkultus in Altengland," *Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, phil.-histor. Abtlg., 1943, Heft 8, p. 11; Mossé II, 439, glosses "liseuse?"

³¹ See Alois Walde—J. B. Hoffmann, *Latienisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* I (3d ed., Heidelberg, 1930-38), p. 74. This etymology was suggested long ago by Sweet in his *Reader*. The Latin word has had a long history in the Romanic languages; see Wilh. Meyer-Lübke, *Romanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* s. v. *assula* and *astella*. From OFr. *astelle* (mod. attelle "surgical splint"), not from OE *œstel*, the word passed into English and is recorded in the *NED* under "astel" from the early fourteenth century to the latter part of the fifteenth; it has survived as "astel" in dialect in Cornwall (see the *English Dialect Dictionary*, s.v.), though one may wonder here whether this is not a borrowing from Cornish *astell*, f., pl. *estyll* "board" "shingle" "plank," ultimately, too, from VLat. *astula* (see R. M. Nance, *A New Cornish English Dictionary* [St. Ives, 1928], p. 7, a reference for which I am greatly obliged to my friend Mr. Eric Hamp, who has also furnished me with a number of other useful Celtic references).

³² Not from *hastula*; see Holgar Pedersen, *Vergleichende Grammatik der keltischen Sprache* I (Göttingen, 109), 199, §124, 7.

³³ See Hessen's *Irish Lexicon* (Halle /S., 1935), p. 65, s.v., where only the definition "Lesezeichen; bookmark" is given. In modern Irish the meaning "book-mark" is obsolete and meanings of *astal* are "lath" "chip" "splinter" "pole used in seine-fishing" (see P. S. Dineen, *Folcloir Gaedhilge*

unusual meaning "book-mark" of Irish *astal*, have seized on a gloss in Ælfric's *Grammar*: *indicatorium æstel* (var. *estel*, *æstyl*),²⁴ given in a miscellaneous list of neuters in -um, and evidently assumed that the otherwise unrecorded *indicatorium* meant something like a "pointer", hence "book-mark." Toller (*loc. cit.* n. 34, above) attempts to connect this with Lat. *index* in the sense of "book-title" and have it refer to the binding on which the title appeared. But the lemma *indicatorium* proves to be somewhat less of a guide in the light of the late Sir John Sandys' observations²⁵ in Thomas' article (p. 12, *ad fin.*). As he says, "*indicatorium* may be a corruption of *involucrum* ('covering, case, wrapping'), which is found in glossaries in corrupted forms. If *ol* were once mistaken for *d*, the rest of the corruption might follow." All this lends strong support to Thomas' suggestion that Alfred's *æstels* were richly ornamented gold covers or cases for his manuscripts. For such objects, now mostly lost, see Thomas, *art. cit.*, p. 13. At the moment of writing and in view of the great value of the object in question I feel that the odds are greatly in favor of a most elaborate gold case or binding (from OIr. *astal*) for the book, certainly not a book-mark, for which, excluding the use of precious stones, not even Tiffany or Cartier would be likely to charge anything like the price suggested here.

On the rare parenthetic *Gode ðonc* (cp. Germ. *Gott sei Dank*) see Klaeber 64, n. 2, and with the elliptical, semi-exclamatory *Uncuð hú* cp. *Wundur hwár* of *Béowulf* 3062b.

APPENDIX

The Old-English Metrical Preface to St. Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber*

Following the letter attached to certain copies of Alfred's version of St. Gregory's *Regulae Pastoralis Liber* comes in three manuscripts a sixteen line poem serving as a true preface to the work (see n. 3, above). It has been edited on the basis of the Hatton manuscript with variants from other manuscripts by E. V. K. Dobbie, *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems* (*cit. supra*), p. 110.²⁶

Pis ærendgewrit	Agustínus
ofer sealtna sáe	súðan bróhte
íegbúendum,	swá hit ár fore
ádihtode	Dryhtnes cempa,
5 Róme pápa.	Ryhtspell monig
Grégorius	gléawmód gindwód
ðurh sefan synttro,	searoðonca hord.
For-ðáem hé moncynnes	máest gestriénde
Ród(e)ra Wearde,	Rómwara betest,
10 monna módwélegost,	mérðum gefrágost.
Siððan míن (var. mé) on Englisc	Ælfréd kyning
áwende worda gehwelc,	and mé his writerum
sende súð and norð,	heht him swelcra má
brengan bí ðáre bisene,	ðæt hé his biscepum
15 sendan meahte,	for-ðáem hí his sume ðorfton,
ðá ðe Lædenspráece	láeste cúðon.

agus Béarla [Dublin, 1927], p. 62, col. 2). It may be noted that no meaning "book-mark" appears in Welsh, Cornish, or Breton.

²⁴ Julius Zupitza, *Ælfric's Grammatik und Glossar* (Berlin, 1880), p. 31, l. 9. The same gloss and lemma (quoted by Toller, Supplement, p. 755, col. 2, under *æstel*) also occurs in a list of objects connected with the fabric and furnishings of a church. It is not at all

unlikely that one of these glosses is taken from the other and that in consequence they lack independent value.

²⁵ Not included in A. J. Wyatt's fragmentary excerpt in his *Anglo-Saxon Reader*, etc. (Cambridge, 1919), p. 214, n. to 81, where I first ran into this discussion.

²⁶ See *op. cit.*, pp. cxii-xv (introduction), 201-02 (notes).

"This treatise (*Regulae Pastoralis Liber*) Augustine brought from the south over the salt sea to island-dwellers as previously the warrior of the Lord, the pope of Rome, had composed it (in Latin). Wise Gregory through the wisdom of his mind made himself acquainted with many true discourses, treasure-troves of sagacious ideas. Therefore, he won over a very large number of human beings for the Guardian of Heaven (lit. Heavens), (he,) best of Romans (l. 10), most gifted of men, most renowned for famous exploits. Subsequently, King Alfred translated each (one) of my words (lit. words of me, or translated me, each of my words) into English and dispatched me to his scribes south and north, ordered them to produce more such (copies) according to that exemplar so that he might send them to his bishops, because some of them needed it who knew very little of the Latin language."

Whether a fact actually known to the author of the poem or not, the statement that among such books as Augustine brought with him from Rome to Britain the *Regulae Pastoralis Liber* was one is almost surely correct.³⁷ It is also to be noted that the *Metrical Preface* is much less optimistic in regard to the Latin learning of the bishops than, perhaps not unnaturally, Alfred is in the letter (p. 103, above). There is an excellent, somewhat reduced facsimile of ll. 1-13 of the poem according to the Hatton manuscript in Hodgkin II, Plate 77, facing p. 622, with transliteration and translation.

³⁷ See Putnam F. Jones, "The Gregorian Mission and English Education," *Speculum* III (1938), 335-48, esp. 345 and n. 5, on the present passage.

Berengar's Definitions of *Sacramentum* and Their Influence on Mediaeval Sacramentology

N. M. HARING S.A.C.

IN HIS work *De sacra coena*¹ Berengar (d. 1088) levels the following criticism at his adversary: "It is rather amazing, especially in view of your great erudition, that you do not hesitate to put it down in writing that I deny the Flesh and Blood, although you admit that I use the expressions *sacmenta carnis et sanguinis*. For how could anyone who professed to be a father be accused of denying that he had a son? You even write *against* your own erudition by saying that I place the whole matter in the *sacramentum* only, for it is impossible to prove something to be at once a *sacramentum* and a *sacramentum* only, since it is evident that, if there is a *sacramentum*, there must of necessity be a *res sacramenti*, as I have expressly stated with regard to the *sacramentum* of Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist."² This doctrine, he states, is clearly indicated in the definitions of *sacramentum* found in the works of St. Augustine. In defining it as *sacrum signum* or *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*, St. Augustine means to say that all *corporalia sacramenta* are nothing else than visible words, sacred indeed yet changeable and subject to time.³ *Sacramentum* and *res* are correlatives like father and son.⁴ In the application of this distinction to Baptism and to the Eucharist, Berengar professes to follow the constant procedure of St. Ambrose who describes both so much in the same manner, that what is said of one is also true of the other. If, then, it is conceded that the water of Baptism is not changed by its consecration, it should likewise be admitted that the bread which, by consecration, is converted into the Body of Christ still retains the nature of bread.⁵ Without differentiation St. Ambrose calls *sacramentum* the water of regeneration as well as the bread and wine which the faithful receive from the altar.⁶ He teaches that, by consecration, the water does not cease to be water;

¹ Composed either in 1063-1069 or in 1076-1077, the work was first discovered by G. E. Lessing in 1770, and published by A. F. and F. Th. Vischer in Berlin, 1834. The scarcity of copies prompted W. H. Beekenkamp to re-edit the work *ad fidem codicis Guelferbytani*, the one and only extant manuscript. The publication appeared in the series *Kerkhistorische Studien*, 'S - Gravenhage, 1941. The rather numerous printing errors do not seem serious enough to make recourse to the Vischer edition indispensable, but other disturbing signs of haste in preparing the new edition should put the student on guard in using the footnotes. If, on page 105, the reader meets note 3: *Hunc locum non inventi*, he may turn to note 12 on page 150 to find the same passage accurately identified. In a critical edition, furthermore, it is a general practice to differentiate between authentic and spurious works to which the author refers. Beekenkamp, however, cites *De fide ad Petrum* and a commentary on *Hebreus* under the names of St. Augustine and St. Ambrose, respectively, without indicating that Berengar's attribution is erroneous.

² *De s. coena*, c. 26; ed. Beekenkamp, p. 55: *Stupendum satis, praesertim in tua erudi-*

tione, quod non dubitas scribere me negare carnem et sanguinem, cum concedas dicere me sacramenta carnis et sanguinis. Quia enim veritate professus aliquis patrem, convinci potest filium abnegasse? Contra tuam eruditioinem scribis qui me rem totam constituere in solo sacramento dicens, cum et sacramentum esse et solum esse minime possit demonstrari aliquid. Constat enim, si sit sacramentum, nulla posse non esse ratione rem quoque sacramenti.

³ *Ibid.*; p. 55. In his letter to Adelman, written ca. 1049, Berengar had offered no less than six definitions: *Ep. contra Almannum*, ed. E. Martène-U. Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* IV (Paris, 1717), pp. 109 ff. Concerning their Augustinian origin, see Joseph Geiselmann, *Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholastik* (Paderborn, 1926), pp. 293 ff. Although Abelard inserted these definitions in his *Sic et Non*, c. 117 (PL 178, 1535AB), I could not detect any further traces of them in the works of mediaeval writers. For that reason, there is no need to discuss them here.

⁴ *Ibid.*; p. 56.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, c. 29; pp. 64 f.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, c. 32; p. 78.

it remains water, although it is changed into something else.⁷ We can see the *sacramentum* with our bodily eyes, but only with the eyes of our hearts can we perceive that of which it is a *sacramentum*.⁸ In other words, the natural water has been changed into a "spiritual laver" or a "visible word"; yet water it still is.⁹ In like manner, St. Ambrose calls the consecrated bread and wine *sacmenta* which we can see with our bodily eyes, though that of which they are *sacmenta* is hidden from them.¹⁰ For the same reason, St. Augustine observes: *Accedit verbum ad elementum aquae et fit sacramentum et ipsum visibile verbum.*¹¹ He entirely agrees with St. Ambrose when he writes: *Hoc accipe in pane quod pependit in cruce.*¹²

Berengar sees the terms of analogy as follows: In Baptism our natural eyes see the water; yet they do not see the Holy Spirit who consecrated it; they do not see the Cross to which the Jews nailed Christ's Body, the Cross whose "impression" made that water a *sacramentum*; they do not see Christ's death and resurrection of which the baptismal rite is a symbol. In the same manner, after consecration, our eyes see bread and wine on the altar; yet they do not see Christ's Body and Blood which rests in heaven—not somewhere on earth—until the Day of Judgment.¹³ How foolish, he tells us, is it to believe that, on the altar, there be a little portion of that Body and a little drop of that Blood, for His Body can suffer no more, nor can it be dissected into parts, nor be removed in its entirety from its place in heaven.¹⁴ How contradictory it is to assert that this *portiuncula* is invisible and yet a *sacramentum*; what a perversion to distort *visibilis forma* in St. Augustine's definition by saying that we can see the color or any other accidents of that "little portion", but cannot see the *portiuncula* itself. Only our intellect can distinguish between *forma* and *formatum*, while in reality such a distinction is impossible.¹⁵ Hence, the accidents would also be changed, if their substance were changed: *Impossibile est enim secundum hanc mutationem, corrupto subjecto, non corrumpi quod erat in subjecto.*¹⁶ However, a change—*conversio*—does actually take place, not by what is called *corruptio subjecti*, but by consecration which changes bread and wine into Christ's Body and Blood, while their natural substances remain.¹⁷ *Post consecrationem . . . jam est corpus Christi ipse panis.*¹⁸ Although opposed to any "dissection" of Christ's Body in heaven, Berengar insists that, according to St. Augustine, parts of His Body are received in *sacramento*, for it is plainly stated: *Per partes manducatur in sacramento.*¹⁹

Judged by *De sacra coena*, Berengar had no doubt concerning the accuracy of his interpretation of Ambrose and Augustine. To corroborate it, he calls on a philosophical maxim: the inseparability of substance and accidents. To his mind, there is only a mental distinction between *forma* and *formatum*. Whether this philosophical principle prompted him to elaborate his theory or whether his concept of *sacramentum* made him call philosophy to his assistance, may be impossible to decide, but it is evident that he approached the doctrine of the real Presence with an amount of dialectics that alarmed his contemporaries.²⁰ His whole theory centers on *sacramentum* defined as a material, visible, mutable,

⁷ *Ibid.*; p. 79.

⁸ *Ibid.*; p. 79.

⁹ *Ibid.*; p. 79.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*; p. 82.

¹¹ *Ibid.* and c. 38; pp. 78 and 116.

¹² *De s. coena*, c. 30; p. 70.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, c. 32; p. 83.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*; p. 84.

¹⁵ *De s. coena*, c. 36; p. 105.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, c. 37; p. 106.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, c. 42; p. 140.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, c. 39; p. 120. Berengar does not explain how the bread itself can be Christ's

Body. We learn from Alger of Liège that his followers conceived it as a sort of hypostatic union: *Personaliter in pane impanatum Christum; De sacram. corp. et sanguinis Domini I*, 6; PL 180, 754B. See also Rupert of Deutz, *De Trinitate, In Exod.* II, 10; PL 167, 617D.

¹⁹ *De s. coena*, c. 41; ed. Beekenkamp, p. 138.

²⁰ Bruno of Asti puts it thus: *Berengarius . . . philosophice disputando ad impossibilita nos ducebatur; In Levit.*, c. 7; PL 164, 404C.

temporal element in strict contrast to *res* or *virtus* as spiritual, invisible, immutable, eternal reality. His opposition to what later theologians will call transubstantiation, rests on the assumption that the definition of *sacramenum* applies in the same manner to Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist. St. Ambrose especially, he contends, supports his view on this perfect analogy, *de paribus pariter tractans*;²¹ and St. Augustine confirms it particularly by his careful distinction between *sacramentum* and *res* or *virtus*.²²

The Christian conscience soon rebelled against the Berengarian heresy, though we may justly wonder how far his contemporaries were prepared to meet the challenge. Had the scholars not been too careless in the elaboration of definitions and their application to avoid the aberration of a mind such as Berengar's? The Eucharistic controversy between Paschasius Radbertus (d. after 859) and Ratramnus (d. after 868) provides sufficient evidence that, without a precise definition of *sacramentum*, theological discussions on sacramental problems were apt to be vague and inconclusive. The Carolingian theologians had recourse to the then well known Isidorian definition and made use of some Augustinian texts to clarify its meaning. Although a number of these Augustinian passages reappear in Berengar's work, it may puzzle the historian why the Isidorian definition is completely ignored by Berengar who had obviously studied both Paschasius and Ratramnus. St. Isidore's definition—*Sacramentum est in aliqua celebratione*²³—was as Augustinian as any of those offered by Berengar, but he was presumably aware of the fact that the Isidorian formula did not serve his purpose. While, despite definitions, Carolingian and post-Carolingian writers continued to use *sacramentum* as the Fathers had done in a wide sense, comprising sacred things both material and spiritual, actions and words, Berengar made a first determined effort to narrow and restrict it to the consecrated material, visible element. Hence his patristic quotations and especially his Augustinian "definitions" are purposely chosen to prove that the dualism, *sacramentum* and *res*, does not convey the notion of a substantial change. In other words, his definition *sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma* means that water is a substance which, by being consecrated, makes an invisible *res* visible, and applied to bread and wine, it signifies the unchanged substances which, after consecration, have become the visible *sacramentum* of Christ's invisible Flesh and Blood. Thus the substances become "visible words, as it were, holy indeed, yet subject to change and time."²⁴ They become "signs of things invisible": *sacramentum* i.e. *sacrum signum*;²⁵ and to be a *signum*, there must be a certain similarity between *sacramentum* and its corresponding *res*, as St. Augustine testifies.²⁶

I. THE IMMEDIATE REPERCUSSION OF BERENGAR'S DEFINITIONS

Berengar's analogy between Baptism and the Eucharist was no novelty; Ratramnus and others had suggested and tried it before him. Nor did Berengar's notion that the baptismal water is a *sacramentum* startle his contemporaries. What did shock them was the conclusion which he arrived at by a rigorous application of the principle of analogy based on *sacramentum*. We may, therefore, expect that his opponents subjected his definitions to a critical examination. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Lanfranc (d. 1089) observes that the formula

²¹ *De s. coena*, c. 35; ed. cit., p. 92.

²² *Op. cit.*, c. 44; ed. cit., pp. 149 ff.

²³ *Etymologies*, VI, xix, 39; ed. W. M. Lindsay, (Oxford, 1911). Augustine, *Ep.* 55, I, 2; CSEL 33², 170.

²⁴ *De s. coena*, c. 26; ed. Beekenkamp, p. 56.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, c. 44; ed. cit., p. 150. Cf. E. Sheedy, *The Eucharistic Controversy of the*

eleventh century against the Background of pre-scholastic Theology (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 100, makes the erroneous statement: "The definition of sacrament as *sacrum signum* does not appear in Berengar of Tours."

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, c. 44; ed. cit., p. 150.

sacramentum est sacramum signum is not stated by St. Augustine as abruptly as Berengar would like his readers to believe by depriving it of its proper context.²⁷ He admits that, according to St. Augustine, there must be a certain similarity between *sacramentum* and its *res*, "provided the word is taken in the same sense as we understand it at present," since *sacramentum* may also designate an oath or the *sacratio* of a thing.²⁸ What is most important for the understanding of the subsequent development, is the fact that Lanfranc does not accept Berengar's restriction. It is, indeed, quite in accordance with Berengarian terminology when Lanfranc defines the invisible Flesh and Blood as *res sacramenti* in contrast with the visible species as *sacramentum*.²⁹ But later on, he terms *sacramentum* what he previously called *res sacramenti*. We read, for instance: *Sacramentum corporis Christi . . . caro ejus est*, or *Caro videlicet carnis et sanguis sacramentum est sanguinis*.³⁰ He finally concludes saying: *Christus ergo Christi est sacramentum*.³¹ Lanfranc thus prefers to use the word in a wider sense, because "not even the divine codices use it in one signification only."³² In the history of sacraments, as we shall see, this turned out to be a momentous and fateful decision.

Durandus of Troarn (d. 1088) does not discuss Berengar's definitions,³³ but seems to be consistent in restricting *sacramentum* to the visible species of bread and wine.

Confronted with the objection that "all ecclesiastical authors and the orations of the Mass" proclaim that the bread of the altar is called *sacramentum*, *quod est sacramum signum*,³⁴ Guitmund of Aversa (d. 1095) observes rather apologetically: "We are not at all afraid to call it (i.e. the Eucharist) *figura* and *signum*."³⁵ Yet, like Lanfranc, he refuses to restrict *sacramentum* in the Berengarian fashion: *Numquid enim nullum sacramentum est id cuius est sacramentum?*³⁶ The fact that Guitmund makes no attempt to analyse or refute the definitions offered by Berengar, proves again that the early anti-Berengarians either eyed them with suspicion or ignored them; they dared not deny their Augustinian origin,³⁷ though Guitmund tells us with rather unusual frankness: *Ex beato Augustino scandali pene totius videtur esse principium*.

However, the question, what is a *sacramentum*, urgently called for a solution. When the Berengarian controversy was drawing to its conclusion, it became apparent that Berengar's definitions had won what might be called a Pyrrhic victory: his definitions were generally accepted,³⁸ but interpreted in a sense compatible with the dogma of transubstantiation. It became equally apparent that the wide and broad meaning of *sacramentum* had fully reasserted itself against the Berengarian innovation. In Alger of Liège, (d. after 1132), for example, we find the Berengarian definitions and are told that *sacramentum* and *mysterium* are often used in the same sense; that *sacramentum* often designates

²⁷ *Liber de corp. et sanguine Domini*, c. 12; PL 150, 422CD.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, c. 13; PL 150, 423AB.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, c. 10; PL 150, 421B.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, c. 14; PL 150, 423D.

³¹ *Op. cit.*, c. 14; PL 150, 424C.

³² *Op. cit.*, c. 19; PL 150, 437D. For some unknown reason, Lanfranc makes no mention of Berengar's definition of *sacramentum* as *invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma*.

³³ He speaks of *sacramenti visibilis forma* in the same sense as Ratramnus did in the ninth century. Durandus, *Liber de corp. et sanguine Domini* II, 2; PL 149, 1380A. Ratramnus, *De corp. et sanguine Domini* c. 21; PL 121, 137A.

³⁴ *De corp. et sanguinis Domini veritate* II; PL 149, 1455A.

³⁵ PL 149, 1457D.

³⁶ PL 149, 1460C. Cf. 1465AB: The Euchar-

istic Body is the *sacramentum* of the mystical Body, the Church. See also 1460D: *Christus sui ipsius est sacramum signum i.e. sacramentum*.

³⁷ See also Eusebius Bruno, *Ep. ad. Berengarium de s. Eucharistia*; PL 147, 1201 ff. Theoduin of Liège; PL 146, 1439 ff. Adelman of Liège, *De Eucharistiae sacramento*, ed. Raoul Heurtévant, *Durand de Troarn* (Paris, 1912), appendice II, pp. 287 ff.). Hugh of Langres, *Tract. de corp. et sanguine Domini*; PL 142, 1325 ff. Wolphelm, *Ep. de sacram. Eucharistiae*; PL 154, 412 ff. Ps-Haimo, *De corp. et sanguine Domini*; PL 118, 817A.

³⁸ Cf. J. De Ghellinck, 'Un chapitre dans l'histoire de la définition des sacrements au XII^e siècle'. *Mélanges Mandonnet II* (Paris, 1930), pp. 79 ff.

the *signum* itself or that of which it is the *signum*; that it must, therefore, not surprise us even to meet *sacramentum* signifying the *res sacramenti*. Alger then warns us that, "in the sacred codices", *sacramentum* occasionally designates an oath, sometimes a *res sacra*.³⁹

No doubt, these distinctions were very helpful guides in Alger's interpretation of the patristic legacy, and only a scholar of his vast knowledge could have summed it up as well as he did; yet, towards a more specific and technical use of the word as initiated by Berengar, they contributed very little. A mere juxtaposition of definitions, followed by an enumeration of meanings which contradicted them, is not apt to clarify the precise significance of *signum* or *forma*, unless a definite stand is taken in the actual application of the words. Only in passing does Alger remark: "How can there be a *signum*, if not by way of some external action that symbolizes the internal *res*?"⁴⁰ Scanty as this information is, it goes to show that, in Alger's time, *signum* signified more than the concrete element, as Berengar had interpreted it.

In the third part of his work on the Eucharist, Alger cites a number of Augustinian texts that contain the expression *sacramentum* in a sense that deserves our special attention. Of a priest who, for some crime, is removed from office he observes: *Sacramento Domini semel imposito non carebit, quamvis ad judicium permanente*.⁴¹ That is to say, the *sacramentum*, previously received, stays or remains in the sinful priest, even after his removal from office. In the succeeding text, we read that apostate priests are not reordained on their return because,—and I quote—*sicut baptismus in eis ita ordinatio mansit integra*.⁴² In the same passage, cited by Alger, St. Augustine states that no reason can be given why he, who cannot lose his Baptism, can lose the right to give it.⁴³ Taking up this Augustinian terminology, Alger points out that a heretic or schismatic does not lose the *sacramenta* of Holy Orders, as his priesthood remains unaffected by separation or heresy.⁴⁴

This usage of *sacramentum*, as lasting and permanent consecration⁴⁵ in both Baptism and Holy Orders, is also of the greatest importance for the understanding of the movement of thought which will be described in the following pages. Alger may have had this terminology in mind when he referred to one meaning of *sacramentum* as *res sacra*. Whatever significance he attributed to the Augustinian terminology just mentioned, he may not have realized the difficulties in reconciling his definitions of *sacramentum* with *sacramentum* as lasting consecration of which the *signum* or *forma* was no longer visible. If Baptism, for instance, is constituted as *signum* by an exterior transitory action, how could Alger make sense of an Augustinian sentence such as *Baptismus quidem potest inesse, ubi conversio cordis defuerit?*⁴⁶

³⁹ *De sacramento corp. et sanguinis Domini* I, 4; PL 180, 751C-752B. Date of this work: 1110-1121.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, I, 18; PL 180, 794A: Quomodo enim more caeterorum sacramentorum visibilium id quod videri non potest rei invisibilis esse poterit signum, nisi per exterioris alicuius actionis circa se imaginem? See also *op. cit.*, I, 19; PL 180, 796B: Quidquid fit in officio missae, sacramentum est Christi et ecclesiae.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, III, 10; PL 180, 842D: Augustine, *De bono conjugali*, c. 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226. Alger ascribes it to *Augustinus in Genesi ad litteram*.

⁴² *Ibid.*; PL 180, 843A: Augustine, *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79.

⁴³ *Ibid.*; PL 180, 843A: Augustine, *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79: Nulla ostenditur causa, cur ille qui ipsum bap-

tisma amittere non potest, jus dandi possit amittere. The expression *jus dandi* signifies a right or power received in ordination. Later, Alger words it as follows: Sicut baptismus sic nec ordinem dandi baptismi posse amittere.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*; PL 180, 843C: Sacrorum ordinum sacramenta non amittit . . . sacerdotium omnino integrum . . . manet. Cf. 844A: Ordinatio . . . mansit integra.

⁴⁵ Paraphrasing St. Augustine, Alger notes that neither Baptism nor Holy Orders can be lost *quia utrumque sacramentum quadam consecratione datur*.

⁴⁶ *De Sacramento corp. et sanguinis Domini*, III, 7; PL 180, 938C: Augustine, *De baptismo* IV, 25, 32; CSEL 51, 260. The passage is followed by a quotation from "Prosper": Verus baptismus constat non tam ablutione corporis quam fide cordis. This text dates back

In his earlier work, *De misericordia et justitia*, Alger had already arrived at the conclusion that, according to St. Augustine "and the other saints", Christ's *sacmenta* remain true and holy in apostates and heretics.⁴⁷

We are obviously faced here with a peculiar usage of *sacmentum* signifying a lasting holiness which is not affected by the loss of grace. Since neither Alger nor his contemporaries made any noticeable effort to elaborate on the distinction between *sacmentum* as sacred *signum* or action and *sacmentum* as permanent consecration, it may suffice here to note its presence.

It is needless to stress the fact that *sacmentum* was still very far from being a well defined technical term, and that this indefiniteness became the source of trends of which later ages could hardly approve. Tendencies set in to bring *sacmentum* in line with the definition as *sacrum signum*.⁴⁸ We read in an anonymous work of the year 1090 that an oath is called *sacmentum* because it is a *sacrum signum* to the effect that, while the oath is being taken in a visible fashion, it should be understood as a sacred *signum* of an invisible *res*.⁴⁹ The historian will also hear the echo of Berengar's definition in Rangerius of Lucca (1097-1112):

Anulus et baculus sunt sacra signa nec ullo
De laicis manibus suscipiendo modo.⁵⁰

This attempt to put the struggle against lay investiture on a theological or sacramental basis is still more pronounced in a letter of Geoffrey of Vendôme to Rainald of Anjou (1116-1118). Investiture, he affirms, is a *sacmentum*, i.e. a sacred *signum*.⁵¹ Ring and staff are *sacmenta* of the Church just as salt and water, oil and chrism, without which there can be no consecration of men or churches.⁵²

While the opponents of lay investiture endeavoured to strengthen their opposition by claiming that ring and staff are *sacra signa* and, as such, reserved to the Church, the Emperor's theologians replied: The king's staff and throne are a *sacmentum* of Christ's staff and throne.⁵³ His anointing with the visible *sacmentum* of oil places him on a level with a priest and, with regard to internal sanctification, the king would even seem to be superior to him.⁵⁴

The author of *De unitate ecclesiae* (1190) has some very encouraging words for the monks: *Sicut enim monachus est vocabulum mysterii, sic et cuculla est quedam virtus sacramenti*.⁵⁵ This is, no doubt, the language of sacramental theology. Again we find a more explicit expression of the same thought in the *Dialogues* of Hugh of Rouen (d. 1164) who states: "My son, the monk's habit is one of the *sacmenta* in the Church, for the consecration of a monk has the

to Lanfranc, *De corp. et sanguine Domini*, c. 14; PL 150, 424D. It is also found in Ivo, *Decretum* II, 9 and *Panormia* I, 110; PL 161, 154C and 1069A. Gratian copied it in D. 4, c. 150, de cons.

⁴⁷ *De misericordia et justitia* II, 84; PL 180, 967A: Permanere Christi sacramenta, vera quantum ad se et sancta.

⁴⁸ That such tendencies existed before Berengar can be gathered from Hrabanus Maurus, *De cleric. institutione* I, 3; PL 107, 298B: Est autem in clericis tonsura signum quoddam, quod in corpore figuratur sed in animo agitur. *Idem*, *Hom.* I, 44; PL 110, 82D: Doctrina symboli virtus est sacramenti. Paschasius Radbertus, *De corp. et sanguine Domini* III, 2; PL 120, 1275C applies the Isidorian definition of *sacmentum* to the nativity and humanity of Christ.

⁴⁹ *De unitate ecclesiae*; MGH, *Libelli* 2, 206: Sacmentum dictum est ab eo quod

sit sacrum signum ut dum visibiliter jurandum agitur, invisibilis rei sacrum signum intelligatur. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.* III, q. 60, a. 1, ad 3.

⁵⁰ *Liber de anulo et baculo* I, vv. 1-2; MGH, *Libelli* 2, 509. Date: 1110. See also *De anulo et baculo*, MGH, *Libelli* 3, 727: Anulus et baculus sunt spiritualia dona. Cum sacra sint, cesar non valet illa dare. Date: beginning of the twelfth century.

⁵¹ MGH, *Libelli* 1, 685: Investitura enim de qua loquimur sacramentum est i.e. sacrum signum quo princeps ecclesiae, episcopus scilicet, a ceteris hominibus secernitur paritur atque dinoscitur.

⁵² MGH, *Libelli* 2, 685 and 690.

⁵³ *Tractatus Eboracenses* IV, MGH, *Libelli* 3, 669. Date: 1100-1101.

⁵⁴ MGH, *Libelli* 3, 665.

⁵⁵ MGH, *Libelli* 2, 278.

same effect as baptismal regeneration.⁵⁶ Hence, out of respect for the *sacramentum*, the monk cannot put off his habit and depart.⁵⁷

To prove that circumcision is a *sacramentum*, the school of Laon proposes the following explanation:

Sacramentum autem i.e. sacre rei signum est illa pellicula quam prepuciant Judei. Res autem sacramenti est spiritualis circumcisio.⁵⁸

Similar explanations are preferred to justify the usage according to which manna,⁵⁹ the washing of feet,⁶⁰ salt⁶¹ and many other sacred things or actions were called *sacramentum*.

Rather than multiply illustrations to prove the broad meaning of *sacramentum*, or point to some clumsy efforts to apply sacramental terminology to symbols such as ring and staff etc., it should be emphasized that an enumeration of *sacramenta* was still as impossible as an enumeration of all the sacred things and actions that would occur in a Christian's daily life. When Nicholas of Clairvaux (d. after 1176) enumerated twelve *sacramenta*, his audience knew well that he could have doubled the number without incurring the slightest suspicion of heterodoxy.⁶² Only after *sacramentum* had assumed a specific and well defined meaning, would it become possible to search Scripture and tradition for a specific number of *sacraments* that fulfilled all the requirements laid down in its definition⁶³. Berengar's challenge did not pass unheeded, but it took more than a century of arduous work to complete a process of clarification which was continually hampered by an immemorable custom of using *sacramentum* as found in Scripture, as well as in patristic and post-patristic writings.⁶⁴ To the same degree, as this process neared completion, the vague terminology which had allowed Christian writers to speak of water, chrism, salt, and countless other sacred objects as *sacramenta*, was slowly abandoned.

II. SACRAMENTUM AS LITURGICAL ACTION OR CONSECRATED ELEMENT

If I undertake to outline the patristic heritage which allows us to see Berengar's contribution to this evolution in its proper light, I cannot do so without warning the reader not to look for a comprehensive study on *sacramentum*, but only a summary exposition on its historical usage in connection with certain sacred rites such as Baptism, Holy Orders or the Eucharist.

I repeat, St. Augustine was as far from a metaphysical definition applicable to but seven sacred rites, as St. Isidore of Seville (d. 636) or Berengar. In his limited library of Augustinian works, St. Isidore detected a letter containing a

⁵⁶ *Dialog.* VI, 2; PL 192, 1217C.

⁵⁷ *Dialog.* VI, 3; PL 192, 1218C. The remark "out of respect for the *sacramentum*" is by no means casual, but based on the idea that the ceremony of the taking of the religious habit is a profession of Public Penance which twelfth century theology commonly declined to repeat *pro reverentia sacramenti*. Hugh states clearly: *Haec enim vestis mutatae consecratio publicam poenitentiam profittetur.* See also Anselm of Lucca, *Coll. Canonum* 7, 83; ed. F. Thaner, (Innsbruck, 1906), p. 399.

⁵⁸ *Sententiae Atrebenses*; ed. O. Lottin, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1933), 223.

⁵⁹ Ps-Bede (i.e. Manegold who lived ca. 1060-1103), *In Ps. 110*; PL 93, 1037A. Cf. G. Morin, *Revue Bénédictine*, XXVIII (1911), 339.

⁶⁰ St. Bernard, *De coena Domini. Sermo de baptismo* c. 1 f.; PL 183, 271B. *Sententiae Parisienses*; ed. A. Landgraf, (*Spic. Sacra Lov.*, Louvain, 1934), 48. Cf. St. Ambrose,

De virg. X, 57; PL 16, 294.

⁶¹ Bonizo (d. 1089), *Libellus de sacramentis*; PL 150, 862D: *Veniam nunc ad sacramentis ab apostolis instituta. Et primum de sacramento salis.*

⁶² See J. J. Ryan, 'Saint Peter Damiani and the Sermons of Nicholas of Clairvaux: a Clarification', *Mediaeval Studies*, IX (1947), 156.

⁶³ Cf. E. Dhanis, 'Quelques anciennes formules septénaires des sacrements', *Rev. Hist. Eccl.*, XXVI (1930), 574 ff.

⁶⁴ In the middle of the twelfth century, Rolandus Bandinelli (*Sentences*, ed. A. M. Gietl, [Freiburg i. Br., 1891], pp. 155 and 157) begins his treatise on *sacramenta* with the *sacramentum* of Incarnation, justifying it by quoting Augustine: *Sacramentum visibile signum invisibilis gratia.* See also Robert of Melun, *Summa II*, 2 f. in F. Anders, *Die Christologie des Robert von Melun* (Paderborn, 1937), pp. 4 and 7. Date: 1155-1160.

assage which appeared to him as a definition of *sacramentum* worthy to be incorporated in such an ambitious work as his *Etymologies*. Explaining to Januarius that the Lord's birthday is not celebrated in *sacramento* but only commemorated, St. Augustine wrote:

Sacramentum est autem in aliqua celebratione, cum rei gestae commemoratione ita fit, ut aliquid etiam significare intelligatur, quod sancte accipiendum est.⁶⁵

By inserting this passage, St. Isidore popularized a definition which was destined to play an important role in the Eucharistic controversy of the ninth century.⁶⁶ Although the text is also found in the *Excerpta* of Eugippius,⁶⁷ there seems to be no trace of it in the known writings of St. Hildegonsus of Toledo (d. 636), the Venerable Bede (d. 735), or Alcuin (d. 804), all of whom were familiar with Isidore's work. In the first half of the ninth century, it was discussed by Paschasius Radbertus,⁶⁸ his adversary Ratramnus⁶⁹ Hrabanus Maurus,⁷⁰ Jonas of Orleans⁷¹ and others.

The great significance of this definition lies in the fact that it describes *sacramentum* as symbolic action—*in aliqua celebratione*—which aspect, as we have noted, was neglected by Berengar. The definition might have fallen into oblivion, had it not reappeared in Gratian's *Decretum* (1140) where it is attributed to St. Gregory I.⁷² When Peter Lombard copied it from Gratian,⁷³ theology could no longer escape its influence.

The aspect of Baptism as action had a similar history. St. Isidore defined it as *tinctio*,⁷⁴ a definition which he seems to have borrowed from St. Gregory the Great.⁷⁵ Of course, the Carolingian theologians did not fail to copy the Isidorian definition, and Burchard of Worms exalted its position by attributing it to Pope Fabian.⁷⁶ It is worth noting, however, that this text did not find its way into later canonical collections.

Peter Lombard sided with this current of thought, though not without expressing his opposition to the view that the water of Baptism becomes a *sacramentum* on the strength of the Augustinian formula: *Accedente verbo ad elementum fit sacramentum*.⁷⁷

This may take us back to a text that Berengar had cited to prove that the consecrated water is the *sacramentum* of Baptism. In the anti-Berengarian literature, as I have noted, there seems to be no evidence that Brengar's interpretation of St. Augustine's words appeared to be novel and startling. In fact, there is good reason to interpret this silence as tacit approval. A brief examination of the historical evidence will prove that the Augustinian formula was indeed considered to mean the sanctification of the element through the "word" by which the water itself becomes a *sacramentum*.⁷⁸ Grammatically, this inter-

⁶⁵ Ep. 55, 1, 2; CSEL 34, 2, 170.

⁶⁶ *Etymologies*, ed. W. M. Lindsay VI, xix. Cf. P. J. Mullins, *The spiritual life according to St. Isidore of Seville* (Washington, 1940), p. 54.

⁶⁷ *Excerpta*, c. 118; CSEL 9, 425.

⁶⁸ *De corp. et sanguine Domini* III, 1; PL 120, 1275B. His definition of oath as *sacramentum juris* (III, 2; PL *ibid.*) is copied from St. Isidore, *Etymologies*; ed. W. M. Lindsay V, xxiv, 31.

⁶⁹ *De corp. et sanguine Domini*, c. 45; PL 121, 146A.

⁷⁰ *De Universo* V, 11; PL 111, 133A. Cf. J. Geiselmann, *Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholastik* (Paderborn, 1926), p. 147.

⁷¹ *De institutione laicali* I, 7; PL 106, 134.

⁷² *Decretum* C. 1, q. 1, c. 84.

⁷³ *Sent.* IV, 13, 1; (Quarrachi, 1916), II, 816.

Lombard does not propose or discuss it as general definition; he cites it in connection with the Blessed Eucharist.

⁷⁴ *Etymologies*; ed. W. M. Lindsay VI, xix, 43; *Baptismus graece, latine tinctio interpretatur*.

⁷⁵ *Moralia* XVIII, 53, 87; PL 76, 91B: *Baptisma i.e. tinctio dicitur ipsa nostra in aquam descensio*.

⁷⁶ *Decretum* IV, 1; PL 140, 727D. Date: ca. 1010.

⁷⁷ *Sent.* IV, 3, 1; (Quarrachi, 1916), II, p. 754 f.

⁷⁸ St. Augustine also applied the formula to the Blessed Eucharist: *Iste panis et hoc vinum accedente verbo fit corpus et sanguis Verbi . . . Tolle verbum, panis est et vinum; adde verbum, et jam aliud est. Et ipsum aliud quid est? Corpus Christi et sanguis*

pretation of St. Augustine is quite possible;⁷⁹ whether or not it is legitimate may be open to debate. It is by no means contrary to St. Augustine's terminology, nor can it be said to conflict with his thought, for he states clearly that the "word" which is a passing sound leaves in the water a lasting power, a *virtus manens*.⁸⁰ To call such consecrated water a *sacramentum* would be compatible with the usage current in his days. On various occasions, St. Augustine defines Baptism as *lavacrum aquae in verbo*,⁸¹ while in other instances the water itself is qualified as Baptism or *sacramentum*. We read in a sermon:

Baptismus, i.e. salutis aqua, non est salutis, nisi Christi nomine consecrata . . . cruce ipsius aqua signatur.⁸²

This text might perhaps be taken in a figurative sense as the word is used by St. Isidore of Seville: *Baptismus enim aqua est, quae tempore Passionis de latere Christi profluxit*.⁸³ Yet, if we consider that the baptismal water was thought to contain a *virtus manens*, the designation *baptismus* signifying the baptismal element will appear more plausible, though rather remote from our own interpretation of the word. Not many Augustinian letters have ever been as well known throughout the history of Christianity as the one written to Boniface, about the year 408, in which St. Augustine speaks of *aqua exhibens forinsecus sacramentum gratiae*.⁸⁴ It is, then, the water that "outwardly displays the sacramentum of grace", while the Holy Spirit is inwardly operating the "benefice of grace".⁸⁵ There is no denying that in such sentences the words *aqua*, *sacramentum*, *baptismus*, connote the ritual action to a certain degree, but this is equally true of twelfth century definitions such as "the *sacramentum* of Baptism is the water consecrated through the invocation of the Trinity".⁸⁶

This terminology reflects an ancient tradition. The doctrine that through consecration the baptismal water "imbibes a power to sanctify" had been clearly pronounced by Tertullian.⁸⁷ His admirer, St. Cyprian, based his opposition to heretical Baptism on the very idea that, being deprived of the Holy Spirit, heretics cannot "cleanse and sanctify the water".⁸⁸ St. Ambrose only translated St. Basil when he wrote:

Si qua in aqua gratia, non ex natura aquae, sed ex praesentia est Spiritus sancti.⁸⁹

Yet there can be no doubt that he made St. Basil's doctrine his own.⁹⁰

Christi. Nam tolle verbum, panis est et vinum; adde verbum et fit sacramentum. *Sermo Den.*, 6, 1 and 3; ed. G. Morin, *Misc. Agost.*, (Rome, 1930), pp. 1, 29 and 31. This text escaped Berengar's attention; it is, to the best of my knowledge, not quoted by any mediaeval scholar. See also *Sermo, Guelf.*, 7, 1; ed. cit., p. 462: Accedit sanctificatio, et panis ille erit corpus Christi et vinum illud erit sanguis Christ.

⁷⁹ See P. Pourrat, *Theology of the Sacraments* (St. Louis, 1930), pp. 59 f. E. Hocedez, "La conception augustinienne du sacrement dans le traité LXXX in Johanem", *Rech. de Sc. rel.* IX (1919) 1 ff.

⁸⁰ In *Joan. Tr.* LXXX, 3; PL 35, 1840: Unde ista tanta virtus aquae, ut corpus tangat et cor abluit, nisi faciente verbo? . . . Nam et in ipso verbo aliud est sonus transiens, aliud virtus manens.

⁸¹ In *Joan. Tr.* XV, 4; PL 35, 1512. *Contra litt. Petilianu* III, 49, 59; CSEL 52, 212.

⁸² *Sermo* 352, 3; PL 39, 1551. Cf. St. Ambrose, *De mysteriis* IV, 20; PL 16, 391 or Rouet de Journel, *Enchiridion Patristicum* (Freiburg, n° 1330): Quid est enim aqua cruce Christi? Elementum commune. Augustine, In *Joan. Tr.* CXVIII, 5; PL 35, 1950 or Rouet de Journel, op. cit., n° 1844.

⁸³ *De eccles. officiis* II, 25, 3; PL 83, 821A. Cf. Leidrad of Lyons, *Liber de sacram. baptismi*, c. 6; PL 99, 861D.

⁸⁴ Ep. 98, 2; CSEL 34², 521 or Rouet de Journel, op. cit., n° 1423. Cf. Amalarius of Metz, *De eccles. officiis*, c. 24; PL 105, 1043A.

⁸⁵ *Aqua igitur exhibens forinsecus sacramentum gratiae et Spiritus operans intrinsecus beneficium gratiae . . . regenerant hominem.* *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ *Sententiae Atrebenses* (School of Laon); ed. O. Lottin, *Rech. de Théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1938), 346: *Sacramentum autem baptisimi est aqua per invocationem trinitatis consecrata, cui invocatio trinitatis confert vim quandam.* The author refers to St. Ambrose, *De mysteriis* IV, 20 and *De sacramentis* I, 5; PL 16, 411B and 440A.

⁸⁷ *De baptismo*, c. 4; CSEL 20, 204 or Rouet de Journel, op. cit., n° 303.

⁸⁸ See Ep. 70, 1; CSEL 3², 779: *Baptizari a nobis quicumque ab adultera et profana aqua venientes ablueri sint et sanctificandi salutaris aquae veritate.*

⁸⁹ *De spiritu sancto* I, 6, 77; PL 16, 723 or Rouet de Journel, op. cit., n° 1282 compared with St. Basil, *De spiritu sancto*, 15, 35; PG 32, 129 or Rouet de Journel, op. cit., n° 947.

⁹⁰ Cf. *De mysteriis* III, 8 and *De sacra-*

St. Augustine, on the other hand, did not correct St. Cyprian's notion concerning the sanctification of the water; he only insisted that it is God, not the heretic, who sanctifies it.⁹¹ In a similar fashion, he rectifies the Cyprianism of bishop Sedatus a Tuburbo.⁹² By virtue of such sanctification, baptismal water is no longer "a common element", it is a *sacramentum*.⁹³

Before investigating another usage of the words *baptismus* and *sacramentum*, we may note a few comments on the important Augustinian passage in *Tractatus 80*, 3. Under the name of St. Augustine, we possess a sermon whose author explains to catechumens why the power (*virtus*) of that water in the font profits both body and soul: "Not every water cleanses", he warns. "This water is hallowed by the consecration of the word. Take the word away, and what else is water than water? *Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.*"⁹⁴ It was faithfully copied by the author of a commentary on St. John, commonly attributed to Bede,⁹⁵ and appeared in a considerably shorter form in Alcuin's commentary on the same Gospel.⁹⁶ In the scriptural *Glossa ordinaria*, John xv, 3 is commented on as follows:

Non ait: "Propter aquam baptismi", quia et ipsa sine verbo est sola aqua, per verbum fit sacramentum.⁹⁷

No doubt, a reader in whose mind the word *sacramentum* still had a wide range of meanings was apt to supply *aqua* as subject of the succeeding sentence which would then read: *per verbum aqua fit sacramentum*. Had he not read that the Holy Spirit descends upon the baptismal water to imbue it with a power to sanctify? A power, which Tertullian had called *vis sanctificandi*,⁹⁸ while St. Isidore only changed it to *vis purgationis*.⁹⁹ This tradition we find in Theodulph of Orleans¹⁰⁰ (d. 821), Jesse of Amiens (d. ca. 836).¹ Leidrad of Lyons (d. 816 or 817)² and Hincmar of Rheims³ combined this Tertullianic current with St. Augustine's *Tractatus 80*, 3. Berengar's contemporaries, who were still steeped in what may justly be called Carolingian theology, could hardly have sufficient reason to disagree, when he considered the water of Baptism as something sacred and called it *sacramentum*. In fact, one of his opponents, Guitmund of Aversa, proposes a description of Baptism that confirms this assumption. He writes: *Est namque baptismus exterior aqua visibilis carnem abluens.*⁴ This exterior Baptism or *sacramentum fidei* is the *signum* of another *sacramentum*, i.e. of an internal Baptism of faith.⁵

mentis I, 5, 15; PL 16, 391 and 440A.

⁹¹ See his criticism of Cyprian's *Ep.* 70, 1 in *De baptismo* V, 20, 27 f.; CSEL 51, 285 f.
⁹² *Sent. episcoporum*, n. 18; CSEL 3¹, 444 corrected in *De baptismo* VI, 25, 47; CSEL 51, 323.

⁹³ See St. Ambrose, *De mysteriis* IV, 20; PL 16, 411B. Augustinian is the thought expressed by Alcuin, *Confessio fidei* III, 27; PL 101, 1073B: Deus sacrat aquam et baptizat.

⁹⁴ *De cataclysmo. Sermo ad catechumenos*, c. 3; PL 40, 694.

⁹⁵ *In Joan.*, c. 15; PL 92, 837AC. Cf. Smaragdus, *Coll. in Joan.*, c. 13, PL 102, 211C.

⁹⁶ *In Joan.* VI, 36 (John xv, 3); PL 100, 942AB. In this process, the words *etiam ipsum tamquam visible verbum* were dropped.

⁹⁷ *Glossa ordinaria in Joan.* xv, 3; PL 114, 410C.

⁹⁸ *De baptismo*, c. 4; CSEL 20, 204 or Rouet de Journel, *op. cit.*, n° 303.

⁹⁹ *Etymologies*; ed. W. M. Lindsay VI, xix, 49.

¹⁰⁰ *Liber de ordine baptissimi*, c. 13; PL 105, 232B: Invocato namque Deo, descendit Spiritus sanctus de caelis et sanctificatis aquis tribuit eis vim purgationis.

¹ *Ep. de baptismo*, PL 105, 790. He adheres to the Tertullian-Isidore tradition more closely by using the expression *medicatis aquis*, instead of *sanctificatis aquis*.

² *Liber de sacramento baptissimi*, c. 6; PL 99, 862A: Sanctificatur haec (aqua) per consecrationem verbi. Tolle autem verbum et quid est aqua nisi aqua? Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum.

³ *Ep. 10*, 5 to Egilo of Sens; PL 126, 75B: Cum accedit verbum ad elementum efficitur sacramentum Spiritu . . . sanctificatum.

⁴ *De corp. et sanguine Domini* II; PL 149, 1466A.

⁵ PL 149, 1465D and 1466AB. Cf. Guibert of Nogent (d. 1124), *Ep. de bucella*, c. 3; PL 156, 532A.

If the consecrated water is conceived as *sacramentum*, the "word" through which it is constituted designates the liturgical formula of the blessing of the baptismal water. Implicitly contained in the doctrine which we have traced back to Tertullian, this view is definitely held by Herveus of Bourg-Dieu (d. 1150). By *verbum*, he affirms, is meant the invocation of the Divinity which is spoken over the water by the minister of Baptism.⁶

The rather categorical form of this statement points to a controversial phase in the interpretation of the Augustinian sentence. At the bottom of this controversy was the problem concerning the definition of Baptism. If the water is the *sacramentum*, it seemed logical to understand by *verbum* the liturgical blessing of the water; if, however, the *sacramentum* is seen in the actual administration, the "word" would seem, rather, to refer to the baptismal form. As classical exponent of this second view, we may mention Peter Lombard whose criticism is apparently directed against the *Summa Sententiarum*.⁷ Alger of Liège had taken *verbum* to designate the necessity of faith in those who perform *sacramenta* and miracles;⁸ Gratian took a similar view.⁹ While some of the early decretists preferred to pass the text over without comment, Gandulphus (d. 1178) compromised by saying: *fit sacramentum vel ipsa aqua vel ablutio in aqua*.¹⁰ He is on record as having ventured the seemingly startling statement: "Consequently, if a donkey drinks that water, it drinks a *sacramentum*, as we have said of the mouse (eating a consecrated host) in D. 2 c. 94 de cons."¹¹

Under a different aspect, the inconvenience of this proposition had already been felt during the Berengarian controversy, for Berengar's disciples claimed that, if a mouse or any other animal could eat the Eucharistic *sacramentum*, it was because its natural substance was still present. Although the very thought appeared to the blasphemous, there was no easy solution at hand to meet the objection.¹² The idea of a donkey drinking a *sacramentum* must have been just as repulsive to many; to others the conclusion looked legitimate, if inconvenient.

The canonical *Glossa ordinaria* on Gratian records this theory in commenting on C. 1 q. 1 c. 54 (*Detrahe*) with the remark that it is based on D. 2 c. 32 de cons.,¹³ in other words, on the very definition of *sacramentum* as coined by Berengar.

⁶ In *Ephes. v*, 26; PL 181, 1267A: Verbum vocat invocationem divinitatis quod a baptizante super aquam profertur. See also Rupert of Deutz (d. 1129), *In Joan.*, c. 3 and *In Exod.* iii, 43; PL 169, 307C and 167, 692D.

⁷ Compare *Sent.* IV, 3, 1 f., (Quarrachi ed. II, p. 754 f.) with *Summa Sententiarum* V, 4 (PL 176, 129CD).

⁸ *Liber de misericordia* III, 7* PL 180, 963AB. This view is based on St. Augustine's often debated remark: non quia dicitur (*verbum*), sed quia creditur (*In Joan. Tr. LXXX*, 3). The idea or suggestion that *verbum* signifies the Incarnate Word arises only in the second half of the twelfth century, and seems to have been a device to place the controversy on an entirely different basis. See, for instance, Alanus of Lille (d. 1205), *Contra hereticos* I, 44; PL 210, 350B or Stephen of Tournai (d. 1203), *Summa in Decretum*; ed. J. F. Schulte (Giessen, 1892), p. 132. *Glossa ordinaria in Decretum* C. 1, q. 1, c. 54; ed. Paris, 1501, fol. 119^{ra}.

⁹ *Decretum* C. 1, q. 1, c. 53D. Gratian, however, is vague, but his title to c. 54 indicates that he associated *verbum* with the consecration of the element: *Dum verbum accedit ad elementum, fit sacramentum*. He cites *Tr. LXXX*, 3 to prove that those bap-

tized in heresy or schism do not receive the *virtus* of Baptism.

¹⁰ *Sentences* IV, 30; ed. J. von Walter (Wien, 1924), p. 402. Approximate date: 1160-1170. Stephen of Tournai (d. 1203), *Summa in Decretum*; ed. J. F. Schulte, p. 132 follows the interpretation of Hugh of St. Victor.

¹¹ In *Sentences* IV, 136; ed. cit., p. 458. Gandulphus expressly refutes this opinion. Duns Scotus accuses the canonist Bernard of this *dubitatio asinina*. In *Sent.* IV, d. 3, q. 3 and d. 6, q. 3; ed. Vivès XVI, 324B and 558B.

¹² Cf. Guitmund of Aversa, *De corp. et sanguine Domini*; PL 149, 1448C. Wolphelm of Brauweiler, *Ep. de sacrum Eucharistiae*; PL 154, 413D. School of Laon, *Fragm.*, ed. O. Lottin, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, XI (1939), 45. Guibert of Nogent, *De sanctis* II, 3, 8; PL 156, 640CD. *Epitome*, c. 29; PL 178, 1743. Alanus of Lille, *Contra haereticos* I, 58; PL 210, 362D. Honorius of Autun, *Eucharistion*, c. 10; PL 172, 1255BD. See also St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* III, q. 80, a. 3, ad 3.

¹³ Augustine, *De civitate Dei* X, 5: *Sacrificium est visible invisible sacramentum i.e. sacram signum. Item alibi: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.*

Embarrassed by this conclusion, yet unwilling to abandon its premise, some canonists declared that it was indeed impossible that a donkey should drink a *sacramentum*, but they still maintained that the water becomes a *sacramentum* precisely at the end of the baptismal formula. If, therefore, a boy were taken out of the water, before the words "and of the Holy Spirit" had been pronounced, his Baptism could not be considered valid.¹⁴ Supposing a boy were baptized on the seashore, would the whole sea become a *sacramentum*? No! replied those canonists, for only the water that immediately touches the recipient becomes a *sacramentum*.¹⁵

In harmony with this concept of *sacramentum*, the *Glossa* contains an interesting comment on the verb *significat* in D. 26, c. 2.¹⁶ We are told a bishop is a *sacramentum* just like the water of Baptism.¹⁷ However strange the terminology may appear to us, it makes sense if we define *sacramentum* as *signum* of something sacred. The verb corresponding to *signum* is *significare*. Gratian's extract from St. Augustine reads: *Unius uxoris vir, episcopus, significat ex omnibus gentibus unitatem uni viro Christo subditam*. If then a bishop is a *signum* of the unity of the world under Christ, he is a *signum* of something sacred, i.e. a *sacramentum*.

The theory that the *sacramentum* of Baptism consists in the consecration of the water or in the element itself was by no means generally accepted. Rolandus Bandinelli (d. 1181) opposed it in connection with the current doctrine that a *sacramentum* is repeated only if all its parts are repeated. If this were true, Rolandus reasons, a boy could be baptized again, provided the immersion were performed in another consecrated water. The *sacramentum* of Baptism, he declares, does not consist in the consecration of water from which Baptism derives no efficacy . . . but in the ablution and triple immersion.¹⁸ At the same time, Rolandus insists that "St. Augustine's definition, *sacramentum visibile signum invisibilis gratie*, is entirely satisfactory".¹⁹ However, despite some opposition, the concept of *signum* or *sacramentum* as consecrated element remained prevalent amongst the canonists.

Since the definition and the consequent usage of *sacramentum* was still a very controversial issue at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the student of canonical Glosses must still be prepared to meet with a rather heterogeneous application of the word in the *Glossa ordinaria*. Commenting on D. 4, c. 1, de cons., the compiler offers this definition of Baptism: *Baptismus est exterior hominum ablutio cum certa forma verborum*. Without a word of explanation he adds: *Est etiam character impressus anime*. As third alternative, we are offered the *baptismus-aqua* definition.²⁰ On the same page we read: *Aqua est sacramentum . . . sed ipse character similiter*.²¹ Hence, it was possible to decide one way or

¹⁴ *Glossa ordinaria in Decretum* C. 1, q. 1, c. 54; ed. Paris, 1501, fol. 119^{ra}. See also *ibid.*, D. 4, c. 1, de cons. (fol. 442^{vb}). The same principle applies to anointing: *Idem dicitur in oleo benedicto vel christmate quod tamdiu est sacramentum quamdiu fit cum eo unctio* (fol. 442^{vb}).

¹⁵ St. Augustine's aliud (est) *virtus manens* is interpreted as follows: *Aliud* i.e. efficacia a Deo sibi collata. In the thirteenth century, both objections and replies increase in subtlety. Richard Fishacre, who defines baptism as *aqua deputata ad lavandum*, has recorded the objection that what touches the recipient is not the water, but rather its *terminus* or surface. Richard retorts: *Fosset dici quod est minimum aqua quod si ulterius dividetur, non jam aqua esset*. *In Sent. IV, 3; Ms Vat. Ottob. Lat. 294, fol. 247v*

¹⁶ Augustine, *De bono conjugali*, c. 21 attributed to *Augustinus scribens in epistolam ad Titum*.

¹⁷ Et ita ipse episcopus est sacramentum sicut aqua ipsa I, q. 1, Detrahe, verbum ab aqua, quid erit nisi aqua. ed. Paris, 1501, fol. 29^{ra}. See Huguccio, *In Decretum* D. 26, c. 2; Paris, *Ms BN Lat. 3892*, fol. 31^{rb}.

¹⁸ *Sentences*, ed. A. M. Gietl (Freiburg i. Br., 1891), p. 264.

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 157: Dicimus diffinitionem fore sufficientem et omni et soli competere sacramento. As first *sacramentum* he discusses the Incarnation.

²⁰ Dicitur etiam baptismum ipsa aqua ut I, q. 1, Detrahe (c. 54); ed. cit., 442^{vb}. See Huguccio, *In Decretum* D. 4, c. 1, de cons.; Paris, *Ms BN Lat. 3892*, fol. 384^{va}.

²¹ Reference is made to C. 32, n. 7, *Licite*

another, and define as Baptism the external washing, or the imprinted mark or the water itself; one could define as *sacramentum* the water as well as the imprinted mark; the author could still use the Augustinian terminology and state: *Baptisma non deletur morte*²⁸ or say of an apostate: *Sacramentum baptismi non amittit.*²⁹

How does this terminology harmonize with the definitions of *sacramentum* as *signum* or visible *forma*? The glossator thinks that the definition is not general, because Christ's Body in the Eucharist is not visible and yet a *sacrametum*;³⁰ should anyone consider it a general definition, he must qualify it to the effect that Christ's Body is visible "to those who are with him", though not visible to us. One might even deny that it is a definition at all and rearrange the words as follows: *Visibilis forma est sacramentum invisibilis gratiae.*³¹

How did the glossator come to such a critical attitude? If, as we shall see, he only echoes the teaching of Huguccio (d. 1210), little is gained. The real source of this confusing terminology is no other than St. Augustine and, to a minor degree, Lanfranc.

III. SACRAMENTUM AS LASTING CONSECRATION OF THE RECIPIENT

If it is assumed that, by Baptism or *sacramentum*, St. Augustine meant only a transitory external rite or, perhaps, the consecrated element, his terminology and—what is no less important—post-Augustinian sacramentology will never be fully grasped. Let us examine some sentences, chosen at random, to show that, in numerous instances, Augustinian terminology implies more than a visible *signum* or *forma*:

Sicut baptismus in eis, ita ordinatio mansit integra.³² Ipsum baptismum amittere non potest.³³ Haerent sacramenta christiana.³⁴ Illa sanctitas sacramenti verbis evangelicis consecrata super eum integra permanebat.³⁵ Baptismus corrumpi et adulterari non potest.³⁶ Ante non proderat (baptismus), sed tamen inerat.³⁷ Baptismum gerit.³⁸ Nec tamen eum fugiet baptismus.³⁹ In baptizato autem inseparabiliter baptisma permanere manifestum est.⁴⁰ Apostata non caret baptismo.⁴¹ Baptismus qui in illo est.⁴² Baptismum quem habent . . . integer manet.⁴³ Sacraenta quae in vobis violare nolumus.⁴⁴ Sacramentum nominis Christi quod in eis sanctum est exsufflatis.⁴⁵ Discerne ergo visibile sanctum sacramentum, quod esse et in bonis et in malis potest.⁴⁶ Inest in eis quaedam forma pietatis cuius virtutem negant.⁴⁷ Sacraenta insunt.⁴⁸

(c. 2) which is an excerpt from Augustine, *De adult. conjugiis* II, 5; CSEL 41, 386: Sicut enim manente in se sacramento regenerationis excommunicatur cuiusquam reus criminis nec illo sacramento (conjugii) caret.

²⁸ *Glossa ordinaria in Decretum C* 32, q. 7, c. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 369^{rb}.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, C. q. 1, c. 97; *ed. cit.*, fol. 123^{rb}.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, D. 2, c. 32, de cons.; *ed. cit.*, fol. 432^{rb}.

³¹ *Sacramentum est id non est diffinitio generalis, nam corpus Christi nobis invisible est sacramentum ecclesie et ita non est visibilis forma. Potest tamen dici quod sit generalis, quia corpus visible est his saltem qui cum eo sunt, etsi non nobis. Vel ordina litteram sic ita quod non agatur de diffinitione: visibilis forma est sacramentum invisibilis gratiae.*

³² *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79.

³³ *Op. cit.*, II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 79.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, II, 13, 29; CSEL 51, 81.

³⁵ *De baptismo contra Donatistas* III, 14, 19; CSEL 51, 210.

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, IV, 2, 2; CSEL 51, 223.

³⁷ *Op. cit.*, IV, 4, 5; CSEL 51, 227.

³⁸ *Op. cit.*, IV, 20, 27; CSEL 51, 254.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, V, 23, 33; CSEL 51, 290.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, V, 15, 20; CSEL 51, 278.

⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, V, 15, 20; CSEL 51, 279.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, V, 16, 20; CSEL 51, 279.

⁴³ *Op. cit.*, VI, 24, 43; CSEL 51, 322.

⁴⁴ *Contra litt. Petilianii* II, 30, 69; CSEL 52, 60.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, 81, 180; CSEL 52, 112.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, II, 104, 239; CSEL 52, 155.

⁴⁷ *Ep. ad catholicos*, c. 13, 34; CSEL 52, 276.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, c. 22, 61; CSEL 52, 309. Owing to the movement towards a more restricted use of *sacramentum*, as initiated by Berengar, the almost exclusive consideration of the external rite has largely obscured the proper understanding of Augustine's termin-

This list of phrases, which could easily be doubled and tripled, offers sufficient evidence that Augustinian expressions such as *baptismus*, *ordinatio*, *sacramentum* signify, not only a passing visible action, but also a lasting reality within the recipient. If this concept of *sacramentum* does not occur in Berengar's writings, the omission was scarcely deliberate, for it was only in the latter part of Berengar's life that scholars began to turn their attention to St. Augustine's anti-Donatist writings which constitute the basic works of his sacramentology. Pre-Berengarian writers occasionally cited extracts from *De baptismo contra Donatistas*, while the other works were practically unknown. Berengar's adversaries were hardly more familiar with them up to the end of the eleventh century, when the results of a more intensive study of Augustinian sacramentology begins to be felt throughout the theological literature of the time. Alger of Liège reaped the benefit of this progress, though he still failed to take full advantage of it.

The neglect of St. Augustine's anti-Donatist writings accounts for the fact that his usage of *baptismus* or *sacramentum* as lasting consecration was extremely rare before the second half of the eleventh century. Traces of it are noticeable in *De fide ad Petrum* by St. Fulgentius and in a fragment ascribed to the same author.⁴³ St. Isidore uses the Augustinian expression *habere baptismum* of baptized heretics,⁴⁴ and Hildegonsus of Toledo insists that heretical Baptism must be recognized because, once received, it perseveres.⁴⁵ Augustinian is his notion that, in baptizing, the baptized heretic gives something holy that he possesses;⁴⁶ Augustinian is his interpretation of Gal. iii, 27.⁴⁷

In the following century, the Venerable Bede made remarkably little progress regarding the present matter,⁴⁸ but Heterius and Beatus clearly reflected Augustinian terminology when they wrote to Elipandus: *Inesse tamen homini baptis-
mum etiam extra ecclesiam baptizato*.⁴⁹

Some Carolingian scholars such as Agobard of Lyons, Paschasius and Hincmar inserted or paraphrased passages from Augustine's *De baptismo*, yet those passages were not numerous enough to affect the literary style of their treatises, a style which was dominated by Isidore and Bede. In Agobard we find the phrase *baptismum gerere*;⁵⁰ Paschasius teaches that apostate priests are not reordained on their conversion "because they carry with them the *sacramentum*

ology. In this respect, the reader will notice considerable shortcomings in an article by H. M. Feret, 'Sacramentum Res. dans la langue théologique de S. Augustin', *Rev. des sc. phil. et theol.*, XXIX (1940), 218 ff.

The same may be said of the otherwise excellent exposition in M. Pontet, *L'Exégèse de de S. Augustin prédicateur* (Aubier, 1945), pp. 257 ff., or the article of A. Michel, *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique XIV¹*, art. *sacrement*, pp. 519 ff. Concerning the pre-Augustinian usage, no work can be more highly recommended than that of J. de Ghellinck etc., *Pour l'histoire du mot sacramentum* (*Spec. sacr. Lov.*, Etudes et documents, fasc. 3, Louvain, 1924).

⁴³ *De fide ad Petrum* III, 41; PL 65, 692B. Fragmentum 29; PL 65, 795B: Formam vero pietatis, quod est tinctio visibile sacramentum, non amiserunt (haereticii) . . . acceptum nullatenus perdidérunt, i.e. baptismatis visible sacramentum.

⁴⁴ *De eccles. officiis* II, 25, 10; PL 83, 822D: Habet quidem haereticus baptismum Christi, sed quia extra unitatem fidei est, nihil ei prodest. At ubi ingressus fuerit, statim baptismus quod habebat foris ad perniciem,

incipit illi jam prodesse ad salutem. See also Lycinianus of Carthage (d. 602?), *Ep. II*, 5, ed. P. A. C. Vega (Madrid, 1935), p. 28: Bigamis (sacerdotibus) . . . resistimus ne sacramentum utique corrumpanus.

⁴⁵ *Liber de cognitione baptissimi*, c. 121; PL 96, 161B: Baptismus enim non est hominis, ut iteretur per hominem, sed Christi, ut permaneat per Christum.

⁴⁶ PL 96, 161D.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, c. 142; PL 96, 171C.

⁴⁸ See, however, in *Petr.*, c. 3; PL 93, 60B: Aqua diluvii praefigurabat omnem haereticum, licet habentem baptismatis sacramentum.

⁴⁹ *Ep. ad Elipandum* II, 33; PL 96, 997C copied from Fulgentius, *De fide ad Petrum*, c. 36, 77; PL 65, 703C.

⁵⁰ *De priv. et jure sacerdotii*, c. 15; PL 104, 142C copied from Augustine, *De baptismo* IV, 20, 27; CSEL 51, 254 f. See also his *Liber de sacramento baptissimi*, c. 6; PL 99, 863B: Habet quidem baptismum Christi haereticus . . . Sic habent baptismum haereticus quomodo desertor habet characterem. Source: Augustine, *De symbolo sermo ad catechumenos*, c. 8; PL 40, 636.

of ordination."⁵¹ His assertion, however, that the *virtus sacramenti* remains in unworthy priests, is either a misunderstanding of the Augustinian meaning of *virtus sacramenti* or a novel usage.⁵²

Hincmar of Rheims studied St. Augustine more thoroughly than any other Carolingian theologian. The Augustinian analogy between the *sacramentum* of Baptism and that of matrimony proved to be a powerful weapon in his criticism on Lothair's divorce. He quotes St. Augustine to the effect that the *sacramentum* of marriage, i.e. the marriage bond, cannot be destroyed, just as the "sacramentum of faith" cannot be lost.⁵³ From the *De bono conjugali* he cites a text in which St. Augustine compares the sacred marriage bond with the *sacramentum* of ordination: Supposing a candidate were ordained, but not assigned to office, the *sacramentum* would still remain in him. Should a cleric ever be removed from office on account of serious misconduct, he will never be deprived of his *sacramentum*.⁵⁴ In a later period of history, these passages will occupy as prominent a position as the famous text from *De adulterinis conjugiis* which Hincmar inserted in his letter to Rofuldus.⁵⁵

Undoubtedly more important than these extracts, however, is the wording of Hincmar's own conclusion:

Hinc liquido demonstratur, quia sicut semel acceptum baptismi sacramentum . . . postea nulla interveniente causa amittitur, sic et vinculum conjugale.⁵⁶

Thus Hincmar adopts St. Augustine's terminology; he does not analyse it.

In the works of Hrabanus Maurus we find a passage that may shed some light on the problem how a *sacramentum* could be conceived as something lasting. In dependence on St. Augustine,⁵⁷ Hrabanus distinguishes between visible and invisible sanctification. He holds that the example of the Good Thief shows that, in certain cases, invisible sanctification can be received without visible *sacramenta*. On the other hand, he insists that a visible sanctification which is given through visible *sacramenta* can well exist—though not be profitable—without invisible sanctification.⁵⁸

When the Gregorian reform movement began to question the sacramental powers of simoniacs, heretics and schismatics, the neglect of St. Augustine's writings against Donatism became soon apparent.

St. Peter Damian (d. 1072) relied principally on Paschasius and the Augustinian *Tractatus* on St. John. Against the claim that *sacramenta* without sanctifying power are useless rites and, therefore, to be repeated with the exception

⁵¹ *De corp. et sanguine Domini* c. 12, 3; PL 120, 1313B: Sacramentum tamen ordinatio nis suae gerunt. Source: Augustine, *De baptismo* I, 2, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

⁵² PL 120, 1313B: Manet igitur in eis sacramenti virtus, sibi inutiliter. St. Augustine had written: Sacramentum dandi baptismi est quod habet qui ordinatur. Paschasius paraphrases it as follows: Sacramentum enim consecrandi est quod habet is qui ordinatur . . . Virtus enim consecrandi est in eo, quod habet is qui ordinatur.

⁵³ *De divortio Loth.* Interrogatio 21, Responso; PL 125, 734C–735B; Augustine, *De nuptiis et conc.* I, 10, 11; CSEL 42, 222: Sicut apostatae anima . . . etiam fide perdita, sacramentum fidei non amittit, quod lavacro regenerationis accepit.

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*; PL 125, 735B; Augustine, *De bono conjugali*, c. 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226: Manet tamen in illis ordinatis sacramentum

ordinationis et si aliqua culpa quisquam ab officio removeatur, sacramento Domini semel imposito non carebit, quamvis ad judicium permanente. See also *Ep. 22* to Rofuldus; PL 126, 143BC.

⁵⁵ PL 126, 146B: Augustine, *De adult. conjugiis* II, 4, 4; CSEL 41, 386. It contains the following analogy: Sicut enim manente in se sacramento regenerationis excommunicatur cuiusquam reus criminis nec illo sacramento caret . . . ita manente in se vinculo uxori dimittitur. See Gratian, *Decretum* C. 32, q. 7, c. 2.

⁵⁶ *Ep. 22*; PL 126, 147B.

⁵⁷ *Quaestiones in Heptat.* III, 84; CSEL 28^a, 305.

⁵⁸ *In Levit.* VI, 16; PL 108, 478D: Visibilē vero sanctificationem, quae fieret per visibilia sacramenta, sine ista invisibili posse adesse, non posse prodesse.

of Baptism, Peter Damian duly stresses the distinction between *sacramentum* and grace, as he found it in Paschasius.⁶⁰ Against the supposition that the *sacramentum* consists in the sanctified material element, he maintains that it consists in "the priests' prayers and the invocation of the divinity."⁶¹ He also adopts Augustinian terms that imply a lasting effect. In this sense we take the phrase: *Habere baptismum et malus potest*,⁶² or the sentence: *Sacramentum tamen ordinationis amittere nequeunt*.⁶³

Entirely unconvinced by Damian's exposition, Cardinal Humbert protested. Heretical *sacramenta*, he retorts, have nothing in common with ours except their names and appearances.⁶⁴ True *sacramenta* are *signa* in such a way that they are also *res*, for they signify what they are and what they contain.⁶⁵ The visible baptismal font, for instance, is a *signum* which contains a *res*, i.e. the Holy Spirit.⁶⁶ This also applies to the *sacramentum* of the Altar, to Anointing and all the other mysteries of the Church, for they are called mysteries because there is a hidden *virtus* in them.⁶⁷ The relationship between *signum* and *res* constitutes their very essence and reality: *Sic signa sunt, ut res quoque essentialiter et vere sint*.⁶⁸

It is obvious that, against these premises, Peter Damian's argument carried but little weight. Particularly, Humbert's concept concerning the relationship between *signum* and *res* points to an ideology as expounded by Berengar, and despite his considerable knowledge of patristic literature, Cardinal Humbert made no apparent effort to study the Augustinian *sacramentum* in relation to its *res*.⁶⁹

Before the eleventh century neared its conclusion, St. Augustine had made powerful inroads in the sacramental doctrine and terminology of the time. To quote one of the finest thinkers of the period, we read in a letter of Ivo of Chartres (d. 1116) that, without any doubt, the *sanctitas sacramentorum* remains undefiled and inviolable even in the wicked.⁷⁰ Once received, the sacerdotal Order is not taken away.⁷¹ Should an unworthy candidate be ordained, he still receives the *sanctitas sacramenti* and remains a priest *solo sacramento* until he repents his sin.⁷² Of more far reaching importance than these personal statements

⁶⁰ *Liber gratissimus*, c. 11; MGH, Libelli 1, 32 compared with Paschasius, *De corpore et sanguine Domini*, c. 12, 4; PL 120, 1315A and Augustine, *De baptismo* V, 21, 29; CSEL 51, 287.

⁶¹ *Liber gratissimus*, c. 20; MGH, Libelli 1, 47: Non ergo in rebus materialibus atque terrenis sed in precibus sacerdotum et invocatione divinitatis sive consecrandi sive baptizandi sacramenta consistunt, quamquam et in consecrationibus sacerdotum sanctificatum oleum videatur nihilominus adhiberi. Since Damian knew that consecrated oil was used in the administration of Holy Orders, the clause, introduced by quamquam, clearly betrays a certain embarrassment for, since the days of St. Isidore, it had been customary to designate *chrisma* as *sacramentum*. The underlying problem was this: can oil be sanctified by those who are not in the Church?

⁶² *Lib. grat.*, c. 9; MGH, Libelli 1, 29. Source: Augustine, *In Ep. Joan.*, Tr. VII, 6; PL 35, 2032.

⁶³ *Op. cit.*, c. 34; MGH, Libelli 1, 67.

⁶⁴ *Adversus simon.* I, 15; MGH, Libelli 1, 125. Probable date: 1057-1058.

⁶⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, 9; MGH, Libelli 1, 188. Speaking of Baptism, Sacrifice, and Anointing, he writes: Haec ita signa sunt, ut sint etiam res; nam quod sunt et in se habent significant.

⁶⁶ MGH, Libelli 1, 188: Sic visibilis fons baptismatis signum est, quod tamen in se habet rem, scilicet Spiritum sanctum.

⁶⁷ MGH, Libelli 1, 188: Idcirco mysteria i.e. secreta dicuntur, quia inest eis occultaria virtus, quae per rem visibilem . . . operatur. Cf. Isidore, *Etymologies*; ed. W. M. Lindsay, VI, xix, 40.

⁶⁸ *Adversus simon.* II, 40; MGH, Libelli 1, 189.

⁶⁹ With great indignation, he refutes the (typically Augustinian) idea that heretical Baptism is not reiterated *propter aliquam sui sanctitatem* (MGH, Libelli 1, 105). He does not admit a sort of sanctification that is independent of grace. Yet, he grants that, according to St. Augustine, heretics have visible *sacramenta*, though without any invisible sanctification. Hence, he concludes that, in the Eucharist, they have "only the bread of the visible *sacramentum*." (MGH, Libelli 1, 174).

⁷⁰ *Ep. 73*; PL 162, 93: Constat enim eam in perversis hominibus . . . impollutam et inviolabilem permanere. Cf. Augustine, *Contra litt. Petilian.* II, 104, 239; CSEL 52, 154. Text is found in Ivo's *Decretum* II, 97; PL 161, 185C.

⁷¹ *Ep. 73*; PL 162, 93: Sacerdotii autem ordinem, sicut dicit idem Augustinus in libro de *bono conjugali* (c. 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226), qui semel suscepint, non privantur.

⁷² *Ep. 224*; PL 162, 228D. The expression *solo sacramento sacerdos* dates back to Augustine, *Contra litt. Petilian.* II, 30, 69; CSEL 52, 58 and is found in Ivo's *Decretum* II, 99; PL 161, 186B.

were Ivo's canonical collections which provided the source material in the twelfth century, until they were superseded by Gratian's *Decretum*. Students could not fail to see that, according to St. Augustine, neither the apostate Christian nor the apostate priest lose their *sacramentum*, as both remain in them: *utrumque permanet.*⁷² In both the just and the wicked Baptism is holy;⁷³ both Baptism and Orders are given with a certain, lasting consecration;⁷⁴ both are unaffected by human shortcomings: *Sicut baptismus in eis, ita ordinatio mansit integra.*⁷⁵

In compiling the second part of his *Decretum*, Ivo collected some source material which was to cause considerable difficulties for more than a century. He borrowed not only from Lanfranc, whose terminology will later enter sacramental treatises under the name of St. Augustine, but also took advantage of Berengar's efforts to define *sacramentum*. Through Ivo's faulty transcription or summary, the expression *invisibile sacramentum* enters the very definition of *sacrificium*.⁷⁶

The adoption of ideas from an author whose doctrine had been solemnly condemned was undoubtedly legitimate, since Berengar had made no pretensions of proposing them as his own personal definitions. To bring them into harmony with *sacramentum*, signifying an invisible reality, was not a compiler's task. We saw that even Alger of Liège did little more than enumerate the various meanings of *sacramentum* as he found them in the writings of the Fathers. Gratian was more interested in questions of sacramental validity than in establishing a definition to stabilize, as far as possible, the still too fluctuating meaning of the word.

We have noted that, in dependence on St. Augustine, Ivo speaks of a lasting *sanctitas* as synonymous with the lasting *sacramentum*. In the writings of Hugh of Rouen, we detect a tendency to substitute *gratia* for *sanctitas* or *sacramentum*. The Church, he states, may suspend or remove unworthy ministers; yet the "grace of ordination" remains: *Eis tamen semel imposita ordinationis manet gratia.*⁷⁷ This substitution indicates a tendency, not a fixed terminology, for the same author provides examples for the more customary nomenclature: *Si per ecclesiam officio deponitur, manet sacramentum semel impositum.*⁷⁸

⁷² *Decretum* I, 162; *Panormia* I, 87; PL 161, 99A and 1064C; Augustine, *De baptismo* I, 1, 2; CSEL 51, 146.

⁷³ *Baptismus quidem potest inesse, ubi conversio cordis defuerit.* *Decretum* I, 178 and *Panormia* I, 109; PL 161, 105A and 1069A; Augustine, *De baptismo* IV, 25, 32; CSEL 51, 260. In homine justo et in homine injusto semper sanctum est baptisma. *Decretum* I, 168; PL 161, 102B; Augustine, *De baptismo* VI, 5, 7; CSEL 51, 303. Non amiserat sacramentum. *Decretum* I, 190; PL 161, 107C. See also *Decretum* II, 94; PL 161, 183A copied from Augustine, *De baptismo* IV, 4, 5; CSEL 51, 226.

⁷⁴ *Decretum* II, 97; PL 161, 185A.

⁷⁵ *Ibidem.*

⁷⁶ *Decretum* II, 8; PL 161, 147C: *Sacrificium visible invisibile sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est. Et alibi: Sacramentum invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.* The first definition points to Lanfranc, *Liber de corpore et sanguine Domini*, c. 12 (PL 150, 422D), while the second is derived from Berengar. St. Augustine had written in *De civ. Dei* X, 5 (CSEL 40, 452): *Sacrificium ergo visible invisibilis sacrificii sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum est.* Lanfranc quoted the passage accurately, although J. De Ghellinck attributes to him the definition:

Visibile sacrificium invisibile sacramentum i.e. sacrum signum. See art. cit., *Mélanges Mandonnet* II (Paris, 1930), p. 86. Lanfranc, as we have seen, applied *sacramentum* to the visible element as well as to its *res significata* (Cf. PL 150, 424B). This, I presume, accounts for Ivo's definition of *sacrificium* which created the terminology *invisibile sacramentum*. Although he substituted *sacramentum* for *sacrificium*, Alger avoided Ivo's error and arrived at the definition: *Sacramentum visibile invisibilis rei sacramentum est i.e. sacrum signum (De sacramentis corporis et sanguinis Domini I, 4; PL 180, 751C).* This was quite compatible with St. Augustine's definition of *signum* in *De doctrina christiana* II, 1, 1; PL 34, 35. In view of the enormous influence of Ivo's *Decretum*, the subsequent history of the "definitions" will not surprise the reader. In *Decretum* D. 2, c. 32, de cons., Gratian followed Ivo rather than Alger. The profound consequences of this transmission will become apparent in the succeeding pages of this study.

⁷⁷ *Dial.* V, 10; PL 192, 1203D. Cf. Augustine, *De bono conjugali*, c. 24, 32; CSEL 41, 226.

⁷⁸ *Epistola ad Matthaeum;* PL 192, 1229A. Note the succeeding sentence: *Excommunicato manet baptismi sacramentum.*

But how can a *sacramentum* be said to remain? It seems that Hugh of Rouen is the first author to pose the problem. It is to be expected that his solution reflects an Augustinian line of argument *a posteriori*. He explains: the *sacramentum* of Baptism is said to remain, because an excommunicated person who repents is reconciled by the Church, not rebaptized. For, if he lost the *sacramentum* by sin, he would, no doubt, have to be baptized again on his return to the Church. Yet we all know that *sacraenta* are something divine and for that reason man cannot take them away.⁷⁹ In offering this explanation, Hugh said nothing new and, in all likelihood, his readers had frequently read such arguments in the works of St. Augustine. What is new and worthy of note is the fact that a conscious attempt is made to clarify the word *manet*, and the permanence of *sacramentum*. Surely, this *sacramentum* could not be entirely identical with the external ritual of Baptism.⁸⁰

IV. THE EUCHARISTIC SACRAMENTUM ET RES

Sooner or later, the latent conflict between this usage and the definitions of *sacramentum* was bound to arise. With truly scholarly restraint, Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141), disciple of William of Champeaux (d. 1121), opened the controversy by directing his criticism at the current definition of *sacramentum* as *sacrae rei signum*.⁸¹ As a general description, he finds it acceptable; as a definition, he rejects it as unsatisfactory.⁸² However, the definition proposed by the scholar of St. Victor is little more than a concise enumeration of what he considers essential elements in the constitution of a *sacramentum*, in such a manner that it can be at once applied to every *sacramentum* and to *sacramentum* alone. Its essential elements, as outlined by Hugh of St. Victor, reveal a remarkable affinity to the ideas which had been elaborated by Berengar and had been known, more or less explicitly, throughout the previous centuries. He defines *sacramentum* as:

corporale vel materiale elementum, foris sensibiliter propositum, ex similitudine repraesentans et ex institutione significans et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritualem gratiam.⁸³

In defining the material element as *sacramentum*, Hugh puts himself in the tradition of which Berengar had become a notorious exponent. The specification *ex similitudine repraesentans* dates back principally to St. Augustine's letter to Boniface which Berengar quotes on various occasions.⁸⁴ The second qualification may not delay us now, although it marks an important step in the development of our definition. By including *ex sanctificatione continens . . . gratiam*, Hugh aims at the *res* or *virtus sacramenti*, produced by blessing and thus signified by the consecrated element.⁸⁵

⁷⁹ PL 192, 1229B.

⁸⁰ Despite his remark: *Sacraenta diffiniri nesciunt* (*Dial.* V, 15; PL 192, 1210D); a definition is found in *Dial.* V, 16; PL 192, 1211A: *Sacramentum sacrae rei signum*. In applying it to the Eucharist, Hugh observes: *Sacramentum itaque hoc res est vera sed sacra, sed signata*. See also *Dial.* VII, 13; PL 192, 1244B.

⁸¹ According to *Sententiae Parisienses*, ed. A. Landgraf, (Louvain, 1934), p. 4, this definition is only "an interpretation of the word." Date: ca. 1139-1141.

⁸² *De sacramentis* I, 9, 2; PL 176, 317C.

Date: 1135-1140.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, I, 9, 2; PL 176, 317D.

⁸⁴ *Ep.* 98, 9; CSEL 34², 531. Berengar, *De s. coena*, cc. 20, 39, 41, 44; ed. Beekenkamp, pp. 40, 125, 136, 150.

⁸⁵ PL 176, 318C: *Sanctificatio ex benedictione est. A sententia in St. Augustine's Contra Faustum XX, 13; PL 42, 379* seems to be at the bottom of Berengar's preference for the word *consecratio* instead of *sanctificatio*. See *De s. coena* cc. 15, 20, 29, 30, 38, 39; ed. Keekenkamp, pp. 27, 38, 65, 70, 116, 122. Cf. Ivo, *Decretum* II, 1; *Panormia* I, 123; PL 161, 135A; 1071C.

Once these three conditions have been fulfilled on water, it is a *sacramentum*.⁸⁰ Since the expression *corporale vel materiale elementum* in Hugh's definition comprises visible things (*res*), or actions (*facta*) or words (*dicta*),⁸¹ it covers an extremely wide field in Christian life: things, such as water, oil, bread and wine *et quaecumque sunt aliae corporales species in quibus sacramenta divina conficiuntur*,⁸² actions, such as the sign of the Cross which we use as *signum* of protection against evil powers or as *signum* of consecration;⁸³ words, such as the invocation of the Trinity.⁸⁴ Foremost of all *sacra menta* are those that contain *virtus* through sanctification and bring about an *effectus salutis* through operation.⁸⁵ The first *sacramentum* is Baptism⁸⁶ which is described as follows: *Baptismus est aqua diluendis criminibus sanctificata per verbum Dei.*⁸⁷

The serious shortcoming in Hugh's concept of *sacramentum* is his considerable disregard for the recipient. Another weakness may be seen in a certain lack of consistency that is revealed in his treatise on the Blessed Eucharist, where he designates as *sacramentum* not only the visible species of bread and wine, but also the Body and Blood.⁸⁸ The Augustinian *sacramentum* signifying a lasting consecration of the recipient was not entirely unknown to him, as can be gathered from his debate on the reiteration of Extreme Unction.⁸⁹ The fact that it is only referred to in passing proves again that it was not yet felt to conflict with the current definitions.

The author of *Summa Sententiarum* (1140-1146) realized the weaknesses in Hugh's definition. The objection had apparently been raised that, even before its sanctification, water could be called visible *forma* of invisible grace.⁹⁰ To overcome this difficulty the following proposition is made: *Sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiae in eo collatae.*⁹¹ By making this addition, a closer relationship is established between *sacramentum* and its recipient, as *gratia* does not designate a quality of the element but the efficacy of the *sacramentum* in the recipient.⁹² As a natural result, the author's interest tends towards the interrelation of object and subject, or the action by which the interrelation is established. Hence Baptism is defined as *immersio facta cum invocatione Trinitatis.*⁹³ The *sacramentum* of Baptism contains a number of

⁸⁰ *De sacramentis* I, 9, 2; PL 176, 318C: *Est ergo aqua visibilis sacramentum et gratia invisibilis res sive virtus sacramenti.* Cf. 319A: *Accedit verbum sanctificationis ad elementum et fit sacramentum, ut sit sacramentum aqua visibilis.*

⁸¹ *Op. cit.* I, 9, 4; PL 176, 326B.

⁸² Examples: *aqua aspersoris et susceptio cineris, benedictio ramorum et cereorum et caetera talia.* *Op. cit.* I, 9, 7; II, 9, 1; PL 176, 327A; 471D.

⁸³ PL 176, 326D. Cf. *op. cit.* II, 9, 1; PL 176, 471D. *Sacra menta* in things and actions are so numerous that Hugh cannot enumerate all of them. *Op. cit.* II, 9, 8; PL 176, 475A.

⁸⁴ PL 176, 362D.

⁸⁵ *De sacramentis* I, 9, 4; PL 176, 326D. Cf. *op. cit.* I, 9, 7; II, 6, 1; II, 8, 1; PL 176, 327A; 441D; 461D.

⁸⁶ *De sacramentis* II, 6, 1; PL 176, 441D.

⁸⁷ *De sacramentis* II, 6, 2; PL 176, 443A. Werner of St. Blasie (d. 1174) attributes it to St. Augustine in *Deflorationes ss. Patrum*; PL 157, 298D.

⁸⁸ *De sacramentis* II, 8, 7; PL 176, 466D: *Credimus . . . speciem quidem visibilem sacramentum esse veri corporis et veri sanguinis; corpus autem sacramentum esse gratiae spiritualis.* Cf. II, 11, 13; PL 176, 506A. The reception of the Blessed Eucharist is also a *sacramentum*.

⁸⁹ *De sacramentis* II, 15, 3; PL 176, 578C: *We can never lose the *sacramentum* of the Christian name.* Cf. Peter the Venerable (d. 1156) who mentions in a similar discussion that priests cannot lose their *sacramentum* (*Ep. V, 7; PL 189, 333B*). See also R. Pullus, *Sent. V, 15; PL 186, 842A:* *Fictio rem sacramenti tollit; ipsum tamen sacramentum tollere nequit.* *Sent. VII, 4; PL 186, 927C:* *Notandum autem quod sacramentum impositum cum vita permaneat . . . Unde rebaptizari aut reordinari non licet.* At the same time, Pullus teaches: *Sacramentum ergo baptismi, quod totum extrinsecus agitur . . . (Sent. V, 16; PL 186, 842B).*

⁹⁰ *Summa sententiarum* IV, 1; PL 176, 117B. His definitions are: *Augustinus: Sacramentum est sacrae rei signum. Idem: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma.*

⁹¹ *Op. cit.* IV, 1; PL 176, 117B. See Hildegard of Lavardin (d. 1134), *Tract. theologicus*, c. 40; PL 171, 1146A.

⁹² *Op. cit.* IV, 1; PL 176, 117B.

⁹³ *Summa sententiarum* V, 4; PL 176, 129D. The reason advanced by the author is the Isidorian definition of Baptism as *tinctio* (PL 176, 129D reads *unctio*). He admits that the sanctified element could be called Baptism, but only in a wide sense (V, 4; PL

sacmenta such as the threefold immersion,¹⁰⁰ the insufflation, the invocation of the Trinity, and many others.¹ The concept of *sacmentum* as something enduring occurs in *Summa Sententiarum* in connection with heretical Baptism. Heretics, we are told, are not baptized again, because they have the *sacmentum*.²

The author also designates the Lord's Body and Blood as *sacmentum*, but it is of the greatest importance to note the manner in which he arranges the division. Three things, he points out, must be distinguished in this *sacmentum* (i.e. the Eucharist): first, what is *sacmentum tantum*, viz. the visible species of bread and wine and such visible ceremonies as *fractio*, *depositio*, *elevatio*; second, what is at once *sacmentum et res*, i.e. Christ's Body and Blood which is *res* in relation to the visible species that signify it and *sacmentum* in relation to something else, namely the unity of Head and members; third, what is *res tantum*, i.e. the aforesaid unity which is called *virtus sacramenti*.³ With great diligence, the author proves why the visible species etc. are *sacmentum tantum*;⁴ no effort is made to show how Christ's Body and Blood could be *res*, i.e. something invisible and yet *sacmentum*, i.e. visible *forma*, as required by definition.⁵

If we turn to Peter Lombard, more direct evidence appears that it was the terminology of Lanfranc which persevered in the threefold division. In describing it, Lombard states: *Sacmentum et res* is Christ's own Flesh and Blood.⁶ Justification for this usage could be found in "Augustine", as cited by Gratian;⁷ the immediate source, however, was Ivo and Lanfranc.⁸ Lombard does not explain how the distinction could be harmonized with his definitions of *sacmentum*.

Other theologians were much more critical. Some fifteen years before Lombard adopted the distinction, a rather solitary, though acute, theologian, Gerhoh of Reichersberg (d. 1169), had openly condemned the custom of calling the Eucharistic Body a *sacmentum* precisely because *sacmentum* is, as he words it, *visibile signum invisibilis gratie*. "I dare not call Christ's Body a *sacmentum*, as it is something secret and hidden from our eyes . . . I am amazed at such affirmations made by some magistri . . . since as a rule the invisible is signified by the visible rather than vice versa."⁹

176, 129D). His authority for this doctrine is *Augustinus de catechismo*: Ps-Augustine, *De cataclysmo sermo ad catechumenos* 3, 3; PL 40, 694. See also *Ysagoge* (1148-1152), ed. A. Landgraf (Spic. s. Lov. n. 14, Louvain, 1934), p. 183.

¹⁰⁰ PL 176, 129C. Cf. Augustine, *De symbolo sermo ad catechumenos*, c. 1; PL 40, 660. Similar doctrines are found in *Ysagoge*, ed. Landgraf, p. 184.

¹ PL 176, 129CD.

² *Summa sent.* V, 8; PL 176, 134D.

³ *Op. cit.* VI, 3; PL 176, 140AB. See also *Sententiae divinitatis*, ed. B. Geyer, in *Beiträge VIII* (Münster, 1909), p. 135; *Ysagoge*, ed. Landgraf, p. 204. The individual elements of this tripartition are, of course, more ancient than the *Summa sententiarum*. We read, for instance, in *Sententia Anselmi* (ed. F. Blumentzreider, *Beiträge XVIII* [1919] p. 116): *Est tamen Christus et sacramentum et res sacramenti. Corpus enim ejus quod diversis respectibus visibile et invisible dicitur, res est visibilis sacramenti; sacramentum panis caelestis et invisibilis quo vivunt angeli.* The editor rightly points out that the chapter was written under the influence of Lanfranc or Ivo of Chartres. The *Sententie Atrebenses* of the same school of Laon (ed. O. Lottin, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1938), 351 f.) teach: *Corpus Christi quod in altari tractatur est sacramentum i.e. signum sacre rei, etiam unionis*

et caritatis que conferitur in ipso.

⁴ PL 176, 140A: *Sacmentum enim sacrae rei signum. Signum autem est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit facit aliquid in mente venire.* See Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* II, 1, 1; PL 32, 34.

⁵ See also Stephen of Autun (d. 1139), *Tract. de sacramento altaris*, c. 17; PL 172, 1296A.

⁶ *Sent. IV*, 8, 7; ed. Quaracchi (1916) II, p. 792: *Sacmentum et res (est) caro Christi propria et sanguis.*

⁷ *Caro videlicet carnis, et sanguis sacramentum sanguinis. Decretum D. 2, c. 48 de cons.* The passage is ascribed to *Augustinus in libro sentenciarum Prospere*.

⁸ Ivo, *Decretum* II, 9; PL 161, 153B copied from Lanfranc, *De corpore et sanguine Domini*, c. 14; PL 150, 423D-424A. From a historical point of view, the development and significance of the formula *sacmentum tantum, res et sacramentum, res tantum* is not satisfactorily described in F. Holboeck, *Die Eucharistie und der mystische Leib Christi* (Rome, 1941), pp. 219 ff.

⁹ *Liber de simoniacis*; MGH, *Libelli* 3, 267. According to F. Holboeck (*op. cit.*, p. 128), the school of Abelard knew only the division: (1) *sacmentum* or *signum*, scil. *corpus Christi verum*; (2) *res sacramenti* or *signatum*, scil. *corpus Christi mysticum*; (3) *efficacia*. However, the text (*Epitome*, c. 30; PL 178, 1744D-1145A) referred to by

Others ignored the threefold division and adhered to *sacramentum* in contrast to *res*. Thus, Magister Simon distinguishes two things in the Eucharist: *unum quod celatur i.e. corpus Christi . . . et aliud quod significatur i.e. mysticum corpus Christi*.¹⁰ In the anonymous *Tractatus de septem sacramentis ecclesie* we find a similar procedure: *Hoc enim sacramentum duas in se res continet, Christum scilicet et unionem caritatis*.¹¹ Other scholars noticed a certain inconsistency, but preferred to accept the distinction.¹² Through Peter Lombard's *Sentences* it gained such wide acceptance that, in the year 1202, it was even used in an official ecclesiastical document, issued by Pope Innocent III (1198-1216).¹³ Henceforth, it was above debate that the Eucharistic Body is *sacramentum et res*.

The opposition to Hugh of St. Victor's definition which we encountered in *Summa Sententiarum* is continued and intensified in Lombard's *Sentences*.¹⁴ Both *signum* and *forma* enter Lombard's definition with heavy stress on the aspect of causality¹⁵ the object of which, in the case of Baptism, is not the water, but the human recipient. Since the baptismal *sacramentum* and *res* are separable¹⁶ and only the Lord sanctifies with invisible grace,¹⁷ the definition of Baptism comprises only the visible *sacramentum* administered by the Lord's servant: *Baptismus dicitur tinctio i.e. ablutio corporis exterior facta sub forma verborum praescripta*.¹⁸ In Baptism even the unworthy put on Christ secundum *sacramenti perceptionem*, though not *secundum sanctificationem*.¹⁹ In addition to this, Lombard knows *sacramentum* as lasting consecration in Baptism, Holy Orders, and Confirmation.²⁰ In the crucial question of heretical Orders, the authority of Augustine and Gregory seem to warrant the conclusion that "in all the wicked, even in condemned heretics, Christ's *sacramenta remain*".²¹ We need not repeat that, for instance in the case of Baptism, the lasting *sacramentum* cannot be identified with *sacramentum* as defined by Lombard.

Holboeck deals with the *sacramentum* of Anointing and hardly confirms the statement. In *Epitome*, c. 29; PL 187, 1741A we read: *Hoc corpus sacramentum est illius corporis Christi quod est ecclesia . . . Sanguis autem Christi sacramentum est Spiritus ecclesiae*. While the designation *sacramentum*, as applied to the visible species, needed no clarification, it is its application to Christ's Body and Blood that might have caused controversy. But the passage proves that the Abelardian terminology was by no means different from the usage of other schools. Had any difficulty been felt, the author of *Epitome* would presumably have given expression to it. The author of *Sententiae Florianenses*, ed. H. Ostlender, (Floril. Patr., fasc. 19, Bonn, 1929), n. 66, p. 30 speaks of *signum* rather than *sacramentum*.

¹⁰ *Tract. de sacramentis*, ed. H. Weisweiler (Louvain, 1937), p. 34.

¹¹ Ed. Weisweiler, p. 22.

¹² See, for instance, Honorius Augustodunensis (d. 1152?), *Eucharistion*, c. 8; PL 172, 1254D: *Omne sacramentum aliud foris ostendit, aliud intus intelligendum innuit . . . Unde licet in veritate caro et sanguis Christi credatur, tamen non incongrue sacramentum vel figura nominatur*. William of Thiery, *De sacramento altaris*, c. 9; PL 180, 355C: *Nemo autem novitatis me arguat, quod corpus Christi sacramentum appellem corporis Christi*.

¹³ *Cum Martha circa*, written on November 29, 1202 to John, former archbishop of Lyons. *Decr. Greg.* L. 3, T. 41, c. 6 or PL 214, 1121B. A. Potthast, *Reg. Rom. Pontificum* (Berlin, 1874) n. 1179. The *Glossa ordinaria*, ed.

Lyons (1584), fol. 137^r gives the following comment: *Corpus Christi est sacramentum, scilicet unitatis, et est res sacramenti, scilicet specierum panis et vini; et ita est signans et signatum*. See also Innocent, *De sacramento altaris* IV, 36; PL 217, 879BD. In c. 39 of the same book (PL 217, 881D), Innocent, then Cardinal Lothario, observes: *Sacramentum autem active et passive dicitur quasi sacram signans et sacram signatum*. In applying this distinction to the Blessed Eucharist, he describes the species of bread as *sacramentum active i.e. sacram signans* and the unity of the Church as *sacramentum passive i.e. sacram signatum*. Then he states: *Corpus Domini, cum utroque modo dicitur sacramentum, est sacram signans et sacram signatum*. In substance, therefore, the division does not differ from that of the decretal, issued in 1202: The Lord's Body is a *sacramentum*.

¹⁴ *Sentences* IV, 1, 2-4; ed. Quaracchi II (1916), p. 745 f. See also the *Sentences* of Rolandus Bandinelli, ed. Gietl, p. 264. Date: 1150-1153. Magister Simon, *Tractatus de sacramentis*, ed. H. Weisweiler, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Sentences* IV, 1, 4; ed. cit., p. 746.

¹⁶ *Sentences* IV, 4, 1 f.; ed. cit., pp. 762 ff.

¹⁷ *Sentences* IV, 5, 3; ed. cit., pp. 775 f.

¹⁸ *Sentences* IV, 3, 1; ed. cit., p. 754. The *sacramentum* consists in the *ablutio facta cum elemento*.

¹⁹ *Sentences* IV, 4, 3; ed. cit., p. 765: Augustine, *De baptismo* V, 24, 34; CSEL 51, 291. Gratian, *Decretum* D. 4, c. 41 de cons.

²⁰ *Sentences* IV, 7, 5; ed. cit., p. 787: Augustine, *Contra ep. Parmeniani* II, 13, 28; CSEL 51, 280.

²¹ *Sentences* IV, 25, 1; ed. cit., p. 907.

We may now pause for a brief review or summary of the theological currents as they appear in the middle of the twelfth century. Despite occasional criticism, the concept of *sacramentum* had not yet been subjected to widespread criticism when Peter Lombard composed his *Sentences*. The early anti-Berengarians had refused to yield to Berengar's definition. When they were generally accepted, the first voices of criticism centered mainly on the problem of causality. To ignore the definitions was completely out of the questions, since they rested on the authority of St. Augustine and an immemorable tradition. The two currents which placed the *sacramentum* in the consecrated element or in the actual administration, respectively, were based on the historically and theologically well founded assumption that *sacramentum* designates something visible and external. In point of time, the visible and outward *signum* or *forma* in Baptism or ordination was only of short duration; after the external rite had passed, there remained in the recipient an effect that could not be erased. In dependence on St. Augustine, the Christian writers called this effect either *baptismus* and *ordinatio (ordo, sacerdotium, gratia)*, respectively, or used the more generic term *sacramentum*. Up to the days of Peter Lombard, we do not meet with an effort to justify or criticize this usage in the light of the current definitions; we do meet with some opposition to the custom of calling the Eucharistic Body a *sacramentum*. In all these cases, a modern theologian might call upon the relationship of cause and effect and propose the solution that, being the effect of a visible *signum*, the internal reality is called *sacramentum* by denomination. In the light of history, we now know that the Eucharistic *sacramentum et res* is not the result of such considerations. In its final analysis, it dates back to Lanfranc who adopted the nomenclature in open defiance of the Berengarian definitions, and in loyalty to an ancient tradition which used *sacramentum* in the most general sense. The Eucharistic *sacramentum et res* established itself so solidly that, at the turn of the century, the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma* was openly questioned by Peter of Capua with reference to the Body of Christ which is at once invisible and a *sacramentum*.²² What Peter of Capua or his contemporaries did not realize was the fact that the custom of calling the Eucharistic Body of Christ a *sacramentum* was only a concession to tradition, not a logical application of a definition.

Since the concept of *sacramentum* as visible *signum* had gained a dominant position, the invisible *sacramentum* might have led to a revision of the definition or to the introduction of a more discriminating terminology. We shall see that both ways were actually tried and resulted in a compromise. After the ensuing controversies, the definitions of *sacramentum* emerged substantially unchanged, while the lasting *sacramentum* of Baptism, for instance, received a new name (character) and, at the same time, reasserted itself in the distinction of a baptismal *sacramentum et res*.

In the controversy which we are about to outline, the designation of the material

²² *Summa*, Ms Clm 14508, fol. 75v: Preterea character ille, cum non sit visibilis, non videatur alicui esse *sacramentum* i.e. *signum*. *Sacramentum enim est invisibilis gratie visibilis forma, ut tradit auctoritas. Responsio: Forte non est hec descripicio sacramenti set qualiscumque assignatio. Nam corpus Christi est *sacramentum ecclesie*, cum tamen non videatur. Date: ca. 1200. See also the anonymous *Summa* of Ms Vat. Lat. 10754, fol. 33^r quoted by A. Landgraf, 'Die fröhscholastische Definition der Taufe', *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), 217. I wish to acknowledge my debt to Bishop Landgraf whose well documented article has greatly facili-*

tated the study of the succeeding period. It may be said, however, that Landgraf was primarily interested in the controversy concerning the definition of Baptism, without laying particular stress on its relationship to the definition of *sacramentum* as *signum* or *forma*. It would seem, also, that the Augustinian background of the ensuing debates needs more emphasis than was given by the author. I have been in a position to verify most of the texts quoted by Landgraf and to add further documents to trace the evolution through the scholastic period up to the beginning of the fourteenth century.

element as *sacramentum* appeared to be condemned to oblivion; yet its decline was only temporary. There were indeed many reasons why this theory should be abandoned. The author of *Summa Sententiarum* had already objected that, even before its sanctification, water could be called visible *forma* of invisible grace.²³ Though this objection could be easily refuted, Peter Lombard shared the author's opposition to Hugh of St. Victor mainly because the relation to the recipient needed more emphasis. We have already noted the rather embarrassing conclusion that, if the consecrated water were a *sacramentum*, it could be consumed by animals. This consequence could be accepted; or it could be rejected on the grounds that the *sacramentum* of water lasted only as long as the actual administration. If the consequence was accepted, its inconvenience could be pressed still further. Supposing Baptism were conferred in a lake or a river, would the whole become a *sacramentum*? Should it become a sacramentum at the first immersion, would it not be a repetition of the *sacramentum* if the immersion were performed a second and third time?²⁴ Supposing only the water that touched the recipient became a *sacramentum*, could the same water possibly touch the body in all immersions? If Baptism signifies a spiritual washing, how can it actually signify and effect it, unless the *sacramentum* lies in the external washing? If the *sacramentum* is in the water, how can it be said to be in the recipient?

The opposite opinion which held that the *sacramentum* consisted in the external *ablutio* or *tinctio* was not entirely without difficulties. The objection was raised: if the action of baptizing is performed by a minister in mortal sin, the act is sinful; yet, Baptism is above the sinfulness of man.²⁵ If, as the Fathers teach, Baptism is the work of God, it cannot consist in the action of man.²⁶ If it consists in the action of man, we are baptized three times; yet, Baptism is but one.²⁷ It is false to say that the *ablutio* is the *sacramentum* of Baptism, for the *sacramentum* remains in the baptized after the ablution has passed.²⁸

However, these objections seemed to be easier to solve than those raised against the first group, and by the end of the twelfth century the opinion of the second group was *sententia plurimorum*, as Magister Martinus puts it,²⁹ whereas the *sacramentum-aqua* theory appeared as opinion of the ancients.³⁰ From some of the objections we could gather that the lasting *sacramentum* affected the controversy to a substantial degree.

V. SACRAMENTUM DEFINED AS CHARACTER

Some of Peter Lombard's first disciples followed their magister almost verbatim,³¹ while others, apparently under attack from the opposite camp, qualified

²³ *Summa sententiarum* IV, 1; PL 176, 117B.

²⁴ In the Eucharistic doctrine, a similar difficulty arose. The *Glossa ordinaria* on *Decretum* D. 2, c. 94, de cons. records the view that the very moment a mouse touches the consecrated host, the *sacramentum* ceases to exist. Could it be consecrated again? We are told that it could not be done, because that which is left is no longer bread but only its species.

²⁵ *Summa* of Ms Bamberg, Patr. 136, fol. 63^v. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 214.

²⁶ See Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* V, 4; PL 211, 1230B. Ms Paris, BN Lat. 16406, fol. 163^r cited by A. Landgraf, *Mél. Mandronet II* (Paris, 1930), p. 138: *Sacramentum non est opus hominis sed Dei. Impressio enim characteris est opus Dei.*

²⁷ Cf. Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* V, 4; PL 211, 1230B.

²⁸ See *Glossa* of Ps-Peter of Poitiers on *Sent.* IV, 3; Ms Paris, BN Lat. 14423, fol. 94^r. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), 216.

²⁹ Ms Paris, BN Lat. 14556, fol. 352^v. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 208.

³⁰ Peter Cantor, *Summa de sacramentis*; Ms Paris, BN Lat. 9593, fol. 17^r. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 202. Far from being extinct, it was still held by St. Bonaventure, though in a mitigated form.

³¹ Cf. Magister Bandinus, *Sent.* IV, 3; PL 192, 1092. Abbreviation of *Sentences* in Ms Paris, BN Lat. 15747, fol. 80^r. Ms Paris, Maz. Lat. 984, fol. 88^v. Peter Manducator, *De sacramentis*; ed. by R. M. Martin as appendix to H. Weisweiler, *Maitre Simon* (Louvain, 1937), p. 14. *Summa Udonis*, Ms Vat., Pal. Lat., 328, fol. 56^{ra}.

Lombard's *tinctio* or *ablutio* as *passio*, in contrast to *actio*. The *actio*, they maintained is indeed the work of man and, therefore, is not the *sacramentum*. By *tinctio*, they tell us, the magister meant the washing as far as it is received by the recipient, and only as such is classified as *sacramentum*.³² Being rather far fetched, this distinction or improvement was refuted by others,³³ or it was claimed that the doctrine was untenable in view of the common belief that the *sacramentum* endures in the baptized.³⁴ We learn from Peter of Poitiers (d. 1205) that, in order to end the quarrel over the interpretation of Peter Lombard, some authors suggested a compromise, *viz.* to reconcile the divine and human element in the administration of Baptism, they taught that Baptism consists in both the *actio abluentis*—the work of man—and the *passio abluti*—the work of God.³⁵ After recording this opinion, Peter of Poitiers remarks: "If you investigate more closely, whether it (the *passio abluti*) is a substance or accident, it is difficult to answer."³⁶

To magister Martinus such investigations seemed indeed very much out of place, *quia non expedit ita subtiliter incedere inter uteros pregnantium*.³⁷ But he insists that the *sacramentum* remains like an indissoluble spiritual marriage bond between God and the soul.³⁸ Peter of Poitiers was also critical enough to raise the problem as to the terminology in describing the Eucharistic Body as *sacramentum*. The answer: "Christ's Body on the altar is visible, not to men, but to angels."³⁹

At first, the distinction *ablutio actio* and *passio* may have been a subtle attempt to discriminate between the divine and human element in Baptism. Under the increasing influence of the Augustinian *sacramentum*, *ablutio passio* began to designate also the lastingness of Baptism in the recipient which was to be attributed to God alone.

Was this *passio* thought to be on the body or on the soul? Magister Martinus replies: *Baptismus non est in corpore vel in anima sed est in persona*,⁴⁰ which seems to mean that, according to Martinus, Baptism or the *sacramentum* is in the compositum of both body and soul.⁴¹ A similar doctrine was held by Huguccio of Ferrara (d. 1210).⁴²

It was previously suggested that the controversy might lead to the adoption of new technical terms. The distinction *actio-passio* was a step in that direction, though it should constantly be kept in mind that to part with age-old traditions and nomenclatures was no easy task. In the works of Hugh of Rouen we found the beginnings of another possible development. He taught that "the grace of

³² Ps-Peter of Poitiers, *Glossa cit.*, fol. 94^r.
Glossa of Ms Paris, *Maz.*, *Lat.* 758, fol. 141^r.
 The anonymous *Summa* of Ms Vat., *Lat.* 10754, fol. 33^r. Hugh of St. Cher, *In Sent.* IV, 3; Ms Leipzig, *Lat.* 537, fol. 216^r.

³³ See the collection of *Questiones* of Ms Salzburg, *St. Peter VI* 8, fol. 30^r: Et dicit iste quod nec *actio sacerdotis* nec *susceptio baptizati* sit *sacramentum*, sed *ablutio aque*. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 215.

³⁴ Ps-Peter of Poitiers, *Glossa* on *Sent.* IV, 3; fol. 94^r: Dicit enim Lumbardus quod *passio abluti baptismus* est. Quod videtur falsum, quia cessante ablutione remanet in baptizato *sacramentum*. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 216.

³⁵ *Sentences* V, 4; PL 211, 1230C.

³⁶ PL 211, 1230C. Note the following observation: Nec est aliquid quod expressiorem habeat similitudinem cum illa interiori mundatione quam illa corporis ablutio.

³⁷ Ms Paris, BN *Lat.* 14556, fol. 352^r. He was certain, however, that this *sacramentum* (of Baptism) is not *sacramentalis res*.

Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 218.

³⁸ fol. 352^r. Baptism is defined as *sacra super hominem aquarum infusio sancte trinitatis nomine invocato*. It is objected: Set secundum hanc diffinitionem videtur quod baptismus transeat et desinat esse. . . . Responso: In baptismino nubit anima fidelis Deo ad contritus vinculum quoddam spirituale quod dissolvi non potest. Et ideo, licet transeat illa aquarum effusio, tamen permanet sacramentum. This thought is not novel (as Landgraf seems to believe) since it is already found in Augustine, *De nuptiis et conc. I, 10, 11*; CSEL 42, 222.

³⁹ *Sentences* V, 12; PL 211, 1250C.

⁴⁰ Ms Paris, BN *Lat.* 14556, fol. 352^r.

⁴¹ Cf. the anonymous *Summa*, Ms Bamberg, Patr. 136, fol. 63^r whose author specifies *tinctio exterior* as *passio* or *passibilis qualitas*. This *qualitas* (exterior) remains: Est enim *qualitas inferens vel illata diu permanens*.

⁴² *Summa in decretum D.* 4. c. 1, de cons. Ms Paris, BN *Lat.* 3892, fol. 384^{ta}.

ordination" remains in the unworthy priest. In the second half of the twelfth century, an unknown scholar applied this terminology to Baptism by distinguishing between "separable and inseparable grace." The latter is identified with Baptism.⁴³ Although a possible solution, it found no followers.

More successful was a certain Magister Paganus of Corbeil⁴⁴ to whom a number of sources ascribe the choice of the word *character*. Thus we read in the *Glossa* of Ps-Peter of Poitiers: *Magister Paganus dicit quod sacramentum est character, quo distinguuntur fideles ab infidelibus.*⁴⁵ Since the word *character* is a new arrival, its analysis should be made with great care. The glossator, we may note, does not accept the *tinctio-passio* theory, nor is he in favor of the compromise recorded by Peter of Poitiers. His basic reason for rejecting those solutions is the permanence of the *sacramentum* of Baptism. Hence, by choosing the word *character*, Paganus presumably aims at two things that were difficult to reconcile: first of all, the lasting *sacramentum* and, secondly, its visibility. The mode of permanence is not yet clearly defined, but its relationship to the external visible *signum* seems to be specified by the clause: *quo distinguuntur fideles ab infidelibus*. It is independent of sanctifying grace⁴⁶ and identified with Baptism. Its existence is in the soul by virtue of the baptismal *ablutio* of the body and may be compared to *caritas* which it signifies, for, just as through *character* the baptized are distinguished from the unbaptized, the children of God are, through *caritas*, distinguished from the children of satan.⁴⁷

Of special interest in our present study is the identification of *character* with Baptism or *sacramentum*; of equal interest is the assertion that *character* "signifies" *caritas*, for, in order to act as *signum*, it had to be brought into relationship with the senses. If Baptism is identified with the lasting *character* in the soul, one may wonder why no greater effort is made to explain how it can serve as a means to differentiate between the baptized and the unbaptized. It was presumably this obscurity that caused a glossator to observe that, according to some authors, Baptism is a spiritual *character* by which the baptized are separated from the unbaptized on the Day of Judgment.⁴⁸ If this report is accurate, the peculiar doctrine may be due to an endeavour to explain the visibility of *character* in a manner similar to the theory that the Eucharistic Body is a *sacramentum*, because it is visible to the angels.

The same glossator relates a variety of opinions concerning the *sacramentum*

⁴³ Ms Brit. Mus., *Harley*, 3855, fol. 13v: *Magister noster dicit quod baptismus est gratia . . . qua carere non potest, que ei inseparabiliter adheret et est donum gratuitum; nec deserit quando mortaliter peccat.* See also Ms Oxford, Bodl. *Rawlinson C* 161, fol. 152v. The terminology is changed in Ms Brit. Mus., *Royal 10 A VII*, fol. 208v: *Baptismus est character quidam invisibilis . . . et inseparabiliter adheret baptizato. Unde sive maneret christianus sive apostet, semper est character illus.*

"Paganus" life and works are unknown. Concerning some doctrines attributed to him, see A. Landgraf, *Miscell. Giovanni Mercati II* (Vatican City, 1946), 260 ff.

⁴⁵ Ms Paris, BN *Lat.* 14423, fol. 94v. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, *Gregorianum*, XXVII (1946), 354.

⁴⁶ *Glossa* of Ms Clm. 22288, fol. 83v commenting on *Sent.* IV, 4, (*sacramentum et res*): *Sacramentum i.e. character secundum P(aganum) de Corbolio, qui character tam bono quam malo imprimitur.*

⁴⁷ Ms Vat., *Lat.* 10754, fol. 33v: *Alii vero ut magister Paganus de Corbolio et alii dixerunt baptismum esse quendam characterem*

quo discernuntur baptizati a non-baptizatis. Sicut per illum characterem distinguuntur baptizati a non-baptizatis, ita per caritatem filii Dei a filiis diaboli.

⁴⁸ Ms Paris, BN *Lat.* 758, fol. 141v. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 355. When, at a later date, the word *character* was applied to Holy Orders, the initial stage was equally obscure, as can be gathered from the following passage: *Notanda est quorundam opinio de ordinibus. Dicunt enim plerique quemlibet ordinem proprie dici sacramentum. Suscipit enim—ut aiunt—clericus, cum ordinatur, characterem quendam seu visibilem seu invisibilem . . . et dicitur tum ordo tum sacramentum . . . Et notandum quod character in clero proprie dicitur corona, per quam discernitur a layco.* Quoted by F. Gillmann, *Der Katholik*, XCIII (1913), 76. See also *Summa D. Henrici Hostiensis*, (Venice, 1542), fol. 35rb: *Potest tamen magistrilater sic describi: Sacramentum est character quidam, qui per eum qui potestatem habet corpori humano recipientis juxta ritum ecclesiasticum visibiliter, anime vero invisibiliter a Spiritu sancto imprimitur.* Date: ca. 1253.

of Confirmation. Some, he states, see it in the *inunctio exterior*, others in a certain *character* resulting from it.⁴⁹

In all these discussions, there is a latent conflict between *sacramentum* as visible *signum* or *forma* and *sacramentum* as lasting reality. The fact that, in the last quarter of the twelfth century, *sacramentum* was principally considered to signify a lasting spiritual effect, reveals that *sacramentum* as visible element or action had actually been superseded by *sacramentum* or *baptismus* as reality that perseveres and cannot be lost. The opposition to both the *sacramentum-aqua* and *sacramentum-actio* theories, shows strikingly that the very definition of *sacramentum* was at stake.⁵⁰

The hopelessness of Peter Lombard's position could hardly be evidenced more impressively than by the following truly desperate "interpretation", recorded by Hugh of St. Cher: *Baptismus est tinctio i.e. karakter tinctione collatus.*⁵¹

The classroom disputes that went on were temperamental and bitter, as can be gathered from some rather unusual remarks in the otherwise calm literary style of twelfth century treatises. A canonist tells us that the "simpletons" who believe that *character* is a sign (*signum*) on the face or on the body, do not even realize what *character* means.⁵² Sicard of Cremona (d. 1215), who commented on Gratian's *Decretum* before the year 1181, appears no less annoyed at the great variety of theories;⁵³ and as late as 1186, the author of *Summa Lipsiensis* shared Sicard's irritation.⁵⁴ Magister Martinus, as we have seen, was equally averse to subtleties and improprieties. All these scholars continued to use *sacramentum* as external action or internal and lasting reality.

More serious than this understandable aversion to subtleties was the almost inevitable criticism directed at the definition of *sacramentum*. In his own way, Hugh of St. Victor had already undermined the position of *sacramentum* as *sacrae rei signum*. Ps-Peter of Poitiers took up the same critical attitude: *Non est diffinitio sed quedam assignatio.*⁵⁵ A later glossator agreed,⁵⁶ while another scholar went as far as to deny that it could even be called *descriptio*.⁵⁷

Sacramentum as visible *forma* was exposed to similar objections.⁵⁸ Writing before 1190, Huguccio tells us that, in his time, some scholars declared it was only an "*unsatisfactory assignatio*".⁵⁹ The following considerations led to this conclusion: the Body of Christ is invisible and, therefore, not a *sacramentum*. To this, Huguccio relates, they reply that it is visible to the Saints in heaven and, in the life hereafter, will become visible to the eyes of our bodies. Huguccio presses on: But how about the *character* of Baptism which is a *sacramentum* and yet invisible? Answer: For that reason they say that it is not a definition.⁶⁰

In speaking of the Eucharistic Body, Peter of Capua (d. 1214) made no such attempt to justify the designation *sacramentum*; yet, he arrived at the same

⁴⁹ A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 355.

⁵⁰ See, for instance, Prepositinus, *Summa*, Ms Erlangen, Lat. 353, fol. 49^v; *Aqua desinet esse qua iste baptizatur, et ablutio de quo-cumque intelligens sive active sive passive. Sed baptismus non desinit esse. Ergo baptismus nullum istorum est.* Peter of Capua, *Summa*, Ms Clm. 14508, fol. 57^v: *Prererea passio illa cras non erit in isto qui baptizatur. Ergo sacramentum baptismi non erit cras in isto.* More examples may be found in A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 356 f.

⁵¹ Ms Leipzig, Univ. Lat. 573, fol. 216^v quoted by H. Weisweiler, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, VIII (1936), 403.

⁵² *Summa Parisiensis*, Ms Bamberg, Can. 36 (P. II. 26), fol. 28^{rb}. Text also quoted by F. Gillmann, *Der Katholik*, XC (1910), 301. Date of *Summa*: 1160-1170.

⁵³ Ms Rouen, Lat. 710, fol. 61^{rb}: *Utrum*

baptismus sit actio vel passio vel ipsum elementum vel caracter vel si aliquid aliud, disputantium conflictui derelinguo.

⁵⁴ Ms. Leipzig, Lat. 986, fol. 232^r. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 359.

⁵⁵ H. Weisweiler, in *Beiträge*, Suppl. 3, 1 (1935), 379 and 386. According to Stephen of Tournai, *Summa in decretum*, ed. J. F. Schulte, p. 132, even Hugh of St. Victor's own definition is no better than a *descriptio*.

See also Archidiaconus (Guido de Bayo), *Super decretum*, ed. Lyons (1516), fol. 99^{va}.

⁵⁶ H. Weisweiler, *loc. cit.*, p. 379.

⁵⁷ H. Weisweiler, *ibid.*: *Non est descriptio sed potius quedam assignatio.*

⁵⁸ H. Weisweiler, *loc. cit.*, p. 386.

⁵⁹ In *decretum* D. 2, c. 32, de cons. Ms Paris, BN Lat. 3892, fol. 371^{ra}.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem.*

critical conclusion concerning the "definition" of *sacramentum*.⁶¹ He also qualifies *character* as *sacramentum*, although he teaches clearly that it is a spiritual accident⁶² and, as such, not visible. No less critical of the definition is an insertion made by a scribe who copied the *Sentences of Gandulphus*.⁶³

Before the last decade of the twelfth century, a theologian and a canonist made a very determined effort to settle the issue. Peter Cantor, the theologian, apparently tried to come to the rescue of his fellow theologian, Peter Lombard; Huguccio, the canonist, attempted to salvage all the conflicting issues under one common denominator, the word *sacramentum*. Huguccio failed, but the canonical literature of the thirteenth century is filled with his ideology and terminology. Through the canonical *Glossa ordinaria* on Gratian, as we have seen, the canonists labored under Huguccio's truly grandiose loyalty to the past, until they conceded the crown to the great scholastic theologians. One can hardly conceive a more generous compromise than that which is contained in the following sentence, written by Huguccio before 1190:

Notandum tria esse in baptismo quorum quodlibet est sacramentum et dicitur baptismus, scilicet aqua, que est visible sacramentum ut in presenti c. (D. 4, c. 1, de cons.) et I, q. I Detrahe (c. 54); et ablutio exterior facta sub forma baptizandi a Christo instituta; et character quidam dominicus.⁶⁴

In other words, both expressions, *sacramentum* and *baptismus*, could be used (1) of the water, qualified as *visible sacramentum*, (2) of the exterior washing, and (3) of *character*. To settle the question regarding the philosophical categories, Huguccio decides: the water is a substance; the external washing a *passio philosophica*; *character* a *qualitas dominica*.⁶⁵ Besides *sacramentum*, Huguccio also uses *signaculum* to designate the lasting divine imprint on the soul.⁶⁶ The same terminology is applied to Confirmation, Holy Orders⁶⁷ and, in general, to any *sacramentum* in which grace is conferred.⁶⁸ Huguccio's exposition indicates that his concept of *sacramentum* as lasting effect is derived from St. Augustine.⁶⁹

In the more strictly theological works of Huguccio's time we find similar tendencies, though less tolerance. To a certain Magister Ernaldus is attributed the doctrine that there are three *sacraenta* in Baptism: water, washing, *character*. Water and washing are just *sacraenta*, because they signify in a wide, vague sense. *Character*, however, is the *sacramentum* of Baptism for, being imprinted upon the soul just as grace is, *character* has a greater resemblance to grace than water.⁷⁰

Similarly, Prepositinus (d. 1210) points out that, in the *sacramentum* of Baptism, three things are considered: the water which signifies and passes; the seal which signifies and remains; grace which is signified. All three are called Baptism, though only the seal is called Baptism in the proper sense. The seal

⁶¹ A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 363.

⁶² A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 362.

⁶³ *Sent.* IV, 91; ed. J. von Walter, p. 463: *Sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma. Hoc autem secundum partem tantum assignatum videtur, cum non omni hoc convenit sacramento. Est enim corpus Christi non solum sacrum secretum sed etiam sacrae rei signum et ita est sacramentum.*

⁶⁴ *Summa in decretum* D. 4, c. 1, de cons. Ms Paris, BN Lat. 3892, fol. 384^{va}.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem.* Cf. F. Gillmann, *Der Katholik*, XC (1910), 305 ff.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁶⁷ Regarding Confirmation, see *In decretum* D. 5, c. 1 ff., de cons. (fol. 398^{ra}). Concerning

Holy Orders see *In decretum* C. 1, q. 1, c. 97 (fol. 118^{vb}-119^{rb}) and C. 32, q. 7, c. 2 (fol. 317^{ra}).

⁶⁸ Huguccio's influence on the later canonical commentators can hardly be overestimated, but it would lead us too far to make a detailed study of the available canonical literature.

⁶⁹ See the references to the Augustinian extracts in C. 1, q. 1, c. 97 and D. 4, c. 41, de cons. in Huguccio's comment on D. 4, c. 1, de cons. (fol. 384^{ra}).

⁷⁰ *Notula* of Ms Vat., Reg. Lat. 411, 411, fol. 63^r. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 359. See also Landgraf, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1939) 40 f.

is meant when the *auctoritates* say that Baptism cannot be lost;⁷¹ the water is meant when they call Baptism ~~in~~visible *forma* of invisible grace.⁷²

A similar opinion is expressed by an anonymous *Glossa*. In order to confirm the permanence of the seal, the author cites St. Augustine: *Illa nota magis adheret quam alia corporalis nota.*⁷³ The glossator slightly modifies Prepositinus' view by saying that the seal is "more properly" called Baptism than water and washing.⁷⁴ The same moderation is exercised by Guido of Orcheles.⁷⁵

Peter Cantor (d. 1197) took an altogether different view, but found no followers. Baptism, he teaches, is something that arises from four components: water, word, the minister's intention, and the recipient's immersion. This something may be classified as *qualitas* and lasts only as long as the ritual action. During this brief period of inherence, it imprints upon the soul an everlasting *character*.⁷⁶ It is then accurate to say that, according to Peter Cantor, Baptism or its *sacramentum* is in the baptized, but does not last longer than the actual administration; that which lasts is neither Baptism nor its *sacramentum*, it is a certain everlasting imprint.

Robert Courson (d. 1219), who ascribes Peter Lombard's own definition of *sacramentum* to St. Augustine,⁷⁷ seriously questions, "together with Cantor", the definability of divine *sacra*menta such as Baptism and matrimony. He openly denies that Baptism is the *sacramentum* which is described as visible *forma*, image and cause of invisible grace. It is rather the resultant of three factors: form, element, and intention. Hence it is a *character* or seal of the Christian religion in the baptized whereby he becomes a member of the Church and is distinguished from unbelievers.⁷⁸

Thus both Peter Cantor and Courson place Baptism or its *sacramentum* in something invisible that results from visible components.⁷⁹ The former sees it in a *qualitas* of short duration; the latter identifies it with the imprint. Since an opinion similar to that of Courson is already recorded by Cantor,⁸⁰ we may rightly assume that Courson was not satisfied with Cantor's view that Baptism or its *sacramentum* lasts no longer than the external action. However, both agree that the current definition of Baptism could not be harmonized with what they thought to be Baptism or its *sacramentum*.

Is the Eucharistic Christ a *sacramentum*? Cantor does not hesitate to grant that He is. It is true that He cannot strictly be called visible *forma*, yet, figuratively speaking, He can be seen just as a hand can be seen under a glove.

⁷¹ A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, *Gregorianum* XXVII (1946), 357.

⁷² *Notula*, *loc. cit.*: Quando auctoritates dicunt quod baptismus est invisibilis gratie visibilis forma, intelligitur de aqua.

⁷³ Cf. Augustine, *Contra ep. Parmenianum* II, 13, 29; CSEL 51, 81. Previous sources do not make explicit mention of St. Augustine to confirm their doctrine. They do not ascribe to him the use of the word *character* as adopted in the second half of the twelfth century. Moreover, they refer only to *auctoritates* when expressing the Augustinian doctrine that "Baptism" or the *sacramentum* cannot be lost.

⁷⁴ Ms Bruxelles, Bibl. Roy. Lat. 1539, fol. 182^v. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 358.

⁷⁵ A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 360. Well worth noting is Guido's remark: Dicitur et gratia sacramentum.

⁷⁶ *Summa de sacramentis*; Ms Paris, BN Lat. 9593, fol. 152^r. Date: ca. 1190. Text may be found in F. Brommer, *Die Lehre vom sakramentalen Charakter in der Scholastik* (Paderborn, 1908), p. 15, n. 2 f. or in *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1938), 41.

⁷⁷ *Summa*; Ms Bruges, Lat. 247, fol. 101^v. A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 367 f. See also *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, X (1938), 42. Peter Cantor had already stated: Dicit enim Augustinus quod baptismus est intinctio in aqua verbo vite sanctificata.

⁷⁸ Fol. 101^v; Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 386; Brommer, *op. cit.*, p. 16, n. 2 f. Courson does admit that Baptism could be called visible form of invisible grace in as far as grace is conferred at its administration: Baptismus dicitur invisibilis gratie visibilis forma quia cum character ipsis imprimitur per visible elementum et formam verborum, gratia invisibiliter infunditur. Cf. *Gregorianum* XXI (1940), 39.

⁷⁹ See also the following *Notula* in Ms Vat. Lat. Reg. 411, fol. 63^v: Et dicit Cantor quod baptismus est quoddam signaculum quod inest anime, proveniens ex aqua et forma verborum cum intentione.

⁸⁰ Cf. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 368. Courson goes as far as to say that Baptism is called *ablutio* in view of its effect, the washing away of sin.

Properly speaking, only the glove can be seen and, in the same sense, only the external form of bread and wine can be perceived by our eyes.⁵¹ Courson, on the other hand, approaches the question with a very appropriate distinction, stating that *sacramentum* is sometimes used as *sacrae rei signum*, sometimes as *sacrum secretum*.⁵² In the Eucharist we find the word used in both meanings. The definition of *sacramentum* as *visible forma* is applicable only to the external species through which the mind perceives the "sacred thing hidden" under the form of bread and wine.⁵³ This solution was undoubtedly excellent, yet it failed to make an impression on Courson's contemporaries.

Geoffrey of Poitiers (d. 1231) accepts Courson's view on Baptism almost to the letter.⁵⁴ Worth noting is his observation that the impression of a baptismal *character* is a *signum* of grace, the *res principalior* of Baptism, and that, therefore, *character* is the *sacramentum* of Baptism.⁵⁵ If grace is described as *res principalior*, one may be entitled to ask whether, besides grace, there is another *res* in Baptism, as is obviously implied in the comparative *principalior*. Though no explanation is offered, we are here confronted, for the first time, with a concept of baptismal *res* other than grace, as we shall later find it in the distinction *sacramentum et res* in Baptism. At the same time, we may take notice of the fact that Geoffrey calls *character sacramentum*, because it is a *signum* of grace.

This development is remarkable, if we consider the traditional meaning of *signum* as visible, sensible sign. We met with traces of this evolution as early as *Magister Paganus* and clear indications of it in Prepositinus who classified the seal as *significans et manens*. It is quite possible that the idea of *character* as *signum* or *signaculum significans* is derived from the so-called definition of *character* as *signum sanctum* attributed to Ps-Dionysius. But since the definition does not yet appear in the writings of the present period,⁵⁶ it is more probable that the designation *character-signum* led to the discovery of a "definition" which neither St. Albert nor Duns Scotus recognized as authentic.⁵⁷

Aware of the new problems arising from this usage, William of Auxerre (d. ca. 1231) declares that *character* is a *signum non sensibile sed intelligibile* for both men and angels.⁵⁸ Herbert of Auxerre also accepts this doctrine as compatible with the definition of *sacramentum* as *visible forma* "inasmuch as

⁵¹ *Summa de sacramentis: De Eucharistia*, ed. E. Dumoulet, *Arch. doctr. et litt. du m. a.*, XVIII (1943), 235.

⁵² *Ms Bruges, Lat. 247: Sacramentum, ut predimimus, dicitur quandoque sacre rei signum, quandoque sacrum secretum i.e. ipsum signatum.* This solution is based on *Sentences IV, 1, 2* and was previously suggested by Huguccio commenting on *Decretum D. 2, c. 32, de cons. Ms Paris, BN Lat. 3892, fol. 371^{ra}*.

⁵³ *Hec definitio convenit sacramento secundum quod sacramentum dicitur signum cuius forma visibiliter exterius apparet significat sacrum secretum invisibilis gratie ibi esse i.e. Eucharistiam sub specie panis et vini.* We may note here a similar solution proposed by Rolandus Bandinelli: the definition *sacrae rei signum* applies to bread and wine; *visibile signum invisibilis gratie* refers to the union between Christ and the Church in Holy Communion the *sacramentum* of which is *visibilis Christi corporis assumptio*; *sacrum secretum* applies only to its *res* i.e. the Body of Christ. (*Sentences*, ed. Gietl, pp. 215 f.). On the other hand, a contemporary of Rolandus rejected such a solution with this argument: *Corpus Christi est*

gratia invisibilis, sed gratum visibile. Commentarius Poretanus in Primam Ep. ad Cor. ed. A. Landgraf, *Studi e Testi*, no. 117 (Vatican, 1945), pp. 173 f. Date: shortly after 1150.

⁵⁴ *Summa, Ms Bruges, Lat. 220, fol. 127^{ra}*. Geoffrey of Poitiers, a contemporary of William of Auxerre, is thought to have written ca. 1231.

⁵⁵ *Fol. 127^{ra}: Ablutio autem aque signum est ablutionis sordium. Sed impressio characteris est signum appositionis gratie, que est res principalior. Et ideo dico quod character est sacramentum in baptismo.*

⁵⁶ It is first mentioned and discussed by Ps-Alexander of Hales, *Summa* IV, q. 8, a. 1; St. Albert, *In Sent. IV*, d. 6, a. 4; St. Bonaventure, *In Sent. IV*, d. 6, p. 1, q. 1; St. Thomas, *In Sent. IV*, d. 4 q. 1, a. 2 and *Summa theol.* III, q. 63, a. 3.

⁵⁷ Geoffrey (*op. cit.*, fol. 136^{ra}) also speaks of *character distinctionis* (in Baptism), an expression which occurs in Robert Courson and Stephen Langton (Cf. F. Brommer, *op. cit.*, p. 18). This may be the beginning of the so-called *definitio magistralis characteris distinctio*.

⁵⁸ *Summa aurea*, lib. 4; ed. Paris (1500), fol. 249^v.

character is united to water in one *sacramentum*.⁸⁹ For that reason, Herbert concludes, it is a *sacramentum*, though not visible in itself.⁹⁰ Another disciple of this school of thought is Vincent of Beauvais.⁹¹

The difficulties that constantly beset our theologians were still increased when William of Auxerre introduced the "authority" of St. John Damascene in addition to St. Augustine, whose terminology had been at the bottom of this struggle to define the *sacramentum* of Baptism. William contends that only the unity of *ablutio aquae* and *character* constitutes one Baptism; they are one *sacramentum* by virtue of the same grace which they signify.⁹² In his belief that St. Augustine defined Baptism as *tinctio in aqua*, whereas St. John Damascene taught that Baptism is the seal or *character* itself,⁹³ William grants that both definitions are right—ne contradicant sibi Augustinus et Johannes Damascenus—in the same sense as, in the Eucharist, the *forma* of bread and wine as well as the one Body of Christ are called *sacramentum*. Typical and characteristic as this comparison may be, the real reason why William refuses to consider *character* by itself as Baptism or *sacramentum*, originated in the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma* and *signum*.⁹⁴ Herbert of Auxerre⁹⁵ and John of Treviso⁹⁶ adopted a similar line of argument.

William's teaching that the two components, *ablutio* and *character*, constitute but one *sacramentum* seemed acceptable to an anonymous glossator who makes use of William's idea to correct Prepositinus. He notes also that, in the *sacramentum* of Baptism, there are three things: water, which signifies and passes; *character* which remains but does not signify; and grace. Water and *character* constitute one *sacramentum* signifying grace. All three are occasionally called Baptism, though not in the proper sense.⁹⁷ Clearly opposed to the notion of *character* as *signum*, the glossator found no followers.

VI. SACRAMENTUM ET RES IN BAPTISM

The analogy between Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist which we have encountered on various occasions found its final evolution in the mind of Hugh

⁸⁹ *Summa, Ms Vat. Lat. 2674, fol. 107v.* Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 371: Similiter character est invisibilis gratie visibilis forma secundum quod unitur aqua in sacramento uno. Unde est sacramentum, licet secundum se non est visibilis. Et nota quod character est signum hominibus et angelis non sensibile sed intelligibile.

⁹⁰ Cf. also John of Treviso. Text in Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 371.

⁹¹ *Speculum historiale VIII, 20, ed. Venice (1494): Cui est signum character? Dicimus quod hominibus et angelis. Sed hominibus est intelligibile, non visibile.*

⁹² *Summa aurea, ed. Paris (1500), fol. 249v:* Nec sola aqua abluiens vel ablutio aquae est baptismus, nec solus character, sed illa duo ita quod utraque sunt unus baptismus et sunt unum sacramentum ab unitate gratie signata. The idea was occasioned by St. Jerome's comment on *Eph. iv, 5 (In Eph. II, 4, 5; PL 26, 528B)* and the solution borrowed from the Eucharistic doctrine concerning the two different species: the Eucharist, theologians taught, is but one *sacramentum*, because the two species are the *signum* of but one grace or *res*. Cf. Peter Cantor, *Summa: De Eucharistia*, ed. E. Dumcute, p. 235. Magister Martinus, quoted by Landgraf, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, VI (1934), 389.

⁹³ Fol. 249^{vb}: Dicit Johannes Damascenus quod . . . baptismus est sigillum et custodia et illuminatio. Ergo baptismus est sigillum: ergo est character. Cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa IV, 9; PG 94, 1122C.*

⁹⁴ Fol. 249^{va}: Dicunt alii quod baptismus est quoddam permanentes, scilicet character impressus anime ad distinguendum hominem baptisatum a non-baptisato sicut circumcisio distinguebat iudeum a gentili. Sed contra: Sacramentum est invisibilis gratie visibilis forma; sed character non est visibilis, cun sit tantum in anima et ita non est sacramentum, et ita non est baptismus. Fol. 249^{vb}: Item signum est quod per speciem quam ingerit sensibus etc. Ille character nullam speciem ingerit sensibus. Ergo ille character non est signum; ergo non est sacramentum; ergo non est baptismus. Item, si ille character est signum, ergo alicui est signum.

⁹⁵ *Summa, Ms Vat. Lat. 2674, fol. 107v.*

⁹⁶ *Ms Vat. Lat. 1187, fol. 58r.* Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 371.

⁹⁷ *Glossa, Ms Paris, BN Lat. 3572, fol. 104v:* Tria sunt in hoc sacramento, scilicet signans et non manens ut aqua; manens et non signans, scilicet character. Et hec duo sunt unum sacramentum et signat gratiam . . . Et nota quod quilibet istorum invenitur baptismum, sed improprie.

of St. Cher.⁹⁸ If we distinguish *sacramentum tantum*, *sacramentum et res*, and *res tantum* in the Blessed Eucharist, Hugh of St. Cher reasoned, the distinction could be put to good use in the clarification of the baptismal problems. Hence he is the first scholar to teach that *sacramentum tantum* is "the water sanctified by the word of life"; *res tantum* is the infusion of grace and the remission of sin; *sacramentum et res* is the baptismal *character*. All three current definitions of Baptism are right from a different point of view, though that of "St. Augustine"—Baptism is *aqua abluiens*—is "more proper" than the other two.⁹⁹ To the objection that *character* cannot justly be called *sacramentum* because it is not a visible *forma*, Hugh replies that *visibilis* could be taken to mean *sensibilis*, and that the definition is sufficiently safeguarded as long as at least one component is visible.¹⁰⁰ It had also been objected that *character* cannot be identified with Baptism, because the effect is distinct from its cause. The objection, Hugh retorts, is based on what is *sacramentum tantum*; hence, it cannot validly be raised against *charakter* or Christ's Body both of which are *sacmenta et res* rather than *sacramentum tantum*.¹ But how can *character* be called *signum*? Hugh replies: It is a *signum* for both men and angels; but for men only in the life hereafter.²

The *Glossa* called *Filia magistri* (1230-1245) is a faithful echo of Hugh's doctrine.³ To stress the momentous step of progress that resulted from the application of analogy, we may transcribe the comparison as found in an anonymous *Summa* of the same school:

Sicut species panis est proprie sacramentum eucharisticie, corpus Christi secundario, ita aqua in verbo vite sanctificata est proprie sacramentum, karakter vero secundario.⁴

According to Roland of Cremona, (ca. 1229-1235), the theory advanced by William of Auxerre was the common opinion of his day.⁵ Roland, however, rejects it on philosophical grounds. Philosophically speaking, he contends, water and *character* have nothing in common so as to constitute a unity, for water belongs to the category of substance, while *character* does not at all belong to the predicamental order of being: "this is the argument of Augustine, Aristotle, and of other philosophers." There are, in fact, two *sacmenta*; the *sacramentum* of Baptism, in the proper sense, is "the water sanctified by the word of life", as St. Augustine teaches saying *Accedit verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum*;⁶ the second *sacramentum* is the baptismal *character*. When St. John Damascene identified Baptism with *character*, he denominated the effect after its cause. Such denominations, Roland explains, are quite frequent. If we speak of Baptism as something lasting, we use Baptism in an equivocal sense,⁷ for Baptism is a transitory *sacramentum*; its lasting effect is another *sacramentum*, the imprinted mark.

Richard Fishacre (d. 1248) approaches the problem by a rather lengthy

⁹⁸ Hugh of St. Cher wrote his *Commentary on Sentences* ca. 1233-1243. He died in 1263.

⁹⁹ H. Weisweiler, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, VIII (1936), 403. The other two definitions are Baptism as *tinctio sive ablutio passio* and *character*. Like William of Auxerre, Hugh of St. Cher points out that the opposition to Baptism as *tinctio* is based on the fact that the action "passes quickly". Cf. F. Brommer, *op. cit.*, pp. 49 f.

¹⁰⁰ A. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 373: *Sacramentum dicitur visibilis forma, non quod ipsum sacramentum sit semper visibile, sed quia ipsum vel aliquid circa ipsum. Et ita est*

hic quia licet caracter non sit visibilis tamen aliquid circa ipsum visibile est, scilicet aqua et ipsum verbum. Visibile enim ibi ponitur pro sensibili quocumque sensu.

¹ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 373.

² *Ibidem.*

³ Cf. H. Weisweiler, *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.*, VIII (1936), 403.

⁴ H. Weisweiler, *loc. cit.*, 403.

⁵ Ms Paris, Maz. Lat. 795, fol. 81^v. Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 373.

⁶ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 374.

⁷ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 375.

etymological analysis of the word Baptism, and finally ends up with the admission that he sides with the definition of Hugh of St. Victor.⁸ He denies the permanence of Baptism as a confusion of Baptism with its effect which is the *res sacramenti* or *character*, unless *sacramentum* is used to designate the *signatum* rather than the *signum*.⁹ In other words, Fishacre admits that there is a *res sacramenti* or *character*, but he is not inclined to call it *sacramentum*. Only the consecrated water is the *signum* of Baptism; the actual washing is not a *signum*, but rather the use of a *signum*.¹⁰ This is also, as we shall see, St. Bonaventure's view, while Fishacre's attitude towards the terminology *character-sacramentum* will be adopted by Duns Scotus.

The revival of the Victorine concept of Baptism proves that the definition of *sacramentum* as material *signum* was far from being antiquated. The increasing influx of Aristotelian philosophy soon enabled scholars to make room for it within the Aristotelian system of causes. Faced with the traditional definitions of Baptism, Ps-Alexander of Hales justifies and classifies them all according to the order of causality, principally expressed in the respective definitions. The material cause of Baptism is given in the definition of Hugh of St. Victor; the formal cause is expressed in the definition of Baptism as *tinctio* which we owe to Peter Lombard¹¹ and "St. Augustine."¹² Dionysius and St. John Damascene defined the final cause, while the efficient cause is indicated in all definitions.¹³ It is to the material cause of Baptism that the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma* is applied.¹⁴

In connection with the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma*, St. Albert the Great again raises the objection that, considering the custom of designating the invisible baptismal *character* as *sacramentum*, the definition would not seem to be generally applicable.¹⁵ *Character*, he replies, is both *res* and *signum*. It is a *sacramentum* as *signum*, not as *res*. Although invisible in itself, it is visible in as far as it is related to an external action; thus, it is not a *sacramentum* by itself, but rather by reduction to the external *tinctio*.¹⁶ In analysing *sacramentum* as *signum*, St. Albert is broadminded, for he believes it to be quite in accordance with Lombard to understand it as sacred thing in the active as well as in the passive sense. Yet, since *signum* is really not *signatum*,¹⁷ he is inclined to think that there is a difference between *sacramentum* as *signum* and *sacramentum* as *res signata*.¹⁸

If then *character* is defined as *signum*¹⁹ or *sacramentum*, though only by reduction, the question arises: Of what is it a *signum*? St. Albert's answer is not new:

⁸ In *Sent.* IV, 3; Ms Vat. Ottob. Lat. 294, fol. 274v.

⁹ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 377. Richard alludes to *Sent.* IV, 1, 2; ed. Quaracchi (1916), p. 746.

¹⁰ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 378. Richard's remark that, according to "Hugeziim" (Huguccio), the word Baptism could be used in as many as four different senses (*aqua*, *tinctio*, *character*, *mundatio interior*), is quite accurate. Cf. F. Gillmann, *Der Katholik*, XC (1910), 309.

¹¹ *Sent.* IV, 3, 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 754.

¹² *Baptismus est tinctio in aqua verbo vite sanctificata*. The attribution of this definition to St. Augustine seems to date back to Peter Cantor.

¹³ Landgraf, *art. cit.*, 379 f. Cf. St. Albert, *In Sent.* IV, d. 3, a. 1; ed. Vivès, XXIX, pp. 55 ff.; St. Thomas, *In Sent.* IV, d. 3, a. 1; ed. M. F. Moos (Paris, 1947), pp. 109 ff.

¹⁴ *Summa* IV, q. 11, m. 7.

¹⁵ In *Sent.* IV, d. 1, a. 5, ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 14B.

¹⁶ Ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 14B: Secundum autem quod (character) accipitur ut signum sic est sacramentum: et tunc, licet sit in se invisibilis, tamen relatus ad actionem exteriorem ipse est visibilis. Ipse enim secundum se non est sacramentum, sed potius reductus in tinctiōne exteriore. Cf. H. D. Simonin et G. Meersman, *De sacramentorum efficientia apud theologos Ord. Praed.* (Rome, 1936), p. 52.

¹⁷ Cf. *Sent.* IV, 1, 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 746: Sacramentum . . . sacrum signans et sacrum signatum.

¹⁸ Ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 16A.

¹⁹ In *Sent.* IV, d. 6, a. 4; ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 123A: Character est signum sanctum etc. He accepts this definition as approved "not by the Saint (Ps-Dionysius), but by the doctors." The second definition is: Character est distinctio etc. and became known as *definitio magistralis*. Cf. St. Thomas, *In Sent.* IV, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, n. 40; ed. Moos, p. 153.

Character is a *signum*²⁰ or cause of grace,²¹ founded on a visible cause.²² Baptism "in the most proper sense" is the baptismal *character*. For that reason, the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma* must be applied to Baptism as it is attributed to *character*, viz. Baptism is visible, not in itself, but in relation to the external *tinctio*.²³ Under no circumstances at all can grace be called *sacramentum*, for grace does not belong to its essence.²⁴

Is the true Body of Christ a *sacramentum*? Yes, it is *sacramentum et res*; it is cause and sign of the unity of Christ's mystical Body; it is signified and effected by bread and wine in conjunction with the transubstantiating form.²⁵ This affirmation is made in dependence on Lombard and Hugh of St. Victor,²⁶ but St. Albert leaves it to his reader to answer the objection, how it could be a *sacramentum* and still be invisible.²⁷

In his *Commentary on Sentences*, St. Thomas offers similar solutions.²⁸ Baptismal *character* and the true Body of Christ are *sacraenta* only in conjunction with the external, sensible signs.²⁹ The former is defined as *signum sanctum* by (Ps-) Dionysius³⁰ because it is signified and effected by a *sacramentum*;³¹ the latter is rightly called *sacramentum* because it is visible "in the species that cover it".³²

The exposition of this doctrine in the *Summa theologiae* is substantially the same. Somewhat startling is the statement that *sacramentum* and *sacrae rei signum* are convertible concepts.³³ The purpose of a *signum*, we learn, is to lead man from the known to the unknown.³⁴ *Character* is a *signum* as far as it is impressed through a *sensibile sacramentum*. The explanation or justification of the word *signum*, proposed by St. Thomas, has puzzled students of theology, since it would only seem to prove that the external action deserves the designation. St. Thomas writes: *Per hoc scitur enim baptismali charactere insignitus, quod est ablatus aqua sensibili . . .* Without expressing his personal view on the matter, Cajetan observes: *Haec responsio multis non facit satis.*³⁵ The sacramental *character*, as Thomas points out, is *res* with regard to the *sacramentum exterius*: it is *sacramentum* with regard to its ultimate effect. As *sacramentum*,

²⁰ In *Sent.* IV, d. 6, a. 4, ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 126B: *Character est signum naturale gratiae.*

²¹ In *Sent.* IV, d. 6, a. 8; ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 134B: *Character est causa gratiae hoc modo quo signum sacramentale est causa, scilicet disponens in subiecto.* Cf. William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* IV, Tr. 3, c. 2: *Est ille character causa materialis gratiae.* See also Hugh of St. Cher, quoted by F. Brommer, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

²² In *Sent.* IV, d. 6, a. 4; ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 127A: *Character non fundatur in elemento materiali sicut in subiecto sed sicut in causa inducente ipsum.* Et hoc sufficit ad hoc ut sit signum sacramentale. Cf. B. T. D'Argenlieu, 'La doctrine d'Albert le Grand sur le caractère sacramental', *Rev. Thom.*, XXXIII (1928), 295 ff.

²³ In *Sent.* IV d. 3, a. 1; ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 58A: *Propriissime, meo iudicio, character baptismus dicitur. Et ad objectum dicendum, quod visibilis est non in se sed in comparatione ad tinctiōnem a qua imprimitur vel in qua imprimitur a Deo.* Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* III, q. 63, a. 2, ad 4.

²⁴ Ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 58A.

²⁵ In *Sent.* IV d. 8, a. 11, a. 11; ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 206B.

²⁶ Ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 206A.

²⁷ This is the objection: Non est visibile vel sensibile. Cum igitur sacramentum sit visi-

bile vel corporale elementum, extrinsecus oculis suppositum etc., videtur non esse sacramentum. Ed. Vivès, XXIX, p. 205B.

²⁸ See, for instance, In *Sent.* IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, n. 18, 3; ed. Moos, p. 10: *Character baptismalis est sacramentum et res, ut infra dicetur; et similiter corpus Christi verum existens in altari. Sed neutrum istorum est visibilis forma. Ergo definitio non est bene data.*

²⁹ Op. cit. n. 41; ed. Moos, p. 14: *Character baptismalis et corpus Christi verum non dicuntur sacramenta nisi secundum quod conjunguntur exterioribus signis sensibili-*bus.

³⁰ In *Sent.* IV, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, n. 39; ed. Moos, p. 152.

³¹ Op. cit. n. 42; ed. Moos, p. 154.

³² In *Sent.* IV, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, n. 21; ed. Moos, p. 308. St. Thomas suggests two solutions: *Omne sacramentum est visibile, non tamen oportet quod quidquid est in sacramento sit visibile . . . Videntur species, sed non videtur corpus Christi.* Vel dicendum quod est visibile non in se sed in speciebus quae ipsum tegunt, sicut et substantia aliorum corporum videtur mediante colore.

³³ *Summa theol.* III, q. 60, a. 2, *Sed Contra.*

³⁴ *Summa* III, q. 60, a. 2c. Cf. q. 60, a. 4c and In *Sent.* IV, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; ed. Moos, p. 13.

³⁵ *Summa* III, q. 63, a. 1, ad. 2.

he goes on to say, *character* is a *signum* of invisible grace which is conferred in the *sacramentum*.³⁶

It is difficult to decide whether St. Thomas was aware of the historical background of the distinction *sacramentum et res*, but it is certain that the Augustinian usage of *sacramentum* as lasting consecration was not unknown to him.³⁷ In his discussion on the general definition of *sacramentum* as *signum sensibile*, no explanation is given to justify the distinction implied in the expression *sacramentum exterius*.

St. Bonaventure maintains that the definitions of Baptism offered by Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard concur in as far as both are founded on *sacramentum* as *sacra rei signum*, but he contends that the baptismal water is more properly called *signum* or *sacramentum significans*, whereas the washing itself may be designated as *sacramentum sanctificans*.³⁸ Apparently in dependence on Ps-Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure raises the objection that Baptism is something permanent: *baptismus manet*;³⁹ he replies that Baptism in the proper sense—*secundum quod dicit sacramentum exterius*—perseveres only in its effect which is sometimes called Baptism.⁴⁰ This is his explanation:

Unde notandum quod cum in baptismo sint tria: quoddam quod est *sacramentum* tantum ut elementum visible; quoddam quod est rest tantum sicut gratia curans; quoddam quod est *sacramentum et res sacramenti* ut *character*; de re sacramenti (*baptismus*) dicitur communiter, de re et sacramento dicitur proprie, de sacramento autem dicitur magis proprie, sed de lotione adhuc magis proprie, de elemento autem sub tali actu maxime proprie.⁴¹

The exposition leaves considerable latitude for the use of the word *baptismus*, while, as in the case of St. Thomas, the expression *sacramentum exterius* points to an “interior *sacramentum*” as reflected in the distinction *sacramentum et res*. Again, it is worth noting that the distinction is not discussed in connection with the definition of *sacramentum*.⁴²

Before we proceed to a study of Scotus’ nomenclature, we may note that, by the middle of the thirteenth century, the distinction *sacramentum et res* was applied to all sacraments.⁴³ Thus St. Albert writes of Extreme Unction:

Non imprimet characterem. Et tamen bene concedendum puto quod tria sunt in eo sicut in quolibet alio sacramento. Sed non est necessarium quod medium quod est *res et signum* sit *character*.⁴⁴

This “middle thing” he describes as “a certain spiritual disposition”, while St. Thomas characterizes it as a “certain inward devotion which is a spiritual anointing.”⁴⁵ St. Bonaventure also speaks of *res et signum* and defines it as *ipsa*

³⁶ Cf. *Summa III*, q. 63, a. 3, ad 2. St. Albert, *In Sent. IV*, d. 6, a. 4 and a. 8, ed. Vivès, XXIX, pp. 126B and 134B.

³⁷ Cf. *Summa III*, q. 66, a. 9c; Augustine, *Contra ep. Parmeniani II*, 13, 29; CSEL 51, 81. See also *Summa III* q. 63, a. 5 Sed contra and ad 2.

³⁸ Cf. *In Sent. IV*, d. 3, p. 1, q.1; ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 65B.

³⁹ Op. cit., obj., 4; ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 65A.

⁴⁰ Op. cit., ad 4; ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 66A.

⁴¹ Ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 66A-B.

⁴² Cf. *In Sent. IV*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2; ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 13 f.

⁴³ Identical only in appearance, such a generalization is found in *Sententiae Parisienses* (1139-1141), ed. Landgraf, 40 f.: Notandum quod in omni sacramento est sacramentum

et *res sacramenti*. What the author had in mind was the distinction visible *sacramentum* and invisible *res*. Sicut in baptismo est aqua et ablution exterior, que est *sacramentum*, et est ablution interior, que est *res sacramenti*, similiter in sacramento altaris est *sacramentum ipsum corpus Christi*, *res sacramenti corpus ecclesie*. In comparing the baptismal *sacramentum* to the Eucharistic *sacramentum*, not as visible species but as Christ’s Body, the author obviously changed to the distinction invisible *sacramentum* and invisible *res*.

⁴⁴ Cf. *In Sent. IV*, d. 23, a. 19; ed. Vivès, XXX, p. 26B.

⁴⁵ Cf. *In Sent. IV*, d. 23, a. 2, q. 2, sol. 3; ed. Vivès, XI, p. 7.

in anima devotionis excitatio, "which is nothing else but a spiritual anointing."⁴⁶

It is interesting to see how this doctrine developed. It originated from a decretal of Innocent III, found in *Decr. Greg.*, L. 1, T. 15, c. 1, where Innocent distinguishes between *unctio exterior, materialis, visibilis* and *unctio interior, spiritualis, invisibilis*. The former is the *signum* of the latter. Pope Innocent then states:

Unctio vero invisibilis et interior non solum est signum sed etiam sacramentum, quia si digne sumitur, vel agit vel auget absque dubio quod designat.

If we compare the Pope's terminology with that of Peter Lombard, the change of terminology is at once apparent. In dependence on *Summa Sententiarum*, Lombard distinguishes only *unctio exterior* as *sacramentum* and *unctio interior* as *res sacramenti*.⁴⁷ In describing the invisible anointing as *signum* and *sacramentum*, Innocent adopts a terminology which he did not find in Lombard's exposition of the matter. Whether the Eucharistic *sacramentum et res* guided him is left to conjecture, though not improbable. The canonical *Glossa ordinaria*⁴⁸ only refers the reader to *Decretum D. 4, c. 1, de cons.* where the canonists usually express their view on *sacramentum*. However, at a later date, a canonist brought the doctrine into line with the triple distinction as follows:

Nota quia hic tria reperiuntur in unctione, scilicet forma visibilis; contritio i.e. gratia; et unitas i.e. salus. Primum est sacramentum tantum; secundum est sacramentum et res; tertium est res tantum.

To meet the difficulty that the invisible anointing should be called *signum*, our canonist has recourse to the Blessed Eucharist:

Salus, cuius signum est illa unctio interior et invisibilis (sed) non est signum apparens sicut non appetit visibiliter veritas corporis Christi et tamen est ibi veritas que est sacramentum et res.⁴⁹

This example shows again that, in the last analysis, the distinction *sacramentum et res* was felt to have its most solid support in the Eucharistic doctrine.⁵⁰

Duns Scotus (d. 1307) discarded the distinction. He defines *character* as *quoddam spirituale impressum*,⁵¹ and rejects the definitions attributed to Ps-Dionysius and St. John Damascene.⁵² Remarkable is his assertion that St. Augustine never taught *character* as *proxima res* of Baptism. In Baptism, he affirms, St. Augustine only distinguishes between *sacramentum—hoc est aliquid visibile extra*—and *res* i.e. grace.⁵³ The significance of this statement lies in the fact that, in studying the works of St. Augustine, Scotus read St. Augustine without realizing the wide meaning of *sacramentum*. The definition of *sacramentum* as something *visibile extra* had become so dominant in his mind as to exclude *sacramentum* as lasting effect. Since the distinction of a baptismal *sacramentum et res* does not yet occur in Peter Lombard, Scotus could easily avoid debating the issue; where the *Sentences* do contain the distinction, Scotus describes the Eucharistic Body

⁴⁶ In *Sent. IV*, d. 23, a. 1, q. 1; ed. Quaracchi IV, p. 589B. See also Ps-Albert (Hugo Argentoratensis), *Comp. theol.* VI, 35, ed. Vives (Works of St. Albert) XXXIV, p. 232B. Date: ca. 1265.

⁴⁷ *Sent. IV*, 23, 3; ed. cit., p. 890.

⁴⁸ Ed. Lyons (1584), fol. 277.

⁴⁹ See A. de Poorter and J. Brys, in *Rev. d'Hist. Eccl.*, XXVI (1930), 617. The author of this *glossa* is not known.

⁵⁰ In keeping with certain tendencies, especially popular among canonists since the days of Huguccio, of considering every in-

ternal *sacramentum* as lasting *character*, Henry, Cardinal of Ostia, offers this solution: Ego tamen sic expono: Non solum est signum, scilicet invisibilis gratiae, sed etiam est sacramentum i.e. sacramentalis character qui semel admissus numquam amittitur. *Summa aurea*, ed. Venice (1542), fol. 35^{ra}. Date: ca. 1253.

⁵¹ In *Sent. IV*, d. 6, q. 9; ed. Vivès, XVI, p. 597B.

⁵² Ed. Vivès, XVI, p. 599 f.

⁵³ Ed. Vivès, XVI, p. 600B.

only as *signatum*.⁵⁴ To a certain extent, he is opposed to the idea of designating *character* as *signum*, unless it is qualified as *signum invisible*.⁵⁵ He likewise frowns upon the usage of applying the word *sacramentum* to *ordo* instead of *ordinatio*.⁵⁶ The reason for this opposition is obvious: *ordo* cannot be classified as *signum sensibile*; hence it cannot be called *sacramentum*, unless we take the word to mean an invisible *signum* as it is used in the distinction *sacramentum et res*.

If we consider the terminology, not the doctrine, Scotus carried the definition of *sacramentum* as something *visibile extra* to its ultimate conclusion, at the expense of a terminology which was too firmly established to yield to his influence.⁵⁷ Likewise, the definition of *character* as *signum* outlived his criticism and was finally adopted in the official language of the Church,⁵⁸ although it is only a *signum* by denomination⁵⁹ just as *character* is still called *sacramentum* by denomination.⁶⁰

VII. CONCLUSION

Berengar and Scotus—*termini a quo* and *ad quem* of our study—have one momentous argument in common: both carry the definition of *sacramentum* to a rigorous conclusion. *Sacramentum*, they insist, is only the visible outward sign, whereas *res* is its corresponding invisible inward reality. By the time of Scotus, *res* had taken on a twofold meaning: it signified either a reality distinct from grace, commonly designated as *sacramentum et res*, or spiritual realities such as sanctifying grace.

When Berengar advanced the idea that *sacramentum* signifies only the visible aspect of the two Christian mysteries which he discussed, his contemporaries, both friends and foes, were confronted with the alternative either of accepting his definitions with his application of them, or of rejecting both. By his heretical aberration, it is true, Berengar had jeopardized his position but, in all fairness to an opponent, it should be granted that his error did not result from his notion of *sacramentum*; it resulted from his false analogy which led him to argue that, under the words of consecration, the substances of bread and wine remained as much unchanged as the substance of water.

In point of terminology, Berengar's contemporaries were entirely free to submit to his imposition. An imposition it was because, despite the fact that definitions of *sacramentum* such as *sacrae rei signum* were generally known and accepted long before Berengar was born, it had not entered a theologian's mind actually to restrict or limit its meaning in the Berengarian fashion.

Confronted with Berengar's challenge, the early anti-Berengarians, especially Lanfranc, refused to accept the limitation. They had at least as much right to reject the restriction as Berengar had in advocating it. In their favor was an

⁵⁴ *In Sent.* IV, d. 8, q. 1; ed. Vivès, XVII, p. 8B.

⁵⁵ *In Sent.* IV, d. 6, q. 9; ed. Vivès, XVI, p. 606B.

⁵⁶ *In Sent.* IV, d. 24, q. 1, schol.; ed. Vivès, XIX, p. 76A: *Ordo non est sacramentum, quia omne sacramentum est signum sensibile et ordo, ut dictum est, quidam gradus est spiritualis. Tamen accipiendo sacramentum pro signo invisibili sicut aliud dicitur sacramentum et res, hoc modo potest dici sacramentum. Quid ergo est sextum sacramentum? Dico quod ordinatio.*

⁵⁷ P. Minges, J. D. Scotti *doctrina phil. et theologica II* (Quaracchi, 1930), p. 508 writes: *In quolibet sacramento est distinguendum inter "sacramentum, hoc est aliud extra, et rem sacramenti, scilicet gratiam."* On the other hand, C. Frassen, *Scotus Academicus IX* (Rome, 1901), p. 15 accepts the distinc-

tion *res ac sacramentum simul* without further discussion.

⁵⁸ Council of Trent, *Sess. 7 can. de sacram. in genere*, c. 9.

⁵⁹ See the explanation given in *Coll. Salmant. Cursus theologicus* (Paris, 1881), XVII, p. 426B: *Character autem non est signum formaliter sed materialiter sive res quae denominatur signum. Cf. Suarez, In Summam theol. III, q. 60, a. 3; disp. I, s. 1, n. 2; ed. Paris (1877), XX, p. 8.*

⁶⁰ According to Paolo Sarpi (Pietro Soave), *Historia del Concilio Tridentino VII* (2nd ed., Geneva, 1629), p. 605 f., the Franciscan Pietro Ramirii, a Scotist, objected to the custom of calling *ordo* a *sacramentum*. However, his contention that the visible *ordinatio* is the *sacramentum* met with great opposition and his motion to substitute *ordinatio* for *ordo* was defeated.

immemorable custom; in his favor the alleged authority of St. Augustine. I say the alleged authority for, although undeniably the source of Berengar's definitions, the works of St. Augustine testify to a usage of *sacramentum* much wider than the definitions would warrant. In addition to this fact, post-Augustinian writers, up to the days of Berengar, had continued this usage without too much inconvenience in expressing their thought or making it understood by their readers. In retrospect, we may admit that it hampered doctrinal progress to some extent, though we should also grant that, just as Rome was not built in a day, progressive penetration of revealed truth was not a matter to be accomplished in a generation.

Berengar's dialectics proved to be a blessing in disguise, a providential challenge to clarify a term that had been used and, in a sense, abused to serve too many purposes; a natural phenomenon in a religion whose very foundation was called *sacramentum Incarnationis* and whose most sacred truth revered as *sacramentum Trinitatis*. If this terminology is out of use today, it is so as the result of a process in which Berengar holds a pivotal position.

The writers who did not bow to the authority of Berengar's definitions had to choose between St. Augustine as interpreted by Berengar, on the one hand, and the traditional usage, on the other. To mention the most influential opponent, Lanfranc decided to follow tradition. After rejecting Berengar's limitation of the word to visible outward signs, he was indeed free to speak of Christ's Flesh and Blood or of Christ himself as *sacramentum*. No longer free to do so, logically speaking, would be those who might accept Berengar's definitions. We have seen, however, that those definitions were accepted together with Lanfranc's wider usage of the word. The scholar who assembled the material that contained the future complications was no other than Ivo of Chartres who, in his collection of source material concerning the Blessed Eucharist, had gathered freely from both Berengar and Lanfranc without realizing that, logically speaking, one cannot accept Berengar's definition of *sacramentum* and, at the same time, perpetuate Lanfranc's usage of calling the invisible Body of Christ a *sacramentum*. Sooner or later, conflict was certain to arise.

By the time the inconsistency was actually felt, the formula *sacramentum et res*, which the author of *Summa Sententiarum* had coined to distinguish the visible *sacramentum tantum* in the Blessed Eucharist from the invisible *sacramentum* of Our Lord's Eucharistic Body, was so firmly established in the theological vocabulary that critical theologians tried to explain, not to abolish it. When Courson, for instance, declared that the Eucharistic *sacramentum et res* was equivalent to *sacramentum* as *sacrum secretum*, he was as close to the truth as those were far away from it who maintained that it was in full accord with the definition of *sacramentum* as visible *forma* or *signum*, because the Eucharistic Christ could be seen by angels and, in the life hereafter, by human eyes. At the same time, it proved to be a fruitless effort to make the Eucharistic *sacramentum et res* the starting point of criticism directed at the current definitions, for in sacramental theology few words were harder to explain away than Peter Lombard's terse statement: *Nunc agitur de sacramento secundum quod est signum.⁶¹* *Sacramentum* as *signum* or *sacrum signans*, not *sacrum signatum*, was the sole object of the fourth Book of *Sentences*.

The baptismal *sacramentum et res* which appeared in the theological terminology about a century after the *Summa Sententiarum* had a rather stormy history. Only vaguely contained in the much more ancient distinction of *sacramentum* in contrast to *res*, the notion that the *sacramentum* of Baptism is a lasting inward reality became so dominant towards the end of the twelfth century, that the external *signum* was considered to be little more than a contri-

⁶¹ *Sent.* IV, 1, 2; *ed. cit.*, p. 746.

buting factor in the constitution of the internal and lasting *sacramentum* or *character*. In other words, that which we call effect of Baptism was held to be its formal cause, or the *sacramentum* of Baptism itself. If later generations contended that, in the formula *sacramentum et res*, *sacramentum* was only a denomination the justification of which was to be seen in its relationship of effect to cause, they read history backwards. Their ancestors were willing to grant that the external *signum* deserved the name Baptism or *sacramentum* in keeping with the traditional definitions, but *sacramentum* "in the proper sense"—as many of them told us—was considered something internal and lasting. We saw how seriously they endeavoured to prove and justify it by analogy with the Eucharistic *sacramentum et res*. We saw, also, how the very concept of *sacramentum* as *signum* became questionable.

At the root of this conflict was what may be called St. Augustine's equivocal use of *sacramentum* and *baptismus*, although the very fact that thirteenth century writers ascribed to St. John Damascene, rather than to St. Augustine, the definition of Baptism as internal imprint provides striking evidence that the real source of the dispute was not clearly perceived. St. Thomas only echoes what seems to have been the common opinion of his day when he affirms that St. Augustine defined Baptism as *tinctio in aqua verbo vitae sanctificata*.⁶²

While St. Albert, as we have seen, sided with St. John Damascene, St. Thomas sided with "St. Augustine" and, in doing so, restored the harmony between the definition of *sacramentum* as *signum* and the definition of Baptism as visible *ablutio*.⁶³ And while St. Thomas held that "in the present matter it is not necessary to follow Hugh of St. Victor", his contemporary, St. Bonaventure, was more than inclined towards the Victorine concept when he declared that Baptism "*maxime proprio*" is the material element "under the act of washing".⁶⁴

Hence St. Albert, St. Thomas, and St. Bonaventure represent three different schools of thought; yet, all of them made the definition of *sacramentum* as *signum* their basic point of departure. They accepted the formula *sacramentum et res* and, since they did not coin or invent it, interpreted it as best they could to fit it into the general frame work of sacramentology. With the same reverence, they adopted the definition of *character* as *signum*, although they knew that the Augustinian concept of *signum* could only be applied to it through the *sensibile sacramentum* as intermediary.⁶⁵

In conclusion, we may state again that the Berengarian definitions of *sacramentum* finally achieved their triumph in the terminology of Scotus, while the formula *sacramentum et res* is a silent tribute to the wider terminology of the Fathers.

⁶² In *Sent.* IV, d. 3, a. 1; ed. Moos, p. 112.

IV, p. 66.

⁶³ *Summa theol.* III, q. 66, a. 1.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Summa theol.* III, q. 63, a. 1, ad 2.

⁶⁵ In *Sent.* IV, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1; ed. Quaracchi,

The Meaning of All the Saints

JOHN HENNIG

DOM QUENTIN¹ has pointed out that the classical accounts of Ado and Baronius² on the origin of the feast of All the Saints scarcely explain when and why the commemoration of Our Lady and all the martyrs³ on May 13th was extended to a commemoration of All the Saints, and when and why, besides this commemoration, that on November 1st was instituted. It is clear that the extension of the commemoration to all the Saints, its transfer to November 1st and its spread to all parts of the Church are unrelated to each other. The *Romanum Parvum* knows only the *festivitas sanctorum* on May 13th. With regard to this commemoration, it uses exactly the same words which Ado applied to the commemoration on November 1st, previous to its extension to Gaul and Germany⁴ and subsequently to the whole Church, saying that it was *celebris et generalis Romae*.

A mediaeval tradition had it that the observance of this commemoration on May 13th was found inconvenient, because it was difficult to obtain sufficient victuals for the numerous pilgrims who came for it to the Eternal City.⁵ This tradition obviously fails to appreciate the climatic conditions of Italy and to explain just why November 1st was chosen instead. Baronius, on the other hand, suggested that November 1st was chosen because of the feast which, according to Isidore of Seville,⁶ used to be observed on this day. We shall see that the first records of the observance of the feast of All the Saints on November 1st are found in parts of the world far away from Rome, and that precisely in those parts the date of November 1st had a very definite significance.

If it was not until the time of Louis the Pious that this feast was celebrated outside the city of Rome, in what sense, then, had it been previously *generalis*? Dom Quentin said that the word *generalis* can be applied to both the object of this feast and its celebration. He felt that the latter appeared to be "the more obvious interpretation",⁷ but he did not state what was the exact meaning of

¹ *Les martyrologes historiques* (Paris, 1908), pp. 363 ff. The present article may be regarded as an attempt to disentangle the numerous misunderstandings underlying summaries of the history of All Saints such as these: The feast of All the Saints was originally the anniversary festival of the Pantheon consecrated by Boniface IV under the title B. Mariae et omnium sanctorum. Siegbert de Gembloux related that Louis the Pious fixed the feast of All Saints for France and Germany on November 1st, Batifol, *History of the Roman Breviary* (London, 1912), p. 109; Our feast of All Saints in its present scope is directly derived from the Roman practice which was developed over several centuries. First we have Boniface IV consecrating the Pantheon . . . and ordering an anniversary. Gregory III . . . consecrated a chapel in the basilica of St. Peter to 'the Redeemer, His Holy Mother, all the Apostles, Martyrs, Confessors and all the just and perfect, who are at rest throughout the whole world' and perhaps fixed the anniversary to 1 November, Dr. L. Foley C.M., in the revised version of Dom Mershman's unsatisfactory article, *Catholic Encyclop.*, 2nd ed. In the bibli-

graphy Dom Quentin's fundamental study is not mentioned. Words in italics (which are mine) relate to points discussed in this paper.

² In their entries for November 1st.

³ Duchesne, *Liber Pontificalis I* (Paris, 1886), p. 317: . . . in quo fecit ecclesiam beatae Mariae semper virginis et omnium martyrum. Baronius (note on May 13th) said: Legi in eius ecclesiae codice Ms templum illud dicatum imprimis in honorem Dei genitricis Mariae, omnium sanctorum martyrum ac confessorum illateque; illic esse reperi duobus de triginta curribus ossa sanctorum martyrum e diversis urbis coemeteriis effossa solemniterque comportata ac decentissime collocata (see below note 14).

⁴ Siegbert de Gembloux, *ad. A.D. 835; PL 160, 159.*

⁵ Beleth, *PL 202, 133 ff.*

⁶ *PL 83, 774. Ibid. 770.* Isidore's comment on the feasts of apostles and martyrs in general.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 638; see also Florus for November 1st: Nativitas sancti Caesarii et festivitas sanctorum (see below note 46). Haec festivitas sanctorum generalis est Romae.

the general celebration of this feast in the city of Rome. Did he mean that the anniversary of the dedication of the Pantheon was celebrated by all the churches of the City? I propose to show that the word *generalis* applies to the object of the feast in so far as it is concerned with the Saints (not only martyrs) in general, with all the Saints and with the Saints of all parts of the world.

Ado does not say how it came about that the commemoration of all the martyrs was extended to all the Saints. We shall see that this extension took place at a time and in a part of the world for which it was of singular importance.

Kellner⁸ suggested that this transition was made through the dedication by Gregory III of an oratory in Saint Peter "in honour of the saints", a dedication which Kellner compared with that of the Roman basilica of "all the Apostles". Although he stated that the anniversary of this latter dedication was May 1st, he failed to notice the obvious connection between this date and the final date of the commemoration of all the Saints. Schuster⁹ traced the tradition of All Saints to the collective feast of all the martyrs in fourth century Syria.¹⁰ At Byzantium, he says, this feast was celebrated on the first Sunday after Pentecost, a custom which at some time was introduced at Rome, as is proved by the reference, made in the *Comes* of Würzburg, to *Dominica in natale Sanctorum*.¹¹ "This festival was short-lived", but, it has been claimed, still exercised some influence on the choice of the same Sunday for the feast of the Holy Trinity. "As it was too fatiguing to celebrate the nightly Office" after the previous Ember Day, the Byzantine custom was abandoned and instead(?) the festival of May 13th in honour of the martyrs was instituted when the Pantheon was consecrated. It appears however that the festival on May 13th was nothing more than the anniversary of the dedication of *S. Maria ad martyres*.¹² "The idea of a collective feast of all the saints and not only the martyrs, however, persisted", leading

Beleth, however, said (*loc. cit.*) that the feast on November 1st was *generalis* because in it not only the feasts of all the Martyrs (May 1st, see below) and of all the Martyrs (according to Beleth not necessarily the anniversary of the dedication of the Pantheon!) were combined, but also the Holy Trinity, all the Angels and Archangels (according to Beleth originally commemorated on the anniversary of the dedication of the basilica of St. Michael), the patriarchs and prophets and the other Saints, male and female, were commemorated.

⁸ *Heortology* (London, 1908), pp. 324-326.

⁹ *Sacramentary V* (London, 1930), p. 209.

¹⁰ Mershman in *Catholic Encyclop.* I, 1st ed., p. 315 refers also to the fifth century Chaldaean *commemoratio confessorum* on Friday after Easter. But what did *confessores* mean in this instance? Holweck, *Dictionary of the Saints* (1924) assumes that this and the Syrian feast were feasts of all the Saints.

Before 1913, a *commemoratio omnium Ss. Martyrum* was made locally in the Mass of St. Stephen on December 26th with four alternative sets of prayers (one of them specially approved by Pius VI on May 18th 1798, see below). The following expressions in these prayers are of interest with regard to the tradition and meaning of All Saints: Deus qui nos annua sanctorum Martyrum commemoratione laetificas . . . Deus qui nos concedis omnium sanctorum Martyrum tuorum commemorationem colere . . . (compare the Collect for All Saints, see below)

Deus qui glorificaris in consilio sanctorum Martyrum tuorum . . . quorum solemnia

celebramus . . . pro cunctorum Martyrum tuorum honore, intercedentibus (omnibus) sanctis Martyribus tuis, in Sanctorum tuorum commemoratione . . . quorum solemnia celebramus, ut non desinant Sancti tui (pro nobis) supplicare.

Most of these expressions are related to the references to the commemoration of all the Saints, or of Saints in general, in the prayers for feasts of individual Saints (see below, note 20).

Similarly on June 29th a *commemoratio omnium Ss. Apostolorum* was made (see above, note 7), where again the local character is obvious from the variety of prayers (three sets, one of them approved by the same decree of Pius VI as the prayers for the commemoration of all the holy Martyrs). The word *omnes* does not occur in these prayers.

On July 4th (originally July 1st) there is a *commemoratio omnium SS. R.E. Summorum Pontificum*.

¹¹ See below, note 19, and my article 'A Feast of all the Saints of Europe' in *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 49-66. This entry in *Comes Würz.* must not be confused with the *Missa in commemoratione Sanctorum* in the Reichenau fragment (Bannister in *Journ. Theol. Stud.*, V [1903], 49 ff.), which is simply a Commune for the feast of a Saint (as in the Ambrosian liturgy), closely related with the Commune of several martyrs in the *Gothicum*.

¹² Quentin, *loc. cit.*, contested this. See above, note 7.

eventually to the dedication of the oratory in Saint Peter's "in honour of all the Saints, confessors as well as martyrs who had died in all parts of the world".

The only account of this oratory in Saint Peter's is found in the *Liber Pontificalis*¹³ which says that "Gregory made an oratory in which he deposited (recondivit), in honour of the Saviour and His holy Mother, the relics of the holy apostles and of all the holy martyrs and confessors,¹⁴ the perfect just, resting in the whole world (*toto in orbe terrarum*)."¹⁵ There is no record of the celebration of an anniversary of this dedication, as could be expected, because it was concerned simply with what later times would have called a side-chapel. Translating the words used by the *Liber Pontificalis* by *zu Ehren des Erlösers, seiner heiligen Mutter, (!) aller Apostel, Märtyrer und (!) aller (!) vollkommenen Gerechten*, Eisenhofer¹⁶ said that this dedication proves that the idea which later produced the feast of All the Saints was already effective. Neither Kellner, nor Schuster nor Eisenhofer¹⁷ seem to have recognised that the only Saint to whom the actual dedication of this oratory was made was the Blessed Virgin. (In Ireland the ancient custom of expressly dedicating a church to God and a Saint was preserved for a long time). There is no indication that the deposition of relics in that oratory was even remotely linked with further secondary dedications.¹⁸

After referring to the curious deposition in that oratory of relics of all the Saints, the *Liber Pontificalis* continues:

Whose feasts the Pope ordered the monks of three monasteries serving there *cotidie per ordinem existentia atque nataliciorum missas in eodem loco celebrare, instituens in canone ita a sacerdote dicenda: Quorum solemnitas hodie . . . celebratur . . . toto in orbe terrarum.*

¹³ Duchesne, *op. cit.*, p. 417 and Maurice 'Les Saints du Canon de la Messe au Moyen Age', *Ephemerides Liturgicae*, LII (1938), 367 ff.

¹⁴ The account (above, note 3) of the deposition in the Pantheon of carloads of relics of martyrs (martyrs only, though the dedication was to the confessors as well!) may be an attempt to overcome the difficulty offered by this account of the deposition in the oratory of St. Peter's of the relics of all the Saints of the whole world. We will have to think, of course, of the principle of representing groups of Saints by outstanding representatives, well known from the Litany and characteristic of a time which, on the one hand, realized that the number of Saints was too large to allow individual commemoration and, on the other hand, was anxious to find adequate means of detailed commemoration of all the Saints. This principle also underlies the appointment of the feast of all the Apostles to either the feast of St. Philip (below, note 30) or, still more significantly the feast of Sts. Peter and Paul, of the feast of all the holy martyrs to the feast of St. Stephen (note 10), of the feast of all the holy Angels to the feast of St. Michael (note 7), and—perhaps—of the feast of all continental confessors to a feast of St. Martin in Ireland (*Speculum*, XXI [1946], 52 ff.).

¹⁵ *Handbuch der kathol. Liturgik* I (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1932), pp. 606 ff.

¹⁶ Quentin, *op. cit.*, p. 640, is hardly more precise when translating "la fondation d'une messe cotidienne en l'honneur de notre Seigneur, de la Sainte Vierge, des apôtres, des martyrs, des confesseurs de tous les justes". In contrast to Eisenhofer and Quentin, we must note that the "Just" are

in this case not a separate choir of Saints (as they are in the *Litaniae breves*, see my article on 'St. Abel's Place in the Liturgy'. *Theol. Studies* VII [1946] 127 f.), but that *perfectorum justorum* is merely an adjective as is the initial *Sanctorum* (also in Baronius' account of the consecration of the Pantheon, above, note 3). See also note 18.

¹⁷ The deposition of the relics of Saints may be compared with the prayer *Oramus te per merita Sanctorum quorum reliquiae hic sunt*, since the eleventh century in the beginning of the Ordinary of the Mass, and with the Postcommunion for the local feast of the Sacred Relics (preserved in the cathedral of the diocese) on November 5th: in *tuorum sollempnitate Sanctorum quorum reliquias colimus*. Compare also the words "istorum et omnium sanctorum" in the prayer *Suscipe, sancta Trinitas* (below, note 18).

An actual dedication to all the Saints would compare to the Collect and Postcommunion *Ad poscenda suffragia sanctorum: Intercedente beata . . . Maria . . . atque beato N. (patron) et omnibus Sanctis* (see the rubrics to the *A cunctis* in the *Ordinarium Officii* and in the Missal) or the less common form (*Concede, quaesumus: intercessio sanctae . . . Mariae, sanctorumque omnium Apostolorum, Martyrum, Confessorum atque Virginum, et omnium electorum tuorum nos ubique laetificet*, i.e., the Collect for the Votive Mass of All the Saints).

The account of the foundation of the oratory in St. Peter's is a very early reference to the deposition of relics of confessors. Since, in this paper, we shall have to treat largely of Irish conditions, it may be noted that in the ancient Irish Church, due to the

In this instance (in contrast to the account of the deposition of the relics) the words *toto in orbe terrarum* are used in reference to the celebration of this commemoration rather than to its object. This liturgical institution, the *Liber Pontificalis* says, was inscribed on stone tablets in that oratory, and with good reason, for it is most intriguing. Every day, it says, in the *Communicantes* between the words *et omnium Sanctorum tuorum*¹⁵ and *quorum meritis precibusque concedas* that relative clause *Quorum . . . terrarum* was to be inserted, through which every day was expressly made a feast of all the Saints. While the amplification of the first words of the *Communicantes* for Christmas, the Epiphany, Easter, Ascension and Pentecost are ancient and well testified to, this enlargement of the passage relating to all the Saints is apparently not found in any liturgical book.

From the early days of the Church, the Mass of every Sunday, in fact, every Mass has been a commemoration of the Resurrection, the Passion and the Ascension, as stated by the *Unde et memores*. When he first refused the universal extension of the feast of the Holy Trinity, Alexander II said that *in omni Dominica, immo cotidie sce. trinitatis memoria celebretur*.¹⁶ Through the liturgical institution proper to the oratory which we may call *Ste. Mariae ad omnes sanctos*, it is prescribed that in it on every *natalicium* of a Saint, it should be expressly stated that virtually everywhere *immo cotidie omnium sanctorum memoria celebretur*. This prescription took the place of a new feast or new feasts; the *Liber Pontificalis* expressly says that it left the existing order of the *Sanctorale* unchanged. The histories of Easter and of the feast of the Holy Trinity show us that the principal events and mysteries may be celebrated in two different ways: either by distinctive feasts with proper variant parts of the liturgy or by their commemoration in every Mass.¹⁷

scarcity of relics of martyrs, the rule that an altar should enshrine the relic of a martyr could not be observed. It was a custom peculiar to Ireland to use instead relics of confessors other than bodily relics, e.g. St. Patrick's staff or bell and St. Brigid's mantle. The difference found in Baronius' account of the Pantheon and the *Liber Pontificalis* account of the oratory in St. Peter's, between the dedication and the deposition of relics, reflects the difference between spiritual representation and historical commemoration (see below). The original Roman custom was that a church was given the name of (or dedicated to) the Saint whose relics it enshrined. The original Irish custom was that the church bore the name of the Saint who was (reputed to have been) its founder (or closely associated with him). He frequently was regarded as a Saint only from the fact of this tradition; nothing was known of him other than that he had founded this church. In the Roman Church, the difference between dedication and deposition of relics arose when churches were dedicated to the Blessed Virgin and the Angels. In Ireland, such votive dedications were unknown until the Norman period.

¹⁵ Rendering the *Liber Pontificalis* account (see above, note 16), Maurice (*loc. cit.*) omitted the words "the perfect Just", but he gives the inscription of that stone tablet, restored by Rossi, according to which this insertion in the *Communicantes* read: *et omnium Sanctorum sed et diem natalicium celebrantes Sanctorum tuorum, (?) martyrum ac confessorum, perfectorum justorum, quorum solemnitas hodie . . . celebretur*, omitting the words "toto in orbe

terrarum"! On the use of this formula, with or without these words, in mediaeval Europe see Maurice, *op. cit.*, p. 368. The prayer, *Suscipe, Sancta Trinitas* (see above, note 17) is first found in a ninth century Amiens Sacramentary with the addition, after the words "*omnium sanctorum*", of these words: *qui tibi placuerunt ab initio mundi et eorum quorum hodie festivitas celebratur et quorum hic nomina et reliquiae habentur*. (*Istorum* in the present version of this prayer, therefore, refers not only to the Saints whose relics are deposited in the altar or to the patron of the Church, but also to those whose names were found in the diptychs). See Eisenhofer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 140.

¹⁶ Eisenhofer, *op. cit.*, I, p. 561. This feast was assigned to the date of the Byzantine commemoration of all the martyrs (above). Originally no special Mass was assigned for this Sunday, since ordination ceremonies continued till dawn; in those churches where no ordinations were held, since the seventh century a Votive Mass of the Holy Trinity was said.

¹⁷ The *Stowe Missal* begins with a *Letania apostolorum ac martirum sanctorum (con)fessorum* (the last word apparently an addition) and contains a daily commemoration *Sanctorum apostolorum et martirum* (Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, XXXII [1906], pp. 3, 7 and 19). However, it also contains a special *Misa (sic) apostolorum et martirum et sanctorum et sanctarum virginum* with a curiously detailed enumeration of the choirs of Saints, invoking in particular the *suffragia sanctorum et sanctarum virginum* (a common noun) *quorum hodie solemnitas a nobis celebratur*. Then follow further lists

Both its dedication and its liturgical privilege indicate that the oratory in Saint Peter's has very little to do with the history of the feast of All the Saints. The Collect for All Saints tells us that the commemoration of all the Saints *per ordinem existentia atque nataliciorum missas* was by Divine dispensation supplemented by a commemoration *omnium sanctorum sub una celebritate*. The liturgical institution proper to the oratory in Saint Peter's could be compared with the Votive Mass of All the Saints. The Collect proper to this Votive Mass does not, of course, refer to *una celebritas* but circumscribes all the Saints by "Holy Mary, all the holy Apostles, Martyrs, Confessors and Virgins and all the Elect", adding the significant word *ubique*.²¹ Thus it does bear some resemblance to the account given by the *Liber Pontificalis* of the foundation of the oratory in Saint Peter's.

I propose to show that, from sources as yet rarely tapped for the history of All Saints, new light can be thrown upon the chief difficulties so far discussed, namely the appointment of this feast to November 1st, its general character both historical and geographical, and its liturgical background.

Dom Wilmart²² has pointed out that in the mid-eighth century York calendar we read:

*Multiplici rutilet gemma seu in fronte November
Cunctorum fulget sanctorum laude decorus.*

Comparing this entry with that for November 1st in the *Félibre Oengusso*, the late eighth century Irish festology, and with the recommendations made by the Synod of Riesbach in Bavaria (A.D. 798) and by Alcuin (A.D. 800) of the observance of the *festivitas omnium sanctorum* on the kalends of November, Dom Wilmart suggested that the commemoration of All the Saints on November 1st was introduced from Ireland via Northumbria to the Continent. So far as the *Félibre Oengusso* is concerned, Dom Wilmart based his theory entirely on the English translation given by Whitley Stokes, who in his edition rendered the last line of the quatrain for November 1st by "the hosts of Hilarius, sure multitudinous, ennable stormy All Saints' Day".²³ These words seem to bear a striking resem-

of choirs of Saints, concluding with references to *omnes Sancti* or *innumerabilis multitudine sanctorum* (above, note 14). See below, p. 154.

The daily commemoration of the Saints in the Office is first testified to by the antiphony of St. Peter's, but this custom seems to be of Gallican or monastic origin, imported into Rome in the course of the 12th century, Batiffol, *op. cit.*, pp. 146 ff. In the Office, the *A cunctis* (note 17) and the *Te Deum* (below, p. 154 f.) are said only on minor feasts, but every day the prayer *Sancta Maria et omnes Sancti intercedant* is said, also the prayer *post divinum officium* (*et omnium Sanctorum universitatem*). There are distinctive Benedictions for the readings of the homily for feasts of God, of the Blessed Virgin and of the Saints.

That every feast of a Saint is virtually a commemoration of all the Saints or of Saints in general (see above, note 10) is frequently expressed in the prayers for the Commons of Saints:

Postcommunion for a Martyr not a Bishop (1): . . . ut sicut tuorum commemoratione Sanctorum temporali gratulamur officio, ita perpetuo laetemur aspectu . . . (the Church militant as a whole corresponding to the Church triumphant as a whole); Secret of a Confessor not a Bishop (1): . . .

in tuorum commemoratione Sanctorum . . . (also Secret of several Martyrs, where "tuorum" may be regarded as standing for "istorum");

Secret of a Confessor not a Bishop (II): . . . pro tuorum honore Sanctorum . . . (similarly in the Secret of a Virgin and a Holy Woman);

Secret of a Confessor and Bishop (1): sancti tui nos ubique laetificant . . . (as the Collect of the Votive Mass of All the Saints, above, note 17).

That every Mass is a commemoration of all the Saints can be seen from the *Confiteor* (below, p. 154). *Oramus te, Domine et Suscipe, Sancta Trinitas* (notes 17 ff.), *Communicantes, Nobis quoque peccatoribus* (Maurice, *op. cit.*, pp. 370 ff.), *Libera nos* (*ibid.*, p. 375) and the *A cunctis*, prescribed for the greater part of the year.

²¹ See notes 17 and 20.

²² "Un témoin anglo-saxon du calendrier métrique d'York", *Revue Bénédictine*, XLVI (1934), 55. This suggestion was adopted by W. Levison in *England and the Continent in the Eighth Century* (Oxford, 1946), p. 160 n. 1 and "Mediaeval Church Dedications in England", *Transactions of the Archaeological Soc. of Durham* . . . X (1946), 76 ff.

²³ Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, XXIX (1905), p. 232.

blance to the entry in the York calendar. The Irish word standing for "multitudinous" is *dálaig* derived from the word *dál*, "assembly", from which the Parliament of modern Ireland takes its name. However, this is a mere figure of speech,²⁴ very common to the *Féilire Oengusso* which usually represents the Saints as "vast troops", "fair trains" or "multitudinous hosts". Stokes, of course, openly confessed that he was not a liturgist; thus he could not foresee what havoc he would work by rendering the Irish word *Samain* by "All Saints' Day". This word signifies simply "summer's end", the ancient pagan seasonal feast, corresponding to *Bealtaine* (May 1st).²⁵ The Breviary originally had only two parts, summer and winter;²⁶ similarly the Irish knew only two seasons, one ending on Hallow's Eve, the other on what on the Continent is known as Walpurgis Night.²⁷ To this day, the idea of seasons beginning with a day between the 21st and the 25th of the month, which underlies, for example, the dates of the feasts of Saints George,²⁸ John the Baptist and of Christmas, is not known in Ireland. On the other hand, the custom of starting the seasons with the first day of the month is known outside Ireland.²⁹ Apart from Walpurgis Night, also, the night leading to August 1st is bonfire night. May 1st, the date of the feast of all the Apostles, is certainly not the historical date of the dedication in 573 of the basilica originally dedicated to Saint Philipp, to all the Apostles.³⁰ Similarly, in the Irish calendar, February 1st became the feast of the greatest native Saint, not for any historical reason, but because this feast took the place of the old seasonal feast of *Inbolc*.³¹

Unlike the feasts of individual Saints, the feast of All the Saints could not be assigned to a historical date. There are two possible reasons why such a feast may be assigned to a definite date: either because it is the anniversary of the dedication of a church (as is e.g. Michaelmas), or because it is a seasonal feast. I propose to show that, in spite of his acceptance of Stokes' misleading translation, Dom Wilmart was right in attributing to Ireland a decisive influence in the establishment of the feast of All Saints on November 1st. The entry in the *Féilire Oengusso* shows us at least that the date to which, as first testified by the York calendar, this feast was assigned, was in Ireland a season-feast which enjoyed a certain recognition even by the Church. Moreover, we shall see, one of the numerous points in which the Irish Church represents features of ancient Church life is the exclusiveness with which she based her liturgy on the conception of natural time, represented by the seasons, not permitting any influence of historical time.³²

²⁴ See my article on 'St. Leonard in Ireland'. *Louth Archaeological Journal*, X (1945), 297 ff.

²⁵ *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 50.

²⁶ Eisenhofer, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 481 ff. and my article 'The Conception of Time in the Liturgy' to be published in *Clergy Review* 1948.

²⁷ See my article on 'Walpurgis Night' in *Tablet*, April 29, 1944. An excellent description of May Eve in modern Ireland is found in Mary Carbery, *The Farm by Lough Gur* (London, 1937), pp. 159-166.

²⁸ See my article on St. George in *Tablet*, April 24, 1943. To what I said in *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 57, I may add that, like St. George's feast, *féil Ruadain* (April 15th) was regarded in Ireland as the beginning of spring "when the cuckoo calls from the woods" (Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, LXVIII, pp. 94 ff.).

²⁹ See Sean O Suilleabhain, *Handbook of Irish Folklore* (Dublin, 1945).

³⁰ Beleth, PL 202, 13, and above, note 14. With regard to Apostles (and Evangelists), the oldest group of foreign Saints which

found its place in the Irish liturgy and the one which lent itself most obviously to collective commemoration, the Irish church favoured collective feasts. The *Martyrology of Tallaght* (Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, LXVIII) enlarged on May 9th the commemoration of the translation of St. Andrew to a *festivitas apostolorum*, i.e. *reliquiarum Tomae et Johannis et Andreæ*,—the earliest evidence for the feast of the *Divisio apostolorum* (July 15th) is Irish.

³¹ *Speculum*, XXI (1946), note 9. I hope to show elsewhere that Ireland played an important part in the introduction into the Western Church of devotion to Old Testament Saints. May, July, August and September 1st were among the most conspicuous feasts of Old Testament Saints.

³² *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 57 ff. and above, note 17. Up to recent years, objections against advanced summer-time (not observed by most ecclesiastical establishments) are raised on the grounds that it is not "God's own time".

On April 20th, the *Félice Oengusso* commemorates "the feast in Rome of the Saints of all Europe", while the ninth century *Martyrology of Tallaght* begins on this day the section dealing with Irish Saints with the words: *Communis sollemnitas omnium sanctorum et virginum Hiberniae et Britanniae et totius Europae et specialiter in honorem Sancti Martini episcopi, et familiae Ego elevatio.* The only other reference to this feast is found in the eleventh century kalendar of Drummond Castle, largely based on Irish sources, where we read for April 20th: *Romae solemnitas omnium sanctorum Europae.*

I have shown elsewhere that this solemnity was an attempt to reconcile, on the one hand, the Roman commemoration of martyrs with Irish devotion to native Saints (almost exclusively non-martyrs) and, on the other hand, the Roman custom of commemorating Saints within the linear order of historical time with the custom, to this day characteristic of the Eastern liturgies, of representing sacred events in the cyclical order of natural time.

The expression *sanctorum et virginum* may be interpreted as synonymous with the expression *sanctorum et sanctarum* (which indeed was sometimes used in the passage quoted above in the *Communicantes*). However, it is more likely that in Ireland the word "Saints" referred mainly to confessors since martyrs and virgins were automatically regarded as Saints.³³ A marginal note in the *Book of Leinster* copy of the *Martyrology of Tallaght* assigns to April 17th a commemoration of "all the martyrs of the world", a commemoration which seems to combine the ancient collective commemoration of the *martyrs* (Syria, Pantheon) with the Roman conception of the *universality* of the Church.

According to the *Martyrology of Tallaght* the commemoration of all the Saints of Europe was linked with a special commemoration of Saint Martin, who was, on the one hand, one of the first confessors to attain liturgical veneration and, on the other hand, the foreign Saint most highly venerated in Ireland,—a fact partly due to the old tradition of his relationship with St. Patrick. Outside Ireland, there is no trace of a commemoration of Saint Martin on April 20th. The *Book of Leinster* starts its note for April 17th on the commemoration of all the martyrs of the world with the names of Saints Stephen, Lawrence, George, the Holy Innocents, Peter the deacon (representing the Church of Antioch) and Donnan of Egg, the most conspicuous of the few martyrs of the ancient Irish Church. Except for the latter two, the date of this commemoration is non-historical.³⁴

Ireland was the first country to develop a vernacular Christian literature outside the Graeco-Roman world. This is one of the chief reasons why many of the elementary terms of Church life had in Ireland a connotation somewhat different from that in other parts of the world.

The Irish conception of "feast" (*féil*)³⁵ preserved the ancient separation of spiritual representation and historical commemoration (which still underlies the distinction between *Temporale* and *Sanctorale*), confining the latter to the extra-liturgical sphere such as represented by the festologies. There was no *Sanctorale* in the Irish liturgy; the Saints were liturgically venerated by collective commemorations³⁶ in the litanies and lists of "obits" read in every Mass rather than by individual feasts. The connection of this custom with the unique liturgical institution proper to the oratory in Saint Peter's is obvious.

³³ See the use of the word *virgines* as a common noun in the Stowe Votive Mass for All the Saints (above, note 20). Grosjean (*Analecta Bollandiana*, LV [1937], 328) argued: *Die 20 aprilis, si Tamlachtensi credimus, virgines potius cum confessoribus commemorabuntur.* *Virgines* are probably "white martyrs" (in contrast to "red" or real martyrs) and the "blue martyrs", i.e. anchorites.

³⁴ The date of the martyrdom of the

familia Ego was well known in Ireland (*Speculum*, XXI [1946], 53 ff.). There is more evidence for the fact that, in the few cases where feasts of Irish Saints were observed on historical dates, these were obtained from abroad. *Félice Oengusso* (Ms. L) says that April 21st is the feast of the obit of Maelrubi, the Irish born patron of Applecross in Scotland.

³⁵ *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 59.

³⁶ Above, note 20.

The Irish word for "Saint" (*noib*) did not denote in the first instance martyrs, but had the general meaning of "holy person", as it had in the early Church. To this day, it is common in Ireland to describe a person during his lifetime as a saint. With the martyr the all-important day is his *natale*; with a confessor his whole life must be considered, and practically any day may be made his feastday; with a bishop such as Saints Ambrose and Martin, it is the day of his consecration.

The extensive place given in the daily Mass to the collective veneration of Saints and, on the other hand, the very wide connotation of the term "Saint" so far as native Saints were concerned, made the Irish Church susceptible to the idea of commemorating the Saints in groups. Each of these groups was represented preferably by a few outstanding individuals, a system familiar to us from the Litany of the Saints.³⁷ There were obviously three main points of view from which the Saints could be subdivided into groups, namely historically (as in the account of the three choirs of Irish Saints),³⁸ geographically (as in the commemoration of all the Saints of Europe) and systematically (the point of view adopted by the Roman liturgy, for example in the *Te Deum*, the *Communia Sanctorum*, the Litany of the Saints, the Collect of the Votive Mass of All the Saints etc.).

Caspari³⁹ seems to have been the first to state that the connection traditionally established between May 13th, the anniversary of Saint Mary *ad Martyres*, and November 1st must be altogether abandoned. He supported this suggestion by a reference to the letter by Catalphus to Charlemagne asking the king to institute *unum diem in honorem sanctae Trinitatis et Angelorum et omnium Sanctorum celebrare super regnum tuum*.⁴⁰ The expression *unum diem celebrare* may be compared to the reference made in the Collect for All the Saints to *una celebritas*. The reference made in this letter to the Angels is curious; neither the *Liber Pontificalis* account of the foundation of the oratory in Saint Peter's nor the Collect of the Votive Mass of All the Saints make mention of the Angels. Catalphus' letter in this respect seems to be related to the *Te Deum* (the first record of its present form is found in the *Antiphonary of Bangor*), the *Litaniae Breves* and the *Proficiscere* of the *Commendatio Animae* (the Irish influences in which have been demonstrated by Dom Gougaud).⁴¹ According to mediaeval liturgists,⁴² the first antiphon, psalm and lesson of the Office of All Saints is concerned with the Trinity, the second with the Blessed Virgin, the third with the Angels, the fourth with the patriarchs and prophets, the fifth with the apostles, the sixth with the martyrs, the seventh with the confessors, the eighth with the virgins, and the ninth with all the saints. These nine orders of the Church triumphant are compared to the nine grades of the hierarchy.⁴³ Similarly the Irish *Litany of Jesus*⁴⁴ compares the nine orders of the Church on earth to the nine orders of Angels. Of choirs of Saints, the Irish litanies know a much greater number; their subtle distinctions of choirs of Saints originated from the idea of representative completeness characteristic of Irish devotion to the Saints. The influence of these subdivisions of Saints on the development of the *Confiteor* is of interest. In its early version (represented by the *Micrologus*) it said *et istis sanctis*; in the twelfth century *Sanctae Mariae et omnibus sanctis*, while in

³⁷ Above, note 14.

³⁸ J. Kenney, *The Sources for the Early History of Ireland I* (New York, 1929), n° 271.

³⁹ *Realencyclopaedie für protestantische Theologie I* (Leipzig, 1896), p. 375.

⁴⁰ MGH, *Epist. IV*, p. 504 = PL 96, 1366.

⁴¹ *Ephemerides Liturgicae*, XLIX (1935), 3 ff. and my article quoted above in n. 16.

⁴² Beleth, PL 202, 156 and Guy d'Orchelles, see V. L. Kennedy, *Mediaeval Studies*, I (1939), 61 ff.

⁴³ See my articles on the offices of cantor and lector in *Liturgy*, XI (1942), 49-52 and *Clergy Review* XXVI (1946), 518-527.

⁴⁴ Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, LXII, p. 31.

the fourteenth the number of Saints enumerated became so large that it had to be restricted to representatives of the basic groups.⁴⁵

In Catulphus' letter there is no reference to any precedence for the feast suggested by it. Ado's account suggests that it was merely by retrospective interpretation that the anniversary of the dedication of Saint Mary *ad Martyres* appeared as a feast of All the Saints. The recommendations of the feast of All the Saints on the kalends of November by the Synod of Reisbach and by Alcuin did not refer either to any precedents; Dom Wilmart and Levison, we have seen, suggested that Alcuin brought this feast from England, the country where its title was first recorded (by Bede). From the ninth to the early nineteenth century, liturgists have tried to trace the commemoration of All the Saints on November 1st back to the seventh century by connecting it with that on May 13th. This tradition was supported by the theory that the institution of such a commemoration was required when, owing to the increasing number of martyrs (in the seventh century!) and to the liturgical recognition of confessors, the number of Saints had become too large to commemorate each Saint by an individual feast. How untenable this theory is may be seen from the history of the martyrology.

Since, in the later Middle Ages, the martyrology was raised from its status as a spiritual reader to that of a liturgical book, finding its definite place in the monastic Office, its original non-liturgical character is often not appreciated. That the martyrology did not originate from the *kalendarium* is obvious; right from the beginning it had several entries for every day, and the commemoration which is the subject of the Mass and Office of the day is by no means always the first.⁴⁶ In the *Martyrology of Tallaght*, the Irish Church had the most comprehensive "martyrology" ever compiled. This is due first to its scrupulous minuteness in copying its foreign sources, resulting in hundreds of doublets; secondly, to its curious addition of a separate section of native "Saints" for each day, reflecting the realization of the gap between the foreign and Irish conceptions of Saints and ways of commemorating them, and thirdly to the extensiveness of this national list, due to the wide connotation of the Irish term *nóib*. The fact that the *Féilire Oengusso*, the earliest Irish martyrology, was a rhymed work in the vernacular shows that this was a book of private devotion. (Similar rhymed martyrologies like that edited by Dom Wilmart and that by Wandelbert of Pruem are clearly connected with Ireland). The martyrology permitted the expression of historical commemoration of Saints without infringing on the strictly spiritual order of the liturgy, but even so the Irish martyrologies remained singularly different from the "historical martyrologies" of the Continent. Neither the *Féilire Oengusso* nor the *Martyrology of Tallaght* give us more than lists of names (place-names were mostly misinterpreted as proper names). The chief aim of these martyrologies seems to have been to commemorate by name every Saint of the day. Aiming, on the one hand, at historical completeness and, on the other hand, spiritually commemorating all the Saints on every day by means of the traditional ending for the entry of each day, the martyrology shows that the explanation of the institution of a special feast of All the Saints as a mere expedient is unsatisfactory. This collective votive feast, appears, rather, as an attempt to bridge the gap, most noticeable at that time in Ireland, between the Eastern way of purely spiritual representation of the Saints and the European idea of the *Sanctorale*. Prior to the York "kalendar", there is no evidence of a feast of All the Saints; if the Eastern commemorations of all the martyrs and of all the "confessors", if the anniversary of Saint Mary's "to all the martyrs" (if May 13th was such) and the feast of all the Apostles (derived from the

⁴⁵ Eisenhofer, *op. cit.*, II, p. 79, and above, note 14.

⁴⁶ See e.g. Florus, above, note 7.

dedication of the Roman basilica) are considered as fore-runners to this feast, even more so the *communis sollemnitas omnium sanctorum . . . totius Europae* must be regarded as such. It appears that this *sollemnitas* was proper to Ireland; the fact that in the *Martyrology of Tallaght* it was entered in the sections of Irish Saints shows that this was recognised in Ireland. Moreover, it seems that this commemoration was not very clearly defined, as we may gather from the variety of descriptions and dates given to it in the records. The date of April 29th, well known as the historical day of the "martyrdom" of the *familia Ego*, was apparently chosen because it permitted assigning to the commemoration of Irish martyrs, observed in the Continental order of historical time, the commemoration of all the foreign martyrs and subsequently of all the Saints; their votive commemoration, i.e. in the Irish order of spiritual time, was suggested by the collective character of this commemoration. This crosswise assimilation, so to speak, between the Continental and Irish ways of commemorating the Saints was perhaps too subtle to last. When this commemoration had become more definitely confined to confessors,—the commemoration of regional groups of martyrs by their chief representatives being omitted—its appointment to a date in the spiritual order of seasonal time was quite natural.

Thus the marginal note in the *Book of Leinster* copy of the *Martyrology of Tallaght* (commemorating all the martyrs of the world, with special mention of the chief representatives of the various Patriarchates) seems to represent the most ancient type—corresponding to the Syrian commemoration of all the martyrs; the entry in the *Martyrology of Tallaght* itself would appear as the second stage, extending this commemoration to the Confessors, preserving the origin of this commemoration from regional commemorations. The *Féilire Oengusso* (and the *Drummond kalendar*)—actually the oldest of our records—would represent the last stage, a commemoration simply of all the Saints of Europe.

There is, I suggest, a strict parallelism between the extension of this commemoration from a group of Saints to all the Saints and its extension from certain parts of the world to the whole world. Though it refers, already, to the martyrs of the whole world, the marginal note in the *Book of Leinster* copy of the *Martyrology of Tallaght*, specially enumerating the representatives of the chief groups of martyrs, seems to point to the origin of this commemoration in the East where the regional conception of the Church was prevalent and of special significance. The assimilation of Irish to Continental liturgical practices was an important feature in the general acceptance by Ireland of the Roman conception of the universality of the Church, not merely as a spiritual fact but as a living reality. The prominence given to Rome through the initial mention of Saints Stephen and Lawrence seems to indicate a similar tendency to what may be regarded as the Eastern prototype of that Irish commemoration. Ireland was the only part of the Western Church that had not belonged to the Roman Empire. Still, different though it was from the rest of the Western Church, Ireland was not of itself a patriarchate. The establishment of the commemoration of all the Saints of Europe was a step in the adoption by Ireland of the conception of the Roman patriarchate over Europe.

The Collect for the feast of All the Saints says that we celebrate on it the memory of all the Saints *sub una*. The Collect for the Votive Mass says that we rejoice in the intercession of all the Saints *ubique*. The Office seems to pay a tribute to the first martyrologist to record the name of this feast, by taking the lessons for the second Nocturn from what is described as Bede's 18th *Sermon on the Saints*, the first of the two sermons for this feast listed by Migne as nos. lxix and lxx of Bede's *sermones subditae*.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ PL 114.

Hodie *omnium* Sanctorum sub *una* sollemnitatis laetitia celebramus festivitatem; quorum societate caelum exultat, quorum patrocinis terra laetatur, triumphis Ecclesia sancta coronatur . . . quae per totum orbem longe lateque diffusa est.⁴⁸

The idea of the universal extension of the feasts of Saints, originally local or diocesan in character, is clearly expressed by Leo's first sermon on the feast of Saints Peter and Paul (the beginning of *lectio iv* in the office of the feast):

Omnium quidem sanctorum sollemnitatum *totus mundus* particeps, et *unius fidei* pietas exigit, ut, quidquid pro salute *universorum* gestum recalitur, *communibus ubique gaudiis* celebretur.

The liturgy repeatedly emphasizes the universal significance of this feast. On the other hand, Hayto of Basle^{49a} stated that it applied in particular to Europe, because the Apostles *Europam sua praedicatione illuminaverunt*.

The Roman origin of the conception of universality in the votive commemoration of Saints in Ireland is apparently expressed through the words *ir-Rúaim* which the *Félice Oengusso* added to is entry for *féil noéb n-Eorapa uile*. The *Drummond Kalendar* boldly translates: *Romae, sollempnitas omnium sanctorum totius Europae*.⁴⁹ The *Book of Leinster* marginal note on the entry of the *Martyrology of Tallaght* and the *Ms L*(auds) note to the entry in the *Félice Oengusso* tried to explain the meaning of the word *ir-Rúaim* by a tradition of a "great tree at Rome, the heathen worshipped it, till the Christians fasted on all the Saints of Europe for it to fall et statim cecidit",—of course, a purely Irish tradition not so much on account of its reference to tree-worship, but on account of the reference to the custom of "fasting on a Saint". Needless to say, there is not the slightest evidence that the commemoration on April 20th was ever known in Rome.

That the regional conception underlying the Irish commemorations of All the Saints comes from the East is obvious from the fact that apart from the commemoration of all the Saints of Europe, the *Martyrology of Tallaght* has, on December 23rd, *magna sollemnitas omnium Sanctorum totius Africæ*.⁵⁰ The date of December 23rd is certainly not related to Christmas, but must be associated with the solstice; the custom of observing the solstice on the 23rd rather than on the 21st is reflected by the commemoration of the death of Christ on March 23rd. That the Eastern patriarchates were known in Ireland to be liturgically distinct from Rome may be seen from the entry—in another margin note of *Ms L* of the *Félice Oengusso*—for November 26th: *Honor Michaelis in oriente hodie*, as compared with such entries as: *Memoria Christofori celebratur apud Romanos* (July 25th, *Ms R¹*). The entries for both April 20th and December 23rd refer to whole Continents.⁵¹ Do the words *Hiberniae et Britanniae et totius Europæ*, proper to the *Martyrology of Tallaght*, imply that what is now called "the British Isles" does not belong to Europe, or are these countries rather singled out as parts of the Continent, particularly important in this context?⁵² I propose to show that an investigation of this question will throw some light on the conception of geographical universality, which is an important feature, though frequently overlooked, in the feast of All the Saints.

In the Epilogue to the *Félice Oengusso*, Saint Anthony of Egypt is invoked as leader of the monks, whereas in a note in *Ms R¹* and in the *Drummond Kalendar*

⁴⁸ Compare in the *Te Deum*: "Te aeternum Patrem *omnis terra* veneratur . . . (Apostles, Prophets, Martyrs). Te per *orbem terrarum* sancta confitetur Ecclesia".

^{48a} PL 115, 62.

⁴⁹ *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 49 ff.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, note 4.

⁵¹ See also the note in the *Drummond*

Kalendar (ed. Forbes, 1882) that on January 4th the feast of Saint Titus "apud Africam celebratur".

⁵² The *Martyrology of Tallaght* refers on October 26th to *Britonia*. The *Drummond Kalendar* frequently distinguishes between feasts celebrated in *Hibernia* and in *Britania* (e.g. January 8th and September 17th).

Saint Benedict is called *summus abbas monachorum Europae, caput* (or: *pater*) *monachorum Europae*. Saint Maedoc is described in his *Vita II* as *erlamh Eorpa* (Plummer: "Patron Saint of Europe").⁵² The *Annals of Ulster* for 851 speak of an Irish monk as *sapientissimus omnium doctorum Europae*; the corresponding entry in the *Annals of the Four Masters* says in Irish: "the most learned and wisest in all Europe". There are parallels to this conception of Europe as a unit in secular literature. In his obituary in the *Annals of Ulster*, Karolus Magnus is described as *Francorum immo totius Europae imperator*, a note omitted by the Four Masters, perhaps because it implied the mediaeval tradition that even the king of Ireland had acknowledged the supremacy of Charlemagne. On the other hand, Murchad Maistan, son of the king of Ireland, was known as *ársid Eorpa* ("veteran of Europe").⁵³

The earliest Irish record of a complete enumeration of the Continents of the ancient world is found in the *Book of Invasions* where the sons of Japhet, Ham and Sem, appear as "the people of all Europe", Africa and Asia respectively. This account is of particular interest to us, as it adds that the sons of Japhet occupied "all Europe to the ocean in the west of the island of Britain".⁵⁴ We shall see presently that in the further subdivisions of Europe made in early Irish writing *Hibernia et Britannia* had a very definite place. With regard to present-day usage in Ireland of the term "Europe" as denoting the Continent in contrast to Britain and Ireland, it may be noted that David O Bruadair described James II as "hero of Europe".⁵⁵

The description in the *Annals of Ulster* of Charlemagne as *Francorum immo totius Europae imperator* is curious, because in Irish literature the word "Emperor" is mostly circumscribed by "high king of the world" (*árd-rí in domain*). This expression was applied already by the eighth century Irish *Synchronism* to Alexander the Great and the Roman Emperors.⁵⁶ It frequently had a derogatory meaning; "the kings of the world" led by Nabuchodonosor (as in the Prologue of the *Féilire Oengusso*, vv. 83, 93, v. 245) are described as *ríg talmain*, but in the Epilogue (v. 44) Christ is called *ri talmain*. Otherwise Christ was called, rather, "king of the universe" (*ri na Cruinne*).⁵⁷ The marginal note in the *Book of Leinster* copy of the *Martyrology of Tallaght* for April 17th commemorating "all the martyrs in the world" shows that in hagiographical writing the expression "in the world" is mainly a more definite expression for "all". In this sense, the Irish *Litanies of Jesus*⁵⁸ invokes "all the holy martyrs in the whole world" and the *Exposition of the Our Father* in the *Leabhar Breac* speaks of "the unity of the patriarchs and prophets of the world" (in both cases: *in domain*).⁵⁹

The subdivision of the world into Continents was often replaced by a subdivision into the four quarters of heaven. Asia, of course, was known as the Orient (as in the note in the *Féilire Oengusso Ms L* for the feast of Saint Michael) or "the Eastern world".⁶⁰ The *Book of Invasions*⁶¹ said that the progeny of Bethach spread to "the northern islands of the world" (*in domain*). We have seen that in the entry for April 20th the *Martyrology of Tallaght* said that the commemoration

⁵² *Lives of Irish Saints I* (1922), 241.

⁵³ *Irische Texte III* (Leipzig, 1891), p. 72.
⁵⁴ Ed. Macalister, I, (1928), pp. 36, 152, 156, 166, 188.

⁵⁵ Ed. J. MacErlean S. J., *Irish Text Society*, XVIII (Dublin, 1916), pp. 78 ff.; see also *ibid.* XIX, p. 227 "the best cobbler of Europe".

⁵⁶ McNeill in *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy*, XXVIII (1910), 135 and 137. Compare: Tibir Cesair ard-rig in uili domain in *The Passion of Our Lord* (*Leabhar*

Breac, ed. Atkinson, p. 113). The application of this term to Arthur may be ascribed to Irish influence (see B. Millican, *Spenser and the Table Round* [Cambridge, Mass., 1932], pp. 25 ff.).

⁵⁷ A. de Blacam, *Gaelic Literature* (Dublin, s.d.), p. 267.

⁵⁸ *Speculum*, XXI (1946), note 20.

⁵⁹ Ed. Atkinson.

⁶⁰ *Irische Texte IV* (Leipzig, 1897), p. 120.

⁶¹ Ed. cit., IV, p. 167.

of all the Saints of Europe was combined with a special commemoration of Saint Martin. In the Epilogue to the *Félice Oengusso*, Saints Anthony of Egypt (see above p. 153) and Martin are invoked as leaders of "the high saints of the world" (*árdnoib in betha*), while Saints Patrick and Columba are the leaders of the Saints of Erin and Alba. Thus, we may say, Saints Patrick and Columba lead the Saints of *Hibernia* and *Alba*; Saint Benedict leads those of Europe and Saints Anthony and Martin lead those of the world. This is clearly a parallel to the extension, advocated by the *Martyrology of Tallaght*, of the commemoration of the Saints of *Hibernia* and *Britannia* to one of the Saints of all Europe, and the subsequent extension of this commemoration to one of all the Saints of the world, *ubique* (Collect of the Votive Mass) and in *Ecclesia per totum orbem longe lateque diffusa* (Pseudo-Bede).

In the entry for November 11th, the *Félice Oengusso* calls Saint Martin "the golden mountain of the western world" (*iarthair domuin*). That Ireland belonged to "the western world" is obvious from the description—in Oengus' Prologue, v. 195—of Glendalough as "cemetery of the western world". For A.D. 1040 the *Annals of Ulster* record the death of Corcan Cleirech, "head of Europe as regards piety and learning"; the Four Masters describe him as "head of Western Europe". In the *Annals of Ulster* for A.D. 1098, Domhnall is called "high bishop of Western Europe and fountain of generosity in the world, doctor of the law of the Romans and the Goidil" (here again the Four Masters emphasize the Irish side, by adding on their own authority: "head of wisdom and piety of the Goidil"). For A.D. 1102 both the *Annals of Ulster* and the Four Masters record the death of an "archlector of Armagh and of all the West of Europe", an entry particularly curious, because the office of *árdfherléighin* was peculiar to the Irish monastic church and because Armagh seems to be implicitly regarded as the patriarchal see of the West of Europe. In the obit for Maelmuire Ua Dunain, one of the early leaders of the Reform in Ireland, the *Annals of Ulster* (A.D. 1117) speak of him as "learned bishop of the Goidil, head of the clergy of Ireland and steward of the almsdeeds in the world"; omitting the words "bishop of the Goidil", the Four Masters changed the words "in the world" into "of Western Europe". The expression "head of the western world" was still used by the *Annals of Tigernach* and *Clonmacnois*⁶³ in an entry for A.D. 1405. In the seventeenth century *Martyrology of Donegal*,⁶⁴ closely related to the *Annals of the Four Masters*, Saint Adamnan (September 23rd) is described as "light of the West of Europe" and Saint Malachy as "high head of Western Europe" (November 4th and February 3rd). An interesting late ramification of these expressions is also found in the poems by Tadgh Dall O hUiginn (d. 1591) who speaks of "Hercules of Western Europe" and of "Caesar of the scatheless hosts who loved the West of Europe".⁶⁵

In the obit in the *Chronicon Scottorum* (A.D. 1148) Saint Malachy was described as *caput religionis totius Hiberniae et Albaniæ*.⁶⁶ We may compare this expression with the curious note made by Probus saying Saint Patrick baptised *Scotiam atque Britanniam, Angliam et Normanniam caeterasque gentes insulanorum*. Colgan described this as an anachronism because the name of *Anglia* was not found before the ninth and that of *Normannia* not before the tenth century.⁶⁷ Probus recognised that those countries formed not only an historical but also a geographical unit. In virtue of both their position and their form, the peninsulas of Brittany and Normandy were reckoned to be what we are accustomed to call the British Isles and what—in analogy to the expression "the

⁶³ For editions of these Annals see Kenney, *op. cit.*, pp. 29 ff.

⁶⁴ Ed. O'Donovan (1864).

⁶⁵ Tr. Eleanor Knott, Irish Text Society,

XXIII (Dublin, 1921), pp. 38, 61 and 117.

⁶⁶ Ed. Hennessy (1866).

⁶⁷ Kenney, *op. cit.*, n° 139.

northern islands"—may be called "the western isles", that is, the realm of the Celtic Church. The entry for April 20th in the *Martyrology of Tallaght* clearly refers to this realm as a part, geographically, historically and ecclesiastically distinctive, of Europe.

In Irish literature this realm is often described as a still further subdivision of Europe. In the *Annals of Ulster* for A.D. 1020, Maelmuire, *cómarb* of Patrick (that is, of Armagh!) is described as "head of the clerics of all the North-West of Europe". Brian Boru (A.D. 1014) was called "Augustus of all the North-West of Europe"; in the corresponding entry the Four Masters speak of him as "Augustus of all the West of Europe", while the Danes are described as the "foreigners of the West of Europe". In a vaguer sense the title of "Augustus of all the North-West of Europe" is attributed by the *Annals of Ulster* (A.D. 1166) to Muircheardach Ua Lochlainn; the Four Masters said "of the West of the world" (*iarthar domhain*). In his obits in both the *Annals of Ulster* and the *Annals of the Four Masters* (A.D. 1505), Hugh Roe O'Donnell was called "Augustus of all the North-West of Europe". In both the spiritual and the secular sphere this term gradually lost its original significance and became a mere expression of Irish grandiloquence. When in his Irish *Vita*, Saint Brendan was called "head of the devotion of a great part of the world", the word "world" was practically equivalent to "Western Europe" or "North-Western Europe". With similar vagueness Oengus had already said that "the great festival" of Ciaran of Cluain "filleth countries".⁶⁸

Europe was equivalent to the patriarchate of Rome; Western Europe was practically the realm of the Gallican Church, of which the Celtic Church of North-Western Europe was regarded as an offshoot. The *solemnitas* on April 20th was *communis* in so far as it coordinated both *formaliter* and *materialiter* the commemoration of the Saints of North-Western Europe with that of the Saints of the Continent. The study of the Irish fore-runner(s) of the feast of All the Saints points to an aspect of the meaning of this feast which, while frequently overlooked, is of special significance in our days. All Saints is universal with regard to both its celebration and its object. It is the feast of all the Saints of the whole world and of all parts of the world. The raising of the Continental feasts of All Saints (of Europe and Africa) to a feast of all the Saints of the whole world must not be necessarily ascribed to Roman influence. It may have been due to the idea of spiritual completeness characteristic of devotion to the Saints in Irish monasticism. The fact that the first reference to a feast of All the Saints *absolute* was made within the realm of the Church of North-Western Europe, and the fact that the date to which this feast was assigned had a very special (unhistorical) significance within that realm, suggest that Irish influence in the constitution of All Saints was very considerable indeed.

The *Roman Martyrology* gives, therefore, a most exact account of the history of All Saints saying that this festival was instituted by Boniface IV, "when dedicating on May 13th the Pantheon to the Blessed Virgin and all the holy martyrs". It does not imply that this feast of All the Saints was then actually assigned to May 13th, though it would have been quite appropriate that this feast be assigned to a feast of the Queen of Martyrs or of all the Saints.⁶⁹ This statement does not even imply that the feast instituted by Boniface IV was actually a feast of all the Saints, for it continues: "Gregory IV later decreed that this same festival should be observed 1° in honour of all the Saints, 2° on this day (i.e. November

⁶⁸ *The Lives of Irish Saints*, ed. Plummer I, p. 44 and 20 note, and Henry Bradshaw Society Collection, XXIX, p. 193.

⁶⁹ See above, note 14. The expression *communis et generalis*, which in accordance with the *Parvum Romanum* and *Ado*, the

Roman Martyrology applies to the fore-runner of the universal feast of All the Saints, seems to be related with the expression *communis solemnitas* in the *Martyrology of Tallaght*.

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1st), 3° by the whole Church". The significant clause is inserted that this was done at a time when this feast had been observed *variis modis jam in diversis Ecclesiis*. The *diversi modi* in which this feast was observed and the conception of the regional structure of the Church underlying them appeared to deserve a closer study.

Up to What Point is God Included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?

J. OWENS C.Ss.R.

I. THE PROBLEM OF SCOTISTIC METAPHYSICS IN RELATION TO GOD

THE extent to which God enters into the metaphysics of Duns Scotus is not easy to determine. For the Franciscan Doctor, as for all the leading Christian thinkers of the Middle Ages, metaphysics was the science of Being.¹ It was the study of Being *qua* Being. For Scotus, as for his contemporaries, God was Being. God was the primary and perfect instance of Being. So God must necessarily be included in the science of Being. Yet certain presuppositions in the thought of Duns Scotus, as well as his treatment of this problem in particular, give rise to serious difficulties. These difficulties prompted an admiring but baffled scholiast to exclaim: "Surely, what the Doctor teaches in this question seem to surpass human ingenuity!"²

The troubles of the scholiast, Hugo Cavellus, arose immediately out of the manner in which Scotus treats this question. The only formal discussion of how God can be the subject of metaphysics, and of the aspect—within primary Being³—under which God is considered by the metaphysician, occurs in the conclusion of a controversy between the views of Avicenna and of Averroes.⁴ Yet Scotus gives no decision in this particular place. Hugo thinks that the arguments presented for the side of Averroes are most telling. But he knows that in the theological works the stand of Avicenna is decidedly championed. The problem, however, is not treated *ex professo* in the theological writings. In the metaphysical discussion, on the other hand, the Averroistic doctrine is presented with high intrinsic probability. These reasons, in Hugo's opinion, permit a loyal Scotist to follow the Commentator's view.⁵

Back of these difficulties are to be found some of the characteristic theses of Duns Scotus. The doctrines of the common nature, of the univocity of Being, of human metaphysics as intrinsically affected by the state of fallen nature, of the special way in which the most perfect natural concept of God is formed through the intrinsic mode of infinity,—all play a significant role in the background of the present question.

Moreover, the problem is posed—both in the formal discussion in the metaphysical *Quaestiones*,⁶ and in the occasional passing treatments in the theological

¹ A general discussion of this topic may be found in Franciscus Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, I, I, 1-30; in *Opera Omnia*, ed. Vivès (Paris, 1871), XXV, 2-12. Cf. especially n° 26, p. 11a.

² Ad dubium sextum disputat, quomodo esse et primitatem esse, demonstrat Metaphysicus de Deo; et ostendit ejusdem scientiae esse, demonstrare passionem communem simplicem de subiecto, et alteram partem passionis disjunctae, cuiusmodi est respectus entis, primum vel non primum. Certe, quae in hac quaestione tradit Doctor, videntur humanum ingenium superare; . . . Hugo Cavellus, *Scholia*, IX; in *Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia*, ed. Vivès (Paris, 1891-1895), VII, 35a.

³ *Quaestiones Subtilissimae super Libros*

Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, I, 1, 43; in *Opera Omnia*, t. VII, p. 33b. Text *infra*, n. 58.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1-49; pp. 11-37.

⁵ . . . et quamvis firmiter non resolvat cui sententiae inherendum sit, colligitur secundum ipsum, probabilem esse sententiam Averrois, quod Deus sit hujus scientiae objectum, pro qua, urgentissima adducit argumenta, eamque ultimo loco ponit. Tenet tamen q. 3. prolog. et clarius ibi in Reportens esse ejus objectum, et his quae in Theologia habet, magis standum est; quia tamen rem hanc ex professo in Theologia non tractat, sententiam hic positam juxta ipsius mentem licet tenere, et quia probabilissima est. Hugo Cavellus, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Quaest. Metaph.*, *loc. cit.*

works⁷—in terms of the Arabian controversy. This context involves the much controverted nature of the Aristotelian Primary Philosophy. To investigate this background is outside the limits of the present inquiry. Its scope must be restricted to determining, as far as possible, the extent to which the texts of Duns Scotus place God within the subject of metaphysics. The Aristotelian and Arabian backgrounds are necessary for an understanding of the problem involved. But they require a separate and much longer treatment.

II. THE SUBJECT OF THEOLOGY

The first step is to determine what may be accepted as certain. The exact point in controversy must be isolated and kept separate from allied questions that mark off and delimit the issue.

The first proposition that may be considered as certain, to the extent in which it is involved in the present discussion, is the subject of theology. For Duns Scotus the subject of theology is God. Theology, moreover, is the only science which can have God as its subject. This subject differs from the subjects of all other sciences in being *singular*. The subjects of the other sciences are all universal:

Si ulterius quaeritur, si Theologia sit distincta a scientiis Philosophicis? dicendum est quod sic; tum, quia habet aliquod subjectum formale aliud, quia subjectum illius est singulare. Secundum vero Aristotelem subjectum aliarum est aliquod universale. Tum quia hoc patet, discurrendo per alias scientias. . . Similiter, Deus non est subjectum in Metaphysica, ut praeostensum est, nec potest alia scientia de Deo esse quam ista, quia tantum una potest esse de ipso, ut prius probatum est.⁸

This is the formal difference between the subject of theology and the subjects of the other sciences. Duns Scotus says in other places that theology treats God under the aspect of Deity or of Divinity. Yet, when precisely explaining how that subject differs from other subjects, he gives as the formal reason the difference between singularity and universality.

The same difference is stressed in the larger commentary on the *Sentences*:

. . . omne attributum *ut hoc* potest *per se* sciri theologice de Deo, licet aliquod *ut confuse* cognitum sit metaphysice cognitum de ipso; sicut enim Deus sic et sic, id est *ut hic* et *ut confuse* cognitum, pertinet ad Theologicum et Metaphysicum, ita etiam quodlibet attributum sic et sumptum est quasi consideratio attributorum naturaliter a nobis intelligibilium est consideratio metaphysica; non sic autem attributa tantum convenientia huic essentiae *ut haec*, et non ei *ut a nobis nunc naturaliter intelligitur*, scilicet confuse.⁹

Theology treats the divine attributes in relation to the essence as singular—*ut haec*. The knowledge of the divine essence as singular pertains, therefore, only to theology. To men in the present state the divine essence is not known as *singular*, but confusedly in the knowledge of creatures. It is known only universally.—This text makes clear that God is not excluded from the consideration of the metaphysician. Even though God is not the subject—or, at least, not the primary subject—of metaphysics, nevertheless, through this science, He is known in the highest way naturally possible to men:

⁷ E. g., *Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV. Libros Magistri Sententiarium*, Prologus III, 7, 80, ed. M. F. Garcia (Quaracchi, 1912), I, 65-66; *Reportata Parisiensia*, Prologus III, 1, 22, ed. Vivès, in *Op. Om.* (1894), XXII, 46a. These two works will be referred to

as *Op. Ox.* and *Rep. Par.* respectively.

⁸ *Rep. Par.* Prologus III, 3, quaestiuncula 3, n° 15; t. XXII, p. 52b.

⁹ *Op. Ox.* Prologus III, 7, 78c; vol. I, p. 63. Text different in Wadding-Vivès.

. . . Deus vero non est subjectum primum in Metaphysica; est tamen consideratum in illa scientia nobilissimo modo quo potest in aliqua scientia considerari naturaliter acquisita.¹⁰

III. THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

God is not the subject of Metaphysics. Yet by the metaphysician He is considered in the most noble way possible to natural intelligence. How, then, is God brought under metaphysics?

Scotus defines the primary subject of a science as that which contains primarily within itself the virtual knowledge of whatever pertains to that science:

*Illud ergo dicitur primum subjectum scientiae, quod primo continet in se virtualiter notitiam pertinentium ad scientiam.*¹¹

The primary subject of a science must be such that, of itself, it virtually embraces all the possible knowledge contained in the science. The subject of metaphysics must be such that it virtually contains a knowledge of God; of God known not as this singular essence, but as apprehended in a universal and confused manner. God is attained in metaphysics according to some aspect which he possesses in common with everything else that metaphysics treats.

What is that common aspect? Scotus takes for granted that it is Being:

*Item, communiter in scientiis assignatur pro primo subjecto aliquod commune ad illa, ad quae se extendit scientia, sicut in Metaphysica ens; . . .*¹²

Ens is the subject of metaphysics. Scotus states this too often for any serious doubt regarding his own position. Concerning the relation of the First Being to the First Mover of the spheres, he invariably prefers the views of Avicenna to those of Averroes. In his theological works, accordingly, he considers metaphysics as primarily a science of Being and not precisely of separate Being.¹³ Scotus identifies the First Being and the First Mover, but only accidentally.¹⁴ So as far as his notion of metaphysics is concerned, he can proceed along the general lines marked off by Avicenna. The long discussion of the controversy at the beginning of the metaphysical *Quaestiones* must, therefore, be regarded as a school *disputatio* in which both sides of the question were treated problematically, but no decision given, at least in the extant text. The treatment in this discussion will have to be judged by the doctrines that are definitely established in the theological works.

Scotistic metaphysics has for its subject the Being which is common to God and creatures. The science must reach God through what is contained in that common notion of Being. Such is the way in which the above texts project the task of metaphysics in relation to God.

IV. THE METAPHYSICAL NOTIONS OF GOD

How is the concept of God reached from this common notion of Being? The Being common to God and creatures is a univocal notion:

*Deus non est a nobis cognoscibilis naturaliter nisi ens sit univocum creato et Increato.*¹⁵

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, n° 80b; p. 65.

¹¹ *Rep. Par.* Prologus I, 2, 5; t. XXII, p. 9a.

¹² *Ibid.* I, 2, 6; p. 10a. Cf. *Op. Ox.* Prologus III, 2, 59; vol. I, p. 49. In both places the statement occurs in an *objectio*, but the doctrine is accepted by Scotus.

¹³ Cf. Cyril L. Shircl, *The Univocity of the Concept of Being in the Philosophy of Duns Scotus* (Washington, 1942), pp. 91-94.

¹⁴ *Quaest. Metaph.* I, 1, 49; t. VII, p. 37a.

¹⁵ *Op. Ox.*, I, 3, 3, sectio 2, n° 328b; vol. I, p. 338.

This common and univocal concept is obtained from things in the way in which any common nature is known by the human intellect. The nature corresponding to the generic concept is seen as such in the thing. It is there as formally distinct from all other entities. The process of abstracting consists simply in viewing the generic nature separately from the other grades or modes.¹⁶ The notion of Being, it is true, is not technically a genus, because of the peculiar way in which it is predicated of its ultimate differences and of the transcendentals.¹⁷ But as far as it is applied to God and creatures, to substance and accident, Being is univocal and is treated by Duns Scotus after the manner of a common nature:

. . . sed intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo, quod sit *ens*, dubitando de ente *finito* vel *infinito*, *creato* vel *increato*: ergo conceptus *entis* de Deo est alius a conceptu isto vel illo, et ita neuter ex se, sed *in utroque illorum includitur*. . . . quilibet Philosophus fuit certus illud quod posuit esse primum principium esse *ens*, puta unus de *igne*, alius de *aqua*, certus erat quod erat *ens*: non autem fuit certus quod esset *ens creatum* vel *increatuum*, *primum* vel non *primum*; . . .¹⁸

Like any common nature, Being is *neutrūm ex se*, even when applied to God and creatures. It remains of itself identically the same concept. It is univocal. There is no question of rising to a higher type of Being when extending the concept to God. The notion remains univocally the same.

This is important for the study of the metaphysical Being attained in God. The concept taken from creatures does not have to be improved in its own nature. Its nature will not be changed. Whatever has to go with that concept in its application to God, must be something apart from the nature of Being itself. A somewhat accidental combination of notions seems foreshadowed in regard to the metaphysical concept of God.

In these texts Scotus is speaking of philosophical knowledge according to the present state of human nature. The first text refers to natural knowledge of God. The wording is only general and is not restricted to fallen nature. But the second text deals with the philosophical knowledge of the Greek Physicists, and so, necessarily, concerns the present state.

According to the text, the intellect of the *viator* can be certain that God is Being, while doubting whether that Being is finite or infinite. This need not presuppose that the notion of God as infinite Being is purely metaphysical, even though it happens to be possessed by the *viator*. The notion itself could be based in some way upon revelation. The process of how the concept of infinite Being is reached must be carefully studied.

How is the concept of infinite Being formed by men in their present state? It seems to be reached in the same way as all other like notions proper to God. A number of concepts taken from creatures extend univocally to God, just as in the case of Being. In regard to the notion of the good, Scotus explains the text of St. Augustine in this fashion:

Hoc est, tolle illa contrahentia rationem boni ad creaturas, et vide rationem boni in *communi*, et in hoc videbis Deum, sicut in conceptu *communi*, in quo potest naturaliter a nobis videri, et non in *particulari*, *ut haec essentia*.¹⁹

The metaphysical procedure in reaching G-d is described:

Omnis inquisitio metaphysica de Deo procedit sic: scilicet considerando

¹⁶ Cf. *Op. Ox.* II, 3, 1, n° 238a; vol. II, pp. 230-231.

¹⁷ *Op. Ox.* I, 3, 3, 2, sectio 2, n° 386a; vol. I, pp. 342-344. The Scotistic terminology is "univocus ut determinabilis vel ut denominata-

bilis" (*loc. cit.*, n°. 384a, p. 340) for these non-generic types of concepts.

¹⁸ *Op. Ox.* I, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 346b; vol. I, pp. 309-310.

¹⁹ *Op. Ox.* I, 3, 5, 396b; vol. I, p. 354.

formalem rationem alicujus, et auferendo ab illa ratione formalis imperfectionem quam haberet in creaturis, et reservando illam rationem formalem, et attribuendo sibi omnino summam perfectionem, et sic attribuendo illud Deo.²⁰

Even though all the notions employed are common, *proper* concepts of God are nevertheless attained:

Quarto dico, quod ad multos conceptus proprios de Deo possumus pervenire, qui non convenientur creaturis: cuiusmodi sunt conceptus *omnium perfectionum simpliciter in summo*, et *perfectissimus* conceptus, in quo quasi in quadam descriptione *perfectissime cognoscimus Deum*, concipiendo *omnes perfectiones simpliciter et in summo*.²¹

Further examples of such concepts proper to God are Necessary Being, Infinite Being, and the Supreme Good:

. . . potest enim in intellectu nostro esse aliquis conceptus de Deo dictus, non communis sibi et creaturae, puta *necessario ens*, vel *ens infinitum*, vel *summum bonum*, et de tali conceptu possumus praedicare *esse* eo modo quo a nobis concipitur.²²

Infinite Being is included among the proper concepts of God that are based upon the metaphysical notion of Being.

From the way in which the metaphysical concepts of God are formed, one point is sufficiently clear. No proper concept of this type is *simpliciter simplex*:

nullus autem conceptus quem habemus de Deo proprius sibi et non conveniens creaturae est simpliciter simplex, vel saltem nullus quem nos *distincte percipimus* esse proprium Deo est simpliciter simplex; . . . quemcumque conceptum concipimus, sive boni, sive veri, si non contrahatur per aliquid ut non sit conceptus simpliciter simplex, ut dicendo *summum bonum*, vel *infinitum bonum*, vel *increatuum*, vel *immensum*, et sic de aliis, nullus talis est proprius conceptus Deo.²³

This text describes the formation of the concepts proper to God. They are *complex* notions formed by combining simple concepts.

Of all the concepts proper to God and accessible to the intellect of the *viator*, the most perfect is “infinite Being”. Is this concept, just as the other concepts proper to God, formed by combining separate notions? Scotus explains its nature:

Tamen conceptus *perfectior* et *simplicior* nobis possibilis est conceptus *entis simpliciter infiniti*. Iste est *simplicior* quam conceptus *entis boni*, vel *entis veri*, vel aliquorum similiūm; quia infinitum non est *quasi attributum* vel *passio entis* sive *eius de quo dicitur*, sed dicit *modum intrinsicum* illius *entitatis*: ita quod cum dico *ens infinitum*, non habeo conceptum *quasi per accidens ex subiecto et passione*, sed conceptum *per se subiecti in certo gradu perfectionis*, scilicet *infinitatis*: sicut *albedo intensa* non dicit conceptum *per accidens*, sicut *albedo visibilis*, imo *intensio* dicit gradum *intrinsecum* *albedinis* in se. Et ita patet *simplicitas* hujus conceptus, scilicet *ens infinitum*.²⁴

No extra attribute is added in the case of ‘infinite Being’, but only an intrinsic mode of the same perfection. Does that mean that the concept of infinite Being, unlike the other proper concepts of God, is simple in the sense that it is not formed by a quasi-mechanical combination of simple notions?

²⁰ Op. Ox. I, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 346g; vol. I, p. 185.
p. 311. ²¹ Ibid. n° 216c; pp. 186-187.
²² Op. Ox. I, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 348a; vol. I, p. 313. ²⁴ Op. Ox. I, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 348b; vol. I, p. 313.
²³ Op. Ox. I, 2, 1 and 2, sectio 1, n° 215;

The text does not warrant any such conclusion. Duns Scotus aims to show merely a *relative* simplicity in the concept of infinite Being. It is simpler than the other proper concepts of God, because those others combine different attributes. "Infinite Being" adds no different notion, properly speaking, but only an intrinsic mode. Yet for Scotus an intrinsic mode is an additional mode. It does not pertain to the nature as such. It is something superadded. From this particular point of view the situation does not really differ from the formation of the other concepts proper to God. In the case of "infinite Being" two concepts univocally common to God and creatures are combined to form a notion proper only to God. Duns Scotus explains this in detail.

Respondeo, quod loquendo de conceptu simpliciter simplici, nullum conceptum proprium de Deo possumus naturaliter cognoscere sed solum talem conceptum communem sibi et creaturis, in quo a creaturis non distinguitur. Sed quia possumus multos tales conceptus communes Deo et creaturis abstrahere a creaturis, et ipsos sic abstractos concipere, unum etiam illorum per alium determinare, ideo sic possumus cognoscere Deum secundum aliquem ~~cum~~ ^{cum} conceptum sibi proprium, non simpliciter simplicem, sed secundum conceptum resolutibilem in duos conceptus simpliciter simplices. Verbi gratia, a creatura possumus abstrahere conceptum *bonitatis vel boni*, similiter conceptum *summi*, cum non sit processus in infinitum, et ita componendo apprehendo conceptum *boni summi*, quod est proprium Dei, et convenit tantum Deo. Sic etiam de ente infinito, quamvis enim uterque conceptus simpliciter simplex sit communior conceptu Dei, conveniens univoce Deo et creaturis, tamen post determinationem uterque conceptus particularisatur, et fit conceptus proprius Deo, sic quod solum illi convenit.²⁵

The notion "infinite Being" is formed in the same general way as the other concepts proper to God. No distinction is made in the construction of these various concepts. Two univocally common notions are combined and so particularized to God. There seems to be something quite mechanical in this process. Yet is not all of a piece with the main theses of Scotistic epistemology? The work of the active intellect consists merely in viewing common natures separately from one another. The intellect does not elaborate sense data, nor raise anything whatsoever to a higher plane. It leaves the immediate object of cognition in exactly the same mode of Being. There is no rising to any higher type of Being.²⁶

Such a concept of infinite Being, even though the most perfect notion of God naturally obtainable, must be of very slight value. It is simply a quasi-mechanical combination of two concepts taken from creatures. Joined together these concepts are limited in extent to God alone. But in comprehension they add nothing over and above what they each contained singly, and in which nothing is proper to God. What kind of knowledge can such a concept give? The combination limits the concept to God, but reveals absolutely nothing about the divine essence in its singularity:

Sic in proposito, possum abstrahere conceptum a creatura, qui communis est Deo et creaturae, licet a conceptu proprio Dei illum conceptum communem abstraherem; et sic verum est quod in conjungendo illos simul, tantum convenit ille conceptus totalis Deo, quem possum cognoscere, licet non cognoscam hanc essentiam, ut haec est, cui convenit talis conceptus. Sic igitur patet qualem conceptum proprium possumus de Deo naturaliter

²⁵ Rep. Par. I, 3, 2, 10; t. XXII, pp. 96-97.

²⁶ In this respect the Scotistic procedure is open to the Aristotelian indictment of Plato's philosophy. No new natures are

reached in the supersensible order. The Platonic Forms are merely sensible natures plus certain characteristics. Aristotle, Metaph. B. 2, 997b 5-12; Z 16, 1040b 32-34.

cognoscere, et qualem non, quia conceptum omnino simplicem de Deo et sibi proprium non possumus cognoscere.²⁷

The notion of infinite Being, according to the formation just described, is not properly on the theological level. It has, as yet, nothing to do with the divine essence *ut haec*. It seems entirely natural in its construction. Duns Scotus has spoken of it as a natural way of knowing God. He seems to give it the same status as the other notions proper to God but metaphysical in origin.

In one text, moreover, Scotus expressly states that the metaphysician reaches the particular concept of Being proper to God by reasoning from finite Being to infinite Being, just as from caused Being to uncaused, and from possible to necessary Being:

... praemissa media ad concludendum quodcumque proprium de Deo est aliqua propositio particularis affirmans de ente particulariter aliquod praedicatum, quod competit enti creato, et ex tali praemissa concludit Metaphysicus de ente particulariter praedicatum proprium de Deo, utpote si arguitur: Aliquod ens est causatum; ergo aliquod ens est causa non causata; vel aliquod ens est finitum, ergo aliquod ens est infinitum; vel aliquod ens est possibile, ergo aliquod est necessarium.²⁸

According to this text, the *metaphysician* reasons to the notion of infinite Being as proper to God. The reasoning is put upon the same plane as the process of reaching the other metaphysical notions proper to God, such as necessary Being and uncaused Being. In the texts already considered²⁹, as well as in other places³⁰, Scotus speaks of 'infinite Being' in the same way as he treats those other metaphysical notions proper to God. In the present text is a formal assertion that the province of the metaphysician includes these notions. There seems little doubt, therefore, that Scotus regularly looks upon 'infinite Being' as a proper metaphysical notion of God. God as infinite Being is in some way included in the science of metaphysics.

Likewise, Scotus has formally stated that the notion of infinite Being is constructed in approximately the same way as the notion of primary Being or highest good. The notion of common Being, in which God is confusedly conceived, is taken with the addition of some more special perfection or mode, such as highest or first or infinite. Then the concept becomes proper to God. The original concept still remains common, but is understood under the aspect of the more special addition, and so is restricted to God. Scotus is speaking of natural knowledge in the present state.³¹

Breviter dico, quod quodcumque transcendens per abstractionem a creatura cognita, potest in sua indifferentia intelligi, et tunc concipitur Deus quasi confuse, sicut animali intellecto, homo intelligitur. Sed si tale transcendens in communi intelligitur sub ratione alicujus specialioris perfectionis, puta summum, vel primum, vel infinitum, jam habetur conceptus sic Deo proprius, quod nulli ali convenit.³²

Both the general perfection of Being and the more special perfection are considered as abstracted from sensible things:

Tertio potest idem ostendi, quia abstractio entis ab hoc ente, et summi

²⁷ Rep. Par. I, 3, 2, 10; t. XXII, p. 97.

²⁸ Quaestiones Quodlibetales, VII, 12; in Op. Om., ed. Vivès, XXV, 294.

²⁹ Supra, nn. 18-25.

³⁰ E. g., Quodl. XIV, 3; t. XXVI, pp. 5-6.

VII, 12; t. XXV, pp. 293-294.

³¹ ... ex perfectione naturali etiam quam habet in isto statu. Quodl. XIV, 3; t. XXVI, p. 5.

³² Ibid. pp. 5-6.

ab hoc summo in sensibilibus est naturalis, et ista duo sibi conjuncta non habent repugnantiam, propter quod ratio ista, *ens summum* . . .³³

It seems quite evident, then, that the notion 'infinite Being' is reached by the *metaphysician* in the same way as any metaphysical concept proper to God. Two simple notions from sensible things are combined to form a notion restricted to God alone. In another place, Scotus states explicitly that God can be proved as infinite Being in *metaphysics*, just as he can be demonstrated under the other uncontested metaphysical aspects:

Item ex omni proprietate manifesta in effectu potest concludi causam esse, si non inest nisi ratione talis causae; sed non solum hujusmodi proprietates effectus considerantur in *Physica*, quae solum convenient Deo, sed etiam in *Metaphysica*, quia non solum motum praesupponit movens, sed *ens posterius* praesupponit prius; igitur ex prioritate in entibus potest concludi primum *ens esse*, et hoc perfectius quam ex motu concluditur in *physica* primum movens esse. Unde ex actu et potentia, finitate et infinitate, multitudine et unitate, et ex multis talibus, quae sunt proprietates et passiones *Metaphysicae* potest concludi in *Metaphysica* Deum esse, sive primum *ens esse*.³⁴

Besides the former statement³⁵ that the *metaphysician* reasons from finite to infinite Being, there is here the explicit assertion that this is done in *metaphysics*.

These texts may seem to prove satisfactorily that God is included in human metaphysics under the aspect of infinite Being. But there is a further consideration entering the problem. Duns Scotus maintains that any reasoning process must presuppose some kind of concept of the term at which it is to arrive.³⁶ Could it not be that the *metaphysician* who reasons to God as infinite Being must first have that notion of 'infinite Being' from revelation? Once he is given the notion, he can prove rationally that there is such a Being. Some of the texts just considered are located in a discussion of the Trinity. Scotus was showing that a Christian and an infidel arguing about the Trinity have the same simple notions. The whole problem concerns their union into one complex concept.³⁷ Could it not be that although the *metaphysician* has the two simple concepts of Being and infinity, he would never, as a matter of fact, arrive at combining them into a proper notion of God, at least in the present state?

This raises a difficult problem. It means that an argument can be entirely rational, and yet be impossible without revelation. The fact that the *metaphysician*, who has learned certain concepts from revelation, can demonstrate rationally those same concepts, need not necessarily prove that those concepts are properly metaphysical, at least for metaphysics in the present state.

The texts studied so far have shown that the *metaphysician* demonstrates God as infinite Being, and that he develops the concept and the reasoning process in the same way as in the case of other notions proper to God, such as primary Being or necessary Being. These latter are found in the pagan philosophers, and so are undoubtedly metaphysical notions. But can infinite Being, as applied to God, be found in these ancient philosophers? There is still the possibility that although the *metaphysician* now uses the notion of infinite Being, he has nevertheless obtained that notion not from metaphysics but from revelation. In this case one could not absolutely say that God enters into present metaphysics under the aspect of infinite Being. All that could be asserted is that, once the *metaphysician* has been given the concept of infinite Being by revelation, he can apply to it his proper reasoning processes.

³³ *Ibid.*, n° 4; p. 6a.

³⁸ *Op. Ox.* I, 3, 1 and 2, 4, 346f; vol. I, p. 311;

³⁴ *Rep. Par.*, *Prologus III*, 1; t. XXII, pp.

7, n° 367b; pp. 327-328.

⁴⁶⁻⁴⁷

³⁷ *Quodl. XIV*, 4; t. XXVI, p. 6.

³⁵ *Supra*, n. 28.

Accordingly, the fact that Duns Scotus actually proves the infinity of God by rational arguments³⁸ does not necessarily mean that the notion of God as infinite Being is originally metaphysical, at least for men in their present state. The origin of that notion, which is presupposed by the reasoning process, still remains a question. The answer can be found only by examining the knowledge of the philosophers who were unaided by divine revelation. Did these thinkers have any notion of God as infinite Being?

V. THE TWO-FOLD SENSE OF INFINITE BEING

At least one sense of 'infinite Being' was known to these philosophers:

Hic primo ponenda est significatio nominis *infiniti* quae videtur esse ista: *quod infinitum est, quod quocumque finitum datum ultra omnem proportionem excedit, ut albedo infinita excedit quocumque album finitorum graduum ultra omnem proportionem; sic autem intelligendo infinitum convenientur omnes tam Sancti quam Philosophi, quod primum ens simpliciter sit actu infinitum; quod patet per Philosophum tertio Physicorum text. 30.* qui ait omnes concedere primum principium esse infinitum, et omnia continere; . . .³⁹

In this text from the *Reportata*, the Philosophers, as contrasted with the Sacred Writers, are said to understand infinite Being in the sense in which it is applied to the primary Being. Aristotle is cited as an authority.⁴⁰ The notion of infinite Being is illustrated by the example of whiteness. This same example was used to show how the most perfect concept of God in the present state is formed.⁴¹ According to this text, the notion of Being used in the metaphysical arguments can be wholly natural in origin. It can be an entirely metaphysical notion.

The problem of the divine omnipotence is discussed by Scotus in terms of infinity. The metaphysical concept of infinite Being is not a sufficient basis for the omnipotence of God:

Nunc autem conceptus simplex perfectissimus, ad quem attingit Metaphysicus de Deo, non includit evidenter veritates ordinates ad istam: *Deus est omnipotens utroque modo, quia Philosophi multi attingentes, ut supponitur, ad conceptus perfectissimos possiles viatori ex naturalibus de Deo, ad notitiam hujus veritatis attingere non potuerunt; quod tamen fuisse eis possibile, si tales conceptum simplicem habuisset, imo fuisse eis quasi necessarium . . .*⁴²

The two-fold sense is omnipotence in regard to every possible effect immediately, and omnipotence without reference to its mediacy or immediacy. The first cannot be naturally demonstrated, the second can.⁴³ Omnipotence in the theological sense cannot be proven by reason. It is accepted only through revelation:

Licet ergo omnipotentiam propriam dictam secundum intentionem Theologorum tantummodo creditam esse et non naturali ratione credam posse probare, . . .⁴⁴

The notion of the infinite, as acquired by natural reason, is not sufficient to explain the omnipotence of God:

³⁸ *Op. Ox. I, 2, 1 and 2, 206 ff.; vol. I, p. 179 ff.; Rep. Par., I, 2, 3, 2-8; t. XXII, pp. 69-73.*

³⁹ *Rep. Par. I, 2, 3, 2; t. XXII, p. 69b.*

⁴⁰ *Aristotle, Ph. III, 4, 203b 4-7.*

⁴¹ *Supra*, n. 24.

⁴² *Quodl. VII, 12; t. XXV, pp. 293-294. Cf. ibid., n° 11, p. 293b.*

⁴³ *Ibid., n° 3; p. 284b.*

⁴⁴ *Op. Ox. I, 2, 1 and 2, 2, sectio 2, 252f; vol. I, p. 211.*

Verum est ergo, quod suprema potentia activa, sive potentia infinita, est omnipotentia, sed non est notum per rationem naturalem, quod suprema potentia possibilis etiam intensive infinita, sit omnipotentia proprie dicta, quae, scilicet potest in quocumque possibile immediate.⁴⁵

In fact, the philosophical principles lead rather to a denial of omnipotence in this sense:

Concedo ergo, quod Aristoteles secundum sua principia negaret Deum multa posse immediate causare, . . .⁴⁶

Infinite Being, therefore, can be understood in a two-fold sense: in one sense, it is sufficient to serve as a basis for the proper omnipotence of God and in this sense it is known only by revelation; in another sense, it can prove the divine omnipotence only in a general aspect that does not require immediacy. The latter acceptance must be the sense in which the notion of infinite Being is common alike to the Sacred Writers and to the Philosophers. So understood, infinite Being is entirely a metaphysical notion, in origin as well as in use.

The possibility of this two-fold sense of 'infinite Being' has a definite basis. The natural understanding of the infinite is not comprehensive. The human intellect can penetrate the 'infinite' in greater or lesser degrees:

. . . intellectio alicujus infiniti *intensive* non includit infinitatem actus, quia non oportet actum habere talem modum realem quallem habet objectum, quia actus sub ratione finiti potest esse ad objectum sub ratione infiniti; nisi esse actus *comprehensivus*: et concedo quod tale actum circa objectum infinitum non habemus, nec est possibilis nobis habere.⁴⁷

Accordingly, the human concept of infinite Being is not comprehensive. It can be had in different degrees, one of which is purely natural, while the others require revelation. The naturally acquired notion, being merely a combining of the notions of 'Being' and 'infinite' as found in sensible things, cannot yield any knowledge which is absent from those simple notions. It cannot prove the immediacy of the divine omnipotence, nor the triune character of the divine nature, both of which are contained in the divine infinity as known through revelation.⁴⁸

VI. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE THEOLOGICAL WORKS

The above texts, taken from the theological works of Duns Scotus, establish the following conclusions:

- (a) God is not properly the subject of metaphysics.
- (b) The subject of metaphysics is Being, which is univocal to God and creatures after the manner of a common nature. It includes God virtually and confusedly, as 'animal' includes 'man'.
- (c) Being, which is the subject of metaphysics, includes God as first Being, necessary Being and the like. These notions are proper to God. They are obtained by adding more special concepts to the general concept of Being.
- (d) The *metaphysician* argues from finite Being to infinite Being. The demonstration of the Being of God on the basis of finitude and infinity takes place in *metaphysics*. These statements are explicit in the text.
- (e) The concept of infinite Being is natural in origin, even in the present state. It is formed by taking the general concept of Being and joining with it the more

⁴⁵ *Quodl.* VII, 32; t. XXV, p. 309.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, n° 26; p. 304b.

⁴⁷ *Op. Ox.* I, 3, 1 and 2, 5, 352; vol. I, p. 317.

⁴⁸ In divinis attributum praedicatur in concreto de attributo, ut Deus sapiens est bonus;

et relativum de relativo, cui non opponitur, ut Pater est ingenitus, propter infinitatem essentiae cui sunt idem. *Rep. Par.* I, 8, 4, 2; t. XXII, p. 165a.

particular concept of 'infinite'. Both these concepts are taken from sensible things. The combined concept is limited in extension to God, but has no more comprehension than the content of the two original simple notions. This concept was known to the pagan philosophers.

(f) This concept of infinite Being, though the most perfect naturally possible to men, does not reveal the divine essence *ut haec est*.

(g) This notion of infinite Being is not attained comprehensively. Of itself, it can extend to things beyond natural comprehension. It can be attained naturally by the metaphysician in a way proper to metaphysics. In other aspects, such as the foundation of the triune nature or of the immediacy of the divine omnipotence, it is not attainable by metaphysics, but belongs solely to Theology.

VII. THE DISCUSSION IN THE METAPHYSICAL QUAESTIONES

The data collected from relevant passages scattered throughout the theological works should provide sufficient light to examine the formal Scotistic discussion of the problem. Though the treatment in the metaphysical *Quaestiones* remains strictly problematical and reaches no final decision, it should furnish materials that can be correctly assessed and determined through the knowledge yielded by the theological studies.

Having discussed the positions of Avicenna and Averroes, Scotus states how God may be considered the subject of metaphysics:

His sic pertractatis, videndum est de principali proposito, quomodo scilicet Deus potest esse subjectum Metaphysicae? Et dicendum quod supposita distinctione scientiae, prout dicitur habitus conclusionis, et prout dicitur aggregatio multorum habituum, tam principiorum quam conclusionum, aliquam tamen convenientiam habentium, . . . quod Deus potest esse subjectum hujus scientiae, primo modo *propter quid*, tam secundum responsionem ad secundam rationem principalem, secundum opinionem Commentatoris, quam secundum illam additionem superius positam ad impediendam rationem primam factam contra opinionem Commentatoris. Quoniam sicut ibi dictum est: Si prius naturaliter ad aliud potest esse medium sciendi posterius naturaliter et aliud, hoc non est in quantum aliud, quia hoc accidit, sed in quantum hoc, ut ibi patet; et ideo non cogit illa ratio prima facta contra opinionem Commentatoris. Similiter potest esse subjectum primo modo in scientia *quia*. Supposito enim quid dicitur per nomen, si tale est causa talis effectus, ex effectu potest concludi tale et esse ex esse, et hoc ex hoc, tam quantum ad essentialia quam quantum ad proprietates, et hoc demonstratione *quia*; sed nihil sic de ipso potest concludi effectu, nisi illud sit sine quo non potest esse talis effectus.⁴⁰

Metaphysics in this context is considered from two viewpoints. It may be taken as a habit of conclusions. Or it may be taken as a body of truths, both principles and conclusions. In present day language, the first sense is subjective, the second is objective.

According to both considerations there is a sense in which God may be considered the subject of metaphysics. The form of speech used is the *dicendum*, the formula for introducing the magisterial *determinatio* of a scholastic disputation. The question to be determined is not whether God is the subject of metaphysics absolutely, but in what sense He may be considered that subject. Scotus continually uses the formula *potest esse* in giving his answers. The sense seems to be that God is not, absolutely speaking, the subject of metaphysics; yet in what senses may He nevertheless be considered the subject of the science?

The first way in which God may be considered the subject of metaphysics is

⁴⁰ *Quaest. Metaph.* I, 39; t. VII, p. 31.

in the way mentioned in reply to a reason advanced for the opinion of Averroes.⁵⁰ The answer is as follows:

"Ad secundam rationem principalem dicitur, quod Deus habet multas proprietates, ut *esse appetibile*, *esse immobile*, *esse perpetuum*, et *primum movens*, et hujusmodi; haec autem posterius aliquo modo concipiuntur secundum se, quam essentia Dei absolute, quia dicunt respectum ad extra."⁵¹

The divine essence can be considered as the root of the properties mentioned, and so these properties can be demonstrated *propter quid* from the divine essence. In this way God can be the subject of metaphysics. The doctrine has to be understood in the light of the different types of metaphysics presently to be considered. In a later *dubitatio*, Scotus shows that in the metaphysics now possible to men there is no *propter quid* knowledge, because the present knowledge of the divine essence is only *quia*.⁵²

The 'addition' referred to and quoted verbatim in the text, is that something naturally prior does not necessarily have to be found in a different thing.⁵³

In the sense of a habit of reasoning, consequently, metaphysics may have God as its subject both *propter quid* and *quia*. It may also have God as its subject when it is considered as a body of knowledge:

Potest etiam esse subjectum scientiae secundo modo dictae, vel quae tantum aggregat conclusiones de Deo *propter quid*, vel *quia* ostensas; et talis scientia, si qua esset, esset una, maxime in illo genere, unitate subjecti; vel quae aggregat multas conclusiones et principia de Deo et de aliis attributis ad ipsum, ut ad primum, in quantum ad ipsum attribuuntur; et talis esset una ex unitate subjecti, non sicut prior, sed *quia* ad rationem subjecti alia attribuuntur, cum consideratio illa de aliquo, sit simpliciter prima, quae considerat ipsum sub prima ratione sub *qua est* considerabile. Et ens causatum (licet sit univocum sub ratione primi entis) considerari potest in quantum attribuitur, et ita prima consideratio de omnibus entibus erit talis in quantum attribuuntur ad primum ens, non ad substantiam; . . .⁵⁴

If there were a metaphysical science which grouped conclusions only about God, it would be a single science on account of its subject. In this way God would be the subject of such a metaphysics. Or if the science grouped conclusions and principles not only about God, but also about other things in so far as they are attributed to God as primary, such a metaphysics would have God as its subject. God would be the notion under which everything in the science is considered.⁵⁵

Viewed in this way, metaphysics can be either *propter quid* or *quia*. But for men in their present state, it can be only *quia*:

. . . igitur si Metaphysica est prima scientia, erit scientia de omnibus secundam hanc rationem; aut igitur considerantur ibi in quantum attributa, *quia* ex notitia Dei ibi cognoscuntur; aut *quia* ex eorum notitia Deus cognoscitur. Primo modo esset ista de Deo, et esset scientia *propter quid*. Secundo modo, *quia*. Primo modo, natae essent istae res cognosci, et haec scientia esset prima de eis, *quia* est de eis in quantum attribuuntur ad simpliciter primum, non sic quod ibi non cognoscerentur res omnes secundum propriam essentiam, (aliter enim non cognoscerentur) sed cognitio essentiae eorum haberetur

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* n°2; p. 12a.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* n°9; p. 15a.

⁵² *Ibid.* n° 46; pp. 34-35.

⁵³ *Ibid.* n° 12; p. 17a.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* n° 40; p. 31b.

⁵⁵ This was the traditional Greek interpretation of the Aristotelian Primary Philos-

ophy. Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *In Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1891), pp. 245.29-246.13; Asclepius, *In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libros A-Z Commentaria*, ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1888), p. 232.2-10.

inquantum attribuuntur ad ipsum Deum. Talem Metaphysicam habet Deus, . . .

Secundo modo tantum potest homo nunc Metaphysicam habere, (quidquid sit de notitia naturali beati, vel in statu innocentiae) quia nunc omnis nostra cognitio oritur ex sensu, tantum igitur sic potuit tradi a Philosopho. Potest igitur prima scientia possibilis homini, per rationem naturalem acquiri, et poni scientia *quia*, et de Deo ut de subjecto primo, et de omni ente ut de materia inquantum attribuitur ad primum ens, . . .⁶⁶

Of themselves things can be known through a metaphysical knowledge of God. But this is not possible in a state where knowledge originates in sensible cognition.

God could easily be the subject of a metaphysics in the first sense. From the knowledge of God known directly as Being would be derived the knowledge of all other things under the aspect of Being. Such knowledge would be *propter quid*. God would be known directly and first, and the other things through Him.

But how can God be considered as the subject of a metaphysics in which He is not known *previousely* to things? Scotus answers that just as in *quia* reasoning all that is presupposed is the nominal definition of the subject, so in *quia* science, considered as a body of knowledge, nothing more need be known of the subject:

Sicut enim in scientia *quia*, *proprie dicta*, non praesupponitur de subjecto, nisi tantum quid dicitur per nomen, et concluditur tam esse quam quid est, ut praedictum est, similiter potest esse in scientia *quia* aggregata; quod enim in alia scientia posset probari Deum esse *quia*, et non in tali, esset inconveniens.⁶⁷

The result of the whole discussion is that an intellect which knew God directly as Being could have God as the subject of its metaphysics. In an intellect which knows God only through sensible cognition, God can be considered the subject of metaphysics in so far as He is seen, through *quia* knowledge, to be the source of subsequent knowledge about things considered in the science.

All this does not bring God any further into present metaphysical knowledge. In point of fact, metaphysics in the state of fallen nature must begin with the notion of Being found in sensible things. This notion, univocal with the Being of God, has to be the subject of present metaphysics. The views given by Scotus in the problematical discussion merely show how metaphysics can be looked upon from the various points of view which will give to God the role of subject. But simply speaking, God is not its subject. The discussion, then, does not bring God any further into our metaphysics than do the texts in the theological works which say that Being as Being, and not God, is the subject of metaphysics.

In the *dubitaciones* which follow the discussion, Scotus formulates in precise terms the question at issue. He asks under what aspect God can be considered the subject of metaphysics:

Item secunda dubitatio, quae est illa ratio in primo ente secundum quam consideratur, ut per se subjectum in Metaphysica.

Ad hoc dicendum, quod non est ratio naturaliter cognoscibilis; . . .⁶⁸

The response is entirely negative in character. 'Natural' is used in the sense of *physical* knowledge. The aspect cannot be physical. It cannot be any *ratio* knowable through the science of nature. But no positive answer is given.

Scotus declares, however, that metaphysical knowledge of God is only accidentally of God as such, though less so than physical knowledge:

⁶⁶ *Quaest. Metaph.* I, 40-41; t. VII, pp. 31-32.
⁶⁷ *Ibid.* n° 41; p. 32.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* n° 43-44; p. 33b.

. . . igitur Metaphysica et naturalis scientia sunt de eodem per accidens; sed de Deo est naturalis magis per accidens, quia summa descriptio, ad quam pervenit de ipso, quasi remotior est a quidditate Dei, quam summa Metaphysici.⁵⁹

The highest metaphysical notion—or rather ‘description’, for all such metaphysical notions of God are only combinations of concepts—is only accidental to God as such, to the divine essence as *haec*.

Must one say, then, that the notion ‘infinite Being’ is *accidental* to the divine essence as such? That ‘infinite Being’ in one sense is really accidental to the divine essence as *haec*, seems stated in a text previously considered.⁶⁰ None of the metaphysical notions—‘infinite Being’ expressly included—imply the divine nature as *haec*.

Yet in treating the question of human theology, Scotus says of the notion ‘*ens infinitum*’:

. . . non est primum subjectum dans *evidentiam*, sed est subjectum primum *continens omnes veritates*, *natum dare evidentiam*, si ipsum cognosceretur.⁶¹

If it were known, infinite Being would contain all theological truths. But neither in itself, nor much less as actually attained by men, does the notion ‘infinite Being’ contain these truths:

. . . quia non continet habitum nostrum virtualiter *in se*, nec multo magis *ut nobis nota* continet ipsum habitum.⁶²

This requires the two-fold sense of infinite Being. The concept, as formed by men and known to men, does not contain any theological truths within itself. It is accidental to them. Yet it can substitute as the primary notion in human theology. To it all theological truths can be referred. But if it were knowable to the fullest extent implied by its terms, it would *contain* all the theological truths. It would be known comprehensively. Only in this way do the above apparently contradictory texts express a consistent doctrine.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The conclusion must be that God enters present human metaphysics according to all the naturally-formed concepts proper to Him. These concepts are formed by combining the notion of Being taken from sensible things with other notions derived from the same source. Such are ‘first Being’, ‘necessary Being’ and the like. Such also is ‘infinite Being’, the most perfect concept of God naturally possible. The concept of infinite Being, as formed through combining notions taken from sensible things, is strictly metaphysical not only in its usage, but also in its origin. As such it is only *per accidens* to God. But because it does not of itself imply any limits, it is capable of a wider comprehension through revelation, and so can serve as the primary knowable object for the science of truths concerning the Blessed Trinity, the immediacy of the divine omnipotence and other strictly revealed doctrines. In this sense it can substitute as the object of human theology. But in this sense infinite Being is not naturally knowable. Only in the sense actually knowable to men does infinite Being pertain entirely to present metaphysics.

An objection at once arises. This conclusion makes the demonstrations of infinite Being in the theological works of Duns Scotus not only rational but also *metaphysical* as well as theological. Scotus himself—again in the *Reportata*—gives

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* n° 49; p. 37a.
⁶⁰ *Supra*, nn. 25 and 27.

⁶¹ *Op. Ox.* Prologus III, 4, 70; vol. I, p. 56.
⁶² *Ibid.*

the answer to this objection. Such demonstrations pertain to both sciences—to theology as *propter quid* conclusions, to metaphysics as *quia* knowledge:

Sic in proposito, omnes veritates secundum se scibiles de Deo *propter quid*, sciuntur in illa scientia, quae est de Deo secundum se sub ratione divinitatis, et ideo omnes veritates, quas Metaphysicus vere probat de Deo, simpliciter pertinent ad illam scientiam; sed *quia* Metaphysica probat illas ex effectibus et demonstratione *quia sunt*, ideo secundum *quid* ad Metaphysicam pertinent. . . . Metaphysica, quantum ad illud, quod de Deo considerat, est simpliciter scientia *quia*; sed scientia simpliciter *quia* est secundum *quid propter quid*; ideo ad Metaphysicam secundum *quid* pertinent illae veritates.⁶⁸

In the procedure of Duns Scotus, therefore, God enters strictly metaphysical demonstration even under the most perfect concept naturally obtainable. This concept is infinite Being. But infinite Being is not known comprehensively by men. It leaves room for a fuller sense in which its concept may serve as substitute for the object of a still higher science, revealed theology.

Such at least seems to be the conception back of the Scotistic texts as now available. The decisive statements of this doctrine, it is true, are found only in the *Reportata*. But in the other theological works 'infinite Being' is consistently given the same status as other undoubtedly metaphysical concepts. This constant usage of Duns Scotus seems explicable only in the light of the express doctrinal statements in the shorter commentary on the *Sentences*.

⁶⁸ *Rep. Par.* Prologus III, Quaestiuncula I, n^{os} 10-11; t. XXII, p. 51a.

Daniel of Morley, English Cosgomonist and Student of Arabic Science

THEODORE SILVERSTEIN

I

SOMETIMES between the years 1175 and 1189 Daniel of Morley returned home to England from Toledo, where he had been studying the new science under the "wiser" philosophers of the world, but especially the famous translator Gerard of Cremona. At that time, according to report, there remained but little concern for the liberal arts in England,—Plato and Aristotle alike having been given over to oblivion,—but he soon fell in with his lord and spiritual father, Bishop John of Norwich (1175-1200), who was so interested in the Toledan astronomy that, not satisfied with what answers he could get in the brevity of a conversation, ordered Daniel to write a tractate on the subject. The result was the *Liber de naturis inferiorum et superiorum*,¹ which turned out to be, not so much a summary of the new astronomical lore, as a neatly organized cosmogony which uses it. And to this character the work owes the two-fold interest that it still has for us.

Like Adelard of Bath before him, Roger of Hereford his contemporary, and the later Michael Scot and Roger Bacon, Daniel belongs in the line of those who introduced the Arabic learning into Britain. The *Liber de naturis* is thus, first of all, a record of what he brought back with him from Spain, both in his head and in that *preciosa multitudine librorum*, to which he refers. But it is also something else than this. Arabic learning aside, it presents a view of the universe which, with its heavy dependence on the Chalcidian *Timaeus*, is also closely related to that cosmology, perhaps a half-century older, of Guillaume de Conches and his contemporaries at Chartres.² The *Liber de naturis* thus

¹ Ed. Karl Sudhoff, *Archiv f. d. Geschichte d. Naturwissenschaft. u. d. Technik* VIII. 1 (Leipzig, 1917), 1-40, from *Ms Arundel 377*. In the same journal (IX. 1, 45-51) Birkenmajer corrects Sudhoff's text with the aid of a Berlin manuscript, and these corrections, where important, are made silently throughout the present article. For further manuscripts, see Thorndike, and Kibre, *Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), cols. 135 and 436. For previous accounts of Daniel, see especially Valentin Rose, "Ptolemaeus und die Schule von Toledo," *Hermes*, VIII (1874), 327-349; Charles Singer, "Daniel of Morley, an English Philosopher of the XIIth Century," *Isis*, III (1920-21), 263-69; Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* II (New York, 1923, 1929), pp. 171-81; and Haskins, *Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), pp. 126-27. For Gerard of Cremona, see Boncompagni *Della vita e delle opere di Gherardo cremonense, Atti dell' Accademia pontifica dei Lincei*, IV (1851), 387-493, which also prints a contemporary list of Gerard's translations; the list reprinted and discussed by F. Wüstenfeld, *Die Uebersetzungen arabische Werke in das Lateinische seit dem XI. Jahrhundert* (Aus dem XXII Bande der

Abhandl. d. königl. Gesellsch. d. Wissensch. zu Göttingen, 1877), pp. 51-81, and the basis of the critical account by M. Steinschneider, "Die europäischen Uebersetzungen aus dem Arabischen bis Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Sitzungsb. d. kais. Akad. d. Wissensch.-Phil.-Hist. Klasse* CXLIX (Vienna, 1904), 16-32. See also Thorndike, II, pp. 87-90; and Haskins, pp. 14-5 and 104-06. For additional lists of Gerard's works, see Thorndike and Kibre, *Incipits*, "Index," s.n. Gerard, which records also his translation of Averroës, *De sensu et sensato*, not given in the contemporary manuscript lists of Boncompagni and Wüstenfeld; cf. *Beiträge z. Geschichte d. Philos. des Mittelalt.*, XVII. 5-6 (1916), 198-99; and for Gerard's version of Alfarabi, *De scientiis*, see Steinschneider, p. 22 and H. G. Farmer, *Al-Farabi's Arabic-Latin Writings on Music* (Collection of Oriental Writers on Music, II, Glasgow, 1934), pp. 18-19, which corrects Wüstenfeld's and Sarton's (*Introduction to the History of Science* II, 1, p. 340) confusion with the printed edition of the version of John of Spain. See also n. 29 and Postscript below.

² The best recent discussion of this cosmology is J. M. Parent, *La doctrine de la création dans l'école de Chartres* (Publications de l'Institut d'Etudes Médiévales

testifies late in the twelfth century, not only to the growing preoccupation with Arabic lore, but also to the continuing power of Chartrian speculation. There is some reason to suppose that Daniel may have found both lines of thought and learning intermingled in the intellectual discourse of Toledo,³ as they had already been in part at Chartres itself.⁴ In any case, both are woven together in the book that he fashioned to instruct his presumably benighted countrymen.

II

As a record simply of the Arabic science that Daniel knew, the *Liber de naturis* contains references to upwards of fifteen works, both original treatises and Arabic translations from the Greek.⁵ Of these four are known to have been turned into Latin by Gerard of Cremona, and it is apparently Gerard's versions that are the source of Daniel's citations: three treatises of Aristotle, the *De celo et mundo*, the *De auditu naturali*, and the *De generatione et corruptione*; and a *Liber luminum*, the identity of which is as yet not certain.⁶ Two other books ascribed by Daniel to Aristotle, the *De speculo adurenti* and the *De sensu et sensato*, do not appear in the surviving record of Gerard's *opera*, but the Toledan master is said to have done a *Liber Tidei de speculo* [=Diokles, *De speculis comburentibus*], as well as the commentaries on the *De sensu et sensato* by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Averroes, and these may offer the clue to Daniel's citations.⁷ Of the remaining works Hippocrates, *De aeris mutatione* [=*De aere?*] is absent from Gerard's list, though the various titles there ascribed to Hippocrates and Galen may hide this book among their subsidiary parts; and the reference to Johannitius, since it is astronomical and not to the usual medical treatise *Isagoge in tegni Galieni*, should perhaps be sought in such a book as Gerard's *Liber Autolici de spera motu*, which is based on a translation sometimes assigned to Johannitius.⁸

d'Ottawa, VIII, 1938). See also the present writer's forthcoming article in *Modern Philology* 'The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris'.

³ See the discussion of Daniel's debt to Galippus in sec. III, below.

⁴ See, for example, Haskin's account (pp. 43-66) of Hermann of Carinthia, and the notes to Hermann's *De essentiis* in the edition by P. Manuel Alfonso (Santander, 1946); H. Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches* (Koblenz, 1929), *passim*; and my 'Fabulous Cosmogony', especially n. 31.

⁵ The list of works and authors specifically named by Daniel is, in the order of their first appearance and with page references to the Sudhoff edition: *Liber triplicis mundi* (p. 8); *Ypocras in libro de aeris mutatione* (p. 11); *Liber luminum* (p. 11); *Magnus Hermes* and *Magnus Hermes, Liber eternorum* (or *De eternitate*, pp. 14 and 16; cf. Birkenmajer, p. 50); *Albumazar* (pp. 17, 26, and 32); *Aristotiles in libro de assignanda ratione unde orte sunt scientie* (p. 24); *Aristotiles in libro de sensu et sensato* (pp. 25 and 30); *Liber celi et mundi* (pp. 26 and 30); *Aristotiles in libro de auditu naturali* (p. 26); *Librum Alfragani* (pp. 27, 35, and 36); *Almagesti* pp. (28 and 40); *Philosophus in libro de generatione et corruptione* (p. 32); *Aristotiles in libro de speculo adurenti* p. (34); *Johannicus* p. (35), and *Ysagoge zaphiris* (p. 39; cf. Birkenmajer, p. 49).

⁶ See Wüstenfeld, p. 75; Steinschneider, p. 29; and Rose, pp. 331-32, n. 3, which seems to suggest identification with Alfarabi, *De*

scientiis. I have found Daniel's quotation itself in none of these books. Cf. n. 29.

⁷ Wüstenfeld, pp. 62 and 67; Steinschneider, pp. 16 and 17; and n. 1 above. Nothing like Daniel's quotations from the *De sensu* appears in the text of Aristotle (nor in the Averroes paraphrase, Junta ed., (Venice, 1574), VI, 2, 4-17). In view of this and the fact that in one known instance he attributes to Aristotle a book by Alfarabi (see below), it is probable that he is using commentaries in other instances as well. See next note. As to the *Liber de speculo adurenti*, Daniel may not have known any such book. Other works classifying the parts of knowledge and listing texts of Aristotle (Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae* [ed. Baur, p. 123], and Alfarabi, *De scientiis* [ed. A. Gonzales Palencia, Madrid, 1932, pp. 156 and 105]), mention an *Ars speculorum adurentium*, but not a book, and this may explain Daniel's reference and ascription to Aristotle. But, cf. n. 29 below.

⁸ *Al bumazar, Maius introductorium* (Naples, Bibl. naz. Ms C. viii. 50, fol. 7") refers to "Ypocras de aera mutatione" in a context that agrees generally with the subject-matter of *De aere*. Daniel's quotation, again, corresponds to nothing in the Hippocrates text, and once more suggests a commentary or reworking by some later writer—i.e. Johannitius, *De mutatione aeris*, or, more likely, another.

⁹ Steinschneider, p. 17. For one limit to Daniel's knowledge of Johannitius, see n. 90 below.

All these pieces represent the newest of the new things in later twelfth century science, hence the more interesting of Gerard's efforts. It would be useful, therefore, to know how many of them were in fact brought back to England by Daniel, how many simply quoted from other sources or from notes of lectures taken in Toledo. A negative clue might seem to reside in the fact that, with the exception of the *De celo et mundo* and *Johannitius*, all are used very sparingly in the *Liber de naturis*, each contributing a single reference or, typically, a single brief quotation,¹⁰ and that none provides anything essential to the substance or structure of the tractate. But it should be observed that most of these works are in fields other than astronomy; where, as with the *Johannitius* and the *De celo*, a book significantly touches Daniel's subject, he makes a somewhat fuller use of it. This is illustrated by the lengthish citation from the *De celo*, I, 2, concerning simple and composite bodies and their movements, a topic of considerable importance in his cosmogony.¹¹ It is thus likely that the *De celo*, at least, and perhaps a few of the other of Gerard's books were among those in Daniel's possession. On the other hand, in treating of the influence of the movements of the moon, the *Liber de naturis* says of Hippocrates and Galen that *secundum motum et diuersas lune mansiones dies creticos computare*. This would seem to reflect a knowledge of Gerard's translation of the *Liber Galieni de creticis diebus* [=περὶ κιστίων ἡμέρων], but when the text is examined carefully, it turns out to be a word for word quotation from Albumazar, *Maius introductorium*,¹² which Daniel used very widely, as we shall see. The entire question of what may be called Daniel's minor sources will repay special investigation when the productions of Gerard have been further studied and their texts made more widely available.

In the case of perhaps the most important work by Gerard to which the *Liber de naturis* refers, the evidence is that Daniel knew it only slightly; his use of it is small and sufficiently inexact to suggest that he did not have it by him as he wrote. This is Ptolemy's *Almagest*, the fountain-head of all Toledan astronomy. It was this book which like a magnet had drawn Gerard originally to Spain, and Daniel with enthusiasm tells of the famous version how *Girardus Tholetanus . . . Galippe mixtarabe interpretante Almagesti latinauit*.¹³ But his attitude is one of wonder, not of knowledge. Ptolemy's astromathematics evidently did not attract him as much as the astrological biology of Firmicus Maternus and the current Arabic "science."¹⁴ If the *Liber de naturis* frequently names Ptolemy, most of the references are vague or drawn from other books, such as Albumazar.¹⁵ The one place where the *Almagest* itself may seem most likely to lie behind his text—a passage dealing with the sphericity of the heavens—is an adaptation of some of Ptolemy's ideas which shows little trace of the language of Gerard's surviving version:

¹⁰ With the exception of the *De sensu*, which contributes two.

¹¹ Ed. Sudhoff, p. 26: *Inuenimus namque omnia corpora, que sunt in sublunari mundo de sua natura ad suum medium aut a suo medio moueri, et hui quidem duo motus sunt recti et illis naturales. Sed motus qui est a suo medio sursum; qui uero ad suum medium est, deorsum* [Sudhoff misreads *sursum*, and Birkenmajer, p. 51, merely prints some mysterious strokes] *tendit. Ex hiis igitur manifestum est, quod naturaliter omne corpus compositum mouetur linearie motu. Celum itaque cum lineariter non moueat, compositum corpus non est. Est igitur simplex. Sed attendendum est, quod simplex corpus in hac facultate dicitur, non quod caret partibus, quod nichil esset, sed*

quod in suis partibus nichil habet diuersum. . . . Sed iam de eius motu aliquid dicatur. Sicut declaratum est in libro celi et mundi corporum quedam sunt simplicia et quedam sunt composita, eius uero, quod est compositum, motus debet esse secundum dominantem in eo naturam, eius autem quod est simplex, motus debet esse simplex et purus.

¹² Daniel, p. 32; and Albumazar, Naples, Ms C. viii, 50, f. 7v.

¹³ Pp. 39-40.

¹⁴ See below nn. 33 and 50 and their context.

¹⁵ See, for example, the account of Ptolemy and the writing of the *Almagest*, Daniel, p. 28, and Naples, Ms C. viii, 50, fol. 18v.

Daniel

Cum constet, ut dictum est, celum esse unius nature consimilium partium est, et ex quo est ex partibus sibi consimilibus et necessaria fuit ei figura, quia erat corpus finitum, tunc ex omnibus figuris sperica fuit illi conuenientior, ideo quod ex omnibus figuris figura sperica est consimilium partium. Sicut ex figuris aliis habentibus superficiem, circulus est partium magis consimilium. Ceterarum autem figurarum corporum nulla congruit celo, ideo quod omnes sunt diuersarum partium et non consimilium, ergo ex hiis, que dicta sunt, patet, quod ex omnibus figuris sperica est conuenientior celo.¹⁷

Gerard

Demonstrat etiam affirmandum esse figuram celi spericam . . . Est circulus maior figuris superficialibus, et est spera maior figuris corporeis. Celum igitur est maius corporibus que sunt preter ipsum. Ad hoc quoque sciendum reperimus semitam ex rebus naturalibus. Ether namque tenuior est et subtilior omnibus corporibus aliis et uehementius similis ad inuicem. Cuius autem partes ad inuicem sunt similes, eius superficies ad inuicem similantur. Superficies uero quarum partes ad inuicem similantur, due tamen sunt, ex superficialibus circulis et ex solidis spera. Quia igitur ether non est superficialis et non est nisi corporeis, oportet esse spericam . . .¹⁸

The significance of this kind of variation is especially striking beside the fact, which we shall shortly discover, that Daniel has the habit of quoting his main Arabic sources fully and with reasonable exactness.

These main sources were three: Alfragani, *Rudimenta astronomica*; Alfarabi, *De ortu scientiae*; and the *Maius introductorium* of Albumazar—none of them the work of Daniel's avowed master Gerard.

Alfragani provides Daniel with many of his views on astronomy in the strict sense—what the twelfth century learned to call “quadrivial” astronomy. He quotes the *Rudimenta* on the sphericity of the heavens, refers to its account of the climates of the world, and promulgates its statement that the number of the spheres is not ten, but eight.¹⁹ Now the curious fact is that Gerard of Cremona had also translated Alfragani, but it is not this version which Daniel knew and presumably carried back to England with him. Daniel's text was that of the older translator John of Spain, who made his version as early as 1135.²⁰ A single quotation comparing the two translations with the *Liber de naturis* will establish this:

Daniel

Si uero huiusmodi solutiones non satisfaciant querenti, librum Alfragani querat et inueniet ibi quod, nulla diuersitas est apud sapientes, quin celum sit instar spere et quin uoluatur cum omnibus stellis, que in eo sunt, ut spera, que super duos

John of Spain

Nulla diuersitas est apud sapientes, quod coelum sit ad instar spherae, & uoluatur cum omnibus stellis quae in eo sunt, ut sphaera super duos axes immobiles, quorum unus est uersus septentrionem, & alias erga meridiem.²¹

Gerard

Inter sapientes diversitas non existit quin coelum secundum similitudinem sperae consistit et quin ipsum revolvatur cum omnibus stellis quae sunt in ipso sicut revolvitur spaera super duos polos immobiles fixos, quorum unus est in parte

¹⁶ Paris, Bibl. nat., Ms Lat. 14738, fol. 3^r.

¹⁷ Daniel, p. 27.

¹⁸ Daniel, pp. 27, 36, and 35.

¹⁹ This is the date given by C. A. Nallino, *Al-Battani sive Albatenii opus astronomicum* (Pubblicazioni de r. osservatorio di Brera in

Milano, XL, 1904), p. lvii.

²⁰ *Rudimenta astronomica Afragranii* [sic!]. Item *Albategnius astronomus peritissimus De motu stellarum . . .* (Nuremberg, 1537), fol. 3^r. For the other passages referred to in n. 18 above, cf. fols. 7^v ff.

axes immobiles mouetur,
quorum unus uersus sep-
tentriōnem et alter erga
meridiem.²¹

septemtrionis et alter in
parte meridiei.²²

The second main source of Daniel's Arabic learning, Alfarabi, *De ortu scientiae*, was current in the twelfth century in a single Latin version, perhaps by Gundisalinus.²³ Its influence on the *Liber de naturis* shows itself at two significant points. In Book II Daniel writes a defense of astronomy against its detractors, in the course of which he sets down an entire *Wissenschaftslehre*, developed out of astronomy as from its source:

Illi uero, qui syderis motibus uim et efficaciam negant, adeo sunt impudentis amentie, ut antequam scientie disciplinam habeant, eius doctrine incipient derogare. Vnde quidam ex solo nomine astronomiam odio habent. Sed si attenderent, quante dignitatis quanteque utilitatis foret, nunquam nisi ex inuidia ei derogarent. De dignitate eius inuenitur, quod illius partes, secundum quod dixerunt sapientes, primi octo sunt: scientia de iudiciis, scientia de medicina, scientia de nigromantia secundum phisicam, scientia de agricultura, scientia de prestigiis, scientia de alckimia, que est scientia de transformatione metallorum in alias species, scientia de ymaginibus, quam tradit liber ueneris magnus et uniuersalis, quem edidit Thoz grecus, scientia de speculis et hec scientia largior est et lacior ceteris, prout Aristotiles manifestat in libro de speculo adurenti.²⁴

Of this Professor Thorndike writes: "Daniel interprets the scope of astrology very broadly . . . Except that magic illusions have replaced navigation, [his] list of eight branches of learning is the same as that which Gundissalinus [i.e. in the *De divisione philosophiae*] repeated from Al-Farabi, but which they called branches of natural science rather than of astrology."²⁵ The slight originality (or enthusiastic overstatement) which would seem to be attributed to Daniel in this summary, would indeed be a fact had he been following the *De divisione philosophiae*, since he would have found there little to suggest his subordination of the individual sciences to astronomy. Daniel, however, though he may have known the *De divisione*,²⁶ must here have been reading, not Gundissalinus, but Alfarabi directly, for Alfarabi's entire natural *Wissenschaft* emphasizes the astronomical-astrological view of the connection between super-lunary and sub-lunary spheres, and this is Daniel's view. In the *De ortu* the eight branches are indeed listed under natural science, but they are merely that part *quae cadit sub circulo lunae*. Above them is the master-science out of which all natural science arises, that which treats the moving spheres and the substances of the heavens and the stars—or, as Daniel says, *astronomia*:

Remansit ergo scientia de massa substantiae superioris, quia cetera de dispositionibus et accidentibus eius iam comprehensa sunt. Nolo autem intelligere substantiam superiorem nisi sphaeram circumvolubilem et mobilem motu naturali deservientem constitutioni huius mundi secundum potentiam dei et sapientiam et voluntatem eius qui est benedictus et excelsus. Manifestum est igitur ex praemissis quomodo emergit scientia naturalis et unde orta est . . .

²¹ P. 27.

²² Alfragano, *Il Libro dell'aggregazione delle stelle*, ed. Campani (Collezione di opusculi danteschi inediti o rari, 1910), p. 64.

²³ Clemens Baeumker, *Alfarabi über den Ursprung der Wissenschaften* (Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Philos. des Mittelalt., XIX. 3, 1916),

pp. 9-10.

²⁴ P. 34. For the works of Thoz Grecus, see, *inter alia*, Thorndike and Kibre, *Incipits, "Index,"* s.n. Toz Grecus.

²⁵ A History of Magic II, 177.

²⁶ See below, n. 46 and its context.

Dico quod substantia superior, postquam mentionem fecimus de illa et consideravimus eius essentiam, induxit nos ad inquirendum de illa et de eius massa. Emersit ergo scientia de substantia caeli et cognitio de substantiis quae sunt in illo, scilicet stellis, secundum inaequalitatem suarum mensurarum et diversitatem dispositionum earum. Fuit ergo haec scientia de natura.²⁷

Nor need we guess any longer that Daniel knew this passage in Alfarabi, for we can find proof that he used the *De ortu* in a second place in his book. There he cites a work called *Aristotiles de assignanda ratione unde orte sunt scientie*, which Aristotle did not write, under a heading suspiciously like the *De ortu*'s fuller title *De assignanda causa ex qua ortae sunt scientiae philosophiae*, and with a long quotation that is straight out of Alfarabi's treatise:

Daniel

Celum autem, quod sua natura mouetur, mouet predicta quatuor et permiscet et complexionatur ea, quia celum si non esset, procul dubio nec moverentur nec permiserentur. Ex motu igitur eius figuratur substantia, que est sub circulo lune, multis figuris et permutatur de accidente ad accidens, de forma ad formam, de figura ad figuram, de triangulo ad quadrangulum, de terra in aquam, de albo in nigrum et huiusmodi et istorum quidem talium superiora in causa esse dinoscitur. Sicut enim ait Aristotiles in libro de assignanda ratione, unde orte sunt scientie: Maxima diuisio scientiarum fit in scientiam de caelo et scientiam de omni, quod continetur sub caelo. Massa autem substancie, quam celum, que est sub circulo lune, est ex igne et aere et aqua et terra, que, quantum ad sua elementa, semper est una et eadem, sed permutantur tantum accidentia eius ex qualitatibus quatuor, que sunt calor, frigiditas, humiditas et siccitas. Verbi gratia, succus cibi, qui conuertitur in sanguinem, ipse idem est, nisi quod tingatur, et postea conuertitur in carnem, et cum sit idem, figuratur alia figura et coloratur alio colore. Similiter ipsa palma est os dactili et ipse homo est sperma, nec permutatur nisi figura et accidens. Et ex hac ratione substantia, que est sub circulo lune uocatur corruptibilis. Substantia uero celi non permutatur, nisi loco tantum . . .²⁸

De ortu

Caelum autem, quod sua natura movetur, movet haec reliqua quatuor et permiscet et complexionatur ea, quia caelum si non esset, nec moverentur nec permiserentur. Ex motu igitur eorum et permixtione figuratur substantia quae est sub circulo lunae multis figuris, et permutatur de accidente ad accidens et de forma ad formam et de figura ad figuram, ut de triangulo ad quadrangulum et huismodi et de terra in aquam et huismodi et de albo in nigrum et huismodi . . .

Maxima autem divisio scientiarum fit in scientia de caelo et scientia de omni quod continetur sub caelo et scientia de eo quod est praeter haec.

Massa autem substantiae quam continet caelum, scilicet quod est sub circulo lunae, est ex igne et aere, aqua et terra. Quae substantia semper est una; sed permutantur tantum accidentia eius ex qualitatibus quatuor, quae sunt calor et frigiditas, humiditas et siccitas. Verbi gratia sucus cibi qui convertitur in sanguinem, ipse idem est nisi quia tingitur et postea convertitur in carnem; et cum sit idem, figuratur alia figura et coloratur alio colore. Similiter ipsa palma et os dactyli et ipse homo est substantia permanens nec permutatur nisi in figura et accidentibus. Et ex hac ratione substantia quae est sub circulo lunae vocatur corruptibilis. Substantia uero caeli non permutatur nisi loco tantum . . .²⁹

²⁷ Baeumker, *Alfarabi*, p. 21.

²⁸ The same, pp. 23-24.

²⁹ Pp. 23-24. Thorndike, II, 177, n. 7: 'I do not know if Al-Farabi's *De ortu scientiarum*

is meant by . . . Aristotiles in libro de assignanda ratione unde orte sunt scientie.' Baeumker, *Alfarabi*, pp. 6-7, had earlier been uncertain also, but he did not have access

Alfarabi thus provided Daniel with his most extended statement concerning the unitary principle of things—a theory which the *Liber de naturis* also supports from other sources, including, as will become apparent, certain of the Hermetic literature.

But by far the most important of Daniel's three main Arabic books was Albumazar's *Maius introductorium*. This work is quoted at least twelve times in the course of the thirty-five pages of Sudhoff's printed edition of the *Liber de naturis*, and though the Arabic astronomer's treatise is of considerable length, the range of Daniel's use indicates an intimacy with it almost from end to end.²⁹ Daniel quotes *Albumazar*, *Albalachi filius* for his theory of the four principles which compose all things. He opposes the view that the heavens and stars are made up of the finer part of the four elements (here disagreeing in part with Guillaume de Conches, whom in other respects he follows),³⁰ offering instead a paraphrase of Albumazar's Aristotelian statement that the celestial bodies consist of quintessence, and a quotation on their circular motion. He gives the reference in the *Maius introductorium* to Ptolemy and the writing of the *Almagest*, together with its brief classification of the planets according to their complexions. In the midst of an argument showing that such physical characteristics as color are not inherent in things, but the result of the admixture of the four elemental qualities, Daniel works in an apt line on the subject from Albumazar, citing him by the honorable title *philosophus*: *Color autem, ait philosophus, qui in igne elementari uidetur, non ignis est, sed materie ardentis*. And he makes his regard for the Arabic scientist doubly patent in his account of a topic of abiding interest to the mediaeval natural philosophers—the influence of the moon, especially on the ebb and flow of the sea,³¹ concerning which, says Daniel, *solus Albumazar, inter omnes quos legi, probabilius tractat*. He gives the reasons which he found in the *Maius introductorium* for putting the sun in the middle place among the planets:

quia, si sol usque ad applaneticam speram sublimatus esset, uel usque ad lunarem orbem humiliatus, tunc uel inde frigore uel hinc calore nimio mundus stare non posset.

In his defense of astronomy Daniel quotes Albumazar on its utility, and he names the signs of the zodiac with a sentence from the same source. He calls the moon by Albumazar's epithet *stella solis*, and repeats this near the end of the book in a summary of the relation between the planets and human personality—a passage that echoes the doctrines of the *Maius introductorium*, though its details owe something also to Firmicus Maternus and others among the Arabian astrologers.³² And beyond all this, even where quotation is not direct or Daniel's

to Daniel's text, as Thorndike did. Alfarabi's longer work, *De scientiis*, survives in versions by John of Spain and Gerard (ed. Gonzales Palencia, pp. 87 ff. and 119 ff.), but Daniel seems to contain no trace of this book; a further clue to his limited knowledge of Gerard.

²⁹ The chief references in Daniel are found on pp. 17, 23, 26, 28, 31, 32 (two passages), 33 (two passages), 34, 37 and 39.

³⁰ See sec. III. The disagreement is remarked by Thorndike, II, p. 173.

³¹ Daniel, in fact, accepts this as only one factor determining the tides, which, he says, depends "in loci . . . natura, in aquarum habititudine, in motu lune"—thus differing from Adelard of Bath and Guillaume de Conches, whose views depend, I suppose, on the second factor primarily. See Guil-

laume, *Philosophia mundi* III, 14 (PL 172, 80); Duhem, *Le système du monde* III (Paris, 1915), pp. 116 f.; and Haskins, p. 37 and n. 83.

³² Daniel, pp. 38 ff. Firmicus Maternus, *Matheseos*, *passim*, but especially Bk. III, ed. Kroll, Skutsch and Ziegler, I, pp. 97 ff. The material is widespread among the Arabs, but nothing exactly corresponding to Daniel appears in the Latin versions he might have used and available to me. Daniel also summarizes (p. 38) the connection between the signs of the Zodiac and the parts of the human body, closely paralleling both Firmicus, II, 24, and Zahel ben Bischr and Messahala (printed in Ptolemy, *Liber quadripartitus* [Venice: Bonus Locatellus, 1493], fols. 140^r, col. 1 and 148, col 2). A similar passage appears in the *Liber Hermetis de vi principiis rerum* (Bodleian,

matter coincides also with other works that he may have read, there are marks of the pervasive influence of Albumazar throughout the *Liber de naturis*.³⁴

Thus, whatever limit there may have been to his knowledge of his master Gerard's works, this was the book of Arabic books that Daniel carried back to instruct England. But what version of the *Maius introductorium* did he have? The simplest comparison of texts at any point where the *Liber de naturis* makes quotation, will settle this question easily. Two translations of Albumazar were available in Toledo, one by John of Spain³⁵ and another by Hermann of Carinthia—the Chartrian philosopher and friend of Thierry of Chartres and Bernardus Silvestris—who completed his rendering before the year 1143.³⁶ It was Hermann's version that Daniel made his bible. Only one passage is printed here to show this—that dealing with the four basic principles of things—but an examination of the other quotations will disclose an equally exact correspondence in language with Hermann:³⁷

Daniel

... sicut ait Albumaxar . . . , in omnibus his corporibus, que sentimus, hec genera inueniuntur. Primum quidem compositum est, secundum compositio, tertium nature quatuor, quartum species. His itaque dispositis, cum superius probatum sit, omnis geniti genitricem causam antiquorem esse, verbi gratia, sustentatio sustinens antiquius, ut terra terrenis corporibus. Sic ergo, cum materie compositis antiquiores sunt, erant quidem genera et species animalium, germinum, metallorum in natura potentia, que tandem actu processerunt, ubi compositio successit. Nec uero compositio fit, nisi aliquo componente, estque materie uetitum, ne se ipsam componat, aut sibi formam imponat. Que cum ita se habeant, necesse est, habere genitorem omne generatum omneque compositum compositorem, discernentem inter genera et species omnium rerum.³⁸

Hermann

In omnibus igitur corporibus hiis, que sentimus, hec genera inueniuntur. Primum quidem compositum est, secundum compositio, tertium nature quatuor, quartum species. Hiis itaque dispositis, tum philosophi sermonem subiungimus: Omnis geniti genitricem causam antiquorem esse genitumque ad esse deprehensionem ducere. Verbi gratia, sustento sustinens antiquius, ut terra terrenis corporibus. Sic ergo compositis cum materie antiquiores sint, erant quidem genera et species animalium, germinum, metallorum in natura potentia, actu uero tandem ubi composit[i]o successit. Nec uero composit[i]o, nisi componente aliquo, est natura uetitum ne compositum sui componentes aut sibi sit materia. Que cum ita sint, necesse est habere genitorem omne genitum omneque compositum compositorem, discernentem inter genera et species omnium rerum.³⁹

With this account of Albumazar we have not yet exhausted Daniel's debt to

Ms. Digby 67, fol. 76^r; and Ms. 464, fol. 200^r), for which see n. 47 below and its context. The *Quadruplicatum* itself, especially III, 2, has material germane to Daniel's discussion, but in detail it is even less like the *Liber de naturis* than the other sources mentioned, and there is no other clear evidence that he had any acquaintance with this book.

³⁴ Daniel (p. 39) also refers to an *Ysagoge zaphiris*, which Birkenmajer (p. 49) connects with Albumazer (= Jafar, Gaphar). The *Maius introductorium* was known as *Ysagoge*, but as Daniel otherwise always cites its author as Albumazar, it seems improbable that he intends this reference here. A reduced form of the work, called *Ysagoga minor Iapharis*, also circulated in a version

of Adelard of Bath, and though Daniel's citation is too general for certainty, this may be the book he had in mind. See Haskins, p. 30.

³⁵ Steinschneider, p. 47, and the reference in Haskins, p. 45.

³⁶ Haskins, p. 45, and Thorndike, II, pp. 84-85.

³⁷ For these passages, compare the references in n. 30 above with *Maius introductorium* (I have seen the printed edition [Augsburg: Erhard Ratdolt, 1489]) but use here the twelfth century Naples Ms C. viii. 50), fols. 4^v, 3^v, 18^v, 15^v, 7^v, 13^v, 8^v, 10^v-11^v and 25^v). See Haskins, p. 45.

³⁸ Ms. Naples, C. viii. 50, fols. 4^v-4^v.

³⁹ P. 17.

the Arabs. The *Liber de naturis* contains further astronomical lore drawn out of Adelard of Bath, *De opere astrolapsus*,⁴⁰ and also other scientific matter probably derived from miscellaneous reading and discussion during his stay in Toledo. There is also a quotation from *libro quodam arabico, qui dicitur liber triplicis mundi*,⁴¹ and, finally, there are references to at least one Hermetic book of Arabic provenience.

I have been unable to identify the *Liber triplicis mundi*; Thomas Bradwardine, fourteenth century Archbishop of Canterbury, refers in his *De causa dei* to a book, discovered in Spain, which, as he says, *loquebatur de triplici mundo ab Adam vsque Christum . . . & principium tertij mundi posuit in Christo*,⁴² but this does not seem to correspond with Daniel's source, where, if Christ had appeared at all, it would have been, not the third world that was placed in Him, but the first (*primus mundus fuit in mente*—corresponding to *voūs* or *Verbum dei*, as developed, for example, in Chartrian cosmogonical theory).⁴³ The entire passage in the *Liber de naturis* is worth a brief examination, since, the *Triplex mundus* aside, it throws some light on Daniel's other sources and his method of adapting them to his purposes:

Mundus igitur iste ymaginem uoluntatis superne representat, quia sicut legitur in libro quodam arabico, qui dicitur liber triplicis mundi, primus mundus fuit in mente, secundus in opere, tercius in imitatione. Primus nec uisibilis, nec corporeus est, sed eternus, secundus corporeus, uisibilis, nec in hoc statu eternus, tercius, qui dicitur microchosmus, corporeus uisibilis sed in parte eternus. Primus mundus est in eternitate figuratus, secundus cum tempore creatus, tercius in tempore formatus, quia, sicut in Trismegisto repperitur, eternitatis deus ante omnia primus, secundus angelus, tercius mundus, homo quartus, istud etiam concordat uerbo Isidori, qui in libro quodam, qui sic incipit: *Summum bonum deus est, angelos ante mundum affirmat creatos, ita dicens: Natura angelorum mutabilis est, gratia uero incommutabilis, deinde subdit: Ante omnem creationem mundi creati sunt angeli et ante omnem creationem angelorum diabolus conditus est, sicut scriptum est: Principium uiarum dei et cetera.*⁴⁴

The text of Trismegistus will be found in the fourth century treatise—sometimes attributed to Apuleius—known as the Latin *Asclepius*, whose hierarchy is *deus, mundus, homo*, like that of the *Liber triplicis mundi*;⁴⁵ Daniel's addition of *angelus* as the second member is his own Christian adjustment of the *Asclepius* under the influence of the *Liber sententiarum* of Isidore of Seville (I, 1, 1; I, 10, 2 and 4). The sentence, *Primus mundus . . . in tempore formatus*, may have been in the *Triplex mundus* (a parallel occurs in Gundissalinus, *De divisione philosophiae*, which is based almost entirely on Arabic originals,⁴⁶ but the idea is commonplace in Christian thought and could easily have been Daniel's own also. The only words which we can be reasonably certain are from the *Triplex mundus* itself are the clause and sentence immediately following its citation. Now the views they express likewise occur in another work of Arabic connection,

⁴⁰ Unpublished. Cited here from photostat of Cambridge (Eng.) Ms McClean 165 in Houghton Library, Harvard. Cf. especially Daniel, p. 35, l. 15—p. 37, l. 17, with Ms McClean, fols. 81-82.

⁴¹ P. 8.

⁴² Thomas Bradwardini Archiepiscopi olim Cantuariensis, *De causa Dei, contra Pelagium, ad suis Mertonenses, libri tres: iussu Reverendiss. Georgii Abbot Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi; opera et studio Di. Henrici Savillii, Collegij Mertonensis in Academia Oxoniensis custodis, ex scriptis codicibus*

nunc primum editi (London, 1618), I, 1, Coroll., pars 32, p. 36.

⁴³ See below, n. 76.

⁴⁴ P. 8.

⁴⁵ *Asclepius*, ed. A.D. Nock, in *Corpus hermeticum II*, ed. Nock and transl. A.-J. Festugière (Collection des universités de France, Association Guillaume Budé, Paris, 1945), p. 308.

⁴⁶ Ed. Ludwig Baur (Beiträge z. Gesch. d. Philos. des Mittelalt., IV. 2-3, Münster, 1903), p. 10. For the Arabic sources see the Introduction and the notes to the text, *passim*.

the *Liber Hermetis Trismegisti de vi principiis rerum*, whose opening chapter is sometimes entitled *De tribus uniuersalibus et eorum singulis*, and whose hierarchy, besides the creating God, is *nōys* (= *primus mundus . . . in mente*), *natura*, which is also the sky and time and *qualitates . . . non qualificando sed operando diffundit*" (= *secundus in opere*), and Man, whom *ad omnifariam mundi imitationem . . . artifex natura composuit* (= *tercius in imitatione*).⁴⁷ The actual words of Daniel's quotation do not appear in the *De vi principiis rerum*, nor does he ascribe his *Liber triplicis mundi* to Hermes. There is, however, strong evidence, from its constant debt to works certainly or probably translated by John of Spain, that the Latin form of the *De vi principiis rerum* originated or circulated before the mid twelfth century in the Spanish peninsula,⁴⁸ and its large use of the astrological biology of Firmicus Maternus (whence its hierarchy is in part derived)⁴⁹ is in keeping with both Daniel's interest and that of Gerard of Cremona. For near its end the *Liber de naturis* tells us how, during a lively debate with his master, Daniel heard Gerard make a remarkable use of Firmicus to refute an attack by Gregory the Great on astrologers.⁵⁰ If, therefore, as is likely, the *De vi principiis rerum* was not what Daniel was using, the *Liber triplicis mundi* was most likely a work which touched the subject-matter of that book, and in similar fashion, in one important point at least.

But whether or not Daniel knew the *Liber Hermetis Trismegisti de vi principiis rerum*, his Arabic learning included some acquaintance with other Hermetic literature. As he read through Albumazar, he came across a number of references to a Hermes who is introduced as an astrologer of the Persians.⁵¹ What he made of this we do not know, nor does he seem to owe anything to the quotations from this Hermes in the *Maius introductorium*. His own citations establish a distinction between two different philosophers named Hermes *quorum unus magnus Mercurius dictus est, alter uero trimegistus Mercurius, predicti Mercurii nepos*.⁵² Trismegistus Mercurius is for Daniel always the author of the Latin *Asclepius*, which he draws on at least three times, twice in accurate and fairly lengthy quotations.⁵³ He names Magnus Mercurius on two other occasions, once as writer of a *Liber eternorum*, or *De eternitate*,⁵⁴ and it is probable from the character of his citations that this Mercurius derives from some Hermetic piece of Arabic origin, perhaps alchemical in nature. The multiplicity of authorities named Hermes itself reflects the distinctions recorded in the prologues to Robert of Chester's translation of the *Morienus* and the *De vi principiis rerum*, where we read:

Legimus in ueteribus historiis tres fuisse philosophos, quorum primus Enoch, qui et Hermes et alio nomine Mercurius dictus fuit. Alius Noe, qui similiter Hermes et Mercurius nuncupatus fuit. Tercius uero Hermes Mercurius Triplices uocatus fuit, quia et rex et philosophus et propheta floruit. Hic enim post diluuium cum summa equitate regnum Egypci tenuit et in liberalibus et mechanicis artibus preualuit et astronomiam prius elucidauit.⁵⁵

In the first of the passages from Magnus Hermes, on the monistic origin of

⁴⁷ Ms. Digby 67, fols. 69^r-69^v, and 76^r.

⁴⁸ The present writer is currently preparing a monograph on this work which will demonstrate these relations. See also 'The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris,' especially sec. IV.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ms. Digby 67, fols. 69^r, 75^v, and 76^r, with Firmicus, I, 5, 10; III, 1, 9; I, 5, 9; II, 26, 1-2; II, 13, 6; and III, 1, 11-17.

⁵⁰ P. 40.

⁵¹ For example, Naples, Ms. C. viii. 50, fol. 32.

⁵² P. 16.

⁵³ Pp. 8 (two passages), and 16-17. Cf. *Asclepius*, ed. Nock, II, pp. 324 and 338.

⁵⁴ Pp. 14 and 16. Cf. Birkenmajer, p. 50, note to p. 16, l. 21.

⁵⁵ Ms. Digby 67, fol. 69^r. Cf. *Morienus*, in J. J. Manget, *Bibliotheca chemica curiosa* II, (Cologne, 1702), p. 509. All this is related somehow to earlier Hermetic tradition; see, for example, Latin *Asclepius* where Hermes' grandfather, like Trismegistus' uncle in Daniel, is named Mercurius.

all things, Daniel asserts that *unum tantum principium esse*.⁶⁶ This is a paraphrase of the famous doctrine, *omnes res fuerunt ab uno, . . . omnes res natiae fuerunt ab hac una re . . .*, of the Hermetic *Tabula smaragdina*, which for centuries was the hope and despair alike of the alchemists.⁶⁷ But unfortunately for the reader after Daniel, the *Tabula* had by his time appeared in various forms and in numerous Arabic works, as well as several Latin renderings of some of these.⁶⁸ Nor does the second quotation help us very much more: *Ait enim magnus Mercurius in libro eternorum: Eterna sunt, que licet agant, tamen nullo modo paciuntur, nec in sua substantia minuuntur.*⁶⁹ The idea, though not the language, occurs in Robert of Chester's *Morienus*: *Huius rei prima & principalis substantia & materia est una, & de ea est unum, & cum ea fit, neque aliquid sibi additur uel minuitur.*⁷⁰ But the *Morienus*, whether in Robert's Latin or its original, was apparently not Daniel's *Liber eternorum*, since, whereas Robert's text tells us, *Hermes quoque ait Terra est mater elementorum: de terra procedunt, & ad terram revertuntur*,⁷¹ Daniel maintains in his passage, against Hesiod, that the *unum tantum principium* is not earth: *Nec tamen illud, sicut uoluit Esiodus, terram assero, sed longe ab omni elementarie prolis generatione alienum affirmo.*⁷²

To Daniel's list, therefore, at least one work ascribed to Hermes must be added,⁷³ and this completes for present purposes the roll of his Arabic books. What this work was we cannot say with certainty until a fuller clarification of the entire later Hermetic tradition makes profitable the re-examination of the *Liber de naturis* for further clues.⁷⁴

III

The astronomical preoccupation of the *Liber de naturis* parallels an interest well-developed by the 1140's among the Chartians, whose cosmological progeny, the result of a marriage between the newer learning and the older philosophy, were perhaps the most vivacious of the times. What this vivacity drew from Arabic science, it owed also in part to the mid-wifery of the Spanish translators. The debt can be traced in such books as Bernardus Silvestris, *De mundi universitate*, and, more clearly still, the *De essenciosis* of Hermann of Carinthia,⁷⁵ whose Albumazar, as we have seen, Daniel used. The *Liber de naturis* may possess a few of the features afterwards added to European scholarship by Gerard of Cremona, but it remains, in both its use of the traditional sources and its ideas, essentially a late-come relative of what Hermann and his friends had already produced.

As with his Chartian predecessors, Daniel's strongly secular interest in natural philosophy shows itself in an extremely limited citation of Church writers. This consists of a single reference to St. Augustine; three brief sentences from Isidore, used in support of arguments based on other works; and two passages from Bede, including a definition of mundus, which is a slightly varying quotation from the *De natura rerum*:⁷⁶

⁶⁶ P. 14.

⁶⁷ The text appears in many places; but see Manget, *Bibl. chem. cur.* I, 381, and J. Ruska, *Tabula smaragdina, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Hermetischen Literatur* (Heidelberg, 1926), p. 2.

⁶⁸ Ruska, *passim*; and for the twelfth century Latin version of Hugo Sanctallensis, pp. 177 ff., and Haskins, p. 80.

⁶⁹ P. 16.

⁷⁰ Manget, *Bibl. chem. cur.* II, 513.

⁷¹ The same.

⁷² P. 14.

⁷³ Assuming, of course, that the two separate citations of Magnus Mercurius refer to

the same treatise. Daniel's further knowledge of Arabic learning evidently did not include the earlier translations of Constantinus Afer, for which see n. 90 below.

⁷⁴ Louis Massignon, 'Inventaire de la littérature arabe,' in A. M. J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* (Paris, 1944), pp. 393 and 395 ff., provides the best recent inventory for such a study.

⁷⁵ See especially Haskins, pp. 56-66; the notes to the *De essenciosis*, ed. Alonso; and my *Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris*.

⁷⁶ Daniel, pp. 8, 15, and 23.

Daniel

Mundus igitur est uniuersitas omnis, ex quatuor elementis cum superiorum ornatibus constans, in speciem orbis absoluti globata, celo, quo sidera lucent, aere, quo cuncta uiuentia spirant, aquis, que terram cingunt, terra, que mundi medio atque imo librata, uolubili circa eam uniuersitate immobilis pendet.⁶⁷

Bede

Mundus est universitas omnis, quae constat ex coelo et terra, quatuor elementis in speciem orbis absoluti globata: igne, quo sidera lucent; aere, quo cuncta viventia spirant; aquis, que terram cingendo et pentrando communiunt; atque ipsa terra, quae mundi media atque ima, librata volubili circa eam universitate pendet immobilis.⁶⁸

Among his philosophic authorities we have already mentioned the Latin *Asclepius*, a work which had considerable circulation at Chartres and was a favorite of the philosopher-poet Bernardus Silvestris.⁶⁹ His chief Latin book, however, as among the Chartrians also, is the Chalcidian *Timaeus*—text and commentary—which affects him both directly and, more subtly, through the intermediary of twelfth century Christian Platonism in general. Thus, his doctrine that the sensuous qualities of actual things are the result of an admixture of non-sensuous elemental qualities apprehensible only to the intellect, parallels an emphasis constantly made at Chartres and fundamental also in the *Quaestiones naturales* of Adelard of Bath.⁷⁰ In his more immediate trafficking with Chalcidius he quotes the commentary or adapts its ideas on such topics as the ancient philosophers' theories about the first principle of things, the three kinds of cosmological works (*opus dei*, *opus nature*, *opus hominis in [quo] imitatur naturam*), and the character of *hyle*, or chaos, before the formation of the world.⁷¹ This last subject, which plays a part of considerable importance in his philosophy, we shall have to consider in detail later.

Daniel also cites Martianus Capella et omnes fere latini with respect to the movements of the planets in their orbits, only to reject what he considers their errors; but even the Arabs spoke obscurely, and, with Adelard's unnoted aid, he offers his own exposition of the subject.⁷² Macrobius, a favorite mediaeval authority, he does not name at all, but in his account of the patterned conjunction of the elements we come across the following words:

Elementorum quidem talis est dispositio, quod inferiorem locum obtinet terra, deinde est aqua, postea aer, superior ignis. Iuxta terram posita est aqua, quia. cum naturaliter grauis sit, etsi non quantum terra, secundum locum optinere potuit. Deinde est aer, qui grauior igne et leuior terra, merito inter utrumque ponitur. Sunt autem elementorum tria intersticia, primum ignis ad aera, secundum aeris ad aquam, tertium aque ad terram. Primum uocant phisici obedientiam, secundum armoniam, tertium necessitatem. Per hec nichil nisi coniunctionem elementorum accipere debemus.

⁶⁷ P. 15.

⁶⁸ Cap. 3 (PL 90, 192-3). Daniel does not forget, of course, Moses' account of Genesis (p. 23).

⁶⁹ F. von Bezold, *Das Fortleben der antiker Götter im mittelalterlichen Humanismus* (Bonn and Leipzig, 1922), p. 78, and p. 105, n. 233; H. Liebeschütz, 'Kosmologische Motive in der Bildungswelt der Frühscholastik', *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1923-4 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1926), p. 133, and pp. 137-8, n. 109a; *Hermetica*, ed. Scott-Ferguson, IV (1936), p. xlvi; and 'The Fabulous Cosmogony of Bernardus Silvestris', especially n. 23.

⁷⁰ Daniel, in fact, quotes the *Quaestiones*

naturales directly on this point, thus indicating his English predecessor must be added to the list of his Chartrian sources: Nullus unquam, ut ait philosophus, terram uel aquam tetigit, nullus aerem uel ignem uidit. Composita quidem hec, que sensu percipimus, non ipsa ex ipsis sunt. (Daniel, p. 19). Cf. *Quaestiones naturales*, ed. Müller (Beiträge, XXXI. 2, Münster, 1934), p. 6.

⁷¹ Pp. 12-3, 12 (see n. 87 below), and 10. Cf. Chalcidius, secs. CXXIII, XXIII, and XXXI, ed. Wrobel, (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 197, 88, and 95).

⁷² Pp. 36-7. His source is *De opere astrolapsus*. See n. 40 above.

Primum interuallum, quod est inter ignem et aera bene obedientia dicitur, quia superiora illa ex quadam obedientia agunt in hec inferiora et quasi per liberum arbitrium illis commiscentur, vnde terra et aqua concipiunt et partus creant. Secundum uero interuallum, quod est inter aquam et terram a quibusdam dicta est necessitas, quia hec duo ex necessitate ab illis superioribus patiuntur. Quare fabulosa astronomia fingit hec femininis et illa masculinis nominibus appellata. Coniunctio autem mediorum recte dicta est armonia, id est diuersorum conuenientia. Est quidem armonia dissimilium sonorum in unum redacta concordia. Coniungitur enim in hac ligatura unum agentium et alterum pacientium.⁷³

Professor Thorndike was reminded by this passage of the essay on fate ascribed to Plutarch;⁷⁴ the fact is, however, that it derives from the *Commentum in somnium Scipionis*, I, 6, 36 ff.—the only direct use of Macrobius of which we can be certain in the book.

But whereas a simple survey of Daniel's authorities has thrown considerable light on his Arabic learning, it soon becomes apparent that the same method will not show, except crudely, the real nature of his debt to the Latin tradition, or the springs and character of his cosmogony. These aspects of his work can only be discovered by a study of the ideas themselves. And these ideas, even on the brief scrutiny which the present occasion permits, mark out openly his likenesses and debt to Chartrian philosophy.

Daniel offers a very Platonic account of the origin of the world:

Sed quia sapiens artifex nichil inconsulte facere suam sapientiam consuluit, sed quoniam, quicquid fit, uel ad similitudinem existentis, ut imago, que in se alicuius rei formam gerit, ideo summus fabricator, que fieri dispositus in nobis, id est mente diuina, tanquam in spera aurea scelata, sigillo perpetue memorie signauit . . .

Igitur uulgari philosophie haut dubium est, quin mundus iste uisibilis ad exemplar et similitudinem eterni mundi sit fabricatus. Eternum mundum uoco mundum illum archetypum . . .⁷⁵

This is basically the view of Chartres—not out of keeping with general Christian tradition—, which placed the archetype of the world *in mente dei*, or *νοῦς*, and identified both with the Second Person of God, though, in a moment of secularity or, more likely, of caution, Daniel does not specifically make this last application.⁷⁶ Again, attempting to explain the Christian world order in philosophic terms, the Chartrians—and especially Guillaume de Conches—had identified the Four Causes, which they borrowed from the Greeks by way of Boethius, with God and Matter, applying three of the Causes to the three qualities of God, which, in turn, they apportioned among the separate Persons of the Trinity: the Efficient Cause as God the Father, the Formal Cause as the Son, the Final Cause as the Holy Spirit. Under attack for thus allotting separately to each of the Persons the qualities that were held to be common to all, Guillaume de Conches withdrew this portion of his doctrine, which remained in controversy long after his day.⁷⁷ In a statement which he ascribes to Plato, Daniel likewise asserts the doctrine of Chartres, though this, too, without the offending application to the Trinity:

⁷³ P. 18. It is important to observe that the first three sentences appear in Guillaume de Conches, *Philosophia mundi* (PL 172, 52D-53A), though not the rest of the passage. On p. 22 Daniel makes a general reference to "in astrologia Tullianum . . . mandatum", which is evidently the *Somnium Scipionis*.

⁷⁴ *History of Magic* II, p. 176.

⁷⁵ Pp. 7 and 9.

⁷⁶ Parent, *La doctrine de la création*, chapter 2; and 'The Fabulous Cosmogony', n. 73 and its context.

⁷⁷ Parent, pp. 66 ff., and chapter 4; cf. 'The Fabulous Cosmogony', sec VI, and especially nn. 144 and 145.

Plato in rerum principiis quatuor causas constituit, primam efficientem, secundam formalem, tertiam finalem, quartam materialem nominabat. Efficientem causam, ipsum deum, formalem, dei sapientiam, finalem, diuinam bonitatem, materialem, quatuor elementa asseuerabat.⁷⁸

And immediately after this he adds another doctrine basic to Chartrian discourse, an adaptation from Chalcidius that names the two opposed principles of things out of which the universe is shaped, *unitas*, or God, and *alteritas*, or matter—a characteristic philosophical tenet of Thierry of Chartres and Bernardus Silvestris, who echoes Thierry in this regard:

Pitagoras uero et Aristoteles duo omnium principia dicebant, unitatem id est deum, alteritatem id est naturam. Hanc enim ylen intelligebant. Pitagoras eam alteritatem uocabat, Aristoteles possibilitatem, quia ex ea diuersarum rerum forma producta sit.⁷⁹

Like others in his day Daniel, as a cosmogonist, is concerned with the problem of reconciling a belief in the eternity of matter with that in the temporal creation of the world. The formula, taken from Chalcidius and Boethius, which is promulgated by Guillaume de Conches—the Chartrian most fully involved in composing the difficulties of the question—is the well-known doctrine that the world was created *non in tempore, sed cum tempore*. And this formula likewise takes its place in the *Liber de naturis*: *Quod cum ita sit, necesse est mundum habuisse principium cum tempore*.⁸⁰

Daniel shows his connection with Chartres most strikingly in his teachings on primal matter, or *hyle*, and the elements, subjects to which he devotes much space and energy. He begins with a direct attack on Chalcidius. *Sed quid est Calcidi,* he asks accusingly, *quod ylen inordinatam dicis et a deo creatam asseris?*

A perfecto namque longe abhorret infirmitas et incompositum opus imperfectum protinus accusat auctorem . . . Item in consilio dei, quid inordinatum potest excogitari? Si igitur ordinato consilio dei primordialis materia creata est, uel sicut dispositus uel aliter ordinata est, sed si ordinate dispositus et inordinate creauit, aliud uoluit et aliud fecit . . . Quod si ita est, in mouere ita est, quem admodum nichil inordinate dispositus, ita uel inordinate fecit . . . Concedatur itaque, ylen substantiam corpoream fuisse, a deo ex nichilo creatam . . . Hec quatuor elementa cum suis ornatis continebat, quia materia fuit singulorum . . . et, ut uerbis detur audacia, concedatur et chaos fuisse, nec tamen illud, ut multi uoluerunt, fuisse ylen. Sed in yle chaos itaque non fuit yle, sed contrarietas quedam in yle, naturalem elementorum motum impediens.⁸¹

Daniel is in fact opposing two positions here, though he saves his ire for one. The second is the Platonic view of *hyle* as the receptacle, which was neither corporeal nor non-corporeal. On this subject there was not complete agreement among the Chartrians; Bernardus Silvestris, for example, in the *De mundi*

⁷⁸ Pp. 13-4.

⁷⁹ The same. See Thierry of Chartres, *De sex dierum operibus*, ed. W. Jansen in *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu Boethius de Trinitate* (Breslau, 1926), p. 108, ll. 9-10; and "Liberum hunc," in Jansen, p. 12*, ll. 5-18: Sunt igitur secundum Platonem duo rerum principia . . . , id est Deus . . . materia . . . Ubique enim magistrum suum sequitur Pythagoram, qui unitatem et binarium duo rerum principia constituit,

unitatem Deum appellans, per binarium materiam designans. Cf. Bernardus Silvestris, *De Mundi universitate*, ed. Barach (Bibliotheca philos. mediae aetat., no. 1, Innsbruck, 1876), II, 13, ll. 1-10: Erant igitur duo rerum principia, unitas et diversum . . . Unitas deus . . . diversum non aliud quam hyle eaque indigens forma.

⁸⁰ P. 15. See Parent, chapter 6, and 'The Fabulous Cosmogony', sec. III.

⁸¹ P. 10.

universitate evidently accepts the Platonic theory. But Guillaume takes a more material stand, essentially like that which the *Liber de naturis* adopts.⁸²

The first and chief position which Daniel opposes in Chalcidius, that *hyle* was primordially in a state of chaos, echoes a long line of Christian discourse going back to St. Augustine, who stated that at original creation God had made matter already formed: *formatam quippe creavit materiam*.⁸³ Faced with the fact that, beyond the first creative act, the world's shaping was a work of six days, Christians had by Daniel's time sought to develop a solution which brought together the oppositions inherent in this theory of creation. Primordial *hyle*, they said, was not completely formless, but possessed a *forma confusionis*. It was thus called chaos, not in derogation of God's work, but only in comparison with the *ornatus* of its better state after six days; then it might be said to possess *forma dispositionis*. This view the Chartrians took as the cornerstone of their various expositions of the world's foundation.⁸⁴ In Chalcidius the terms *hyle* and *chaos* are made synonymous; Daniel, therefore, seems for a moment original in distinguishing them from each other. But it is a very superficial originality indeed, going no further than the terms themselves, since the entire discussion of *hyle* that follows in his book, though it does not use the words *forma confusionis*, *forma dispositionis*, takes the stand that in his day had become conventional. Besides this, the only new feature in Daniel's statement is the violence of its quarrel with Chalcidius—evidently reproducing the instruction of one of his Toledan teachers, Galippus—which is rather like beating a dead horse, since in dealing with the topic the Chartrians had already made Daniel's reinterpretation of the same source, but without his polemical heat.

It is in Daniel's further discussion of *hyle* that we find our first evidence of the special presence of the Chartrian to whom he is most fully indebted, Guillaume de Conches. This occurs in the account of the separation and ordering of the elements within *hyle*, which does not, to be sure, follow the *Philosophia mundi* exactly, but is so close as to be a sort of reduced quotation from it:

Daniel

Quia enim omne inordinatum in se malum esse manifestum est, elementa in prima creatione licet non, prout nunc sunt, separata, tamen ubi nunc sunt, ordinata fuisse certum est, ita tamen, quod terra cooperta fuit aquis, aer aliquantulum corpulentior, quam modo sit, in latitudinem se usque ad maximam partem ignis extendebat. Ignis similiter aliquantulum spissior, nec fuerunt isti visibiles elementorum ornatus, qui nunc elementata uocantur.⁸⁵

Guillaume

dicimus, iste liberavit nos ab hoc malo, non quia hoc malum primum fuisset, et poste nos inde liberasset, sed quia iste nobis nisi esset, accideret. Fuerunt in prima creatione ubi nunc sunt: et enim terra cooperta erat aquis, aqua uero spissior, aer item spissior et obscurior quam modo sit; quippe, cum neque sol, neque luna, neque aliae stellae essent quibus illuminarentur. Ignis spissior quam modo sit, id vero quod terra aquis cooperta, nec aliquo lumine illustrata, nec aedificiis distincta, nec suis animalibus repleta . . .⁸⁶

Daniel continues with the Chalcidian statement of the three kinds of cosmological work, *opus dei*, *opus nature*, *opus imitationis*, which Guillaume uses in

⁸² *Philosophia mundi*, cap. 21 (PL 172, esp. 53).

⁸³ *De gen. ad litt.*, I, 15, 29 (PL 34, 257).

⁸⁴ "The Fabulous Cosmogony," sec. III; and M. Baumgartner, *Die Philosophie des Alanus de Insulis im Zusammenhange mit den Anschauungen des 12. Jahrhunderts dargestellt* (Beiträge, II, 4, Münster, 1896), pp. 71 ff.

⁸⁵ P. 12. The term *elementata* for the final products of *ornatus* (and not found in Guillaume) may reflect the influence of Bernard Silvestris, ed. Barach, p. 30, or Gundissalinus, *De proc. mundi*, ed. Bülow, p. 38 pff.

⁸⁶ PL 172, 54B.

another edition of his *Philosophia*, called the *Dragmaticon*,⁸⁷ just as Daniel quotes in the same context the famous line from Lucretius that the *Philosophia mundi* also brings in here: *Ex insensibili non credas sensile nasci.*⁸⁸

When he comes to discuss the elements themselves, Daniel advances an atomic theory that parallels the atomism of Guillaume, and proceeds to argue the non-sensual nature of the original elemental qualities—a view held, as we have already observed, by Adelard of Bath—in words taken almost straight from the *Philosophia mundi*:

Daniel

Phisici quidem de generatione mundi agentes, non de naturis singulorum corporum ista quatuor, que uidentur, elementa mundi dixerunt, cum nullum istorum, quod ex quatuor elementis factum non sit, quod facile probari potest, exempli gratia, in terra aliquid de aqua, quia inde humiditatis aliquid uidemus exire, in eadem est aliquid aeris, quod probat fumus inde euaporans, sic et in aliis contingit uidere.⁸⁹

Guillaume

Nullum istorum elementum est, quia nullum horum est, quod ex quatuor istorum elementis factum non sit, quod probant sic: In terra aliquid de aqua est, quia humiditatis aliquid videmus exire. In eadem est aliquid aeris, quod probat fumus inde evaporans, et aliquid caloris, quod tactu percipimus. Similiter de aliis probatur . . .⁹⁰

And in at least one further instance of influence, Guillaume furnishes Daniel with a summary description of the world:

Daniel

Mundus uero ad similitudinem ovi factus est uel dispositus, terra in medio ut uitellum in ovo; circa hanc est aqua ut circa uitellum albumen, circa aquam aer ut panniculus continens albumen; extra uero cetera concludens est ignis ad modum teste oui.⁹¹

Guillaume

Mundus nempe ad similitudinem ovi est dispositus. Namque terra est in medio, ut vitellus in ovo. Circa hanc est aqua, ut circa uitellum albumen. Circa aquam est aer, ut panniculus continens albumen. Extra vero concludens omnia, est ignis ad modum testae ovi.⁹²

Nor is this the final limit of Guillaume's effect, which permeates its areas of the *Liber de naturis* as Albumazar, we may remember, does elsewhere.

How much the intermingling of Arabic science and Chartrian cosmology was Daniel's own, how much the product of lectures in Toledo, we do not know. Early in his book he asserts that the account of the universe which it gives, is a setting-down in Latin of what he had learned a *Galippo mixtarabe in lingua Tholetana*.⁹³ But he offers no further indication of the actual bounds of this expressed debt to the Christian Arab—whether it included his knowledge of Guillaume de Conches, as well as Toledan astro-physics. It remains, therefore, merely a tempting conjecture, not beyond probability, that a considerable amount of the fusion of schools discoverable in the *Liber de naturis* already existed

⁸⁷ *Dialogus de substantiis physicis confectus a Wilhelmo aneponymo philosopho, industria Guil. Grataroli* (Argentorati, 1567), p. 31 f.

⁸⁸ PL 172, 54C. Daniel, p. 10.

⁸⁹ PL 172, 50C.

⁹⁰ P. 19. For atomic theories, cf. Daniel, pp. 13-4 and 19-20; and Guillaume, 48-9. Throughout Guillaume leans heavily on the earlier translator of Arabic science, Constantinus Afer, whom he quotes frequently by name, as well as on Johannitus, *Isagoge in tegni Galieni*—neither of whom appears

in Daniel, who thus evidently was unacquainted with these works. For the influence of Constantinus and Johannitus on Guillaume, see H. Flatten, *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Conches*, pp. 107 ff., et passim.

⁹¹ P. 20.

⁹² IV, 1 (PL 172, 85A). For further evidence of the influence of the *Philosophia mundi*, see n. 73 above.

⁹³ P. 9.

among Gerard of Cremona and his colleagues, the lively report of whose lectures exercises an ever-present charm in Daniel's book.

These then were the sources that Daniel of Morley drew on, and this the cosmogony that he fashioned out of them. He prefaced his work with a defense whose burden is not unlike that of many another mediaeval treatise, but whose care suggests that, despite his bishop's benevolence, he expected rough going with some of his English audiences. How far his fears were justified we cannot find in the record; in retrospect at least, his "little trickle of learning from Toledo" appears to be no very extraordinary thing beside what Chartres had already accomplished and what was soon to be the expansion of intellectual life in all of Christian Europe.

Postscript

What is certainly the best treatment thus far of the *Liber de naturis* came to the writer's attention when the present article was in proof: Martin Müller, 'Die Stellung des Daniel von Morley in der Wissenschaft des Mittelalters,' *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görres-Gesellschaft*, XLI. 3 (1928), 301-37. This essay emphasizes Daniel's relation to the Latin tradition, of which its scope makes possible a treatment in considerable detail. It clarifies especially the connection with the Chartians and the related schools in the twelfth century—noting, among things, the influence of Guillaume de Conches and Adelard of Bath—, though its emphases and conclusions must be reappraised in the light of more recent studies and publications of texts in that field. Nor does it escape some important errors. Thus, in dealing with Daniel's theory of the proportional conjunction of the elements and their interstices (pp. 318-19), it searches Albumazar in vain for the source and concludes for the topic in general only that

die Lehre von der Verkettung der Elemente nach dem Gesetze der Proportionalität setzt noch keineswegs voraus, das etwa die betreffende Stelle bei Chalcidius unmittelbar zugrunde liegen müsse.

But Daniel, as we have seen (above, nn. 73, 74 and their contexts), was drawing directly on Macrobius, and some of his language also occurs in Guillaume de Conches. On the other hand, Müller (p. 326) attributes to Guillaume the citation of Hippocrates and Galen *de creticis diebus*, which Daniel owes to Albumazar (above, n. 12 and its context). As a student of Adelard of Bath and afterwards the editor of the *Quaestiones naturales*, Müller is sensitive to the use of this work, yet he makes a curious slip (p. 319) with regard to a quotation on the subject of the nonsensuousness of the elements, which Daniel attributes simply to *philosophus*. In the Middle Ages, Müller reminds us, *philosophus* earlier referred to Plato, later came to refer to Aristotle; moreover, the Berlin manuscript of the *Liber de naturis* actually reads *Plato* at this point. The quotation itself, however, (and this Müller overlooks) is from the *Quaestiones naturales* (above, n. 70); and as Daniel uses the honorable title for others besides the two great men of Greece (see n. 30 above its context), it is plain that *philosophus* here means Adelard, who is the immediate authority for this view of the elements in the *Liber de naturis*. A far more serious limit with regard to Adeiard's influence lies in the fact that Müller does not discover the large debt of Daniel in matters astronomical to the as yet unpublished *Libellus magistri Alardi Batoniensis de opere astrolapsus*, a deficiency shared hitherto by all the critics (and very nearly including the present writer; see nn. 40 and 72 above).

On the side of Daniel's Arabic learning Müller (especially pp. 317 ff., 322, *et passim*) makes only small progress beyond previous scholarship. He recognizes the debt to Alfarabi's *De ortu* and makes a somewhat fuller use of Albumazar

than had earlier been done, though he does not indicate the extent and profundity of this influence (besides the *Maius introductorium* he mentions the *Isagoge minor*, but does not mention its translator Adelard of Bath). He follows Daniel's clues in distinguishing the Latin *Asclepius* from Magnus Hermes, without, however, adequate consideration of the nature and probable Arabic origin of the latter, and he omits discussion of the *Liber triplicis mundi* altogether. The question of Daniel's knowledge of the contents of the *Almagest* is not dealt with, but Müller (p. 317) prefers a reference in the Berlin manuscript: *Ptolemaeus Almagesti* to the variant in the Arundel: *Ypogras de aeris mutatione* on the ground that, as far as the latter is concerned, *ein Werk dieses Titels findet sich weder unter den hippokratischen Schriften, noch unter den Uebersetzungen Gerhards.* The actual quotation in Daniel, however, to which the citation refers (ed. Sudhoff, p. 11: that all color *ex quatuor qualitatibus est proueniens*) does not seem to appear in the *Almagest*, and an *Ypocras de aeris mutatione* was indeed known to Daniel, in name at least; it is quoted in the Latin texts of Albumazar (see n. 8 above).

But the greatest deficiency in Müller's article, with respect to Daniel's Arabic lore, is its failure to distinguish the Latin versions which the *Liber de naturis* employs. It is unaware, for example (p. 322), that Daniel read, not Gerard's, but John of Spain's translation of Alfragani, and erroneously attributes Daniel's text of Albumazar to John of Spain, rather than Hermann of Carinthia, thus blurring a significant connection between Spain and Chartres, which Daniel reflects (see nn. 19 ff., 35, 36 above and their contexts. For other deficiencies, cf. Müller, pp. 322 *et passim*, with the present article, section II throughout). Finally, accepting virtually at face value the indications in the *Liber de naturis* of debt to Gerard of Cremona, Müller does not recognize the importance of testing the limits of this indebtedness for Daniel of Morley's true *Stellung* in the learned world of his time.

Mediaevalia

I. Lawman's London

THE text of Lawman's *Brut*¹ contains about three hundred and twenty-five names of places, peoples and derived adjectives. The occurrences of the place-name *London*, over two hundred in number, are exceeded only by those of *Rome* the spiritual capital of the mediaeval world. In addition to the designation *London* (*Londen*, *Londene*, *Londone*, *Lundune* etc.), Lawman, following Geoffrey² and Wace,³ refers to the city as *Ne(o)we Troye*, *Trinouant*, and *Kaerlud*. Such frequent mention of the capital of Britain in a poem of over thirty-two thousand lines would lead one to expect some detailed references to the city during the period of the poem's composition, i.e. the latter portion of the twelfth century,⁴ and to its history. An examination of the text, however, shows that either Lawman was not especially familiar with the city or felt that, in his historic account of Britain, circumstantial references to the capital and its history were superfluous.

By far the largest number of references to the city are quite perfunctory; kings native and foreign besiege and capture it, hold their "hustings", die, and are buried there. There are however a small number of references of especial interest and these are discussed below.

I. VARIOUS NAMES OF LONDON

Early in the poem (ll. 1114 ff.), we are told that the legendary Brutus, eponymous founder of *Britain* (*Brutlond*) in his flight from Greece stopped at *L(e)ogice*.⁵ Here, in a pagan temple, he is told in a dream by the goddess Diana to sail westward beyond France where he will find a fertile land, and there he is to found *ane neowe Troye* (l. 1246). This Brutus proceeds to do and in Britain finds a site near a river (the R. Thames though it is not named l. 2022) on which he causes to be built:

A-Text⁶

riche ane burhe
mid bouren & mid hallen
mid hæ3e stan walles

B-Text⁷

one borh riche
mid boures and halles
mid gode ston walles (ll. 2024-26)

In commemoration of his lineage and probably remembering the advice of Diana, Brutus calls the city *Troye þe Newe* (l. 2032). Of interest in this passage is the reference to the walls⁸ of London. Afterwards, continues Lawman (ll. 2035 ff.),

¹ Ed. Frederick Madden, *La3amon's Brut* (London, 1847), 3 Vols. Cited Madden.

² Ed. Acton Griscom, *The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth* (London, 1929). See also Edmond Faral, *La Légende arthurienne* (Paris, 1929), 3 Vols.

³ Ed. Ivor Arnold, *Le Roman de Brut par Wace* (Société des anciens textes français, Paris, 1938-40), 2 Vols. See also Le Roux de Lincy ed., *Le Roman de Brut par Wace* (Rouen, 1836-38), 2 Vols.

⁴ Cp. Madden I, xviii-xxi.

⁵ To be identified probably with *Leucadia*, one of the Ionian islands. See August Pauly, Georg Wissowa et al. edd., *Pauly's Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertums-*

wissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1894 ff.), XXIV, 2213 ff.

⁶ A-Text refers to British Museum, *Ms Cotton Caligula A. IX*.

⁷ B-Text refers to British Museum, *Ms Cotton Otho C. XIII*.

⁸ For the history and extent of which see *A Survey of London by John Stow*, ed. Charles L. Kingsford I (Oxford, 1908), pp. 5-10. Cited Stow. It is interesting to note that Stow (I, p. 1) repeats substantially what Lawman says concerning the various appellatives for London. Both are in turn quoting from Geoffrey. Other perfunctory references to the walls of London are ll. 7085, 10737, and 16949 etc.

this name was abandoned and the city was called *Trinouant* (l. 2038). Geoffrey, however (p. 252), says that *Trinouant* was merely a corruption of *Troia Noua*: . . . *eamque Troia(m) Noua(m) vocavit . . . tandem per corruptionem vocabuli Trinouantum dicta fuit*. Wace repeats this:

La fist *Troie Nove* apeler;
puis ala li nuns corumpant,
si l'apela l'om *Trinovant*; (ll. 1224-26).

Lawman goes on to say (ll. 2043-49) that still later the town was named *Kaerlud* after Lud, a descendant of Brutus. Here the poet is following Geoffrey (p. 252) who at this point breaks off his etymologizing of the name of the city. Wace, however (ll. 1234-37), says that the name Lud was corrupted to *Lodoin* which in turn was Anglicised to *Londene*. Lawman does not exactly follow Wace here, but says (ll. 2051-53) that after Lud's time there arose a new dominion and new customs and that the city was called *Lundin* (*Lunden* l. 2053). Later, with the coming of the English, says Lawman (2055-56), the city was called *Lundene* (*Londene*) and, after the coming of the French, *Lundres* (l. 2060). Lawman's French form of the name is also directly copied from Wace (l. 1238).

After anticipating some of the events of his narrative to give us these various explanations of the different names for the city, Lawman continues his poem and, when Lud duly appears in the story (ll. 7069 ff.), the various appellatives for London and their origins are again touched on (ll. 7080-7117) in terms almost identical with those previously discussed.

II. GATES OF LONDON

(a) *Billingsgate*

To an eponymous Belin is attributed the erection of a tower called *Belynes3at* (i.e. Billingsgate, l. 6061) a special feature of which was an underground gate. This latter reference is obviously to a sluice or water-gate. The wharf, now known as Billingsgate,⁹ is the site of London's great fish market and the name has become a synonym for abusive language. In this tower we are told were buried Belin (ll. 6082-3) and, later, Vortimer (l. 15070). Lud, one of Belin's successors, found standing of London only the tower erected by Belin (i.e. *Belynes3at*) says Lawman (ll. 7081 ff.). Because of his love for London, Lud, we are told (ll. 7085-90), caused the walls of London and its public buildings to be rebuilt.

(b) *Ludgate*

When the British king Lud died he was buried, says Lawman (ll. 7138 ff.), at *Ludesgate* which is still called *Port-Lud* in British (Old Welsh *porth* 'gate, tower'). Later, with the coming of English, it was called *Ludes-3ate* (l. 7142). The reference is to Ludgate¹⁰ the principal gate in the west wall of the city. The name now designates that section of greater municipal London which embraces such well-known points as Ludgate Hill and Ludgate Circus.

(c) *The North Gate*, i.e. *Aldersgate*

When the British king Nennius died, he was buried at the '*nord 3œte i Lundene*' says Lawman (l. 7621). The reference is to Aldersgate,¹¹ the principal gate in the northern wall of the city, now the site of Aldersgate Street.

⁹ Cp. Stow I, pp. 43, 205-211. *London and its Environs*, ed. Findlay Muirhead (London, 1922), p. 289. Cited Muirhead.

¹⁰ Cp. Stow I, pp. 38-42; Muirhead p. 202.

¹¹ Cp. Stow I, pp. 27-34; Muirhead p. 231.

III. THE TOWER OF LONDON

We are told early in the poem that king Eliud was captured by his brothers Jugenes and Peridur and imprisoned in London in *a tower* (l. 6815). Yet a few lines later we are told that Eliud for 'many a year and a day' lay in *the tower* (l. 6818). It is not at all clear from this that it is the Tower of London which is being referred to. Much later we find the only other reference to a tower in London and this clearly refers to the Tower of London. We are told that Octa, Hengist's son, lay bound a prisoner:

<i>A-Text</i>	<i>B-Text</i>
<i>in þe quarterne¹² of Lundun</i>	<i>in þe tour of Londone</i> (l. 19293)

The reference is to the White Tower,¹³ the oldest part of the present fortress, dating from soon after the Conquest. The rest of the buildings are to be referred to the reign of Henry III (1216-72).

IV. WALBROOK

Lawman tells us (ll. 10755 ff.) that the Britons besieged the Roman garrison in London under Livius Gallus. After the Britons 'broke the walls' (l. 10763), Livius retreated to 'the castle' (l. 10767) and from there asked for a truce. Allowed to depart, Livius however was attacked by the Scots under Columban. He and his men were annihilated and their bodies cast into 'the brook' (l. 10831) which, says Lawman, because of the name Gallus was called in 'the English book' *Wale-broc*¹⁴ (l. 10841). The reference is to Walbrook,¹⁵ a stream which ran through what is now Finsbury Circus in London, down the street which goes by the name of 'London's Wall', past All Hallows Church and the Bank of England, across Cannon Street and over the site of the Cannon Street railway station to the Thames, just north of Southwark Bridge.

V. ST. PAUL'S

In ll. 12639 ff. Lawman states that archbishop Guencelin summoned the clergy of all Britain to assemble in London and then goes on to say that in those days and for many years (previously?) the archepiscopal seat was at *Seint Pouli*¹⁶ (l. 12656) but, that since the coming of St. Austin (i.e. Augustine), it had been removed to Canterbury. Much later, Lawman, in the midst of enumerating the notables attending Arthur at his court in *Kair-liun*,¹⁷ remarks that at that time there were three archbishops in the country, one each at London, York, and Kair-liun. He then goes on to say, apropos of nothing in particular, that the archiepiscopal seat was in *London* (l. 24373) and was removed to Canterbury after the English had conquered this land (i.e. Britain). Finally, we are told (ll. 24445-24462) that at a Whitsuntide coronation ceremony in Kair-liun the three archbishops crowned Arthur. In the subsequent procession the archbishop of Kair-liun preceded the king (l. 24457), the archbishop of London walked at the king's right hand (l. 24459) and the archbishop of York on his left (l. 24462). Now, the

¹² *quarterne* of the *A-text* < OE *cweartern* n. 'prison' is apparently an older designation for the fortress than the (French) *tour* of the *B-text*.

¹³ Cp. *Stow*, I, pp. 45-50: *Muirhead* pp. 291-98 (and map).

¹⁴ The name means the 'stream of the Britons' < OE *Wéala* 'Briton', 'foreigner' and *brōc* 'stream'. Cp. Eilert Ekwall, *English River Names* (Oxford, 1928), p. 430;

J. E. B. Gover, *The Place-Names of Middlesex* (London, 1922), p. 90.

¹⁵ Cp. *Stow*, I, p. 118.

¹⁶ The Cathedral Church of St. Paul, for the history and description of which see *Stow* I, pp. 35, 324-338: *Muirhead* pp. 240-47 (and map).

¹⁷ Caerleon - on - Usk, (Montgomeryshire) Wales.

protocol observed at the coronation would seem to indicate that the archbishopric of London did not hierarchically out-rank that of Kair-liun. Yet Lawman has twice previously said that the archepiscopal seat had been moved from St. Paul's (London) to Canterbury (ll. 12656-12661: 24373-4). Lawman's designation of St. Paul's (London) as the site of the archbishop's seat is probably a reference to the earlier metropolitans¹⁸ of London who at various times possessed varying degrees of autonomy,¹⁹ and were sometimes practically equal in power to the archbishops of Canterbury.

The above then constitute all the specific references made by Lawman in his poem to the architecture and history of late twelfth century London. Granted that Lawman was writing of events already remote in time to him and had in addition to observe the proprieties of both historical narrative and poetic composition, the paucity of detail thus disentangled from the body of the poem makes one doubt whether he was at all familiar with London to which he so often refers. Knowing that the bulk of his material had been furnished him by Geoffrey and Wace, one feels that however freely he may have adapted this material in other details, when it came to dealing with the London of his time, he was content to accept unquestioningly what already lay before him. That he should do so in an epic poem celebrating the origins and past glories of his native country, makes his obvious reticence on that country's capital city in his own day hard to explain save on the grounds of unfamiliarity.

ROLAND BLENNER-HASSETT,
Stanford University.

II. Middle English *Questmonger*¹

IN THE large body of late medieval complaint and satire concerning legal corruption, the word *questmonger* appears frequently. A good sample of its use is a speech by Pilate in the Towneley *Play of the Conspiracy*:

Bot all false indytars
Quest mangers and Iurers,
And all thise fals out rydars,
Ar welcom to my sight.²

Except for the outriders, all the folk Pilate welcomes are somehow involved in legal corruption. Fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth century writings furnish many such lists of perverters of the law, and probably the majority of such lists include questmongers, who commonly keep company with bribed judges, perjured jurors, lawyers who maintain unjust causes, and individuals who bring false actions and suborn witnesses and jurors to win them. The term *questmonger* has, then, ordinarily a decidedly pejorative connotation.

When, however, we seek more definite information on the meaning of the word, we are disappointed. Existing definitions and glosses are unsatisfactory. These are well represented by the definition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*: 'One who made a business of conducting inquests.'³ Oman quotes Murray to

¹⁸ NED 'metropolitan' sb. B 1, 'A bishop having the oversight of the bishops of a province; in the early church his see was in the metropolis of the province'.

¹⁹ For an interesting discussion of this problem, especially as it concerned the archbishopric of Canterbury in early England, see R. H. Hodgkin, *A History of the*

Anglo-Saxons I (Oxford, 1935), pp. 267-69.

¹ I wish to express my thanks to Professor Hans Kurath and the staff of the Medieval Dictionary for letting me see their materials.

² Towneley Plays, ed. George England (EETS OS 71), XX, 24-27.

³ Vol. VIII, ed. W. A. Craigie (1914).

the effect that questmongers 'seem to have been persons who made it their business and profit to give information, and cause judicial enquiries to be made against others, so as to get a share of the fines.'⁴ The word is defined or glossed in approximately this sense by Dr. Johnson, by Nares,⁵ by Babington,⁶ by Skeat in the glossary to his edition of *Piers Plowman* (1886), and by several recent editors of Middle English texts. Nares, however, apparently had some doubts, for he offered as a supplementary gloss, 'also a juryman, a person regularly impanelled to try a cause.' Skeat possibly changed his mind, for in the glossary to his edition of Chaucer (1892) one finds 'questmen, jurymen.' Stratman also defines *questmonger* in this more general sense: 'inquest holder.'

The existing definitions are, then, two: one restricting the term to professional informers and promoters of legal actions, the other making the word practically synonymous with 'juror' and thus depriving it of pejorative connotation. An analysis of passages, ranging from the late fourteenth to the early seventeenth centuries, in which *questmonger* appears, fails to support the first definition and casts suspicion on the second. The only passage which I have found that purports to define *questmonger* is late:

The same Thursday, the saide Commons went to Saint Martins le Grand in London, and tooke from the high Altar in that Church one Roger Legat chiefe sisar (or *questmonger*) led him into Cheape, and cut off his head . . .⁷

A *sizar* or *assizer* was one of those who constituted the inquest, a sort of juror. What a 'chief' *sizar* was I have been unable to discover, but certainly Stowe gives no support to the *OED* definition. The lateness of the citation and the fact that the author is describing events that took place over two centuries before (1381) deprive the citation of great authority.

There are, however, numerous passages from the late fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries in which the word appears. I have divided the citations into five groups:

I. The first group contains citations in which questmongers are condemned as vicious or avaricious, but without any indication that they are in any way associated with the law or legal corruption. Italics are mine.

Who brekys þe ey3ten maundement lyeres glosersis, and fals *questmongeris*. Why lyeris. for þe[y] hatyn þe trewthe. And why fals *questmongeris*. For þey sellyn þe trewthe.⁸ (c. 1380)

Also it is ordeined þat if any brother or soster, after þat he be receyued in to bis Fraternite, by-come of euel fame oper of euel name, as thef, or commune barettour, or comune *questmonger*, or meyntenour of quereles; or be atteint of any falschede, þat anon he be put out of þe fraternite & neuermore com þer-jnne in no manere.⁹ (1389)

Questmongers also he [Cupiditas] doith embrace;
And al the vices in euery lande

⁴ *The Great Revolt of 1381* (Oxford, 1906), p. 193. I suppose this to be a private communication from Murray to Oman.

⁵ *A Glossary*, ed. J. O. Halliwell and Thomas Wright (London, 1888).

⁶ Reginald Pecock, *The Repressor of Over Much Blaming of the Clergy*, ed. Churchill Babington (London, 1860, "The Rolls Series," n^o. 16).

⁷ *Middle English Dictionary*, ed. Henry Bradley (Oxford, 1891).

⁸ John Stowe, *Annales* (London, 1615), p. 286.

⁹ *Lay Folks Catechism* (EETS OS 118), p. 55.

¹⁰ *London English*, ed. R. W. Chambers and Marjorie Daunt (Oxford, 1931), p. 43.

Be hooly enclosed into his hande.¹¹ (c. 1450)

Four persons sett on the pyllory for fals *questmongers*.¹² (c. 1500)

II. In the second group fall those citations in which there is an apparent distinction between false jurors and *questmongers*:

... et puis abateront [the insurgents of 1381] a terre vn belle place de Johnne de Imeworth adonques Marshall de la Marshalcye, del banke le roy, et gardeine de les prisoners de la dit place et toutz les measons de les Jurors et *questmanger* partenante a la Mareschalcye abaterent a terre pur toute la noete . . .¹³ (late 14th century?)

In þis chirche ben vsureris. okureris. iourours. iullars. *questmongars*. & alle false witnessse berars . . .¹⁴ (before 1415)

... gileful crafti men, or iurouris and *questmongers*, or pleders for mony (thouȝ the causis of plee be wrong) . . .¹⁵ (c. 1449)

To these should be added the passage in the Towneley Plays given above (c. 1435?).

III. A third group of citations makes no apparent distinction between jurors and *questmongers*, but lists the latter with other classes guilty of legal corruption:

Pe þridde ben þes fals witnesses and fals *questmongers*; þilke it beþ þat bynemeþ men here heritages, and doþ many obere wronges . . .¹⁶ (c. 1375?)
 And fals men, flatereres . vsurers and theues,
 Lyeres and *questmongeres* . that were forsworen ofte
 Wytynge and willifuly . with the false helden,
 And for syluer were forswore . sothely they wist it.¹⁷ (1376?)
 . . . ever having a rabble of promoters, *questmongers*, and leading jurors at their command; so as they could have any thing found, either for fact or valuation.¹⁸ (1621)

IV. In the fourth group of citations *questmonger* rather clearly means one who for a bribe, either bears false witness or renders a false verdict:

Ware yow *questemongeres* and notaries certes for fals witnessyng was Susanna in ful greet sorwe and peyne and many mo.¹⁹ (c. 1390)

Certis so in our daies . who þat mediþ þise iullars/ þat ben þe sones of Belial . & fals *questmongars*, he may slee & he may saue . þus fals were neuer þe Iewes.²⁰ (before 1415)

... and ofte tymes falsely forsworne, as fals *questemongers*, be þat for wynnyng of a litell moneye oþur for loue or hatred or for drede puttes vp false verdittys and will not sey þe trouthe, but selles trouthe, and so ofte tymes þei hare wers chapmen þan Iudas was, þat solde Criste for xxxxi pennes.²¹ (early 15th century)

¹¹ Peter Idley, *Instructions to His Son*, ed. Charlotte D'Evelyn (Boston, 1935), I, 299-301.

¹² *Chronicle of Grey Friars* (Camden Society, LIII), p. 24.

¹³ 'Anominalle Cronicle belonginge to the Abbey of St. Maries in Yorke,' in G. M. Trevelyan, 'An Account of the Rising of 1381,' *English Historical Review*, XIII (1898), 514.

¹⁴ *The Lanterne of Liȝt*, ed. Lillian M. Swinburn (EETS OS 151), p. 132.

¹⁵ Pecock, op. cit., II, 540. Cp. *ibid.*, II, 516.

¹⁶ *The Book of Vices and Virtues*, ed. W. Nelson Francis (EETS OS 217), p. 35. Cp.

ibid., p. 40.

¹⁷ *Piers Plowman*, ed. W. W. Skeat (Oxford, 1886), B, XIX, 366-69. Version C, XXII, 372, has 'a sisour and a somenour' for 'lyeres and questmongeres.'

¹⁸ Francis Bacon, *History of King Henry VII*, in *Works*, ed. Spedding, Ellis, and Heath (Boston, 1860), XI, 327.

¹⁹ Chaucer, 'Parsons Tale' (Manly-Ricket ed.), 1, 797.

²⁰ *The Lanterne of Liȝt*, p. 113.

²¹ *Middle English Sermons*, ed. Woodburn O. Ross (EETS OS 209), p. 103. Cp. *ibid.*, p. 174.

But above all things, these *Questmongers* had neede to take heede: for there all things goeth by oath . . . They must judge by their oath, according to conscience, guilty or not guilty. When he is guilty, in what case are those which say, not guilty? Scripture doth shew what a thing it is, when a man is a malefactor, and the *Questmongers* justify him, and pronounce him not guilty . . . I my self did once know wher there was a man slaine of an other man in an anger, it was done openly, the Man-killer was taken and put in Prison. Sute was made to the *Questmongers*, for it was a rich man that had done the act. At the length every man had a crowne for his good will: and so this open man-killer was pronounced not guilty . . . Therfore (I say) these *Questmongers* had neede to say: *Our Father which art in heaveu [sic], thy will be done . . .*²² (c. 1550)

V. In a class by itself stands a single citation, in which *questmonger* clearly means juror, but without any pejorative sense:

. . . the *Questmonger* doing uprightly his duty in discharging of his conscience, if he shall have displeasure, happy is he, and he shall have reward of God.²³ (1553)

It will be noted that in none of these passages is the *OED* definition or anything like it needed for complete sense and consistency, and in several of them it is positively excluded. It remains only to meet certain apparent objections to establish as probably the definition of *questmonger* as 'juryman, especially a bribed juryman.'

One such possible objection is that several of the citations fix the sin of the *questmonger* as bearing false witness. May a *questmonger*, then, be a perjured witness? It is possible, but it should be remembered that 'false witness' is the general term for all sins against the eighth (or in the Protestant decalogue the ninth) commandment. Moreover, the distinction between a juror and a witness was not so strict in earlier times as now. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the jury consisted, at least in theory, of men who had first-hand knowledge of the principals and issues in the case. Hence, the jurors were in a sense witnesses.²⁴

Next, there are the citations of Group II, which itemize jurors and *questmongers* separately in their lists of perverters of the law. The distinction between *questmongers* and false jurors here implied may, however, be only apparent. The habit of using two words for the same thing, particularly when one is formal and the other colloquial, is well known. It may thus well be that *questmonger* is a rather colloquial term, needing the more formal *juror* to reinforce it. Or the two terms may be used much as we say 'racketeers and thugs', without implying any strict distinction between a racketeer and a thug.

Finally, there is the question whether the term is commonly pejorative. The single citation which speaks of good *questmongers* is rather late and is balanced by another from the same author in which *questmongers* receive bribes. It is also possible that the term underwent melioration. Several citations from all periods specify for condemnation *false* *questmongers*. Whether the *false* is definitive, descriptive, or merely emphatic cannot, from the evidence, be finally decided. The number of citations, likewise from all periods, in which the

²² Hugh Latimer, *Fruitfull Sermons* (London, 1635), fol. 146^v. Latimer in another place gives a more detailed account of what is apparently the same incident: I can tell where one man slew another in a township, and was attached upon the same; 12. men were impaneled, that man had friends, the Sherieffe had laboured the bench, the 12. men stacke at it, and said, except he would

disburs 12. crownes, they would finde him guilty. Meanes were found that the 12. crownes was payd. The quest come in and sayes, not guilty. *Ibid.*, fol. 66^v.

²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 193^r.

²⁴ Cf. F. W. Maitland and F. C. Montague, *A Sketch of English Legal History* (New York, 1915), p. 56.

unmodified term is used strongly suggests that *questmonger* alone was quite capable of expressing full condemnation, and was commonly so used and understood, unless the contrary connotation was clearly specified.

It, therefore, appears that the most usual meaning of *questmonger* was simply 'juror who accepts bribes for a false verdict.' It is of course possible, even likely, that the word was sometimes used in a more restricted sense to denote a specially notorious bribed juror,²⁵ or perhaps a juror who not only accepted bribes himself but also induced others to do so by acting as a broker between bribable jurors and litigants who wanted packed juries.²⁶ Like most pejorative terms, *questmonger* probably developed considerable elasticity in use. Doubtless it varied in meaning from time to time and place to place. Nevertheless, the general content of the term must have been, for two and a half centuries, approximately 'bribed juror.'

ARNOLD WILLIAMS,
Michigan State College.

III. Les deux compilations de Thomas de Perseigne

MIGNÉ a réimprimé un volumineux commentaire du Cantique des Cantiques, attribué à un certain "Thomas le cistercien".¹ Ce livre avait déjà eu l'honneur de trois éditions,² et les manuscrits qui le conservent sont assez nombreux;³ il a donc été, autrefois, lu et apprécié. De nos jours il n'a pas encore fait l'objet d'une étude d'ensemble. Seul le problème d'authenticité a été abordé: on peut dire qu'il est désormais résolu, grâce aux recherches consciencieuses de Dom Bruno Griesser.⁴ Des articles de ce dernier, il ressort que le commentaire du Cantique a été certainement écrit par un moine cistercien de la fin du XII^e siècle. Un manuscrit attribua jadis ce commentaire à un moine de Perseigne du nom de Thomas.⁵ Mais les bibliographes ne se sont pas, jusqu'à présent, prononcés au sujet de cette attribution, faute de preuves certaines.⁶

D'autre part, on savait qu'un certain Thomas de Perseigne avait écrit un ouvrage sous ce titre: *De p̄eparatione cordis*.⁷ En une brève notice de moins de deux pages, Léopold Delisle fit connaître, il y a plus de soixante ans, un manuscrit, coté à la bibliothèque du Mans sous le n° 3, contenant cet ouvrage,⁸ qui depuis, d'ailleurs, ne fut pas étudié.

Or il suffit d'avoir en même temps sous les yeux le commentaire du Cantique

²⁵ The Roger (or Robert) Legett whom the rebels of 1381 pulled off the high altar of St. Martin's and beheaded must have been more than a perjured juror. Stowe calls him 'chief sizar,' and if Stowe is also right in terming him a 'questmonger,' the word must sometimes mean some sort of official at inquests (foreman of the jury?). Still, the pejorative sense remains, as well as the connection with a jury.

²⁶ Such individuals existed. Gower speaks of a 'tracier,' who is a captain of bribed jurors. If you want your case tried before a sympathetic jury, says Gower, you go to the 'tracier,' who makes all the necessary arrangements and handles the financial details. *Mirour de l'home*, II, 25033-64, in *Works*, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford, 1899).

¹ PL 206, 17-862.

² Sur l'histoire de ces éditions, voir l'*Histoire littéraire de la France XV* (Paris, 1869), pp. 329-330.

³ MSS Grenoble 397; Mont-Cassin 59; Paris, B. N. lat. 475, 562, 563, 16296; Rouen 133;

Valenciennes 54, etc.

⁴ 'Thomas Cisterciensis als Verfasser eines Kommentars zum Hohenlied', *Cistercienser Chronik*, LI (1939), 168-174, 219-224, 263-269.

⁵ D'après De Visch, *Bibliotheca scriptorum sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis* (Douai, 1649), p. 247.

⁶ De Visch, loc. cit.; *Hist. litt.*, loc. cit., p. 329.

⁷ De Visch, op. cit., p. 248; B. Hauréau, *Histoire littéraire du Maine X* (Paris, 1877), p. 93.

⁸ Le "De p̄eparatione cordis" de Thomas de Perseigne, *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, XLIII (1882), 422-423. Delisle a publié la lettre-dédicace (au début de la ligne 13, corriger aperuit en apparet). Dans cette lettre, on notera que Thomas emploie le mot *colorare* au sens "d'orner" ou de "varier la forme" qu'il revêtait dans la rhétorique classique (exemples dans *Thes. ling. lat.* III, 1724), et non au sens de "modifier" qu'il revêtira chez Duns Scot.

et le *De praeparatione* pour constater qu'ils sont du même auteur.⁹ Ils mériteraient d'être analysés conjointement. Sans doute le second, presque aussi volumineux que le premier, ne vaut-il pas d'être publié en entier. Mais le premier, éclairé et complété par le second, est une source où il y aurait lieu de puiser bien des indications sur l'auteur, sa culture et son milieu monastique. En particulier, il y aurait à étudier ses sources et sa doctrine spirituelle. Dans quelle mesure dépend-il de saint Bernard et des grands maîtres cisterciens? Ajoute-t-il à leur enseignement? Ne l'appauvrit-il pas? Quelle est son information en matière de littérature patristique et profane?¹⁰ Cite-t-il ses auteurs d'après des florilèges ou en a-t-il une connaissance directe? Quel usage en fait-il? Quels sont les caractères de sa théologie et de sa spiritualité? Pour aider à poser tous ces problèmes—en attendant qu'il se trouve quelqu'un qui tâche à les résoudre—une rapide présentation du *De praeparatione* ne sera pas inutile. Elle suffira en outre à établir l'identité de Thomas de Perseigne et de l'auteur du commentaire du Cantique.

Ce dernier, quoi qu'en dise le titre, est une compilation. Le texte du Cantique n'y est qu'une occasion de rassembler, selon un ordre artificiel, des enseignements très divers, qui n'ont de commun que d'être relatifs à la doctrine spirituelle. Il en va de même du *De praeparatione*: ce titre est inspiré d'un verset du 1^{er} livre des Rois¹¹ qu'avait retenu la liturgie.¹² L'expression "préparation du cœur" avait reçu des Pères de l'Eglise un sens précis; saint Basile, par exemple, en donne la définition: préparer son cœur, c'est le purifier des souvenirs laissés par les habitudes mauvaises, de façon qu'il soit prêt à recevoir l'enseignement de Dieu et de lui seul.¹³ Cette formule résume donc tout le programme de l'ascèse chrétienne.¹⁴ Aussi Thomas de Perseigne a-t-il pu couvrir de ce titre tout ce qui se rapporte à la vie spirituelle, et un bibliothécaire du XVII^e siècle a-t-il eu le droit d'assigner à son oeuvre le titre suivant: *De praeparatione cordis et de multis aliis etc . . .*¹⁵

L'ouvrage est divisé en dix livres.¹⁶ Chacun a pour titre une expression tirée du texte scripturaire par le commentaire duquel il débute. A l'intérieur de chaque livre, il n'y a guère de plan.¹⁷ Entre les livres, il n'y a pas davantage d'unité. Le seul lien entre les parties vient de l'idée de la *praeparatio cordis*: elle est rappelée de temps en temps,¹⁸ et c'est sur elle que s'achève le tout.¹⁹ Mais ce thème, si large lui-même, ne crée qu'une unité factice. A vrai dire, le recueil est constitué de "mélanges": de nombreux points de la doctrine chrétienne

⁹ Contemporain, probablement, de l'évêque de Rouen, Rotrou de Warwick (1164-1183), le *De praeparatione* étant dédié à un évêque de Rouen dont le nom a pour initiale la lettre R. Thomas n'est mentionné ni dans les documents ni dans la "notice historique" publiés par G. Fleury, *Cartulaire de l'abbaye cistercienne de Perseigne* (Mamers, 1800).

¹⁰ Ce problème—and lui seul—a été abordé, d'après le seul commentaire du Cantique, par B. Griesser, *Dichterzitate in des Thomas Cisterciensis Kommentar zum Hohenlied, Cistercienser Chronik*, L (1938), 11-14, 118-122; LI (1939), 73-80.

¹¹ Rois I, vii, 3.

¹² Répons *Praeparate corda uestra Domino* . . . du temps après la Pentecôte.

¹³ Epist. II; PG 32, 226. Dans la liturgie, l'expression *praeparatio mentis* figure dans la collecte de la fête de saint Silvestre abbé (26 novembre) au propre monastique.

¹⁴ Ce thème sera repris par le dominicain Gérard de Liège (+1270) au premier livre de son *De doctrina cordis*; cf. Quétif-Echard, *Scriptores ordinis Praedicatorum* I (Paris, 1719), p. 249.

¹⁵ Ecrit sur le feuillet de garde.

¹⁶ Delisle a publié les titres.

¹⁷ Il y a cependant parfois une certaine suite dans le développement; on lit, par exemple, dans le *De transitu Iacob IV*, après un commentaire de ces paroles *Resistite diabolo . . .* (Iac., iv, 7), ces mots: *huius libelli consummatio est uictoria. Haec uictoria debet habere firmitatem . . .*; col. 219.

¹⁸ Cols. 27, 28, 37, 39, 47, 401, 402, 403, 408, 454, 513, 529, 606, 631.

¹⁹ Hiis ergo horis laudes Deo nostro cantamus in gratiarum actione quia de Egypto liberati sumus et cor nostrum per plagas Egypti comparatum per legem est reparatum, ut Deus noster adueniens paratam sibi in nobis inueniat mansionem de qua mereamur ascendere ad illam supernam ciuitatem, ipso praestante qui uiuit et regnat per omnia saecula saeculorum. Amen; col. 655. Le traité est suivi (656-673) d'une série de tableaux à accolades qu'introduit cette transition: Nunc autem quia sunt septem uitia principalia quae cordis impediunt praeparationem, de his uideamus. De inani gloria procedunt haec.

y sont traités sans aucune suite logique, chacun d'eux étant introduit par une parole biblique. Celle-ci, aussitôt, suggère différentes idées: d'où une division générale des réalités auxquelles on peut l'appliquer; à l'intérieur de chacune de ces divisions, des subdivisions se succèdent: on reconnaît ici le même procédé que dans le commentaire du Cantique. Le style est identique.

Les sources, elles aussi, sont les mêmes. La plus abondamment exploitée est la Bible. Ensuite viennent les "poètes": ce sont presque toujours les écrivains profanes—and à quel point!—de l'antiquité classique: Ovide, Lucain et bien d'autres encore. Parfois, un mot caractérise leur genre: Horace et Juvénal sont désignés comme "satiriques".²⁰ Souvent leur nom figure avec la référence.²¹ Mais il arrive qu'ils ne soient introduits que par le mot *poeta*,²² comme si le seul fait d'avoir écrit des vers était une garantie de véracité suffisant à authentifier un enseignement moral. Prudence, d'ailleurs, est parfois invoqué, ainsi que les hymnes et les séquences liturgiques.²³ Parmi les Pères, Thomas mentionne saint Augustin, saint Jérôme, saint Grégoire, mais beaucoup moins souvent que la Bible ou que les poètes. Dans la tradition chrétienne, sa préférence va, sans doute possible, à Boëce. Ne serait-ce point parce que ce "philosophe catholique"²⁴ a écrit partiellement en vers sa *Consolation*?²⁵ Sur tous ces points, la méthode suivie par Thomas est la même que dans le commentaire du Cantique.²⁶

Thomas de Perseigne a des sources inavouées: il dépend certainement de saint Bernard en plus d'un endroit du *De praeparatione*,²⁷ dans le commentaire du Cantique, il utilise, parmi d'autres, Gilbert de Stanford.²⁸ Il a donc fait une double compilation. Il ne s'est pourtant pas interdit d'être—dans une mesure qu'il resterait à déterminer—original par rapport à ses sources, et par rapport à lui-même. Car il arrive qu'il se cite,²⁹ mais il arrive aussi qu'à propos du même sujet son enseignement soit, dans les deux ouvrages, différent.³⁰ On ne peut qu'admirer la patience qu'il a fallu pour écrire tant de choses, venant de tant de sources, sur tant de points de la doctrine chrétienne et monastique. Si l'ensemble est orienté vers la pratique de la morale, l'exhortation suppose toujours le dogme et l'expose souvent; les grands thèmes mystiques du moyen âge monastique trouvent aussi leur place en cette somme: douceur du Christ,³¹ désir de Dieu,³² symbolique du lit,³³ du repos³⁴ et du sabbat,³⁵ pour ne citer que

²⁰ Vnde ait ille satiricus, scilicet Oratius; col. 251. Quales describit satiricus ille, scilicet Oratius; col. 298. Ista sunt comicae gesticulationes de quibus satiricus ille, scilicet Iuuenalis; col. 276.

²¹ Par exemple, col. 114: Idcirco Virgilius, in sexto Eneidos, quatuor ostendens passiones . . .

²² Par exemple, Luxuria quoque insatiables est. Vnde quidam poeta de quadam nobili femina ait:

Et lassata uiris nondum satiata recessit. Nonne ista est quae Samsonis fortitudinem eneruauit, sapientiam Salomonis infatuauit. Amon filium David ad incestum sororis suae Thamar impulit? Col. 242. Citation de Juvénal, *Sat.*, VI, 129.

²³ Par exemple, cols. 41, 45, 46, 47, etc. De même dans le commentaire du Cantique, PL 202, 476BC etc. Thomas cite en particulier les hymnes attribués à Ambroise: cols. 33, 91, 345, etc.

²⁴ Vnde ille catholicus philosophus, scilicet Boethius; col. 118.

²⁵ C'est en effet le *De consolatione philosophiae* qu'il cite; cols. 40, 68, 109, etc.

²⁶ Par exemple PL 206, 136A etc. Thomas introduit souvent les citations des poètes par séries; parfois il reproduit les mêmes vers dans le *De praeparatione* que dans le com-

mentaire du Cantique, mais dans un ordre inversé; c'est le cas, par exemple, pour les citations de Lucain, cols. 66-67, et PL 206, 625A.

²⁷ Par exemple, col. 306: Quatuor impedunt confessionem . . . incredulitas, timor, desperatio, erubescencia; comparez Saint Bernard *De diversis* CIV; PL 183, 730; *Sententiae* 24; PL 183, 753.

²⁸ Je l'ai prouvé ailleurs: 'Le commentaire de Gilbert de Stanford sur le Cantique des Cantiques', *Analecta monastica*, *Studia Anselmiana*, Rome, ch. XI, note.

²⁹ J'indiquerai dans les notes suivantes quelques éléments de concordance qui suffiront à la démonstration.

³⁰ Par exemple le symbolisme des lits est exposé différemment; col. 316 et PL 206, 256D.

³¹ Par exemple, col. 152: DULCEDO CHRISTI.

³² DE LONGANIMITATE. Longanimitas ista est qua prae desiderio aeternae patriae adquirenda diu incommoda patienter sustinimus uel desiderata expectamus; col. 248; suit un développement. De même col. 155 etc.

³³ Cols. 410-418, col. 316 etc.

³⁴ DE REQUIE SPIRITALI . . . SABBATUM TRIPLEX . . . ; col. 303 etc.

peu d'exemples. Ce document, s'il n'est pas un chef d'œuvre de littérature ou de théologie et s'il n'est pas aussi original que les écrits d'un Aelred de Rievaulx ou d'un Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, n'en est pas moins révélateur du milieu cistercien; il mérriterait qu'on l'interrogeât soigneusement.

Contentons-nous ici de lui poser une question précise: quelle idée l'auteur se fait-il de la vie monastique? Le rôle des "religieux" dans l'Eglise est essentiellement de prier: Thomas ne conçoit de religieux que contemplatifs.³⁵ Ils n'ont rien d'autre à faire que s'adonner au loisir de la contemplation:

DE TRIPLOCI QUIETE SABBATI ET TRIPLOCI SABBATO. Triplicem scimus animae quietem. Prius enim debet quiescere a peccato, secundo a opere humano, tertio quiescat ab hoc miserabili exilio. Primo ut iustificetur, secundo ut contempletur, tertio ut beatificetur . . . De secundo sabbato dicitur per Ezechiel: *Porta haec clausa erit sex diebus quibus fit opus, sabbato autem aperietur.*³⁶ Porta haec dicitur interior sensus, qui clauditur quando exterius speramur, aperitur quando otiosi exterius contemplatur. Vnde scriptum est: *Sapientiam scribae in tempore otii . . .*³⁷

. . . De secundo sabbato dicitur absolute: *Nihil operis facietis in eo.*³⁸ In isto enim sabbato iacuit Deus in sepulchro, et similiter qui contemplationi uacare uolunt a saeculari inquietatione seipso sepultos et quasi absconditos debent habere ne impedianter a terrenis respicere caelestia.³⁹

Le cloître est comme une hôtellerie où l'on prend soin de tout ce qui est nécessaire à l'épanouissement spirituel des moines.⁴⁰ C'est aussi un jardin où fleurissent les vertus qui doivent les distinguer.⁴¹ L'une de celles sur lesquelles Thomas insiste le plus volontiers est "l'unanimité", cette concorde qui, seule, fait l'agrément de la vie claustrale.⁴² Pour en parler, son imagination ne manque pas de ressources:

DE UNANIMITATE. Sequitur: *Et germinassent mala punica.*⁴³ Malum punicum exterius in cortice habet liuorem. Grana multa clauduntur interius quae habent exterius ruborem, interius candorem. Cortex claudens grana est claustral disciplina quae per liuorem designat distinctionem claustral disciplinae. In rubore designatur ferver claustralium, in candore simplicitas et munditia innocentium et continentium. Cortex liuorem habet exterius quia omnis disciplina in praesenti uidetur non esse gaudii, sed moeroris . . .⁴⁴ Pluralitas ergo granarum in cortice mali unanimitatem claustri designat.⁴⁵

³⁵ Hanc uineam quae est ecclesia sustinent potentes, sustinent praedicatores, sustinent religiosi. Primum fouendo bonis temporibus et defendendo a persecutoribus, secundi praedicationibus, tertii orationibus; col. 17; suit un développement, col. 19. De même col. 48.

³⁶ Ezech., xlvi, 1.

³⁷ Eccli., xxxviii, 25. Cols. 639-640. Tout ce paragraphe est littéralement identique à celui de PL 206, 351B3-352B12.

³⁸ Ezech., xlvi, 1.

³⁹ Col. 304.

⁴⁰ Stabulum domus est ecclesiae, domus religionis. Ibi enim firmiter statur contra tentationum assultus, ibi enim saecularia non uidentur, orationibus fratrum adiuuatur, diuinis laudibus ad deuotionem excitatur, religiosa fratrum conuersatione ab amore saeculi retrahitur, parcitate ciborum ad sobrietatem inuitatur. Stabularius in ecclesia est praelatus, in domo religiosa abbas qui ipsum custodit nunc consolationibus, nunc increpationibus, nunc persuationibus

. . . ; col. 260.

⁴¹ *Descendi in hortum nucum . . .* Hortus Christi est quodlibet claustrum religiosorum, uariis uernans religiosorum floribus uirtutum . . . In quatuor uirtutibus, quae claustra spiritualiter solent esse domesticae, uenit (sponsus) hortum nostrum explorare. Hae sunt illae uirtutes: patientia, humilitas, Christi caritas, fratrum unanimitas; col. 9. Hortus in quo descendit Deus est ecclesia, est claustral obseruantia, est quaelibet fidelis anima; col. 142.

⁴² DE COHABITATIONE FRATRUM. Ecce quam bonum et quam iucundum . . . (Ps. cxxxii, 1). Est habitatio quae nec est bonum, nec iucundum, insimul uiuentium aspere nec religioso. Est bonum et iucundum simul habitare religiose cum gaudio et deuotione. Bonum sed non iucundum pro Deo martyrium sustinere. Iucundum et non bonum est luxuriose uiuere; col. 315.

⁴³ Cant., vi, 10.

⁴⁴ Col. 24.

⁴⁵ Cf. PL 206, 304A.

Sed notandum quod claustrales prius debent esse unanimes, secundo magnanimes, tertio longanimes.⁴⁶ Primum ut sint in bono concordes, secundum ut sint fortes contra tentationes, tertium ut non deficiant propter longas uexationes . . .⁴⁷

. . . Hoc malum punicum est congregatio fratrum religiosorum, sub una regula uiuentium, de quibus: *Ecce quam bonum et quam iucundum . . . Corticem habent liuidum propter exteriorem paupertatem et contemptum mundi, utpote qui circuierunt in melotis, in uestibus caprinis . . .*⁴⁸ In eo quod simul uolant (locustae) attendimus fratrum non solum unanimitatem, sed magnanimitatem, sed longanimitatem: magnanimitatem in sustinenda pro Christo, si necesse fuerit, passione: unanimitatem in uoluntatum identitate; longanimitatem in spei longa expectatione.⁴⁹

Avec la charité, l'une des vertus les plus nécessaires au moine est l'obéissance. Thomas de Perseigne y distingue trois degrés:

DE OBEDIENTIA. Notandum uero quod obedientia non solum exhibenda est maiori, sed pari, sed minori. Maiori est bona, pari meliora, minori perfecta . . .⁵⁰ Illa quae maiori persoluitur implet iustitiam, quae pari impenditur aufert inuidiam, quae minori exhibetur aufert superbiam: Prima enim est ex debito, secunda ex gratia, tertia ex humilitatis uehementia. In his tribus Christum doctorem habemus . . .⁵¹

La tentation ne manque pas dans le monastère. Le malheur le plus grave qu'elle puisse occasionner est de faire sortir le moine, soit par l'esprit, soit même par le corps, du cloître où il devrait trouver toute sa joie:

Fugint et non elongantur qui corporaliter mundum fugientes se trans-tulerunt ad religionem, sed ibi murmurant, detrahunt, mundanas delicias concupiscunt quas nec in saeculo habuerunt nec habere potuerunt.⁵²

Est et alia domus in qua sunt filii Iob, id est Christi, scilicet claustrum religiosorum. In hac sunt quatuor anguli quibus innititur domus, scilicet institutionis regula, abbatis censura, prioris diligentia, cellararii in temporalibus prouidentia. Sed istos angulos concutit uentus temptationis: diiudicant claustrales regulam distinctiorem, abbatem austriorem, priorem negligentiorem, cellararium auarum et crudeliorem. Inde surgunt murmurationes, conspirationes, detractiones. Sicut ergo uenenum est uita serpentis, ita ista sunt consolatio amatoribus mundi . . .⁵³

Quid ergo, fratres, dicemus de claustralibus quos de claustro ad saeculum trahit gulositas, causa uidendi amicos dicit carnalitas, uidendi res saeculares uocat curiositas, etiam ad causas tractandas inuitat uanitas. Ecce non est curia in qua non causentur, non est forum in quo non negotientur, non est synodalibus congregatio in qua de iure ecclesiarum quas possident non disputentur. Vbi sunt regum uel principum colloquia in quibus etiam non uocati non inueniantur? Vbi ergo est interim disciplinae distinctio, ubi orationum deuotio, ubi silentium et contemplatio? O quam timenda sunt sic ambulantibus mundi blandimenta, carnis inquinamenta, diabolicae fallacie argumenta!⁵⁴

Le diable use "d'arguments" pour induire en erreur. Il leur faut opposer ceux que procure la vérité. Celle-ci parvient au moine sous trois formes également

⁴⁶ Cf. *Ibid.*, 640-642.

⁴⁷ Col. 26.

⁴⁸ *Hebr.*, xi, 37. Col. 165.

⁴⁹ Col. 24.

⁵⁰ Col. 264.

⁵¹ Col. 350. Cf. PL 206, 560AB, 624CD.

⁵² Col. 287.

⁵³ Col. 180.

⁵⁴ Col. 85. On notera que ce texte commence comme un sermon. Il y a d'autres exemples dans le *De præparatione*. C'est peut-être cette forme donnée à certaines exhortations, lesquelles ont pu être extraites de leur contexte et transcrives séparément, qui a fait attribuer des sermons à Thomas de Perseigne. Cf. De Visch, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

nécessaires: la prudence de la terre, la connaissance des lettres et la sagesse du ciel.⁵⁵ La première est ce qu'on nomme "philosophie". Thomas de Perseigne est loin d'en être l'ennemi. Tantôt il invoque l'autorité des philosophes en général,⁵⁶ tantôt il félicite l'un d'entre eux, comme Diogène.⁵⁷ Sans doute affirme-t-il que la philosophie ne suffit ni à découvrir ni à comprendre le mystère du Christ: on n'y parvient qu'en s'élevant jusqu'à la Théologie. Mais si on l'unit à la foi, elle est une authentique sagesse:

IN LECTULO MEO QUAESIUI PER NOCTES . . .⁵⁸ Notate uerborum ordinem: *quaesiui Christum philosophica et naturali ratione ut inuenirem eum in sola diuinitate; et non inueni, quia non eram illuminatus diuina ueritate; uocau philosophica disputatione, et non respondit mihi, ut me certificaret quia quaerebam eum in sola humanitate; paululum cum percussissem ad theologicam lectionem, inueni quem diligit anima mea in diuinitate et humanitate per incarnationem . . .*⁵⁹

DE TRIPLOCI SAPIENTIA. Ad quod sciendum est quod est sapientia philosophica, est sapientia angelica, est sapientia diuina. Philosophica disputat de naturalibus. Angelica ministrat Deo et hominibus. Diuina tamen praestat omnibus. *Omnis ista sapientia a Domino Deo est et cum ipso fuit semper et est ante eum:*⁶⁰ *Philosophica a Domino Deo est sicut aliae; diuina cum ipso fuit semper; angelica est ante eum.*⁶¹

J. LECLERCQ O.S.B.

Clervaux, Grand Duché de Luxembourg.

IV. Notes on the Fragmentary Fairfax Version of the *Disticha Catonis*

THE famous Moral Distichs,¹ attributed to a Cato, are represented in English by translations from the ninth century,² the earliest in any vernacular tongue, to the twentieth.³ The first Middle English versions, those found in the Bodleian Vernon⁴ and Fairfax⁵ manuscripts, are both derived primarily from Everard's Anglo-Norman version,⁶ which was made in England in the neighborhood of 1150.

⁵⁵ Est ergo necessaria saecularis prudentia, litteralis scientia, caelestis sapientia; col. 6.

⁵⁶ Etiam iuxta philosophos sunt quatuor uenti qui uenient ab his angulis terrae; col. 288. Thomas semble dépendre beaucoup du Bestiaire traditionnel.

⁵⁷ O quam conuenienter philosophus ille, scilicet Diogenes, de hiis tribus respondit Alexandro! "Quid fui?", ait Alexander. Et ille: "Sperma liquidum". "Quid modo sum?" "Vas stercorum". "Quid futurus sum?" "Esca uermum"; col. 212.

⁵⁸ Cant. iii, 1.

⁵⁹ Col. 410.

⁶⁰ Eccl., i, 1.

⁶¹ Col. 421.

¹ The best brief account, rich in references to vernacular translations, is by Max Förster in M. Schanz, *Geschichte der römischen Litteratur* III (3d ed., Munich, 1922), pp. 34-40; see also Tauno F. Mustanoja, *The Good Wife Taught her Daughter* (*Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae*, B LXI, 2, Helsinki, 1948), pp. 45-50. A standard Latin text is in Emil Baehrens, *Poetae Latini Minorae* I (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 205-235.

² Printed Ludvig C. Müller, *Collectanea Anglo-Saxonica* (Copenhagen, 1835), pp. 28-48; Julius Nehab, *Der Altenglische Cato* (Berlin, 1879); E. Sievers, *Metrische Studien*, IV (*Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akad-*

emie der Wissenschaften, Philologisch-Historische Klasse, XXXV, 1919), 601-615, 219-220.

³ Wayland J. Chase, *The Distichs of Cato, a Famous Medieval Textbook* (University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, 7, Madison, 1922); J. Wight Duff and A. M. Duff, *Minor Latin Poets* (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1934) pp. 535-621.

⁴ The Vernon manuscript contains also the Latin and French texts; printed, English only, by Max O. Goldberg, *Die Catonischen Distichen während des Mittelalters in der Englischen und Französischen Literatur* I (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 13-24, and, with a few corrections, in *Anglia*, VII (1884), 165-177; complete, by F. J. Furnivall, *Minor Poems of the Vernon MS.*, Part II (EETS, 117, London, 1901), pp. 553-609. British Museum Additional Ms 22283 is a copy of Vernon, from which Goldberg prints a number of relatively unimportant variants.

⁵ *Fairfax Ms 14*, a fragment only, is printed by E. Brock as Appendix 4 of Richard Morris's edition of *Cursor Mundi* (EETS 57, 59, 62, 66, 68, 99, 101, London, 1874-1893), III, 1669-1674.

⁶ Printed (with Latin) by Le Roux de Lincy, *Le Livre des Proverbes Français* II (2nd ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1859), pp. 439-458;

The present note offers a partial commentary on the Fairfax translation which was rendered fragmentary by a mutilation which also removed the last pages of a text of *Cursor Mundi*.⁷ An entry at the end of the poem states that "Stokynbrig scripsit istum librum. Willelmo Keruour de Lancastre."⁸ The stanzas which survive include nearly all that the poet translated from books three and four of the Distichs,⁹ and the epilogue. It is evident that the translator, like Everard and the Vernon poet, had included *Parvus Cato*,¹⁰ and his debt to Everard is indicated not only by his phraseology but by his use of a six line stanza, riming *aabccb*. His versification, it must be admitted, is rough.

Since almost no critical apparatus is given by Brock and since no attention, beyond occasional mention, has been paid to the poem, it will be useful to indicate its relationship to certain important versions and editions. In the succeeding table are given, (1) stanza (not supplied by Brock) and lines of the Fairfax version, (2), references to Everard's text, first, as printed by Stengel, and second, as printed by Furnivall from the Vernon manuscript; and (3) references to the Latin text as printed by Baehrens.

STANZA	FAIRFAX LINES	EVERARD STENGEL	VERNON	DICTA CATONIS BAEHRENS
1	1- 6	113	110	III 3
2	7- 18	114-15	111	III 4
3	19- 24	118	114	III 7
4	25- 30	117	113	III 6
5	31- 36	120	116	III 9
6	37- 42	119	115	III 8
7	43- 48	121	117	III 10
8	49- 54	122	118	III 11
9	55- 60	123	119	III 12
10	61- 66	124	120	III 13
11	67- 72	128	124	III 17
12	73- 78	130	126	III 19
13	79- 83	131	127	III 20
14	85- 90	132	128	III 21
15	91- 96	136	132	IV Prol. ll. 1-2
16	97-102	138	134	IV 1
17	103-108	140	136	IV 3
18	109-114	141	137	IV 4
19	115-120	142	138	IV 5
20	121-126	143	139	IV 6

E. Stengel (with two other Anglo-Norman versions), *Ausgaben und Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der Römanischen Philologie*, XLVII (1886), 106-156.

⁷ *Cursor Mundi* III, 1668.

⁸ III, 1674. A William de Stockinbridge obtained a messuage in Cockerham, Lancashire, in 1370-1373 (*The Victoria History of the County of Lancaster*, ed. William Farrer and J. Brownbill, 8 vols., London, 1906-1914, VIII, p. 95, n. 35) and William de Stockenbridge was a conditional grantee of lands in Lancaster, Bare, and Cartmel in 1385-1386 (VIII, p. 277, n. 7). Stockenbridge appears also as an estate name (VII, p. 229, n. 12, pp. 267, 272, 279) and there are references to a Stockenbridge family in Lancashire as late as the eighteenth century (VII, p. 195). A further search of available records would doubtless turn up more about individuals named Stockenbridge in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries and well might discover "Willelmo Keruour." The dialect of the document is certainly Northern or North West Midland, and not inconsistent with Lancashire; see *Cursor Mundi* I, xxi,

103*, 132*-133*. H. Hupe held that the "Fairfax MS. was copied in the first half of the 15th century in the Western part of the ancient archdiocese of York" and that the "scribe copied from a late 14th century MS. written more towards the South" (p. 133*).

⁹ Of the following distichs not found in Fairfax, it may be presumed that the first two were lost in the mutilation; the others, for one reason or another, were omitted by the English poet. The figure in parenthesis after the book and number of the Latin distich refers to Furnivall's edition of Vernon: III, 1 (107), III, 2 (109), III, 5 (112), III, 14 (121), III, 15 (122), III, 16 (123), III, 18 (125), III, 22 (129—English wanting), III, 23 (130—English wanting), III, 24 (131), IV, 2 (135), IV, 7 (140), IV, 8 (141), IV, 9 (142—English wanting), IV, 10 (143), IV, 14 (147), IV, 24 (157). The following stanzas in Fairfax represent distichs which the Vernon poet did not translate, although the manuscript has a blank space in each instance: 3, 9, 14, 16, 24, 25, 30, 34 (Vernon has neither Latin, French nor English), 36, 38, 42, 44, 46, 49, 51.

¹⁰ *Cursor Mundi* III, 1668, n.

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21	127–132	148	145	IV 11
22	133–138	149	144	IV 12
23	139–144	150	146	IV 13
24	145–150	152	148	IV 15
25	151–156	153	149	IV 16
26	157–162	154	150	IV 17
27	163–168	155	151	IV 18
28	169–174	156	152	IV 19
29	175–180	158	154	IV 21
30	181–186	159	155	IV 22
31	187–192	160	156	IV 23
32	193–198	162	158	IV 25
33	199–204	163	159	IV 26
34	205–210	164	(missing)	IV 27
35	211–216	165	160	IV 28
36	217–222	157	153	IV 20
37	223–228	166	(161)	IV 29
38	229–234	167–68	(162)	IV 30
39	235–240	169	(163)	IV 31
40	241–246	170	(164)	IV 32
41	247–252	171	(165)	IV 33
42	253–258	172	(166)	IV 34
43	259–264	173	(167)	IV 35
44	265–270	174	(168)	IV 36 (?)
45	271–276	175	(169)	IV 37
46	277–282	176	(170)	IV 38
47	(280–282 badly torn)			
47	283–288 (badly torn)	177 (?)	171 (?)	IV 39 (?)
48	289–294	178	(172)	IV 40
49	295–300	179	(173)	IV 41 and II 15
50	301–306	180	(174)	IV 42
51	307–312	181	(175)	IV 43
52	313–318	182	(176)	IV 44
53	319–324 (partly torn)	183	(177)	IV 45
54	325–330 (largely torn away)	184	(178)	IV 46
55	(torn away)			
56	337–343	186	(180)	IV 48
57	343–345 (three blank lines)	187	(181)	IV 49
[Epilogue,	349–378	Based on Everard's Prologue]		
58	349–354	4 (but largely original)		
59	355–360	1	1	
60	361–366	2	2	
61	367–372	3	3	
62	373–378			

The Fairfax Cato, like the Vernon, is in the main a very close translation of Everard,¹¹ but comments must be made on a few stanzas, especially where the Englishman deserts Everard and returns to the Latin.¹²

3rd

The last three lines of Everard's stanza:
Kar si autre de tey

¹¹ See M. Förster, *Archiv für das Studium der Neueren Sprachen und Literaturen*, CXLV (1923), 208, n. 3; for Vernon, see Goldberg, p. 39.

¹² Comparisons with the Latin and French are to the texts printed by Furnivall which, while inferior to Baehren's and Stengel's, are closer to the ones used by the Middle

English translator. In a number of stanzas, notably 10, 31, 41, 44, the English translation is loose and almost unintelligible.

¹³ By coincidence the first line, "other mennis worde or werke," is almost identical with Vernon, "Othur monnes word ne work."

Le face en dreyt de cey,
Il te veut peiser

have been slightly augmented in English:
þat oþer þe no3t dispise
ri3t in þe same wise.
þi saumple be þi shame.

5

The point of the distich is that rich old men should be generous with their goods. The English poet adds, "þi gift wiþ þe weindis."

6

The English translator leaves a blank for his third line and changes the last of the stanza slightly. Everard's:

Ke tu ne eyez blame,
Pensez de ceo anoyer

becomes

þat þou ne name of þese.
þat men famis in fable.

7

The stanza ends with a proverb, "of folts leris wise,"¹⁴ which, while it follows the general sense, is not directly from the French.

9

Latin and French tell a man to get rid of his wife if she harm him. The English is more specific, "if ho be vnchest."

12

The English:

a-monge gestis atte borde.
be mesurable of worde

comes from the Latin: *inter conuiuas fac sis sermone modesta*, rather than from Everard:

Gard tei tote feez
Ke tu a get ne seyez
fforfetous in parole.

13

The last line, which should contain the point of the distich, is a blank in the English manuscript.

14

The last line of this stanza, which represents Latin III, 21, has at the end *securam*, which is the first word of Latin IV, Prol. 1, as given in Vernon. Fairfax 15 is based on IV, Prol. 1-2, and the fact that *securam* is tacked on to 14 suggests that Fairfax was copied from a manuscript which included the Latin text, and presumably the French, but a Latin text which, unlike Vernon, omitted III, 22, 23 and 24.¹⁵

¹⁴ Cf. G. L. Apperson, *English Proverbs and Proverbial Phrases* (London, 1929), p. 223, fool (12), A fool may sometimes give a wise man counsel; W. G. Smith, *The Oxford Dic-*

tionary of English Proverbs (Oxford, 1935), p. 9.

¹⁵ The English is wanting in Vernon for III, 22 and 23.

The English:

say þou noȝt in mynde.
þat bi grace is blinde.
bot wite bi folies

comes from the Latin: *noli fortunam, que non est, dicere cecam*, rather than from Everard:

Ne deies blamer nul houre
Pur ta mesauenture,
Mes meymes ta folye,

with the exception of the last line which is obviously from the French.

The English:

for-sake þou þe werlds blis.
in þe quhilk wrange liking is
fle wiþ bi hert

comes from the Latin: *ffac fugias animo, que sunt mala gaudia uitae*, rather than from Everard:

En Ioyes de ceste mound
Ke mout maueis sount
Ne seiez consentaunt.

Both Latin and French counsel study for old as well as young, since learning does not come automatically with age. In English the advice is limited to the young, and the translator adds:

þe man þat is harde witte
gode clergis mai gitte.
wiþ-in lite ȝeres.

The two stanzas which Everard devoted to this distich are reduced to one in English:

wiþ drinking and lecheri.
ioynid is wiþ foli.
lustis and strife.
quat-sim nedis to bi hert
take þat to bi querit.
be-quar of ouer-rife.

The English:

quen þou has of bi þing.
þorou hap vnliking.
in chaunce or in cas.
be-halde þou on oþer men.
þat has harder ten.
for lasse trespass

is from the Latin:

Cum tibi displiciat rerum fortuna tuarum
(Baehrens: Dum Fortuna tibist rerum discriminem praus,)
Alterius specta quo sis (Baehrens: cui sit) discriminem peior

rather than from Everard, whose last three lines read:

Veiez si tu eiez tecche
Ou vice en quey ceo pecche,
E taunt tost tei ament.

The Latin is:

Dampnaris nunquam post longum tempus amicum;
Mutauit mores, sed pignora prima memento

and the French:

Si toun amy change
Soun corage pur vyl hange,
Ne le voilles dampner;
Mes ke il ad samour
Chaungez en Amour
Vers tey deis remembrer.

The English is rather different:

ofter lange biding.
for nane alde wrabbing.
hate no3t þi frende.
if he chaunge his manere.
þink how he was dere.
first quen he was hende.

The English translator seems to have remembered II, 15:

Litis preterite, noli maledicta referre;
Post inimicicias iram meminisse, malorum est.

The English:

þe mare þou art of prise.
and gracious to office.
serue þou mare tentli.
þat þou ne be calde vn-wise.
in skorne tint offise.
or office perdi.

seems to come from a mistranslation of the Latin:

Gracior officijs, quo sis mage carior, esto:
Ne nomen subreas, quod dicunt, officij perdi

rather than from the French:

Cum vous cher tey eies
De taunt penetrer tey deyes
Pur seruer plus a gre,
Ke vous ne seytes nome
Maueis, ne a-pele
A uostre eyn degre.

The English is incomplete, and a space is left for the last three lines.

One would find it pleasant to say something warm about the intellectual qualities and literary style of the anonymous translator of the fragmentary text which we have just considered, but perhaps the best that can be said is that worse

things have come down complete. He appreciated alliteration's artful aid,¹⁶ even if it was not always apt, his vocabulary contained a number of unusual words and phrases,¹⁷ and he was sufficiently discriminating on occasion to use the Latin as well as the French. A laudable desire to achieve the right line led him to leave a number forever blank, but the obscurity of some of his verses was not sufficiently conscious, we fear, to count as artistry. He was, to give him nearly all his due, one of a number of obscure men who made a standard handbook of sententious wisdom available to the Englishman who otherwise "knew nat Catoun, for his wit was rude."

B. J. WHITING,
Harvard University.

V. *Guillaume de Palerne* and a Monreale Sculpture

THE Old French romance *Guillaume de Palerne* (ca. 1200) is based on familiar folklore motifs.¹ Menaced by an envious uncle, William, the son of the King of Sicily, is rescued by a friendly wolf who is in actuality a transformed prince. The werewolf subsequently helps William to elope with the daughter of the Emperor of Rome and win back his rightful position in Sicily. In a doctoral dissertation I have suggested that the romancer drew his material from a propagandistic legend which had been attached to some royal heir of either the Norman (1130-1194) or Hohenstaufen (1194-1250) Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.² This hypothesis depends on several inferences, and positive proof that such a legend did in fact circulate in Sicily is lacking. One of the sculptured groups on the capitals of the Benedictine cloister of Monreale Cathedral resembles the legend in content, and it seems particularly desirable, therefore, that its subject should, if possible, be interpreted. So far as I know, no explicit identification has been offered.

The sculpture (West Side, Capital 5) consists of a male figure standing, holding a sword upright in the left hand and embracing with the right arm a wolf-like animal which is clasping the male figure with its fore-paws.³ Since several of the Monreale sculptures, which were carved ca. 1174-1189 by a cosmopolitan group of sculptors, are clearly secular in subject and one, at least, deals with contemporary events (King William II offering the Cathedral to the Virgin and Child), it is tempting to see in this group a representation of a legend cognate with that contained in *Guillaume de Palerne*. The upright figure would correspond to the protagonist of the romance, and the animal to the protecting werewolf. So miscellaneous are the subjects illustrated on the Monreale capitals,

¹⁶ See, among others, lines 2, 5, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 19, 24, 31, 36, 42, 47, 56, 57, 93, 99, 114, 116, 120, 126, 134, 149, 152, 166, 169, 171, 182, 184, 186, 191, 196, 209, 221, 222, 223, 235, 236, 239, 243, 249, 250, 256, 257, 262, 263, 264, 339, 342, 344, 349, 351, 352, 358, 361, 372, 373.

¹⁷ Lame (1.5) ("lame thi frendis shame" [Latin: *celato crimen amicil*]) is surely an error for *lane* (NED *Iain*) conceal; flipers (1.7) is the only example in NED; steke (1.17) is the only example in NED, *steek*, v.¹ 1c; doweri (1.58) is the first example in NED, *dowry*, 2; ne drutuin to bismere (1.77) antedates the first example in NED, *bismere*, 1, by a good sixty years (see also NED, *drive*, 17, where a similar idiom is quoted from *Cursor Mundi*); bricoun (1.103), the only example in NED, is directly from Everard; *clap* (1. 263) in "And hope ay of gode hap To come with a gode clap. With-out ani warne," is to be compared with NED, *clap*, sb.¹, 7: A sudden stroke; in

phrases, *At a clap, at the clap*: at a stroke, at once. *In a clap*: suddenly, in a moment. The earliest example is 1519.

¹ *Guillaume de Palerne*, ed. Henri Michelant (Société des anciens textes français, Paris, 1876). Important emendations in W. E. Delp, *Etude sur la langue de Guillaume de Palerne* (Paris, 1907).

² Charles W. Dunn, *William of Palerne: History, Legend, and Romance* (Harvard thesis, 1947), now being revised for publication.

³ Reproduced in Luigi Biagi, 'Nel chiostro di Monreale,' *L'Arte*, New Series XXXIV (1931), fig. 1, opp. p. 468; in Fogg Museum (Harvard) photograph 1721/M 757/2 CC 9i (second down, right) ("Monreale, Cathedral. Cloisters. Detail: nine capitals."), and in Carl D. Sheppard, Jr., *Sculpture of the Benedictine Cloister of Monreale* (Harvard thesis, 1947), plate 5.

that there does not seem to be any *a priori* reason why a sculptor could not have chosen to carve in stone his record of a current legend.

There is obviously ample scope for identifications other than that tentatively suggested here. In the first place, standing close beside the figures of the man and animal on the capital (to their left) is a female figure encircled with a snake-like coil—a subject which can hardly have been drawn from the legend of a prince and a guardian wolf; although we need not assume that a relationship between the two groups is intended. Moreover, Carl D. Sheppard, Jr., in grouping the capitals stylistically, ascribes the sculptures of Capital 5 to what he calls an Archaic Group, whose "decorative vocabulary consists primarily of the human figure, plus a few fantastic monsters."⁴ Thus the subject may ultimately derive from a classical motif rather than from contemporary folklore; it may even serve a purely decorative role, its original significance quite forgotten.

Alternatively, in the twelfth century the wolf as a companion of man might be intended to convey some religious connotation. Both medieval art⁵ and letters⁶ afford representations of saints attended by wolves which they have turned into submissive servants. A sculpture in the Cathedral of Freiburg in Breisgau represents a monk vainly trying to teach a wolf the ABC;⁷ and the same theme—a Christian reworking of an international folklore motif—is represented in Marie de France's *Fable LXXXI*.⁸

For the composers of bestiaries, on the other hand, the wolf was the symbol of evil. Peter of Beauvais in his Old French prose version of *Physiologus* (ca. 1200) writes: "The wolf signifies the devil, for he constantly shows his envy of the human race and encompasses the thoughts of the wayward whose souls he controls."⁹

Any one of the interpretations mentioned might, I suppose, equally well have been in the mind of the Monreale sculptor. All that the student of medieval literature and folklore can do is to propose these conflicting possibilities and await the decision of the art historian.

CHARLES W. DUNN,
University College, Toronto.

⁴ Sheppard, *Sculpture*, pp. 38, 44.

⁵ Christliche Kunstsymbolik und Ikonographie (Frankfurt, 1839), pp. 194-195; Louis J. Guénebault, *Dictionnaire iconographique des figures, légendes et actes des saints, Encyclopédie théologique*, ed. Migne, XLV (Paris, 1850), s. v. "Loup", cols. 827, 901.

⁶ Sister Mary Donatus, *Beasts and Birds in the Lives of the Early Irish Saints* (Philadelphia, 1934), pp. 128-138. Cf. Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature* (Bloomington, 1932-1936), Motifs A165.2 and B442.

⁷ Charles Cahier, "Le loup écolier", C.

Cahier and A. Martin, *Mélanges d'archéologie, d'histoire et de littérature* I (Paris, 1847-1849), 124-126, and plate 24.

⁸ See Karl Warnke, "Die Quellen des Esop der Marie de France," *Forschungen zur romanischen Philologie: Festgabe für Hermann Suchier* (Halle, 1900), 237-239. Cf. Thompson, Motif U125.

⁹ Here translated from the Old French prose of *Le Physiologus ou Bestiaire*, ed. Charles Cahier, in Cahier and Martin, *Mélanges* IV (Paris, 1856), 71 n. 11. Cf. Thompson, Motif G303.3.3.2.

Reports of Recent Theses Defended at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies

- I. *One Baptism: An Historical Study on the Non-Repetition of Certain Sacraments.* (Theology Section). Nicholas Haring S.A.C., S.T.D.

THE historical evidence that the non-repetition of Baptism is principally derived from a passage in St. Paul's Epistle, *Ephesians* iv, 5: *One Lord, one faith, one Baptism*, has motivated the choice of the title *One Baptism* for a work in which an attempt is made to examine the reasons for the non-iteration of Baptism as they have been presented by both East and West from the beginnings of patristic literature to the end of the twelfth century. In contrast to the Greek Fathers, the Latin writers saw in *John* xiii, 10 an additional argument against any repetition of Baptism, while from the days of St. Ambrose the Western authors has frequent recourse to *Hebrews* vi, 4-6 which they adopted from Greek sources. The fact that these scriptural texts were commonly cited to corroborate *Ephesians* iv, 5 serves again to underline the far reaching influences of the two Pauline words: *One Baptism*. In view of the misinterpretation of this text by Tertullian, St. Cyprian and numerous African bishops who followed his lead, it is not surprising that St. Augustine invoked the custom of the Church Universal rather than a scriptural text as the ultimate basis for his opposition to Donatism, although he left no stone unturned to defeat his opponents on scriptural as well as on theological grounds. Apart from *John* xiii, 10, he made use of *John* i, 33 and iii, 5 respectively to defend Baptism as Christ's action in opposition to any human intervention by re-Baptism, and as a spiritual birth, the reiteration of which is no more possible than that of natural birth. His penetrating analysis of the numerous inconsistencies into which all the advocates of re-Baptism involve themselves led him to distinguish between *sacramentum* and grace as separate and separable entities. St. Augustine reasoned that, if on the strength of a universal custom trinitarian Baptism is not repeated despite the absence or loss of divine grace, it must be because of something inseparably attached to the baptized Catholic or non-Catholic; hence Baptism is something permanent, independent of divine grace.

Today it is commonly accepted that St. Augustine employed the term *character* to designate a certain indelible, spiritual effect upon the soul. As a result of a comprehensive study of Augustinian and post-Augustinian literature, I feel that this view must be abandoned because by *character* St. Augustine did not mean what we mean today. The Augustinian words corresponding to *character*, in its modern signification, are *consecratio, sanctitas*, i.e. a certain ontological sanctity resulting from a divine operation, *sacramentum* or *baptismus*. These expressions he uses, at one time or another, to designate something sacred, lasting and indelible, effected through the administration of trinitarian Baptism which does not depend on the presence or absence of grace, while he employs *character* mainly to illustrate and express the inviolability of the trinitarian form of Baptism.

This usage of *character* accounts for the fact that, for some seven centuries, the word *character* never appears in connection with the problem of re-Baptism or re-ordination. Thus the peculiarly Augustinian usage of the term was actually lost, but his doctrine embodied in his terminology *sacramentum* etc. persevered, though only in very imperfect form. For reasons of the prevailing literary rather than intellectual conditions of the time, post-Augustinian sacramentology was familiar with some scriptural arguments, derived from St. Augustine while his

use of *sacramentum* as designating something lasting in the recipient was known only vaguely until the vigorous return to patristic sources which commenced in the middle of the eleventh century began to bear fruit. Certain tendencies setting in at the end of the century, of opposing reiteration of sacraments such as Extreme Unction or Penance are but an outgrowth of the Augustinian statement: *Nulli sacramento injuria facienda est.* Numerous attempts to reject the validity of this principle or to harmonize it with the actual reiteration of some sacraments divided schools and scholars throughout the twelfth century. To mention the two most important scholastic centers of the time, Paris tended to deny the general validity of the Augustinian formula while Bologna advocated it. The sacrament of Baptism was, as it were, the testing ground of the many theories and the solid foundation of its non-reiteration in both Scripture and liturgical tradition radiated its influence upon the other sacraments. It was in the sacrament of Baptism that the theologians had their first recourse to a change of terminology, substituting *character* for *sacramentum* or *baptismus* as lasting consecration; it was only a matter of time for the terminology to be applied to other sacraments, the permanence of which was evidenced by the liturgical practice of non-reiteration, if not by scriptural testimonies. While the theologians leaned more heavily on considerations which St. Augustine had held to be basic in his opposition to Donatism, the canonists of Bologna favored an abstract principle and as a result attributed a *character* to sacraments such as Extreme Unction and Matrimony. In this struggle of theory *vs.* practice it was the liturgical custom of the Church Universal that decided the issue, as it had done in the baptismal controversies of the early centuries.

To outline this interplay of doctrinal forces, the study of Baptismal non-reiteration led inevitably to a consideration of all the sacraments and the problems pertinent to their reiteration or non-repetition. Though this justified the extension of the subject, the attention remained focused on the primary topic. In assigning only a secondary position to the other sacraments, a great deal of work remains still to be done in tracing the process of analogy between Baptism and Confirmation or Holy Orders which placed their non-reiteration on a more scientific basis. Concerning the non-reiteration of these two sacraments, neither St. Augustine nor post-Augustinian theologians could draw on directly scriptural testimonies and consequently took their guidance from the existing liturgical tradition and applied an *analogia fidei* to them from Baptism. When papal decretals relating to such matters began to exercise their influence, the conflicting interpretations of these official documents reveals a strong Cyprianic current which came to a head in the controversies at the time of the Gregorian reform movement.

If thirteenth century scholastics express the view that the doctrine of *character* was of comparatively recent origin, they confused terminology and doctrine. In point of terminology, the usage of the word *character* in its modern signification originated in the second half of the twelfth century. To the best of my knowledge, no twelfth century theologian claims the authority of St. Augustine to add the weight of tradition to his doctrine on *character*; this seems to be the strongest confirmation of the view that St. Augustine used the word in different sense. The fact that Gratian's *Decretum* offered four Augustinian extracts containing the expression *character* was, on the other hand, conducive to a different outlook on its origin. There is, however, ample evidence that the early commentators attached the question of non-reiteration to the Augustinian *sacramentum* and not to *character* as indelible mark. Towards the end of the century, they do refer to those Augustinian extracts and thus seem to imply that they considered their usage of *character* as identical in meaning with the Augustinian nomenclature.

The historical evidence points to a different origin: the word *character* which had never completely disappeared from the vocabulary of Christian writers

came into vogue about the middle of the twelfth century and was, in its modern signification, first incorporated in the terminology of sacramental theology by Paganus of Corbeil. As time went on, the new term took the place of the Augustinian *sacramentum* as lasting consecration. In point of terminology, then, we can fully agree with some rather important thirteenth century scholastics who assert that *character*, as discussed and understood by their contemporaries, could not be traced back to an ancient tradition.

In point of doctrine, *character* as something lasting was clearly taught by St. Augustine, although he used words such as *sacramentum* etc. to express this doctrine.

Thus the discontinuity of tradition regarding sacramental *character* disappears and a hitherto embarrassing problem vanishes. If the reader wishes to consult the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas on the question whether Baptism can be repeated, he will find, in a nutshell, an extremely skilful summary of the traditional arguments: (1) the Augustinian analogy between the unrepeatable natural and supernatural births; (2) the interpretation of *Hebrews* vi, 4 as prohibition of re-Baptism; (3) the idea that the *sacramentum* is no less closely attached to the baptized than a *character militaris*; (4) the argument that, being a remedy against original sin, Baptism is not reiterated because original sin never returns. Only the last argument originated in the thirteenth century; the others date back to the patristic period. As his foremost authority, St. Thomas cites St. Paul: *Sed contra est quod dicitur Ephes. IV: Una fides, unum baptisma.*

There is, then, overwhelming evidence that the non-repetition of Baptism went through the following evolution: the Pauline *One Baptism* was universally understood to mean *one* unrepeatable *Baptism*. As subsidiary reasons, the Western Fathers quoted *John* xiii, 10 and the Greeks developed *Hebrews* vi, 4-6 in the same sense. On the strength of these texts, a custom of baptismal non-reiteration established itself within the Church and led to a recognition of trinitarian Baptism conferred by heretical sects. Tertullian demanded a revision of the practice of recognizing heretical Baptism and thus initiated a period of dissension which brought St. Cyprian into conflict with Rome. The Cyprianic ideology of Donatism met its most powerful critic in St. Augustine to whom we owe the conclusion that, if the Church Universal opposed the repetition of trinitarian Baptism, it must be because the baptismal *sacramentum* is something indelible.

For the next seven hundred years, St. Augustine's anti-Donatist works were largely neglected and his sacramental teaching was inadequately known. In the controversies of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, particularly in regard to the validity of Orders conferred by heretics, the complete Augustinian sacramentology was gradually rediscovered and accepted. That in these controversies it was the lasting sacerdotal *sacramentum* rather than *character* that finally decided the issue, again confirms the thesis that the problem of non-reiteration was couched in a terminology different from our own.

II. *The Notion of History in Early Mediaeval Historians.* (History Section). Benoit M. Lacroix O.P.

INTRODUCTION

WRITERS in the field of historiography have generally recognized that there is a graeco-roman conception of history and likewise that there is a modern conception of history. They are often less willing to admit that there is a true mediaeval conception of history. Many would deny the title of historian to mediaeval writers on the ground that they are naïve, credulous, entirely uncritical, etc. If the standards of the modern historian or historiographer are alone

to be invoked, perhaps much of what has come down from the Middle Ages will not be regarded as history. Yet the enormous mass of mediaeval material published in the "historical" collections of the different countries of Western Europe is eloquent testimony to the fact that a considerable amount of what purports to be historical writing was produced in the Middle Ages. One can hardly help wondering just what these mediaeval "historians" thought they were doing, why they wrote so much, how and for whom. It is this that has prompted the present enquiry into the mediaeval historians' own notion of history. The enquiry centres around the question: is there a specifically mediaeval conception of history, different perhaps from that of the ancients and different from our own, yet a valid conception withal?

The writers themselves of the Middle Ages must be interrogated, if we are to answer the question. This we have attempted to do for the historians of Western Europe to the end of the eleventh century. Greater attention has been given, of course, to the more important among them, but a sincere effort has been made to consult in chronological order all the known ones of the period. The beginnings of our enquiry carry us back to the very first writers of the christian era, since here, as elsewhere, so much of what is characteristic of the mediaeval outlook has its roots in the patristic period. The eleventh century is justified as a closing date, if by that time we find, as we do, that a clear-cut answer can be given to our question.

CHAPTER I: THE GENESIS OF A TRADITION

For at least two centuries the early Christians had no historiography of their own. They were interested primarily in the history of Christ, in the history of His person and in the doctrine which was attached to that person. All facts of christian importance were related to a doctrine, namely the doctrine of Christ. Nevertheless, Christians, and especially the first christian intellectuals, found themselves in a milieu where there already existed two distinct and non-christian types of historiography: graeco-roman (pagan) and jewish, the former representing an essentially literary culture, the latter based primarily on a theocratic and theological point of view. As a christian historiography begins to appear, the attitude of Christians to the graeco-roman pagan conception of history and to jewish historiography, as well as the position adopted by their own writers of history, is of major importance.

While the Christian does make use of pagan history, he first feels the need of refuting it, and this he attempts on historical grounds by attacking pagan chronology and even certain alleged facts and by ascribing the origins of historical writing to Moses rather than to the pagans; on doctrinal grounds, he would refute it by showing it to be fatalistic and polytheistic and often the product of vain curiosity only; as to literary grounds, he is willing to admit that pagan historians have written well, but, to what purpose, he asks . . . *non eloquimur magna, sed vivimus*. Nevertheless, the Christian is obliged to utilize pagan history, both for apologetic purposes and to fill in certain gaps in judaeo-christian historiography and chronology.

On the other hand, the Christian regards himself as successor to the Jews; for him, the Old Testament both prepares and predicts the New; as a result, he takes over the facts and history of the Old Testament as a legitimate part of his own story. He makes himself the defender of jewish historiography and is at pains to prove its greater antiquity against the pagans. From biblical history the Christian likewise takes over that typically jewish orientation which sees in the events there recorded so many examples of how God rewards the good and punishes the evil. This orientation, present from early christian times, will have a great influence on the mediaeval conception of history. Finally, biblical texts furnish the first basis for a christian *interpretation* of history.

In so far as there is a distinctly christian historiography, it consists, before Eusebius of Caesarea, in partial accounts only. Christians of the first three centuries seem to have been interested, for the most part, in the meaning of events rather than in the events themselves. But, with Eusebius and with St. Jerome, Christianity has its history, seen as extending *a mundi creatione . . . usque ad finem mundi*, one and the same universal history for all Christians of the same Christian Church. Not that it is an altogether new departure; its dependence on the ancients is, in fact, quite evident. Christian history, too, is destined for posterity, it is thrown into a similar chronological and annalistic framework, and, in its technique, it does not depart from what had been learned from pagan predecessors. What is new and distinctive is chiefly the choice of events and their general interpretation.

CHAPTER II: HISTORIANS OF THE TRANSITION

The fifth and sixth centuries form a transitional period between the graeco-roman world and the formation of the mediaeval world; it is the period of such writers as Orosius and Salvianus, of the continuators of St. Jerome, of Cassiodorus and Jordanes. On the whole, they follow in the footsteps of the Fathers: the *chronica minora* of the period are simply prolongations of St. Jerome's chronicle; Orosius' work is an historical adaptation of the doctrinal position of St. Augustine. The distinctly christian elements in historical writing are stressed with increasing emphasis. Orosius strives to give a christian meaning to history, especially to that part of it constituted by the last centuries of the Roman Empire. The creation of man, his sin and the Incarnation become for him the major facts of history. God's providence, as well as His omnipotence, runs through history, even though man may not always be able to descry His immediate aims. Orosius advises his readers to interpret history as they do their individual lives, taking always into account the persistent action of Providence. Cassiodorus bears witness to the awareness of a christian historical tradition in the list which he draws up of the earlier christian writers of history; moreover, in condemning explicitly the pagan interpretation of history, he condemns it as being something of the past (*ut fecerunt Gentiles*). Their interpretation, he notes, brought in such things as Fate and Fortune, which actually have no existence at all and are certainly not to be found in God who has created all things. Even the matter of fine style is now of less concern to the christian historians; the general position adopted by the Fathers towards pagan letters has had its effect upon them.

CHAPTER III: THE FIRST MEDIAEVAL HISTORIANS

Among the first mediaeval historians, four names are pre-eminent: Gregory of Tours, Isidore of Seville, the Venerable Bede and Paul the Deacon. Significantly enough, they are from four different countries, a fact which suggests the completed break-up of the old Roman unity. In all fairness to these first historians, it should be noted that the times were not favorable to literary expression. Nevertheless, however imperfect their works may be, these four do offer us a first, concrete expression of a *mediaeval conception of history*. The originality of, and the achievement represented by, this conception can be properly appreciated only if we view it, as historically we should, in relation to the graeco-roman pagan form of history and not in comparison with modern historiography.

Historians are no longer primarily men of letters, rhetors; they are men of the Church, bishops in the case of Gregory of Tours and Isidore of Seville, Benedictine monks in the case of Bede and Paul the Deacon. There is bound to be a considerable difference in point of view between historians whose interests are distinctly literary and historians who are bishops and monks interested above all in Holy Scripture. All four of these latter interpret history

from a judaeo-christian point of view, with a tendency perhaps to be more jewish in interpretation than Christian.

The first official definition of history as *narratio rei gestae . . . ad posteritatem*, is recalled by Isidore of Seville. It is a pagan and a literary definition. When Christian writers reproduce it, they use the same words as the pagans, but they attach to the words a distinctly christian sense: *posteritas* is, for many of them, *ecclesia*, or, perhaps better, *christianitas*; while the *res gestae* include not only the facts of civil and military life, but those of ecclesiastical life as well.

The main sources of history are, for mediaeval historians, the same three as for the ancients: eye witnesses, oral tradition and written tradition. However, because they are writing new history, because written sources are comparatively rare, because too there is a dearth of materials for transmitting these written sources, the tendency exists among mediaeval historians to give, if not more, at least as much attention to oral traditions as to written sources.

CHAPTER IV: THE CAROLINGIAN RENAISSANCE

Historians of the Carolingian Renaissance give us very little direct information about their views on the theory of history as such. Nevertheless, from their actual writing of history, we can learn something of their attitude towards history itself. Carolingian men of letters did a good deal to improve the existing conception of history. With them, Roman historians were reintroduced into the schools; Sallust and Suetonius are cases in point and the influence of the latter is only too obvious in Einhard's *Vita Karoli*. A new form of historical writing is evolved in the *Annales*, which develop gradually from entries in a liturgical calendar to an increasingly fuller narration. The central position occupied by the king is another novelty; monks and clerics will write their history for him or for his family and they will inevitably tend to praise this king, or, perhaps, duke, at the expense of some other king or duke. Charlemagne may not have introduced royal historiography, but his person and his family certainly become a centre of interest which attracts, and frequently distracts, many ecclesiastical historians. The writing of history in carolingian times is almost exclusively a preserve of monks and clerics but, instead of narrating visits of members of their own class and their affairs, they emphasize strongly visits of the king and all that concerns him.

If we compare merovingian historiography on the one hand, or frankish historiography of the tenth and eleventh centuries on the other with historical writings in the carolingian period, there is no doubt of the reality of a renaissance in the latter: the multiplicity of annals, chronicles and all forms of historical writing is there to substantiate it. Writers in carolingian times certainly wanted to set down for posterity the things that happened in their own life time.

The interpretation of history does not differ from what it was in earlier christian times.

CHAPTER V: HISTORIOGRAPHY: A SIGN OF THE TIMES

CHAPTER VI: TOWARDS A NEW EPOCH

Since these two chapters deal with the same period, namely the tenth and eleventh centuries, the general conclusions drawn from both may be conveniently stated together.

A major difficulty confronts us at once in examining the nature of history as it was conceived by the writers of these two centuries: so few of the texts are preserved for us. There were texts to tell what happened in those days and some of them presumably made statements concerning what their authors thought about history as such; but most of these texts are lost. It has been necessary, therefore, to examine fragments, *vita*e, polemical and other such writings, in

addition to the few historical texts available, in order to determine what conception of history prevailed among historians during this period. In general, it does not depart from that of their mediaeval ancestors. There can certainly be no doubt of the historical preoccupations of men of the tenth and eleventh centuries or of their desire to write history. We find certain ones voicing their deep regret that they have no written traditions, no written sources, upon which to rely; they were obviously aware of the different classes of source material. They recognized the existence of historical truth (*veritas historiae*), and they were able to distinguish between history and polemic.

A grave temptation beset historians of these centuries, that of abandoning history to what we should to-day call "politics"; and they did not succumb. In the struggle over investitures, historians sided either with the Pope or with the Emperor and were perfectly aware of what they were doing, even informing their readers that they were for Pope or for Emperor. It may seem a fine distinction to make, but it is a very important one, when we say that these writers were not trying to use history to prove that their particular position was right, but rather were writing history because they were convinced that they could show in all sincerity that history was on their side; the former would be polemic, the latter is history.

While the end of the eleventh century sees a revival of interest in those universal histories, which begin with the Creation or the Incarnation and come rapidly to the author's own time, history writing, for the most part, tends rather to be fragmentary in this period, especially in France. Writers are isolated, are remote from one another and yield to the natural inclination to deal only with their own abbeys or their own churches. Annals and chronicles pass from one to the other; as we have them, they are the work of several authors, and, in the eyes of the critic, this produces disproportion, confusion, lack of classification. Nevertheless, such a practice reflects an interesting mentality on the part of those who wrote thus. For them, history was a collective work, which was supposed never to be completed. These monks knew that they could never say the last word in history!

GENERAL CONCLUSION

There is a mediaeval christian conception of history, with a predominant tendency to narration and with noticeable moral pre-occupations. It is a conception different from the pagan Greek's conception, especially in the interpretation of facts and in qualities of style. It is different likewise from that of today, particularly in being less critical and rarely rationalistic. It is, nevertheless, a real conception of history, with its admitted faults and limitations but with its originality too, especially when seen against the background of the notions of history which preceded it.

Liber de Anima of William of Vauvouillon O.F.M.

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THE *LIBER DE ANIMA* OF WILLIAM OF VAUROUILLON O.F.M.

IGNATIUS BRADY O.F.M.

WILLIAM VORRILON¹ or, more correctly, William of Vauvouillon,² O. F. M. (d. 1463), is acknowledged as the author of a *Commentary on the Sentences*,³ and of a *Vademecum* or *Collectarium*, a companion-piece to the *Opus Oxoniense* of Duns Scotus.⁴ He is reckoned by scholars as one of the most important Scotists of the fifteenth century.⁵ It may be a surprise to many that he is also the author of a *Liber de anima* which is not ex-professo a Scotistic work, but primarily a modernization of the *Summa de anima* of Joannes de Rupella (Jean de la Rochelle), a manual into which are incorporated and integrated the Franciscan traditions of Alexander of Hales and Saint Bonaventure,⁶ together with certain theses from Duns Scotus. The work therefore throws invaluable light both on its author and on the Franciscan School of the fifteenth century.⁷ The first two books of the treatise form the present article; the third book will be published in the succeeding number of *Mediaeval Studies*.

I. MANUSCRIPTS

For the present edition, the only two known manuscripts have been used:

A—Paris, BN *Latin*, 6684, formerly Bibl. Royale 2168.

B—Paris, BN *Latin*, 16585, formerly Sorbonne 1193.

A was discovered within the past two years by Father Ephrem Longpré O.F.M., the distinguished mediaevalist, and graciously made available by him

¹ Cf. F. Pelster S. J., 'Wilhelm von Vorillon, ein Skotist des 15. Jahrhunderts', *Franziskanische Studien*, VIII (1921), 48-66; and 'Wilhelm von Vorillon', *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* X (Freiburg i. Br., 1938), col. 910; also Erich Wegerich O. F. M., 'Bio-bibliographische Notizen über Franziskanerlehrer des 15. Jahrhunderts', *Franz. Stud.*, XXIX (1942), 193-197.

² The name has many variants: Vorillon, Vorillong, Varrilon, Vorlion, Forleon, etc. Fr. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 49, adopts Vorillon on the basis of the printed works and manuscripts. According to Ch-V. Langlois, however, Guillaume de Vauvouillon is the only correct form (*Histoire littéraire de la France*, 36 [1924], p. 312, n. 1). This is accepted and used by many outstanding mediaevalists (Gilson, Doucet, Geyer, Roth, etc.).

³ Cf. E. Wegerich, *art. cit.*, 196, for editions. In the present work I have used the Basle edition of 1510, through the kindness of the librarians of Holy Name College, Washington, D.C.

⁴ Cf. E. Wegerich, *loc. cit.* I have used the Padua edition of (circa) 1485, obtained on microfilm through the good offices of Fr. Carter Partee O. F. M., from the Walters Art Gallery, Baltimore, Md.

⁵ B. Geyer terms him a *Vertreter des Scotismus*, a champion of Scotismus (F. Ueberwegs *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* II [Berlin, 1928], p. 623); Fr. C.

Balic, head of the Scotist commission, characterizes him as an outstanding Scotist: *Prae ceteris Scotti discipulis saec. XV, Guillelmus Vorillong particulari modo eminet (Relatio a commissione scotistica exhibita* [Rome, 1939], p. 88); and Fr. Longpré says that he is the best Scotist of the fifteenth century (letter to the author, Dec. 5, 1947).

⁶ Cf. the prologue to Book I: *Ut ergo me agnoscam et promissum adimpleam, quod promisi, confusis de adjutorio Dei, sacra-tissimae Virginis et beati Francisci auxilio ad aliqualem animae humanae notitiam juxta vires modicas, non ex me quia scientie paucervulus, devenio, inter Minores minimus, tres Minores velut stellas tres praeful-gidas imitatus, fratrem Alexandrum de Halis, qui Doctor Irrefragabilis nuncupatur Parisius, fratrem Joannem Bonaventuram, qui exstat Doctor Devotus seu Seraphicus, et fratrem Joannem de Rupella, provinciae Turoniae juxta morem Ordinis.*

⁷ Professor Gilson, some twenty years ago, cited the work (without knowing its author) as a remarkable witness to the continuity of tradition in the Franciscan School (*Comptes-rendu de Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia*, of Cardinal Ehrle, *Revue d'histoire franciscaine*, III (1926), 128-133. For further literature on the Franciscans of the fifteenth century, cf. E. Wegerich, *art. cit.*, 150-197.

in photostatic copy. It embraces 73 folios divided into quaternios. The text is given in a single column of 39 lines, with few abbreviations. Folio 1^r carries a large initial *M* surmounted by a fleur-de-lis, and containing within the *M* a miniature of two angels supporting a shield. The whole page is bordered with floral decorations.

The importance of this manuscript can be realized from the colophon:

Explicit apparatus trium librorum de anima editus per eximum sacre theologie professorem Magistrum Guillelmum de Valle Rouillonis, fratrem minorem, provincie Turonie ministrum provinciale meritissimum atque dignissimum; scriptus per manum Georgii le Maalot, sui discipuli, in decretis et sacra theologia licentiati, Illustrissimique ac potentissimi principis, domini Johannis Dei gracia Comitis Engolismi capellani immeriti, Pictavis studen[tis]. Deo gracias. (fol. 73^r-73^v)

From this we may conclude that the manuscript was written before April 30, 1467, the death of Jean d'Orlean, Count of Angoulême,⁸ if not before 1463, since there is no mention of the death of Vauvouillon. The *terminus a quo* would be about 1450 at the earliest, since Vauvouillon became Minister Provincial of the Franciscans of Tours sometime after that year.⁹ I have not been able to discover any data on the scribe and disciple George le Maalot. He is evidently a secular priest, or at least not a Friar Minor;¹⁰ chaplain to Jean d'Orleans, and a student at Poitiers, but there is no record of him in *Gallia Christiana* and other sources available to me.¹¹

B has been known for the last seventy years, being described in 1875 by Father Fidelis a Fanna, the founder of the famous College of Saint Bonaventure, Quaracchi;¹² it was cited by Professor Gilson in 1926, and was known to Father Longpré, who was the only one to suspect, from internal evidence, that it was the work of Vauvouillon.¹³ It is written in two columns to the half-folio, averaging 43 lines to the column, in a fair hand of the fifteenth century. The whole page is approximately 250 X 175 mm., the text covering 160 mm. X 130 mm. of each page, through folios 2^r-38^v. I would judge, from Professor Gilson's previous study of the manuscript, that the copy lacks any indication on cover or fly-leaf (folio 1 is missing) of author or provenance. The manuscript is listed as anonymous in the catalogues.¹⁴ I have used it only in photostatic copy furnished by Professor Gilson and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.¹⁵

⁸Cf. Mas Latrie, *Trésor de chronologie* (Paris, 1889), col. 1537; also *L'art de rérifier les dates II* (Paris, 1784), pp. 386a-387a.

⁹I here depart from the dates given by Fr. Felster. The latter thinks that Vauvouillon was Minister Provincial after he left Paris in 1430 and before his return in 1448 (*art. cit.*, 53). This is hardly correct. Peter Legerius was Minister Provincial in 1447 (*Bullarium Franciscanum*, nova series, I [Quaracchi, 1929], n. 1107, 560b); and William is mentioned as Provincial for the first time in a document of Pope Nicholas V, in 1455 (*ibid.*, n. 1810, 894-895), and thereafter in succeeding letters dealing with a dispute between the Conventuals and the Observants over the convent of Châteauroux (*Bullarium Franciscanum II* [1939], n. 120, p. 65-66; n. 774, 397b; n. 937, 486-487; and n. 1016, 531a). In one letter, of Pius II, he is specifically termed Master of Theology and successor of Peter Legerius in the office of Provincial (*ibid.*, n. 937, p. 486). See also note 27, *infra*, pp. 228-229.

¹⁰I conclude this from the fact that A omits two references to Saint Francis (fol. 1^r, and fol. 13^r), and substitutes *et omnium*

Sanctorum juvamine on fol. 39^v.

¹¹A also contains two references which would lead us to believe that le Maalot or a fellow scribe had heard the lectures of Vauvouillon that form the *Liber de anima*. On folio 38^v, the scribe omits: *et forsam ultra quam petit desiderans; and 73^r, he adds: et qui audit, to the final prayer.*

¹²In a letter of July 11, 1947, Fr. Victorin Doucet O. F. M., head of the Alexander of Hales Commission at Quaracchi wrote. "The Parisian Ms. is known in Quaracchi since 1875, being described in the manuscript notes of Fr. Fidelis a Fanna (vol. X, p. 125) . . . The author of the *Tractatus* is still unknown."

¹³Letter to author, Dec. 5, 1947: "I have supposed that Vorillong is the author, ten years ago, by internal evidence."

¹⁴Cf. L. Thorndike-P. Kibre, *A Catalogue of Incipits of mediaeval scientific writings in Latin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), col. 416.

¹⁵This manuscript was used by the present editor as part of a doctoral dissertation for the University of Toronto, 1948. I would take this opportunity to thank all concerned, especially Prof. A. C. Pegis, president of the

Beyond concluding that these two manuscripts are independent copies in a collateral line, I would not attempt to establish further relationship. There is some evidence that they are each derived from the same exemplar: parallel corrections and mistakes, identity in spelling, etc. One outstanding difference is to be found in the unique quotation of a French proverb: *imaginativa est illa potentia qui fait les chasteaux en Espagne* (A 73^r) . . . *les chateaux* (B 29^r).

In the present edition I have not attempted to use either manuscript exclusively as the basis of the text. To some extent *B* is the better manuscript, since the scribe has been more careful in his corrections. The titles of the chapters are found in the text, unless otherwise indicated by square brackets. The chapter-numbers I have added. On occasion, the text of quotations is not in agreement with the sources used; however, if the reading of the original has been adopted, the change will be indicated in the notes. In a few rare instances words have been added (in square brackets) that were clearly called for by the sources or sentence structure.

II. AUTHENTICITY

While the evidence of authorship furnished by the colophon of *A* is convincing enough, it can be confirmed by further intrinsic proof taken from the *De anima* itself, and by parallels between this work and the acknowledged works of Vauvouillon.¹⁶

A. Intrinsic Evidence.

On the basis of the *Liber de anima* alone the following details can be established concerning the author:

1. He is a Franciscan. In the prologue to the first book, he states that he is a Friar Minor: *inter Minores minimus*, and that his work will follow the Franciscan tradition chiefly as embodied in Alexander of Hales, Saint Bonaventure and John of Rupella. To these must certainly be added John Duns Scotus, on whom the work relies for many important doctrines.¹⁷

This agrees with the apostrophe to the Franciscan School delivered by William of Vauvouillon, in the *Collatio praedicativa* or Prologue to the second book of *Sentences*.¹⁸ It should be noted, however, that Duns Scotus plays a more leading role in the latter work than in the *De anima*.

2. The *Liber de anima* was written between 1410 and 1482. The *terminus a quo* can be established as 1410, on the basis of a reference to *Petrus de Candia, ordine*

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, and Father J. R. O'Donnell C. S. B., professor of Latin paleography; likewise, those scholars and libraries that furnished needed reference material.

¹⁶ Through some error, Father Léon Veuthey O.F.M. Conv., assigned *B* to Friar Alexander of Alessandria, listing it among the manuscripts and editions of that Franciscan Scholastic of the early fourteenth century (*Alexandre d'Alexandrie* [Paris, 1932], p. 24). The error is repeated by Abbé P. Glorieux, *Repertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au xiii^e siècle II* (Paris, 1934), n. 340b, p. 199.

¹⁷ Three whole sections are based directly on Duns Scotus, and are given as a summary of his teaching: the passibility of the soul (Book II, c. xiii, *infra* p. 293); the relation of the soul and its powers (Book III, c. i.); and the question of the object of the intellect (Book III, c. xviii). To these can be added other doctrines not treated at any length: the theory of knowledge, hec-
cency, divine immutability and contingency,

imago-doctrine, judgment on the proofs for immortality, the movement of a separated soul, the subject of hope, the notion of color, the synderesis, etc.

¹⁸ Ed. cit., fol. 122^r: Sed de valle Spoletana egressus est flosculus fructus producens varios in Minorum collegio. An non ille est oblita retinendus memoria Alexander de Hales angelicus, qui ob sui validissimas sententias Irrefragabilis dicitur? Succedit Doctor Devotus tuscana natus provincia, Taceo Joannem de Ripa, Franciscum de Marchia, et alium Franciscum Maronis, . . . Taceo et inumeros quos brevitatis praetermittit. Ad te venio, ad te vertit meus sermonis curriculus, nunc noster o amor praecordialissime: qui tanta in universitate tantum scientia plenus eras, ut Doctor Subtilis nomen retineres, cuius error nullus tuam doctrinam, tuum opus maculavit; devotione compositus praecipua. . . . O igitur gloria vallis, sed o gloriiosior vallis Spoletana, a qua talia germina tales lucernae prodierunt. Sed o gloriiosissima vallis parisiense studium! etc.

*Minorum, post Alexander quintus.*¹⁹ Elected Pope by the Council of Pisa in 1409, Peter died the following year. On the other hand, since the author does not call Bonaventure either *beatus* or *sanctus*, but simply *frater Joannes Bonaventurae*,²⁰ or *Doctor Devotus* and *Doctor Seraphicus*, it is safe to say that the work was written before 1482, the year in which Pope Sixtus IV canonized the Franciscan Doctor.²¹ This statement relies on the fact that the author salutes Thomas Aquinas as Saint. Were his Franciscan brother a Saint, he would hardly have neglected to use that title at least once in his many citations from him.

William of Vauvouillon was sent to the Studium at Paris by the General Chapter of Casale, 1427, to read the Sentences;²² and he is listed among the Bachelors in 1429.²³ After 1430, however, he disappears from history until 1448, when he is again at Paris and receives the Licentiate.²⁴ Sometime thereafter he became Minister Provincial of the Franciscan Province of Tours. His scholastic activity thus coincides reasonably well with the dates determined for the *Liber de anima*. This provides a background also for a third detail.

3. The author had been a student at Paris, but was not at Paris when the *Liber de anima* was written. The work contains two references to the author's *Sentences* (to be considered presently), which of itself is no direct proof of attendance at the University of Paris. However, from several other passages in the work I would conclude that he had been at Paris previously. He shows that he is familiar with Parisian traditions and customs, and yet writes in such a way that one gathers he is not at Paris.²⁵ That he should speak of the *alma Universitas* does not lead directly to the conclusion that he was an *alumnus*, but it does add something to the foregoing argument.

In the life of Vauvouillon, the period between 1430 and 1448 could well have been spent in his own Province of Tours. Furthermore, on the basis of the colophon of *A*, it appears that Vauvouillon as well as George le Maalot, his scribe and disciple, may well have been in Poitiers, since the Franciscans of that university town formed part of the Franciscan Province of Tours.²⁶ There is some grounds for holding that William was teaching in the University of Poitiers.²⁷ Finally, the favour which John of Rupella holds in the *Liber de anima* could be explained in part by the fact that both John and William, though

¹⁹ *A*, fol. 62v; *B*, fol. 33^{ra}. Cf. A. Teetaert O. F. M. Cap., *art. 'Pierre de Candie, pape sous le nom d'Alexandre V, Dict. de theol. cath.* XII, 1889-1895; also F. Card. Ehrle. *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia* (Münster, 1925), p. 4 ff. In 'The New List of Popes' (*Mediaeval Studies*, IX [1947], p. 71 ff.), Monsignor A. Mercati points out that Alexander is now listed among the antipopes in the *Annuario Pontificio* 1947.

²⁰ The expression, *Joannes Bonaventurae*, is very unusual, but the author is consistent throughout his work. It is not paralleled in the *Sentences* of Vauvouillon, at least in the edition of 1510. This is no argument, since the editor has added *sanctus* before *Bonaventura*. The *Joannes* of the expression is explained, of course, by the fact that Saint Bonaventure's original name was John Fidanza (cf. *Opera omnia S. Bonaventurae* K, p. 40a); the editors add that *Ioannes neppissime in codicibus occurrit*. But the genitive use of *Bonaventurae* seems peculiar to our author. There is no parallel for it in the incipits and ascriptions of works and testimonies of contemporaries cited by the editors (X, p. 15b; 16a; 18b; 27a; etc.).

²¹ Cf. E. Longpré O.F.M., *art. 'Bonaventure saint'*, *Dict. de Hist. et Géographie ecclés.* X, col. 786; and L. Veuthey O. F. M. Conv., *Bonaventurae philosophia christiana*

(Rome, 1943), p. 3.

²² Cf. F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 51-52.

²³ Cf. Denifle - Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis IV* (Paris, 1897), n. 2330, p. 485: *Nomina bachalariorum Sententiariorum pro anno 1429 in mense Septembri: . . . Guillermus de Valle Reullon, Minor. In n. 2347, p. 498, William is listed once more, as Guillelmus de Valle Rullion, Minor.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 2625, p. 677a and p. 678, note 2.

²⁵ E.g., in the prologue to Book I: . . . *Hic doctorum ternarius triplex flos censetur Parisius* (*A*, 1^v; *B*, 2^{rb}); or: *Et haec est mens trium doctorum almae Universitatis Parisiensis* (*A*, 23^b; *B*, 13^{ra}); and speaking of Henry of Ghent, he remarks: *quem doctores Parisius Doctorem Solemnam nominant* (*A*, 37^v; *B*, 20^{rb}).

²⁶ Cf. the lists of Franciscan provinces of the late fourteenth century in Girolamo Golubovich O. F. M., *Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Santa II* (Quaracchi, 1913), pp. 257; 260.

²⁷ Since it is highly probable that he is to be identified with *Guillelmus de Vallibus* O. F. M., professor of sacred theology and confessor to Mary, Queen of France, residing in Poitiers in 1450, I venture to make this statement. See *Bullarium Franciscanum*, nova series, I, n. 1381, p. 711a (an annual pension is granted), and n. 1395, p. 713b.

distant in time, were fellow members of the same Province. Hence it is at least possible that Vauvouillon, on his return from Paris after 1430, was requested to modernize the work of his thirteenth century confrere. The *Liber de anima* is the result.

4. The *Liber de anima* does not furnish any clues on the origin of the author, unless we would argue from a humorous reference to Brittany that the writer came from that region: *ipse brutus* (Averroes), *sed non Brito*.²⁹ Vauvouillon, who was born at Vauvouant (Côtes-du-Nord),³⁰ was not beyond punning on his family name, *meum cognomen*, in his *Sentences*.³¹ He could well have done the same for the country of his birth.

From the manuscript itself, therefore, there is no reason to deny the ascription of A.

B. Extrinsic Evidence.

A certain amount of extrinsic evidence may be derived from a comparison between the *Liber de anima* and the *Sentences* and *Vademecum* of Vauvouillon. Parallels can be found both in method or technique and in doctrine that amply support the authenticity of the present treatise.

1. TECHNICAL PARALLELS

In the judgment of Father Pelster, the *Commentary on the Sentences* of Vauvouillon is expressly *ein Schulbuch*. It is not intended to be an original piece of work replete with fresh and independent investigations, but a clear, short exposition, summary and defence of the teaching of Duns Scotus.³² Certainly, the author of the *Liber de anima* meant his work to be a concise handbook of the Franciscan tradition on the human soul.³³

Perhaps a more conclusive argument is the parallel use of the ternary in both the *Liber de anima* and the *Sentences* of William. Of the latter Father Pelster says very expressively: *Sein Werk steht förmlich unter die Banne der Dreizahl, die in alle Einteilungen hineinspielt*.³⁴ None who has examined the present text can fail to agree that its author also is under the spell (or curse!) of the number three, which enters into any and every division he makes. Moreover, William uses *conclusiones*, *corollaria* and *dubia* always in sets of threes; and this is the habitual practice of the second and third books of the *Liber de anima*.

2. DOCTRINAL PARALLELS

From the viewpoint of doctrine, there is, first of all, the same general eclecticism in both the *Liber de anima* and the *Sentences* in respect to sources used, passages or doctrines quoted from various Fathers, philosophers and Scholastics, besides a general agreement on minor points of doctrine. These latter I have endeavoured to embody in the footnotes.³⁵ Outstanding parallels that have been quoted at

(two benefices are conferred at the instance of the queen). Both F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 53, and E. Wegerich, *art. cit.*, 193, follow H. Denifle (CUP IV, 678, n. 2) in saying Vauvouillon was the Queen's confessor.

²⁹ A, 64^a; B, 34^{ra}. This play on words goes back to Saint Isidore of Seville, *Etymolog.* IX, n. 102, PL 82, 338B: *Britones quidam Latine nominatos suspicantur, eo quod bruti sint...* It is used later by Peter Abelard: *Ut Brito dictus est quasi brutus; licet enim non omnes vel soli sint stolidi* (*Dialectica*, P. I, L. III; *Ouvrages inédits d'Abelard...* par M. Victor Cousin, [Paris, 1836], p. 222).

³⁰ Cf. F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 50; E. Wegerich, *art. cit.*, 193.

³¹ *I Sent.*, Collatio totius libri sent. illus-

trativa, fol. 1^r; cf. Pelster, *loc. cit.*, 49.

³² F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 62 ff.

³³ However, in contrast to the *Sentences* of Vauvouillon, the *Liber de anima* contains no reference to Franciscus de Mayronis, on whom Vauvouillon depended for many points (Cf. B. Roth O. F. M., *Franz von Mayronis O.F.M.* [Werl, 1936], 554-572). Likewise, the name of William of Ockham does not occur; the only Ockhamist mentioned is Adam Wodham (A, 69^b; B, 36^{ab}).

³⁴ F. Pelster, *art. cit.*, 63-64.

³⁵ Cf. Book I, c. vi, n. 44, identifying matter and hecceity in spiritual hylomorphism; II, ii, n. 23, on the meaning of *incorporeum*; II, iv, n. 18, Macrobius as the source for the Platonic doctrine of pre-existence; etc.

length are: 1° the commentary on the Aristotelian definition of the soul (I, vi, note 2); there is a general agreement here, though the exposition of the *Liber de anima* is of greater length, as might be expected; 2° a very close parallel in commenting on the definition of the soul borrowed from Cassiodorus (II, iii, n. 1); 3° an exact parallel in explaining the difference between *individuum*, *suppositum* and *persona* (II, v, n. 18).

To these must be added an important parallel in the final chapter of the third book, which compares Saint Bonaventure, Saint Thomas and Duns Scotus, on the seat of the synderesis and conscience:

Liber de anima, III, xix;
A 70^r-71^s; B 37^b:

In proposito autem nostro (conscientia) pro habitu sumitur et actu ejus; et in hoc convenientur Sanctus Thomas, prima parte *Summae*, quaestione 401, Doctor Seraphicus, ubi supra, et Doctor Subtilis eadem distinctione in dissolutione duarum quaestionum simul junctarum, quod conscientia stat ex parte intellectus.²⁵ Hoc enim et nomen indicat . . . In synderesi autem Sanctus Thomas et Doctor Subtilis, qui in multis aliis sibi contradicunt, contra Doctorem Devotum convenientur veluti contra tertium, ipsis dicentibus²⁶ synderesim ex parte intellectus, ipso dicente²⁷ ex parte affectus.

II Sent., d. 38-40, art.
2, fol. 223B:

Patet secundo quod defecit Doctor Devotus ponens synderesim in voluntate et conscientiam in intellectu; ita quod sicut conscientia ex parte intellectus est quasi naturale judicatorium agendorum, sic affectus habeat suum habitum quo tendat in bona honesti . . . Ex quo patet tertio quod verius dicit Sanctus Thomas, qui hac distinctione, arti. 3, q. 1 et 2, et altius dist. 24 hujus secundi, parte 1, arti. 1, q. 3 et 4, posuit tam synderesim quam conscientiam in intellectu. Cui consonat Doctor Subtilis in dist. 39, 1 et 2 questionibus. Unde secundum eum ibi tam synderesim quam conscientia sunt habitus intellectus, non quidem speculativi sed practici.

Finally, there is complete agreement in the two references given by the author of the *Liber de anima* to his own *Sentences* and the latter work of William of Vauvouillon. In a lively discussion of the nature of matter in the soul, the author of the *De anima* bluntly closes the debate by referring the reader to his *II Sent.*, d. 3: *Ilic quaere, ibi invenies* (II, v; A 24^r; B 14^r). The doctrine, sources and style of argument accord perfectly with Varouillon's second book of *Sentences*, d. 3, p. 1, fols. 131 ff. Later in the *De anima*, the author makes a passing reference to the doctrine of the *forma corporeitatis* to be found in his fourth book (II, x; A 33^r; B 18^b). This would coincide with Varouillon's *IV Sent.*, d. 44, a. 1, fol. 438 ff.

III. CONCLUSION

From the data thus presented, I would judge that William de Vauvouillon composed the *Liber de anima* sometime after 1430 and before he became Minister Provincial,²⁸ most likely at Poitiers. From the addition in *A*: *et qui audit* (III, xix, 73^r), we may likewise conclude that it was originally delivered in lecture form, and, with great probability, at the University of Poitiers.

²⁵ St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 79, 13, which is actually art. 401; St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 1, q. 1, resp.; ed. cit., II, p. 899; Duns Scotus, *Opus Oxonense* II, d. 39, n. 3 (Paris, 1891), XIII, 411a.

²⁶ St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 79, 12; Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 39, n. 2; ed. cit., XIII, pp. 410-411.

²⁷ St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2, q. 1;

ed. cit., II, pp. 910 and 911.

²⁸ While this is not the place to enter into any further discussion on the chronology of Vauvouillon, I would propose 1454-1457 as the dates of his provincialate. Fr. Odoric M. Jouve O.F.M., has edited a document from the Archives of the Friars Minor (*La France Franciscaine*, XV [1932], 107-117) which purports to give a list of the Vicars

INCIPIT LIBER DE ANIMA¹

MULTA REPREHENSIONE aestimo dignum se ignoto² ad alia cognoscenda inhiare, quasi se neglecto nunc caelorum axes et circulos, nunc maris varios fluctus et ambages aut terrae et columnas et profunda comprehendere quis nitatur.³ Res absurdia nimis. Et tamen de multis in *Meditationum suarum exordio* sic beatus scripsit Bernardus: Multi multa sciunt et seipsos nesciunt.⁴ Quod non in laudem sed in vituperium dicit. Et se nosse magna sit hominis perfectio. Unde et Juvenalis gentilis poeta in satiris suis dicit: E caelo descendit *nothis olitos*.⁵ Quod latinus explicat sermo: nosce te ipsum. Et si coactus hoc dicit Apollo, ut autumnat quidam,⁶ aut voluntarie ut ad suum attraheret cultum, ut voluit in *Chronica Helinandus*,⁷ verbum tamen est utile: *nothis olitos*.

Quantum honestatis homini afferat hominis cognitio et praecipue animae rationalis quae est praecipua pars hominis, in promptu est. Homo enim ut Moyses, Genesis primo, testatur ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei conditus est;⁸ quod non secundum corpus sed animam dicitur, quae est speculum et imago quibus⁹ in aenigmate cognoscitur Deus, licet non videatur speculum aut imago, ut pulchre in libris *De Trinitate* declaravit Aurelius Augustinus.¹⁰

Unde in opprobrium animae nolentis aut non curantis se cognoscere in Canticis Canticorum, capitulo primo, Sapientia Dei dicit: Si ignoras te, o pulcherrima inter mulieres, egressere et abi post vestigia gregum, et pasce haedos tuos juxta tabernacula pastorum.¹¹ Quid nobilius cognoscere quam animam, quae pulcherrima asseritur mulierum? / Et tamen si se agnoscere neglit, praecipitur ut a se egrediatur et abeat non in greges sed post gregum vestigia; nec jam agnos sed haedos pascat; non in tabernaculis, sed juxta tabernacula pastorum; nec ultra ad se redeat

- A 1v nisi misericordia Dei, sicut in / psalmis scriptum est;¹² et eodem psalmo, scilicet 48, bis positum: *Homo, cum in honore esset, non intellexit: comparatus est jumentis insipientibus, et similis factus est illis:*¹³ etsi natura maneat, miseria assimilat.
- B 2rb Ut ergo me agnoscam et promissum adimpleam, quod promisi, confisus de adjutorio Dei,¹⁴ sacratissimae Virginis et beati Francisci¹⁵ auxilio, ad

provincial of the Observants of the province of Tours-Poitiers from 1415 onward, the beginning of the Observance movement in that province. However, Friar Peter Leger is listed (p. 112) as a Vicar provincial, 1446-1449, when he was actually the Minister Provincial; and for the years 1454-1457 a Friar Guillelmus Picard is set down also as vicar. On the basis of the error concerning Leger, it is not altogether improbable to say that the *Guillelmus* here mentioned is actually Vauquillon. I have, however, no further material available at present to carry this point to any definite conclusion.

¹ Om. title A.

² ignorato B.

³ nutatur (?) B.

⁴ Pseudo-Bernard (William of Saint-Thierry), *Meditationes piissimae de cognitione humanae conditionis*, c. i, n. 1; PL 184, 485A; cf. also Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), *De spiritu et anima*, c. 1; PL 40, 816.

⁵ *Satira XI.* 27 (Loeb Classical Library, n. 91), p. 222; E caelo descendit: gnathi seauton.

⁶ autumnant quidem A.

⁷ Cf. *Helinandi Frigidi Monachi Flores a Vincentio Bellovacensi collecti*, "De cognitione sui," c. ii; PL 212, 724.

⁸ *Genesis* i, 26-27: Et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram . . . Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam.

⁹ qua A.

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., *Lib. IX, passim*; PL 42, 959 ff.; and especially XV, viii ff., n. 14 ff.; PL 42, 1067 ff.

¹¹ *Canticum* i, 7. This verse forms the initium of the *Summa de anima* of John of Rupella (ed. Teofilo Domenichelli, [Prato, 1882], p. 103). It had already been applied to the soul by Helinandus, *op. cit.*, col. 723B, and others before him in the Christian tradition.

¹² Apparently Psalm xlvi, 16: Verumtamen Deus redimet animam meam de manu inferi, cum acceperit me.

¹³ Psalm xlvi, 13 and 21.

¹⁴ Add. et A.

¹⁵ Om. et beati Francisci A.

aliqualem animae humanae notitiam juxta vires modicas, non ex me quia scientia pauperculus, devenio, inter Minores minimus, tres Minores velut stellas tres¹⁶ praefulgidas imitatus, fratrem Alexandrum de Halis, qui Doctor Irrefragabilis nuncupatur Parisius, fratrem Joannem Bonaventurae, qui exstat Doctor Devotus seu Seraphicus, et fratrem Joannem de Ruppella, provinciae Turoniae juxta morem Ordinis. Hic doctorum ternarius triplex¹⁷ flos censemur Parisius. Et si aliquando de aliis loquor,¹⁸ hi tamen sunt praecipui. De philosophis tres capio, etsi aliquando¹⁹ quidem veniant alii, quos resonant philosophorum gymnasia. Hi tres sunt: Pythagoras, Plato, Aristoteles, quorum primum Italiae, secundus Academiae, tertius Peripateticorum fundaverunt aut dedicaverunt studia. Sic enim si hos ternarios philosophorum et doctorum conjungamus,²⁰ senarium perficiemus²¹ qui numerus est perfectus ex omnibus partibus constans suis, ut doctissimus Boethius in *Arithmetica* docuit.²²

Ad rem igitur accedamus, ubi tria sunt videnda;²³ primo, ne in aequivoco ambulemus cum anima nomen sit aequivocum,²⁴ de aequivocatione hujus nominis anima sermo habendus est; secundo, unde hoc nomen anima sumptum sit dicendum est. Quid enim nominis ante quid rei in libro *Posteriorum* Aristoteles ordinavit, et in *IV Physicorum*, capitulo de vacuo: Vacuum habet quid nominis, non quid rei, cum nihil sit.²⁵ Tertio de re animae sermo habebitur, quod est intentum principale.

I. DE AEQUIVOCATIONE HUJUS NOMINIS: ANIMA

A 2r Quantum ad primum sciendum est, quod sunt tria nomina / quae multum secundum vocem inter se convenient aut scriptum,²⁶ et tamen in significato multum variantur: anima, animus, animal.

Primus terminus est anima. Anima enim tribus dicitur ternariis.

B 2va Primo enim dicitur anima substantia incorporea / rationalis, de qua in tertia parte maxime erit intentio nostra, de qua Gualterus in *Alexandreide* dum infernum tangit dicit: Hic sontes animae passim per plana vagantur.²⁷ Secundo anima dicitur spiritus vegetativus; Genesis enim primo scriptum est: *Producant aquae reptile animae viventis.*²⁸ Tertio dicitur vita; unde Lucanus: Quod superest animae verte per omnes bellorum casus:²⁹ animae, id est, vitae. Ecce primus ternarius.

Quarto dicitur sanguis. Unde Ovidius: Purpuream vomit ille animam,³⁰ id est, sanguinem. Quinto dicitur compositum ex corpore et anima, sicut homo. Unde scribitur prima Petri tertio: *Pauci, id est, octo animae salvae factae sunt per aquas:*³¹ animae, i.e., homines. Sexto anima dicitur diabolus. Unde in quodam libro, qui *Escalapius Mercurii* dicitur, dicitur quod animae inclusae erant in statuis, i.e., daemones.³² En secundus ternarius.

¹⁶ Om. B.

¹⁷ Om. A.

¹⁸ loquor B.

¹⁹ quandoque A.

²⁰ conjungimus A.

²¹ perficiimus A.

²² I, xx; PL 63, 1098B and D.

²³ sunt videnda B.

²⁴ sit aequivocum nomen B.

²⁵ Analyt. Post. II, 10, 93b29 ff.; Phys. IV, 7 ff., 213b30 ff.; and especially 9, 217b20 ff.

²⁶ Om. aut scriptum A.

²⁷ Phillippe Gauthier de Chatillon (c. 1178), *Alexandreis* X, 5107; PL 209, 565C: Hic sontes animae passim per plana jacentes Mortis inaudite torquentur agone.

Cf. Dante, *Inferno*, XIV, 31 ff.

Quali Alessandro in quelle parti calde d'India vide sopra lo suo stuolo fiamme cadere infino a terra salde; etc.

²⁸ Genesis i, 20.

²⁹ Pharsalia III, 718-719:

Ecce quod superest animae, Tyrrhene,
per omnes
Bellorum casus.

³⁰ Rather, Vergil, *Aeneid* IX, 349.

³¹ Peter iii, 20.

³² Add. sic A.

³³ Cf. Asclepius, in *Corpus hermeticum* II, traités xiii-xviii & Asclepius, texte établi par A. D. Nock et traduit par A-J Festugière (Paris, 1945), n. 24, p. 326 ff. It is possible that the author derived his knowledge of this from Saint Augustine, *De*

Septimo anima intentio dicitur. In Job enim 13^o dictum est capitulo: *Animam meam porto in manibus meis.*⁹ id est, intentionem mentis meae praetendo operibus meis.¹⁰ Octavo anima dicitur voracitas. Scriptum est enim Isaiae quinto capitulo: *Dilatavit infernus animam suam, et aperuit os suum absque ullo termino.*¹¹ Nono anima voluntas dicitur. Unde Jacob de Simeone et Levi filiis suis 49^o dicit capitulo: *In consilium eorum non veniat anima mea*, i.e., voluntas.¹² Ecce tertius ternarius. Et hi tres ternarii qui novem constituunt his versibus continentur:

Est simplex anima, vegetabile, vitaque, sanguis,
Compositum, daemon, intentio, gula, voluntas.

Et in tantum de hoc nomine anima.

Secundus terminus est animus, qui ab anima descendit. A mutata in V quae est ultima vocalis seu quinta versa superius. Significat enim rationem quae sursum aspicit si recta est.¹³ Addita S quae ima est designans humilitatem. Ratio enim si recta est humili est.

Tribus autem senariis animus solet accipi. Primo animus ratio dicitur, ut dictum est. Unde Cato seu Censorius seu secundo Uticensis aut tertio Cato tertius qui de caelo cecidit, ut inquit poeta Juvenalis:¹⁴

- A 2v Si deus est / animus nobis ut carmina dicunt,
hic tibi praecipue sit pura mente colendus.¹⁵*

*B 2vb Hoc enim modo sic hunc terminum capiendo construitur si pro quia;¹⁶
quia deus est, ut animus et carmina dicunt, id est, / sicut ratio et*

Secunda animus coniunctio dicitur. *Ual. ill. 1. II. 11.*

Si quadringentis sex septem milia desint,
Est¹⁷ animus tibi sunt mores et lingua fiduciaque¹⁸

et cetera: animus, id est, sapientia. Tertio animus vita dicitur. Unde illud *Epistolarum Ovidii*: Sustinet hoc animi spes tamen una tui,¹⁹ id est, sola spes tui sustinet hoc animi, id est, sustinet hanc vitam meam.

sola spes tui sustinet hoc animi, id est, sustinet hanc vitam meam.

Quarto animus voluntas dicitur. Unde in *De Arte Ovidius* dicit: Mille animos excipe mille modis,²⁰ id est, mille hominum voluntates. Quinto dicitur animus virtus sive moralitas. Unde dicit in *De Ponto Ovidius*: Et gemines²¹ animi nobilitate genus,²² id est, nobilitate morum et virtutum. Sexto animus dicitur anima, ut in praedicto exemplo: Si deus est animus, et cetera. Et secundum hoc sic legi debet: Si deus est animus, etc., i.e., si animus est deus, i.e., si anima est dea, i.e., divina, i.e., a deo habens originem, hic, id est, animus, sit colendus, i.e., anima colenda est et virtutibus ornanda. Ecce primus senarius.

Civitate Dei VIII, xxiii, 1; PL 41, 247-248. Cf. also J. Kroll, *Die Lehren des Hermes Trismegistos* (BGPTMA XII, 2-4, Münster, 1928), p. 91, and p. 409.

^o Job xiii. 14.

10 *Om. B.*

¹¹ Isaias v, 14.

12 Scil.,

¹³ sit B.
¹⁴ Add. sit Tullius B. *Satira II*, 40; ed. Loeb, p. 20: *Tertius e caelo cecidit Cato*.

¹⁵ Caton *Disticha* I, 1; ed. J. W. Duff, *Minor Latin Poets* (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1934), p. 596.

¹⁶ Cf. William de Vauvouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 11, art. 1, (Basle, 1510), fol. 35G: Si enim est

secundum Donatum causalis conjunctio: et solet capi tripliciter. Uno modo capitur pro quia, ut in Cathone: Si deus est animus nobis ut carmina dicunt, etc. Si, id est, quia.

17 Et A.

¹⁸ *Epistulae I*, i, 57-58; ed. Loeb, p. 254:
Est animus tibi, sunt mores et lingua
fidesque,

¹⁹ *Eristula*, III, 142; ad. Dolabini, p. 22.

¹¹ Epistula III
Sustinet hoc :

²¹ Sustinet hoc animae spes tamen una tui.
²² *Ars Amatoria I*, 756; ed. Delphini, p. 644.
²¹ geminas A.
²² *Epist. ex Pont. I*, ii, 2; ed. Delphini, 2502.

Septimo animus dicitur spes. Unde in *De Ponto* Ovidius dicit: Cum bene firmarunt animum²³ praecepta jacentem,²⁴ id est, cum tuae monitiones confirmarunt²⁵ spem meam quasi penitus cadentem. Octavo animus dicitur dispositio ad bene vel male operandum aut intelligendum. Unde Horatius: Caelum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt.²⁶ Nono animus dicitur cura, ut Ovidius in *De Ponto* dicit: Anxietas animi, continuusque labor,²⁷ id est, curarum. Decimo animus dicitur impetus volendi, ut apud Horatium: Animus rege qui nisi paret imperat,²⁸ id est, impetuosa voluntatem reprime. Undecimo animus dicitur consilium, ut Ovidius in *De Ponto* dicit: Magnaque pars animi consiliique mihi,²⁹ et est efferesis, i.e., expositio unius per alterum. Duodecimo dicitur animus ingenium, ut in eodem libro,³⁰ idem³¹ Ovidius dicit: Non libet in tales animum dimittere curas,³² animum, id est, ingenium. En secundus senarius.

Tertiodecimo dicitur animus³³ propositum; unde et in usu dicitur: habeo hoc in meo animo,³⁴ hoc est, in proposito meo. Quartodecimo animus dicitur audacia. Unde apud Horatium dicitur: Numeros

- B 3ra animosque secutus / Archilochus,³⁵ id est, metrum et audaciam ejus. Quintodecimo animus dicitur cogitatio. Unde Ovidius in *Epistolis* dicit: / A 3r Aeneam animo noxque diesque refert;³⁶ animo, id est, meae cogitationi. Sextodecimo animus anhelitus dicitur. Unde Lucanus: Egregium facinus animum servare sub undis,³⁷ animum,³⁸ id est, anhelitum. Tamen quidam libri habent animam. Septimodecimo dicitur animus mentis praeconcepcionis. Unde in usu dicitur: animus meus dicit mihi quod bene continget mihi in hoc. Duodevigesimo dicitur animus res futura, ut per signum res signata capiatur. En tertius senarius. Quorum omnium versus exstant:

Est animus ratio, sapientia, vita, voluntas.
Sit virtus, anima, spes, dispositio, cura,
Impetus, ingenium, propositum. Consultit, audet,
Cogitat, exsufflat, praeconcipit, atque futurat.

Et tantum de isto termino animus.

Tertius terminus est animal, descendens ab anima, liquida l addita, quia anima partem dicit compositi principalem, sed animal totum compositum ex anima et quodam liquido hic et fluido corpore, scilicet terrestri.

Dicitur autem animal tripliciter. Primo communiter et sic sumendo animal philosophi definiunt dicendo³⁹ quod est substantia animata sensibilis.⁴⁰ Quo in loco sensibilis passive non habet capi; tunc enim arbores animalia forent: sunt nempe substantiae et animatae quia habent animam vegetativam et sunt sensibles et visu et tactu. Sed capitur active quia sentit, sicut de Sapientia Dei dicitur: *Omnibus mobilibus⁴¹ mobilior est,*⁴² quod active non passive dictum est, ut⁴³ homo dicitur risibilis, non eo quod possit rideri sed ridere. Secundo animal restrictive

²³ animi A.

²⁴ Epist. ex Pont. I, iii, 27; ed. cit., p. 2516.

²⁵ confirmaverunt B.

²⁶ Epistulae I, xi, 27; ed. Loeb, p. 324.

²⁷ Epist. ex Pont. I, iv, 8; ed. cit., p. 2522.

²⁸ impera, mss. Epistula I, ii, 62; ed. cit.,

p. 266.

²⁹ Epist. ex Pont. I, vi, 16; ed. cit., p. 2535.

³⁰ Om. A.

³¹ Om. B.

³² Epist. ex Pont. I, v, 11; ed. cit., p. 2527:

Non libet in tales animum contendere curas.

³³ animus dicitur A.

³⁴ animo meo A.

³⁵ Epist. I, xix, 24-25; ed. cit., p. 382:

Numeros animosque secutus

Archilogi . . .

³⁶ Epist. VII, 26; ed. Delphini, p. 135:

Aenean animo noxque diesque refert.

³⁷ Pharsalia III, 696-697:

—Pugna fuit unus in illa

Eximus Phoebus animam servare sub undis.

³⁸ Om. B.

³⁹ Om. B.

⁴⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2, 413b2 ff.

⁴¹ mobilitatibus A.

⁴² Wisdom vii, 24.

⁴³ et B.

sumitur,⁴⁴ vel ad bruta solum animalia, ut apud Theodolum: Res miranda nimis, laxatur vox animalis;⁴⁵ et ita vulgus recipit. Unde hanc non sustinet:⁴⁶ homo est animal. Vel sumitur⁴⁷ tantum ad homines, ut in psalmo: *Imples omne animal benedictione,*⁴⁸ id est, hominem.⁴⁹ Tertio dicitur transsumptive animal, pro imagine animalis, quomodo animalia vident Ezechiel, Ezechielis primo capitulo. Unde de hoc habentur isti versus:

Res vivens animal brutum supponere tantum
Nunc habet aut homines animalque vocatur imago.

Et tantum de istis⁵⁰ terminis tribus:⁵¹ anima, animus, animal.

II. UNDE ANIMA DICATUR¹

B 3rb Unde autem dicatur anima, vel quid sit quid nominis ejus, nunc breviter videndum est. De quo tres binarii sunt dicendi.

A 3v Primus modus est, quod / anima dicitur ab² alio, aliis, quia omne animal, immo omne animatum, cibo indiget. Genesis enim primo³ dicit Deus: *Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam afferentem semen super terram, et universa ligna quae habent in semetipsis semen generis sui, ut sint vobis in escam: et cunctis animantibus terrae, omniisque volucris caeli, et universis quae moventur in terra, et in quibus est anima vivens, ut habeant ad vescendum.*⁴ Et tunc dicitur anima quasi alma et animal quasi animal.

Secundus modus dicendi est, quod anima dicitur⁵ ab a quod est sine et mene quod est *defectus*, quasi sine defectu, eo quod anima sit immortalis, et diceretur tunc⁶ anima quasi anima et animal quasi animal.⁷ Sed ista expositio solum animae rationali congruit, licet Pythagoras transitum posuerit animarum a corporibus in corpora, de quo infra.⁸ Relique enim cum corporibus suis deficiunt, et ita sola anima rationalis foret anima. Ecce primus binarius.

Tertius modus dicendi est, quod anima dicitur ab a quod est *sine* et *neme* quod est *sanguis*, quasi sine sanguine, eo quod ex sua natura simplex sit,⁹ sanguis autem corporeus. Sed tunc anima diceretur proprie¹⁰ anima et animal animal, e remanente vocali.

Quartus modus dicendi est,¹¹ quod anima dicitur ab a et *nemen*, quod est *tribuere*, quia corpori vitam tribuit, ut dicatur corpus vivum, et ex ambobus tercia resultat entitas quae a corpore et anima distinguitur, quae per animam non per corpus vivit et vivens est. De qua tertia entitate loquitur Doctor Subtilis, III Sententiarum distinctione secunda, in *Opere Anglicano.*¹² Et hoc modo anima non est una dictio sed est duae; a enim tunc hic non est per compositionem sed per appositionem,

⁴⁴ dicitur A.

⁴⁵ Cf. Theoduli *Elogiam e codicibus parisinis et marburgensi recensuit et prolegomenis instruxit* August. Aemil. Alfr. Beck (Sangerhausen: E. Dittmarium, 1936), line 163, p. 38:

Res horrenda nimis, laxatur vox animalis. See *ibid.*, the note on *miranda*. (University of Michigan Library).

⁴⁶ suscipit A.

⁴⁷ Om. B.

⁴⁸ Psalm cxliv, 16.

⁴⁹ homines A.

⁵⁰ his A.

⁵¹ tribus terminis A.

¹ dicatur anima A.

² de A.

⁵ dicitur A.

⁶ Genesis i, 29-30.

⁷ dicitur A.

⁸ tunc diceretur A.

⁹ Cf. Cassiodorus, *De anima* i; PL 70, 1282; Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* xi; PL 40, 786. Cf. Cassiodorus, *loc. cit.*, for the *tertius modus* also.

¹⁰ Infra, Book II, c. xii, p. 288; and St. Albert, *De natura et origine animae*, tr. II, c. vii; ed. Borgnet, IX, 414b.

¹¹ sit simplex A.

¹² proprio diceretur A.

¹³ Om. B.

¹⁴ Opus Oxoniense III, d. 2, q. 2, n. 7; ed. Vivès, XIV, 134a.

ut ponatur pro *ad*, ut jam dicatur *a nima* quasi ad tribuendum duplice dictione, non *anima* unica dictione veluti ad animandum. Ecce secundus binarius.

Quintus modus dicendi est quod anima est nomen primitivum nec querenda est ejus origo¹³ aliunde, et in hoc ejus primitas super corpus ostenditur et dignitas. Tanto enim anima preeminent corpori quanto perfectio substantialis perfectibili suo preeminent: illa enim ¹⁴ actus, istud¹⁵ potentia.

Sextus modus dicendi est quod anima dicitur ab *animos* graece,

- B 3va quod / latine dicitur ventus, / eo quod quidam animam ventum¹⁶ esse
A 4r putaverunt,¹⁷ eo quod dum ventum seu aërem attrahimus vivere videmur. Sed hi ad pauca aspicientes de facili defecerunt. Multa quidem animalia non respirant si convertuntur habere pulmonem et respirare, ut in libro *Posteriorum* posuit Aristoteles;¹⁸ eorum enim multa pulmone carent. Patet in multis piscibus et multis volatilium. Ceterum arbores et herbae animam habent vegetativam, quae tamen non respirant. Ecce tertius binarius.

Dicamus igitur¹⁹ in epilogo, quod si quilibet modus suum habeat defensorem, quintus tamen magis placet propter animae primitatem.

Et notandum quod sicut hoc nomen anima tres habet syllabas, sic a parte' rei tres sunt partes animae subjective: vegetativa, sensitiva, intellectiva. Vegetativa per primam *a* designatur quae sicut angulum trinum habet sic triplicem habet²⁰ anima vegetativa²¹ quam maxime potentiam, scilicet generativam, quae maxime quid aspicit; nutritivam, quae quale; augmentativam, quae quantum. Et sicut *a* est prima vocalis per se sonans, sic vegetativa prior est origine ceteris animabus. Unde in *De Animalibus* Aristoteles dicit quod embrio prius vivit vita plantae quam vivat vita animalis, et per se sola est in herbis et arboribus.²² Sensitiva per secundam syllabam designatur, quae ex consonante et vocali conficitur: *n* consonans est²³ et semivocalis ex duobus²⁴ ramis confecta quibus²⁵ designat sensitivam in duas dividi portiones: in sensum interiorem et exteriores, et consonat cum vegetativa in brutis et cum intellectiva in hominibus. Unde merito semivocalis dicitur, quae in multis brutis rationi approximat, ut patet in canibus, elephante, formica et apibus ceterisque. Et sicut *i* vocalis est media inter *a* et *e* ex una et *o* et *u* ex altera, sic proprie sensitivum inter vegetativum et intellectivum quamvis gradus multos habeat, sicut et *i* aliquando est plena²⁶ vocalis, et²⁷ aliquando in vim transit consonantis dum alteri vocali additur, ut Jupiter, Juno.

Intellectiva anima per ultimam syllabam designatur, quae similiter

- B 3vb ex consonante / et vocali conficitur. Ex *m*, quae tres habet ramos et tamen una littera est, innuitur quod in anima rationali vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum convenient et tamen unum sunt, ut infra clarebit.²⁸ Unde recte in *II de Anima* Aristoteles dicit quod sicut trigonum A 4v est in tetragono et tetragonum in pentagono, sic vegetativum / in

¹³ origo ejus A.

¹⁴ illud B. for illa enim.

¹⁵ illud A.

¹⁶ Om. A.

¹⁷ St. Isidore, *Etymolog.* XI, i, 7; PL 82, 398B: Anima autem gentilibus nomen accipit eo quod ventus sit. Unde et ventus Graece *anemos* dicitur, quod ore trahentes aërem vivere videamur. Sed aperissime falsum est. Cf. also Cassiodorus, *loc. cit.*, for a slightly different version: Animus vero dicitur *apo tou anemou*, id est, a vento, eo quod velocissime cogitatio ejus ad similitu-

dinem venti motu celeri pervagatur.

¹⁸ Cf. *Analyt. Post.* I, 13, 78b15 ff.

¹⁹ ergo A.

²⁰ Om. A.

²¹ animam vegetativam A.

²² *De generatione animalium* II, 3, 736b27.

²³ en B.

²⁴ duabus B.

²⁵ quo B.

²⁶ plena est A.

²⁷ Om. B.

²⁸ Cf. *infra. Book II. c. vi*, p. 273.

sensitivo et ambo in intellectivo.²⁹ Aut per *m* triplex intimetur potentia quae animae est rationalis: memoria, intelligentia,³⁰ voluntas. Quod autem per *m* quae semivocalis est, non vocalis, designatur, ratio est quia rationalis anima his tribus potentis plus dicitur esse ad imaginem quam imago Dei; cum³¹ Filius solus Dei imago sit Dei. Quod autem *m* in medio est litterarum latini alphabeti hoc nobis insinuat, quod Alpharabius verum dixerit in libro *De Causis* animam³² rationalem fore creatam in horizonte aeternitatis³³ ut sicut inter duo hemisphaeria, superius et inferius, horizon mediat, sic inter pure spiritualia et pure corporalia anima rationalis media est, ut aevum inter aeternitatem et tempus. Quod enim³⁴ cum *m* a jungitur ut syllaba sit perfecta hoc innuit quod inter formas perfectior anima rationalis sit: sicut a inter vocales obtinet primatum et primitatem et disjunctis³⁵ labiis profertur et dentibus, sic haec sola animarum dissoluta a corpore remanere perhibetur.

Et in tantum sit dictum de quid nominis animae vel impositione nominis.

III. PRIMUS SENARIUS OPINIONUM PHILOSOPHORUM DE ANIMA

Viso quid sit anima secundum quid nominis, videndum est de anima secundum rem. Principaliter tamen de anima intellectiva quam quaerimus; de vegetativa autem et sensitivam propter hanc.¹ Primo veterum philosophorum narrabuntur errores; secundo opinionis² ponentur Aristotelis declarationes; tertio de anima agentur theologicae veritates.

Apud autem veteres philosophos de anima multiplex fuit opinio quid erat; non dico quidditative sed quid erat³ significative. Quae quidem opiniones⁴ ad tres senarios reducuntur.

Pythagoras et Philolaus dixerunt animam esse corporis harmoniam.⁵ Unde anima delectatur harmoniis velut sibi similibus et suo tristatur contrario; et doctus Boethius in primo suae *Musicae*, quae quinque

- B 4ra gaudet libellis, narrat aliquos per conso- / nantias pedum metri sanos esse ab infirmitate varia.⁶ De quibus et Guido in suo opere dicit: Hoc unum sufficiat dum Saulem spiritus malignus invaderet, David cum A 5r cithara / lusisse ante eum ut se haberet quietius.⁷ Hoc secundum addatur

²⁹ *De anima* II, 3, 414b20 ff.

³⁰ intellectiva B.

³¹ quod B.

³² Add. videt B.

³³ Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift *Ueber das reine Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis*. (Im Auftrage der Görres-Gesellschaft bearbeitet von Otto Bardenhewer, Freiburg im Br., 1882), § 2, p. 165: Est in orizonte aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus. Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa contra Gentiles* II, c. 68 and 81; III, 61. On Alfarabi as the author of the *Liber de causis*, cf. H. Bedoret S. J., 'L'auteur et le traducteur du *Liber de causis*', RNP 41 (1938), 519-533.

³⁴ Om. B.

³⁵ Add. et A.

¹ It is evident that the author is inspired by the historical approach of Aristotle in *De anima* I; likewise, perhaps by Saint Albert the Great. However, the actual material used in stating the opinions of the philosophers in the following three chapters is based, directly or indirectly, on a passage in Macrobius, which we quote in full here for the sake of convenience:

Plato dixit animam essentiam se moventem, Xenocrates numerum se moventem,

Aristoteles entelecheian, Pythagoras et Philolaus harmoniam, Posidonius ideam, Asclepiades quinque sensum exercitium sibi consonum, Hippocrates spiritum tenuem per corpus omne dispersum, Heraclites Ponticus lucem, Heraclitus physicus scintillam stellaris essentiae, Zenon concretum corpori spiritum, Democritus spiritum insertum atomis hac facilitate motus ut corpus illi omne sit pervium, Critolaus Peripateticus constare eam de quinta essentia, Hipparchus ignem, Anaximenes aëra, Empedocles et Critias sanguinem, Parmenides ex terra et igne, Xenophanes ex terra et aqua, Boethos ex aere et igne, Epicurus speciem ex igne et aere et spiritu mixtum. Comment. in *Somn. Scipionis*, I, xiv, 19-20; ed. F. Eysenhardt, *Macrobius* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 543. The text will also be found in H. Diels, *Doxographi Graeci* (Berlin, 1929), p. 213.

² opinionum A.

³ Om. B.

⁴ Om. quidem opiniones B.

⁵ Macrobius, loc. cit.; cf. also Aristotle, *De anima* I, 4, 407b27 ff.

⁶ C. i. PL 63, 1170D.

⁷ Guido Aretinus (d'Arezzo), *Micrologus*, XIV; PL 141, 394A: Item et David Saul

quod psaltem petit Eliseus ut prophetaret.⁸ Et tertium quod sanctus Franciscus ad sonum citharae caelicum convaluit.⁹ Sed hoc esse non poterit cum harmonia sit qualitas aut vocum relatio, anima substantia. Ex non-substantiis enim nunquam fit substantia, ut docuit Philosophus in primo *Physicorum*,¹⁰ anima autem cum corpore substantiam constituit.

Secundus in hoc senario exstat Plato qui in multis Pythagoram est secutus. Dicit enim:¹¹ Anima est numerus seipsum movens.¹² Quo enim ligantur omnia in numeris. Unde in *De consolatione philosophiae* libro tertio, metro nono, ad Deum loquens Boethius dicit: Tu numeris elementa ligas;¹³ ut ab anima mundi jussu Dei universum sit ligatum, ut patet in *Timaeo*.¹⁴ Quae mundi anima juxta eum sit exemplar et paradigma reliquarum animarum; ipsae vero sint animae mundi ethimagia atque imagines, sicut impressio reducta in cera a sigillo ethimagiū est¹⁵ sigilli seu vestigium; et sint animae compositae ex uno ut fonte primario numerorum quo rectus aspectus nominatur seu¹⁶ designatur qui post in circulum derivatur, ut patet de igne in furno clauso, et in dualitatem venit, in convexum scilicet superius et in concavum inferius, et efficit dyapason in musica, a *dia* quod est *de* et *pan*, totum, et sonus, quia totum bis continet quam arithmeticus duplam proportionem dicit. Bis enim unum duo sunt quo¹⁷ venit ternarius si unum seu rectum contra convexum et concavum dividimus. Et habemus diapenthe, quae est sesquialtera proportio, quam Philosophus in fine quinti *Physicorum*¹⁸ nominat emiolia¹⁹ ab emi,²⁰ quod est dimidium, *olon*, totum, sicut sesqui, dum numerus totum obtinet numerum et medietatem ejus, ut sunt tria ad duo, quae juncta quinque faciunt. Ideo dicitur diapenthe,

B 47b non *y* graeco sed latino, a *dia* quod est *de* / et *pentha*, quinque, quia in quinario numero primo haec proportio reperta est.

Sed ad quatuor nos venire oportet, ut anima omnia cognoscat, sitque microcosmus similis macrocosmo: simile enim simili cognoscitur. Et A 5v videmus primum mobile circuiri²¹ super polos mundi ab / oriente in occasum, et rursum reverti ad²² orientem. Rursum circulum signorum conspicimus sub quo septem planetae girantur super alios polos motu planes, non aplanes, id est, erratici non uniformi. Planes quidem error est ab aquilone in austrum et econtra, ut jam quatuor appareant: oriens, occidens, aquilo et auster. Et nascitur diatesseron, a *dia* quod est *de*, et *tessaron*, quatuor, dum numerus numerum continet et tertiam partem ejus quae primo inter²³ quatuor et tria apparuit; ideo sesquiteria dicitur proportio, quae si ambo jungerentur septenarium haberemus et numerum virgineum qui nec gignit nec gignitur. Tria enim et quatuor septem conficiunt qui est numerus planetarum a quibus anima perficitur.²⁴ Dicit enim ipse Plato animam a Saturno accipere memoriam longam,

daemonium cithara mitigabat, et daemoniam feritatem hujus artis potenti vi ac suavitate frangebat. The Scriptural reference is to I Kings xvi, 23: *Igitur quandcumque spiritus Domini malus arripiebat Saul, David tollebat citharam, et percutiebat manu sua, et refocillabatur Saul, et levius habebat; recedebat enim ab eo spiritus malus.*

⁸ prophetet A. IV Kings iii, 15: *Nunc autem adducite mihi psaltem. Cumque caneret psaltes, facta est super eum manus Domini.*

⁹ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *Legenda sancti Francisci*, V, 11; (Quaracchi, 1882), VIII, p. 519.

¹⁰ De anima A. Correctly, *Phys.* I, 3, 186b20 ff.

¹¹ *Om. B.*

¹² Macrobius (*loc. cit.*) and Aristotle (*De*

anima I, 4, 408b31) do not attribute this to Plato.

¹³ Verse 10; PL 63, 759.

¹⁴ Plato, *Timaeus* 33-34.

¹⁵ est ethimagiū A.

¹⁶ *Om. nominatur seu B.*

¹⁷ 14^o A.

¹⁸ Rather, *Meta.* V, 15, 1021al: hemiolion.

¹⁹ enniolum B.

²⁰ enn B.

²¹ circulum A.

²² in A.

²³ in B.

²⁴ Plato, *Timaeus* 36; however, most of this is directly from Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, xii, 13 ff.; *ed. cit.*, p. 533; and will also be found in St. Albert, *Liber I de Anima*, tr. II, c. vii; *ed. cit.*, V, p. 155.

in sphaera Jovis ratiocinationem probabilium sive opinionem, in sphaera Martis irascibilem, in sphaera Solis sensibilium illustrationem, in sphaera Mercurii nocivi et convenientis²⁵ aestimationem, in sphaera Veneris concupiscibilitatem, in sphaera Lunae motus quo movet corpus attrahendo, digerendo, nutriendo, generando. Et si unum ad septem adderemus *ogdous*²⁶ surgit, quem dicimus octo, et est numerus cubitus, quem dicimus justitiae propter suam firmitatem, habens longum, latum et profundum. Et rursum, si duo addas, tonum habes, qui in novem designatur, octo continens et octavam partem ejus, et dicitur *epogdous*,²⁷ et dividitur in majus et minus semitonum, quia in aequalia nequiret et in primum²⁸ limitem numerorum qui dicitur denarius. Computus enim sequens replica est, ut undecim: unus et decem, duodecim: duo et

B 4va decem, viginti, quasi biginti, id est, bis decem—gentos / quippe decem dicit. Sic in triginta et reliquis.

Si igitur omnia sint ex numeris, etiam harmoniae, et anima in se habeat omnes, ut patuit juxta Platonem, species numerorum, recte omnia quasi suo simili cognoscit; et nominatur numerus ex suis componentibus, et congaudet quasi harmonia caeli cuius²⁹ exstat vestigium. Et sic patet quod Plato velut Pythagorae discipulus suum sequitur et exponit magistrum. Addit Plato quod est numerus seipsum movens.³⁰ Posuit enim animam in corpore, non sicut forma est in materia, sed sicut nauta in navi, qui movendo per se navem per accidens ad motum navis movetur.

A 6r Super / qua re latius edocet secundus Macrobius Ambrosii *Super Somnio Scipionis*³¹ et Constabentlucae in libro *De differentia animae et spiritus*.³²

Sed sicut de magistro Pythagora, sic de Platone discipulo censeatur. Nequit enim³³ esse quod dictum est, nam numerus quantitas est et motio, aut actio aut passio, quorum neutrum substantiae ingreditur quidditatem.³⁴

Contra ergo³⁵ magistrum et discipulum est tertius decimus et quartus decimus *Mēaphysicae* Aristotelis.³⁶ Qui enim quantitates impugnat continuas, ne sint substantiarum exordia intrinseca, impugnat et discretas, cum a discreta apud eos derivetur continua: ex duobus enim fit linea, ex tribus superficies. Nec valet dicere quod duplex est numerus, substancialis et accidentalis, ac si diceretur duplex homo: unus qui est substantia et unus qui est accidentis. Et cognoscimus quia ex arithmeticā geometria ortum habet, ut punctum ex unitate. Punctum enim, ex primo *Posteriorum*,³⁷ unitas est posita.

Tertius in hoc senario exstat Possidonius, qui animam ideam nominavit.³⁸ Quod tripliciter intelligi potuit. Primo ut animam omnium rerum formam Deum posuerit,³⁹ veluti David de Dinanto Deum posuit hyle⁴⁰: seu omnium rerum materiam, ut narrat Albertus Magnus in

²⁵ Cf. Boethius, *De arithmeticā* I, i, and II, liv; PL 63, 1082D and 1166B.

²⁶ Boethius, *loc. cit.*; and Plato, *Republic* X, 617B; Macrobius, *loc. cit.*

²⁷ ipsum B. for in primum.

²⁸ ejus A.

²⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 404b18 ff., and especially 27 ff. This is usually given as the source for the doctrine ascribed to Plato. Cf. the lengthy treatment of this ascription by H. Cherniss, Aristotle's *Criticism of Plato and the Academy* I (Baltimore, 1944), Appendix IX, pp. 565 ff.

³⁰ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, II, i-ii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 582-592.

³¹ Costa ben Luce, *De differentia animae et spiritus*, c. 3 (Bibliotheca philosophorum mediae aetatis, herausg. von C. S. Barach, II, Innsbruck, 1878), pp. 131-134; cf. also p. 120.

³² Om. B.

³³ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 4, 408b32.

³⁴ Om. B.

³⁵ E.g., *Meta.* XIII, 7, 1080b38 ff.; 8, 1083b8 ff.; XIV, 2, 1090a1 ff.; 3, 1090a21 ff.; *et passim*.

³⁶ *Analyt. Post.* I, 27, 87a.

³⁷ Macrobius, *op. cit.*, I, xiv, 19; *ed. cit.*, p. 543; cf. note 1, *supra*.

³⁸ posuit A.

³⁹ Om. A.

secunda parte *Summae* sua, juxta principium,⁴⁰ et Thomas prima parte *Summae*,⁴¹ agens de simplicitate Dei. Idea quippe verbum graecum forma est.

Quae licet opinio falsa sit, tamen eo minus quo materia forma minus est nobilis. Inexcusabilis tamen quia anima mutationi et malo subicitur et tristitia et gaudio, quod de Deo nefas est opinari. Nec obstat quod Jeremias 51° scribitur: *Juravit Dominus exercituum per animam suam.*⁴²

B 4vb Anima enim illic pro voluntate / sumitur, quasi diceret *firmavit*.

Secundo, ut formam pro idea exemplari acceperit, quae corpus non informat formaliter sed exemplat, sicut Aristoteles in septimo *Metaphysicae* loquitur de domo in mente artificis et domo operata.⁴³ Prima quidem est exemplar, sed secunda est exemplum. Sed quid ad rem? Anima de qua loquimur est forma, non quidem foris manens, sed intus informans ut informet, non efformet.⁴⁴

Tertio intelligi potest Possidonius dum animam ponit ideam ut in composito, et sic⁴⁵ hyle et idea: hyle sit pro materia, idea forma signetur.

B 6v Quae ambo compositum ita loquar hypostasim constituant, quo nihil verius. Unde si in composito hyle esse ex se entitativum / habeat, non formale tamen nisi solum per ideam. Forma enim seu idea hoc modo est quae dat esse rei.

Quartus hujus senarii est Xenocrates, qui ut Plato, differenter tamen,⁴⁶ dicit quod anima est numerus seipsum movens.⁴⁷ Plato enim censuit animam fore numerum quasi ex unitatibus constitutum. Hic autem Xenocrates, quasi peregrinus philosophus—*Xenon* quidem peregrinum dicimus: *crates* additus, Xenocrates fit, de quo et dictum est ipsum dixisse ut philosopharetur quietius: Abite, O pessimae divitiae! Ego vos submergam, ne submergar a vobis;⁴⁸ hic siquidem⁴⁹ animam posuit numerum ut esset numeri unitates et situatiter moveretur,⁵⁰ ut elici potest ex rationibus Alberti Magni contra eum *Super primum de Anima*, tractatu secundo, capitulo decimo.⁵¹ Quae quam aliena a philosophia sit ista positio, etiam peregrinus philosophus intelligit qui⁵² animam incorpoream moveri situatiter dicit, cum situs solum sit corporum, Gilberto in *Libro Sex Principiorum* profitente quod positio est quidem partium situs, et generationis ordinatio.⁵³ Nec valet si dicatur: situs genus est positionis. Cui inquam: situs hic ponitur, ut positionem quam definit a positione distinguat quae est species quantitatis. Utraque tamen corporalis est. Unde merito peregrinus philosophus nuncupatur qui tam peregrine⁵⁴ in philosophia locutus est.

Quintus hujus senarii exstat Asclepiades. Inquit autem: Anima est consonum exercitum quinque sensuum. Videlicet nempe juxta Philosophum, primo *De anima*, animam sensu et motu cognosci.⁵⁵ Ideo utrumque

B 5ra complexus / est ut perfecte anima nosceretur: motum per exercitum, sensum per quinque sensuum.—Sed quam sit insipida haec Asclepiadis in palam est. Primitus, vegetabilia sensus non habent, animam tamen. Secundo, quia juxta Philosophum sunt multa animalia solo tactu gaudentia, ut gustus quodammodo tactus, ut cocci et conchilia.⁵⁶ Tertio,

⁴⁰ Saint Albert, *Summa theologiae* I, tr. IV, q. 20, m. 2, q. incid.; ed. cit., XXXI, p. 140a.

⁴⁹ quidem sic A.

⁴¹ Saint Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 3, a. 8c.

⁵⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 4, 403b32; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. 1, c. 2 (Venice, 1508), fol. 2^{va}.

⁴² Jeremias li, 14; cf. Amos vi, 8.

⁵¹ Ed. cit., V, pp. 166-170; St. Albert does not mention Xenocrates by name.

⁴³ VII, 9, 1034a23.

⁵² quod B.

⁴⁴ efformem B.

⁵³ PL 188, 1265-1266.

⁴⁵ sit A.

⁵⁴ peregre B.

⁴⁶ Om. A.

⁵⁵ Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 403b25.

⁴⁷ Macrobius, *loc. cit.*; cf. Cherniss, *op. cit.*,

⁵⁶ Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, *De plantis* I, 3, 816; and Aristotle, *De anima* III, 13, 435a11 ff.

p. 567.

⁴⁸ The reference seems to be to Crates the Cynic.

quia dum animalia quiescerent somno suo, tunc amitterent animam suam, ex quo anima⁵⁷ est exercitium. Sic enim sapientes somnum definiunt: Somnus est quies animalium virtutum cum intensione naturalium.⁵⁸ Nec oportet distinguere de sensu interiori seu exteriori; uterque enim exstat animalis. Et si vigeat tunc phantasia, per⁵⁹ accidens est et non per se. Per se quidem tunc habet dominium vegetativa portio, ut puta digestiva,⁶⁰ nutritiva.

- A 7r** Sextus et ultimus hujus senarii exstat Hippocrates. Inquit enim: Anima est spiritus tenuis per omne / corpus dispersus. Considerat hic medicus tali spiritu pulsum generari secundum *dyastolen* et *systolen*, quod nos dicimus secundum dilatationem et restrictionem, ut patet per Philaretum et Aegidium de Salerno in libris *De pulsibus*.⁶¹ Pulsus autem motus est interior, qui nequit nisi ab interiori motore generari, quam nominavit⁶² animam.—Sed nequaquam hoc sufficit. Spiritus iste⁶³ etsi tenuis corpus tamen est, anima autem⁶⁴ incorporea. Ceterum, secundo: in uno corpore anima una, spiritus autem triplex, ut dicunt et⁶⁵ philosophi et medici, naturalis in hepati, animalis in capite, et vitalis in corde sedem tenet.⁶⁶ Tum tertio, quia vegetativa⁶⁷ sunt animata, ut herbae et arbor quae tamen hujusmodi non habent spiritum. Nec id obviat de motu aut⁶⁸ pulsu, cum secundum Messehalath, rota possit per artem confici semper vertens, argento vivo in curvaturis⁶⁹ inclusa ad mensuram seu⁷⁰ in mensura.⁷¹—Et tantum de primo philosophorum senario.

IV. DE SECUNDO PHILOSOPHORUM SENARIO

- B 5rb** Heraclitus Ponticus, qui hoc in numero septimus ponitur et primus / hujus senarii, quem sudantes¹ philosophi vix queunt intelligere, ut contra Jovinianum scripsit Hieronymus,² lucem animam posuit.³ Vedit quidem nobilissimam formam⁴ et in corporibus nobilissimis lucem collocari maximae communicabilitatis⁵ nec sine ea quid cognosci aut videri et

⁵⁷ Om. A.

⁵⁸ To be found (originally?) in Guillaume de Conches, *De philosophia mundi* IV, xxi; PL 172, 94. Saint Albert remarks: Communiter autem diffinitor a Magistris: Somnus est, etc. (*Summa de creaturis* II, q. 43, a. 1; ed. cit., XXXV, p. 363a); cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 25, p. 2, a. 1, q. 6, ad 4; ed. cit., II, p. 624.

⁵⁹ Om. A.

⁶⁰ nutritiva, digestiva B.

⁶¹ Philaretus is the same as Theophilus Protospatharios or Philotheus, of the first half of the seventh century, according to G. Sarton, *Introduction to the history of science* II-1 (Washington, 1931), p. 75. His teachings were adopted and incorporated into the School of Salerno (cf. *ibid.*, p. 436). For the present reference, cf. his *Liber pulsuum*, in the medical corpus: *Articella* (Venice, 1487), fol. 4^{ta}: *Pulsus est motio cordis et arteriarum quae secundum dia-stolen et sistolen fit. Aegidius of Salerno is to be identified with Gilles de Corbeil (died 1220-1224?), author of medical poems, the main channel through which Salernitan lore reached the Parisian doctors. His *De pulsibus* (380 lines) was a popular text-book (Sarton, *ibid.*, pp. 440-441). The present reference is to part I, lines 44-45:*

⁶² Ex arsi atque thesi confatur motio talis,

⁶³ Quae pulsum faciat et vitae consona fiat. Cf. L. Choulant: *Aegidii Corboiensis Car-*

mina medica (Leipzig, 1826), p. 29 (University of Minnesota Library); cf. also Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis* XI, 2 (BGPTMA XXIII, 1-2), 46.

⁶⁴ nominant A.

⁶⁵ ille B.

⁶⁶ Om. B.

⁶⁷ Om. A.

⁶⁸ Cf. Costa ben Luce, *De differentia spiritus et animae*, c. 2; ed. cit., p. 130; Alfredus Anglicus, *op. cit.*, X, 9; ed. cit., p. 42.

⁶⁹ vegetabilia B.

⁷⁰ et A.

⁷¹ curvatis B.

⁷² Om. ad mensuram seu B.

⁷³ Cf. G. Sarton, *op. cit.*, I (Washington, 1927), p. 531; and P. Duhem, *Le système du monde* II (Paris, 1913), pp. 204-206. I have not been able to locate the present reference in Messahallah (died, c. 815), *De scientia motus orbis* (Nuremberg, 1504), the only work available to me.

⁷⁴ sudentes A.

⁷⁵ St. Jerome, *Adversus Jovinianum libri duo*, I, n. 1; PL 23, 222; Heraclitus quoque cognomento skoteneion, sudantes philosophi vix intelligunt.

⁷⁶ Cf. Macrobius, *ut supra*, c. iii, note 1, p. 237.

⁷⁷ formarum B.

⁷⁸ communicationis A.

secundum lucis influxum ampliorem ampliorem esse cognitionem et visionem, ut patet in luce solis et lunae vel candelae. Patet insuper interius. Unde apud Macrobius, in primo *Super somnio Scipionis*, secundum lucis aut luminis varietatem, variae apud nos fiunt interiores apparitiones, ut inibi declarat de somnio in somnio, phantasmate, visione et oraculo.⁶ Quod et Albertus Magnus clare ostendit, *Super de somno et vigilia*,⁷ de diversis inducens somniis,⁸ et post, super libro tertio; siquidem apud eum in expositione Philosophi, primus est de sommo, secundus de somnio, tertius de divinatione. Ad hanc serenitatem suam purgando animam rubigine opertam potest quis naturaliter pervenire, ut aliqua aut divinet aut prophetet de futuris.⁹ Nec mirum, cum etiam aves ut cornices pluviam praevideant ad futuram. Sed unde hoc, nisi quia anima lux est, sed corpore obumbratur? Quod autem removere oportet, ut fecit Theobrotus Platonis discipulus, ut primo *Tusculanarum quaestionum*¹⁰ / narrat Tullius;¹¹ aut purgare, quod fecerunt philosophi, ut merito in *Menone* a Platone scriptum sit: Nostrum scire esse quoddam reminisci,¹² sicut apparet in ferro bene polito et limato quod relucet. Et sic distinguuntur animae in brutis et hominibus, ex diversitate luminum.

A 7v Sed si de luce corporali loquatur, falsum manifeste dicit. Est enim qualitas, cum sit adaequatum objectum¹³ visus. Si color non sit nisi quaedam epiphania, ut Pythagoras voluit,¹⁴ aut si color sit extra, ut verius dicitur, aliquod innominatum commune tam luci quam colori erit visus objectum adaequatum, ut vult Doctor Subtilis in secundo, 13 distinctione, tamen per se lux est visibilis et sufficit.¹⁵ Si vero sermo suus ad lucem incorpoream ascendit, potest quidem sustineri, sicut dicitur Deus lux, sed transcenderet. Unde hoc modo anima magis dicitur lucida quam lux. Quod enim verum est substantia nulli accidit, ex primo *Physicorum*.¹⁶ Est autem lux interior et exterior ejusdem generis?¹⁷ Nec arbores haberent animam. Unde longe melius et altius loquitur in libris

B 5va *De Trinitate* Augustinus, / qui dicit animam speculum,¹⁸ imitatus divinum Dionysium, qui angelos in *De angelica hierarchia* appellavit specula clara et immaculata et splendida,¹⁹ quam iste Heraclitus obscurus obscure ponens lucem.²⁰

Octavus ad totum et secundus hujus senarii est Heraclitus physicus. Inquit enim quod anima est scintilla stellaris essentiae. Unde enim esset fatum nisi ex comparibus stellis, ut, secundum quod diversificantur stellae, diversae fatentur animae et inclinentur ad varia? Unde reversio post mortem ad Campos Elisios nisi quod animae illuc redeunt unde prodierunt? Quo enim Campi collocantur Elisii apud eos, nisi super firmamentum in caelo, quod in Almagesti ratione adinvenit Ptolomeus?²¹ Et nos dicimus crystallinum aut aqueum aut in stellis com-

⁶ Macrobius, *De somno Scipionis*, I, iii, 1-11; ed. cit., p. 484 f.

⁷ vigilantia B.

⁸ Liber III de somno et vigilia, tr. I, c. 10;

ed. cit., IX, pp. 190-192.

⁹ Cf. St. Albert, loc. cit., c. 12; ed. cit., pp. 195-196.

¹⁰ quaestionum Tusculanarum A.

¹¹ Rather, Cyrenaeus Theodorus; cf. Cicero, *Tuscul. quaest.*, I, 43; M. Tullii Ciceronis *opera philosophica*, ed. Delphini, p. 541.

¹² Meno 81D.

¹³ objectum adaequatum A.

¹⁴ Aristotle, *De sensu et sensibili* III, 439a31.

¹⁵ Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia* II, d. 13, n. 3; ed. cit., XXIII, p. 43a; cf. *infra*, Book III, c. iii.

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Phys. I*, 3, 186b1 ff.

¹⁷ In B there is a marginal note to this, s. m., which seems to read: scilicet qualitatis.

¹⁸ E. g., XV, viii, 14; PL 42, 1067 ff.

¹⁹ *De caelesti hierarchia*, c. 3, § 2; PG 3, 166.

²⁰ Here and above, in note 2, the author has confused Heraclitus Ponticus with the following philosopher, Heraclitus of Ephesus, who is known as the Obscure (Cf. Überweg-Praechter, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* I [Berlin, 1926], p. 55).

²¹ Cf. K. Manitius, *Des Claudius Ptolemäus Handbuch der Astronomie VIII*, ii, Ed. II, (Leipzig, 1912-1913), p. 64 ff.; and William de Vauvillon, *II Sent.*, d. 2, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 129B.

paribus, si juxta Philosophum firmamentum primum mobile sit.²² Quo moti, Chaldae in duodecim²³ nativitatum circulis²⁴ juxta signa duodecim²⁵ stellam quamdam notant, quam nominant Hylem²⁶ et Alococodem, quae vitam et intellectum dicimus, quos aestimant natos²⁷ a motore illius stellae quem Plato in *Timaeo* Deum dicit obtinere.²⁸

Erit tamen semper Campus²⁹ Elysius. *Elyos* quippe unde venit?
Elysius misericordia est quae appareat reducendo animam ad locum post

- A 8r exsilium / quo ierat ad terrena. Unde Doctor³⁰ Irrefragabilis, frater Alexander de Halis, unam ponit opinionem³¹ et eam narrat Doctor Devotus, frater Joannes Bonaventurae, in Secundo, secunda parte secundae distinctionis, articulo primo, quaestione secunda: Quod cum triplex sit anima, vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva, caelum stellatum in vegetativam, crystallinum in sensitivam, et³² empyreum in intellectivam³³ influunt.³⁴ Quod bene et male intelligi potest.³⁵ Si de influxu virtuali, non habebit calumniam. Si de formal, quasi aliquid caelorum in compositionem terrenorum veniat, falsum est: consumerentur³⁶ quidem etsi non secundum totum tamen secundum partem, et hae partes violenter ibi essent³⁷ extra locum proprium.

Unde patet hujus opinionis falsitas. Scintilla enim ignis, ignis est; sic scintilla stellae pars stellarum est, si accipitur proprie. Quodsi improprie, nihil ad rem: sic enim stella acciperet scissionem, quod est contra Messehalath in libro *De sphaera mota*, ubi dicit quod licet caeli sint rarefactibiles aut condensabiles, non tamen divisibiles.³⁸ Nec fatum

- B 5vb obviat quod nihil est, seu Campi / Elisii qui nihil sunt, aut stellarum comparitas. Non enim juxta numerum stellarum accipitur numerus electorum hominum apud Deum, sed juxta numerum angelorum Dei, juxta quod in suo cantico, Deuteronomii 31°, cecinit Moyses: *Statuit terminos popolorum*, id est, electorum hominum, *juxta numerum filiorum Israel*.³⁹ Alius textus habet *Dei*, per quod intelliguntur angeli.⁴⁰ Et tantum de istis Heraclitis, licet sint in luce gloriosi juxta nomen: *Her* quidem lis est (unde Hercules venit), et *cleos*, gloria. Unde et idem Hercules, quasi in luce gloriosus.

Tertius hujus senarii et nonus ad totum Zeno est: secundum alios Zenon—et utrumque bene dicitur. Dicit iste animam esse concretum corpori spiritum. Quod sic intelligendum censeo in tribus exemplificans: in corpore simplici, in corpore mixto et in corpore complexionato. Dator enim formarum quantum dat de materia ignis quod est corpus simplex, tantum dat et de forma quae concreatur materiae, id est, concausatur, quod Zeno dicit concretum, a concrino, —nis,⁴¹ concretum venit in supino, quia formam⁴² suam aut materiam vel subjectum concrevit. Sic qui facit hydromel, quod ex aqua et melle conficitur et est corpus /

- A 8v mixtum, operatur. Sic de corpore hominis quod complexionatum est

²² Cf. Aristotle, *Phys.* VIII, 6, 260a1 ff.; *De caelo* I, 9-10, 277b26 ff. And St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 14, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3; ed. cit., II, pp. 355-356; William de Vauouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 16, a. 2; fol. 171A.

²³ duodecimum B.

²⁴ circulum B.

²⁵ duodecimam B.

²⁶ Hyle B.

²⁷ notum B.

²⁸ *Timaeus* 28 ff.

²⁹ Elysius . . . Doctor B in marg., s. m.

³⁰ Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae*, I-II, n. 266 (Quaracchi, 1928); II, p. 327.

³¹ Om. B.

³² intellectum B.

³³ St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; ed. cit., II, p. 74; and d. 14, p. 2, a. 2, q. 2; ed. cit., II, p. 360.

³⁴ potest intelligi A.

³⁵ consumeretur A.

³⁶ ibi essent violenter A.

³⁷ The reference seems to be to his *De scientia motus orbis* (Nuremberg, 1504): Sermo quod terra, aqua, aer et ignis et orbis sunt sphaerica (fol. 3°-4°), or the chapter "Sermo in rotunditate orbis et motu eius et natura eius" (fol. 5° ff.).

³⁸ Rather, *Deuteronomy* xxxii, 8.

³⁹ That is, the Septuagint.

⁴⁰ cerno, cernis A.

⁴¹ forma B.

judicemus. Sicut in hoc ternario visum est in quibus adhuc non est anima, sic in alio ternario quae vivunt per animam judicatur, ut primo anima vegetativa sit spiritus concretus corpori arboris. Unde aliquando tremitus in arboribus auditus est, maxime dum sunt pingues aut ventosae, ut patet dum ad ignem ligna ponuntur viridia. Secundo, anima sensitiva sit concretus spiritus corpori animalis, ut appareat in muscis manifeste, cicada et apibus quae non attrahunt aërem cum pulmonem non habeant, et tamen sonum faciunt. Unde et Doctor Devotus triplici opinione impugnata,⁴² in secundo, distinctione 15^a, articulo primo, quaestione prima, dicit quod animae sensitivae veniunt seminaliter, id est, mediante agente naturali sunt generabiles et corruptibles.⁴³ Tertio, anima rationalis sit corpori humano concretus spiritus. Videmus enim totum hominem nasci a femina in corpore et anima.

B 6ra Sed haec opinio, licet aliqualem habeat / veritatem, non tamen⁴⁴ totalem. Primo, anima rationalis non est concretus corpori spiritus. Aliunde enim organizatur corpus hominis, nisi loquendo de influxu generali, de quo non loquimur; aliunde anima infunditur. Unde Gennadius in *Libro ecclesiasticorum dogmatum*, (qui liber aliquando beati⁴⁵ asseritur Augustini, quia ex ejus dictis Gennadius Massiliensis episcopus⁴⁶ ipsum composuit, sicut de *Epigrammatibus Prosperi diceretur*): Anima infundendo creatur et creando infunditur.⁴⁷ Et Aristoteles, XVI *Animalium*, dicit solum intellectum fore ab extra,⁴⁸ et in libro *De Pomo*, quod corpore disposito fit in eo spiritus jussu Dei.⁴⁹ Secundo, quia arbores talem non videntur habere spiritum; illi enim tremitus ex ventis fiunt inclusis. Tertio, quia si dicat animam spiritum quem⁵⁰ spiramus⁵¹ continue, ideo⁵² plus millies in die animam mutamus, cum continue aut inspiremus aut respiremus.

Quartus hujus senarii sed decimus simpliciter fuit Democritus, qui ob sui sapientiam aurum populi dicebatur: *Demas*, siquidem populus, *erisis*,⁵³ aurum, apud Graecos. Inquit enim: Anima est spiritus atomis insertus, sic ad motum facilis, ut omne corpus sit illi pervium.⁵⁴ Aestimavit enim iste philosophus omnia fieri ex atomis quae sunt corpora indivisibilia: *atomus* enim dicitur ab *a*, quod est sine, et *tomos*, quod est divisio, quasi sine divisione. Dicebat tamen ea differre tripliciter: primo, figura, quia unum rotundum, aliud quadrangulum et cetera; secundo,

A 9r positione, / quia unum superius, reliquum inferius, unum ante, reliquum retro, unum a dextris, reliquum a sinistris; tertio,⁵⁵ qualitate, quia unum vivum, reliquum non. Et sic diversimode per diversa atoma constituebat universum.⁵⁶

Sed contra hunc ut dictum est contra praecedentem de anima rationali, nullam habet evidentiam. Secundo, quod de aliis dictum est contra praecedentem⁵⁷ dicatur contra istum. Tertio, quia indivisible additum indivisibili majus non facit, licet plus. Indivisible autem latine, graece *atomus* est, et qualiter possunt varie figurari cum sint indivisibilia?

⁴² impugnatur A.

⁴³ Ed. cit., II, p. 374b.

⁴⁴ Om. B.

⁴⁵ Om. B.

⁴⁶ Om. B.

⁴⁷ *De eccl. dogmatibus*, xiv; PL 58, 984B; or among the *Opera* of St. Augustine; PL 42, 1216. Cf. William de Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 178A.

⁴⁸ That is, *De generatione animalium* II, 3, 736; cf. de Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, loc. cit.; ed. cit., fol. 178D.

⁴⁹ Unavailable; cf. Sarton, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 563 and 855. Saint Albert quotes the same

passage from this spurious work in *De natura et origine animae*, tr. I, c. 6; ed. cit., IX, p. 393a.

⁵⁰ quam A.

⁵¹ Add. cotidie et A.

⁵² immo A.

⁵³ crisis A.
⁵⁴ Cf. Macrobius, *supra*, c. iii, note 1, p. 237; Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 404a1 ff; and Avicenna, *De anima*, p. 1, c. 2; ed. cit., fol. 2^{va}.

⁵⁵ tertio modo B.

⁵⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* I, 4, 985b5-24.

⁵⁷ contra praecedentem dictum est A.

B 6rb Si vero quis Democrito faveat, legat *Praedicamenta* optima fratris Nicolai Boneti, ordinis fratrum minorum, et in praedicamento / quantitatis reperiet qualiter inter tres melior est in istis atomis; praeponitur enim ibi et Aristoteli et Platoni.⁵⁸

Quintus fuit Critolaus peripateticus et undecimus quoad totum. Hic dicit quod essentia animae de quinta est essentia, id est, caeli. Si enim incipimus computare ex infimo et minus nobili, prima essentia est terra, secunda aqua, tertia aér, quarta ignis, quinta caeli. Si a supremo, e verso⁵⁹ fit, ut prima essentia caelum sit, terra ultima seu quinta, solo aëre in suo loco remanente. Hic attendit animae nobilitatem et quatuor ascendit, verius transcendit,⁶⁰ elementa, et nobili nobilem essentiam tribuit. Erravit tamen ut dictum fuit⁶¹ contra Heraclitum physicum de scintilla stellaris essentiae. A quo tamen in tribus differt. Primo, quia Heraclitus se limitat ad stellas, hic se ad totum ampliat caelum. Secundo, quia Heraclitus ad scintillas currit. Unde si aciperet has scintillas pro radiis, in errorem veniret alterius Heracliti, qui animam lucem posuit. Hic autem ad essentiam festinat. Tertio, quia Heraclitus dicit quod anima est scintilla in recto stellaris essentiae, et tria ponit nomina. Hic autem in obliquo, quod anima est de essentia caeli, et solum duo nomina.

Sextus hujus senarii et⁶² duodecimus totius, exstitit Hypercus. Hic dicit: Anima est ignis.⁶³ Vedit caelum non dividi; consideravit ignis naturam et proprietatem: calido enim⁶⁴ fit gignitio, nutriuntur animalia, calido fit attractio, digestio, conservatur sanitas; in calido cor consistit et vita animalium; et frigore dissipatur: dum humor frigidus descendit super oculos obdormiunt, sed in vigilia calor movet ad videndum. Sic de sensibus reliquis, ut patet in somno / et vigilia. Unde quantum potest natura, tantum custodit naturale calidum per humidum, ut ignis in lampade per oleum, ut Albertus Magnus ostendit in libello *De nutrimento et nutritibili*, quo exstincto extinguitur animal, veluti anima exeunte.⁶⁵

Sunt et quindecim nobiles ignis proprietates quas in *De angelica hierarchia* ponit Dionysius.⁶⁶ Si ergo anima nobilissima est formarum,

A 9v B 6va nobilissimum / est elementum quod est ignis.—Sed modica consequentia.⁶⁷

⁵⁸ Cf. *Liber praedicamentorum Nicolai Bonetti*, II (Venice, 1505), fol. 79^{ra}: Primum igitur perscrutemur de compositione continui. Deinde de eius resolutione si habeat statum vel non. De compositione namque continui sunt tria dicta disparata antiquorum et modernorum philosophorum. Primum dictum est, quod continuum est compositum ex punctis. Secundum, quod continuum est compositum ex indivisibilibus de genere quantitatis; non tamen ex punctis: sed ex quantitatibus indivisibilibus in alias quantitates. Tertium dictum: continuum est compositum ex quantitatibus divisibilibus in alias quantitates . . . Quartum dictum est Aristotelis, quod continuum non est compositum ex indivisibilibus: sed ex partibus divisibilibus in semper indivisibilibus. Primum dictum est platonicum quod linea est compositum ex punctis: et superficies ex lineis: et corpus ex superficiebus. Secundum dictum est Democriti quod continuum est compositum ex quantitatibus indivisibilibus, ut corpus ex indivisibilibus corporibus: ut ex atomis quae sunt corpora indivisibilia; superficies etiam secundum eum componitur ex superficiebus indivisibilibus; et linea ex lineis indivisibilibus: non autem ex punctis, sicut dicebat Plato . . . (81^{ra}): Concludimus ergo cum Democrito: quod omne continuum

est compositum ultimate ex indivisibilibus et in illa ultimate resolvitur; nec est compositum ex infinitis indivisibilibus, sed ex numero finitis. Adhaeas cui volueris vel peripateticus vel platonicus. Democritus tamen videtur loqui rationabilius. (Biblioteca nazionale centrale, Roma; I am indebted to Fr. Bernardine Schneider O.F.M., for the references to the works of Bonetus.)

Cf. A. Maier, 'Das Problem des Kontinuums in der Philosophie des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts', *Antonianum*, XX (1945), 349. How little de Vauvouillon knew about the life, etc., of Bonetus may be gathered from a remark in his *Vademecum*, in which he designates Bonetus as the author of an opinion opposed by Duns Scotus (*op. cit.*, II, d. 3, q. 3 [Padua, 1485], fol. 21^v).

⁵⁹ eversio A.

⁶⁰ verius transcendit B in marg., s. m.

⁶¹ est B.

⁶² Om. B.

⁶³ Hipparchus, according to Macrobius (*supra*, c. iii, note 1, p. 237).

⁶⁴ Om. B.

⁶⁵ Tr. I, c. 4; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 332a, and c. 5; *ed. cit.*, p. 334a.

⁶⁶ *De cael. hier.*, XV, § 2; PG 3, 327-330.

⁶⁷ contraria B.

Anima est equidem incorporea sed ignis corporeus. Et si ignis super tria nobilitatem habeat elementa, imperfectius tamen quid est quolibet mixtorum, nec nutrit aut digerit et cetera nisi instrumentaliter, ut patet per Philosophum in II *De Anima*,⁸ et est sicut vitae dispositio; nec ex puris affirmativis in secunda figura aliquid sequitur, aut secundo ex quatuor terminis, ut procedit argumentum; etiam tertio, quia anima nobilior est quolibet mixtorum sub quibus ignis ponitur.—Et tantum de secundo senario.

V. DE TERTIO PHILOSOPHORUM SENARIO

Jam tempus est ut ad tertium antiquorum philosophorum de anima loquentium senarium veniamus, ut appareat veritas et falsitas confutetur.

Veniat igitur qui loco tertiodecimo de anima audet loqui; et primus est in loco hoc; et nobis quid sit anima aperiatur: exstat philosophus⁹ Anaximenes. Aér, inquit, anima est.² Ipso equidem vivimus; sine ipso vivere non possumus; pulmonem refrigerat. Calidus est et humidus, ut oleum, ut in lampade humana calidum subtle seu ignem custodiat. Ad omnem partem orbis cito labilis est, ut motus progressivus. Finaliter, sine aëre animalia nec vivunt nec moventur. Et forsan ex dicto³ antiquioris Orphei motus est, qui inter theologos vetustos tertius est. Est⁴ siquidem primus Pindarus, secundus Linus, tertius hic.⁵ Hic mundum diis plenum posuit qui cum inspirantur animae, cum exspirantur dii sunt et remanent immortales, sicut senex Democritus omnia corpora fore ponit animata, sed in quibusdam animas a materia ex toto deprimi, ut in lapidibus, et sic consequenter ascendendo usque ad hominem in quo etiam aliqualiter deprimitur intellectus.⁶—Sed mira haec simplicitas!

- A 10r Nonne, primo, animam habent⁷ arbores seu⁸ herbae / quae non spirant aërem? Nonne, secundo, multi pisces maris quibus aér exstat incognitus? Nonne, tertio, aér intrat in corpora et egreditur, et alias et alias, anima tamen eadem permanet? Animam rationalem praetermitto, quia facilimum est probare eam non esse aërem. Tantum de hoc.

Secundus hujus senarii et quartus decimus totius loquens de anima quid sit exstat Empedocles et Critias.⁹ Dicunt enim: *Anima sanguis est*.¹⁰

- B 6vb Quod tam clarum aestimant / quantum esse; omnis enim anima in sanguine est. Textus inquit: Et sanguine fuso, animatum non est.¹¹ Quod animalium sanguine caret nullum videtur; et prius quidem semen sanguis est quam sit caro. Sed ista pauca sunt ex jam dictis quae hic sunt supposita. Ceterum arbores aut herbae sanguinem non habent. Tum secundo, multa animalia sanguinem non habent sed jecur, ut in libro *Animalium* docet Philosophus.¹² Cujusmodi sunt euconia, malacostrata, ostracoderma, malakia. Tum tertio quia etiam sanguine toto separato potest anima remanere, aut toto remanente anima recedit, ut patet in suffocatis.

Tertius est hujus senarii et quintus decimus in ordine toto Parmenides. Iste¹³ vetustus, licet sibi contradicat concordando cum ceteris ejus

⁸ C. 4, 416a10 ff.

¹ Om. B.

² Cf. *supra*, c. iii, note 1, p. 237.

³ dictis A.

⁴ Om. B.

⁵ Cf. Aristotle, *Met.* I, 3, 983b27; St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Metaph.*, lect. 4, ed. Cathala (Taurini, 1926), n. 82; *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 6, ed. cit., n. 2502.

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 404a8 ff.; *De respiratione* I, 2, 470b28, and I, 4, 471b30 ff.

⁷ habent animam A.

⁸ aut A.

⁹ Thircias, *mss.*

¹⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 2, 404b11; 405b6.

¹¹ The closest reference to this is in Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, c. 2; PG 40, 542.

¹² Cf. *De generatione animalium* III, 11, 761; and *De partibus animalium* III, 7, 670.

¹³ Ille B.

dictis, Anima,¹⁴ inquit, non est terra, non est ignis, sed est ex terra et igne. Cujus aestimatio suo simili fuit omnia fore cognoscibilia aut cognita. Omnia autem sunt aut ignis vel terra aut comprehensa in medio. Ignis enim supremum est corpus,¹⁵ terra infimum. Negavit autem omne invisibilium genus. Haec duo quasi videtur, ut inquit Guillelmus Parisiorum antistes in *Summa de universo*,¹⁶ Moyses innuisse dum primo Genesis dicit: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.*¹⁷ Deus enim figulus est qui finxit caelum et terram; caelum enim hujus figuli rota est, terra limus. Et quid caelum nisi ignis, ut Parmenides aestimavit, qui¹⁸ ab igne superius ignem omnia dicit? Quid limus nisi terra, quae faex est elementorum, ut narravit Pythagoras?¹⁹ Si ergo omnia sunt visibilia et illa²⁰ sunt contenta inter ignem et terram aut terra sunt seu ignis, cognoscendo terram et ignem²¹ in quibus in virtute sunt omnia media,²² dicitur omnia²³ cognoscere. Sed quam pauca sint ista, bene cognovit qui principia, verius principium, novit ejus. Ipse enim, ut in primo *Physicorum* dicit Aristoteles, omnia posuit unum sed finitum sicut Melissus²⁴ omnia unum dicit sed infinitum.²⁵ Si ergo / omnia unum sunt, qualiter animae sunt duo principia, terra et ignis? Secundo, quia non oportet cognoscentem²⁶ componi realiter ex cognito ut cognoscatur, sed solum potentiam habere cognitivam, ut patet in visu et potentias reliquis cognitivis. Tum tertio quia eodem jure non sufficeret nisi ex aere vel aqua compонeretur ut ipsa cognosceret, cum sint ab igne et terra

A 10v

B 7ra distincta elementa, et²⁷ virtualis²⁸ continentia non sufficiat / sed formalis, ut dicit de terra et igne.

Quartus hujus senarii et sextus decimus totius est Xenophantes.²⁹ Hic dicit animam ex terra et aqua constitui. Ex terra quasi passivo; fundamentum quidem est omnium et mutationi subicitur. Sic anima, non tamen sola. Terra enim per se inter principia judicem aut indicem non accepit, ut inquit Philosophus,³⁰ sed cum aqua. Voluit enim Thales Milesius, qui inter septem sapientes primus est, aquam quam dicit *Thetim* omnium rerum fore principium.³¹ Quid terra nisi aquae mixta solus pulvis? Unde rerum gignitio nisi semine humido? Et mirum est, inquit Guillelmus in *De universo*: in aliqua terra nascantur aut herbae aut arbores, crescant, nutritantur, fructificant,³² portent flores et folia, terra minor non appareat.³³ Cujus signum poterit cognosci³⁴ si in potis aut terreis aut ligneis terra reponatur et post in eadem crescant³⁵ aut herbae aut arbores videbitur ad oculum terra non minui. Unde ad oculum colligitur aqua sola aut solum cum duobus reliquis elementis succrescere et³⁶ flores et folia atque fructus³⁷ producere arborem ipsam et herbam, ut non immerito³⁸ dicat Aristoteles in primo *Metaphysicae* quod veterum fuerit juramentum per aquas Stygias veluti per quoddam sacrum et omnium rerum matrem;³⁹ et Genesis primo dicitur: *Spiritus*

¹⁴ Add. enim B.

¹⁵ corporum A.

¹⁶ P. I-II, c. 31, in *Guilielmi Alverni epis copi Parisiensis opera omnia* (Orleans, 1674), I, p. 626b; cf. also c. 29; *ibid.*, p. 625a.

¹⁷ Genesis i, 1.

¹⁸ qui bis A.

¹⁹ For Parmenides, cf. H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch* I (3^o Aufl., Berlin, 1921), p. 158. I have not located a reference to the doctrine of Pythagoras.

²⁰ ista A.

²¹ ignem et terram A.

²² media omnia B.

²³ Om. B.

²⁴ Mellisius A.

²⁵ Phys. I, 2, 185a5 ff. and 185b17 ff.

²⁶ cognoscere A.

²⁷ ut B.

²⁸ virtualiter mss.

²⁹ Xenophanes, according to Macrobius.

³⁰ Meta. I, 8, 989a6 ff.; and De anima I, 2, 405b7.

³¹ Meta. I, 3, 983b20-30.

³² fructificant, nutritantur, crescent B.

³³ Op. cit., I-II, c. 46; ed. cit., pp. 667-668, which seems the closest reference.

³⁴ agnoscit A.

³⁵ certae stant B.

³⁶ Om. A.

³⁷ fructusque B for atque fructus.

³⁸ merito A.

³⁹ C. 3, 983b30 ff.

Domini ferebatur super aquas,⁴⁰ ut scilicet ipsis alia produceret. Unde et apud nos super caelum stellatum caelum locatur aqueum, et desuper, si Macrobius super⁴¹ primo *De Somnio Scipionis* creditur ubi adduxit quemdam philosophum, caelum tertium⁴² situm est.⁴³ Quo in mentem christianam venire potuit illud psalmi: *Credo videre bona Domini in terra viventium.*⁴⁴

Sed tantum ad Xenophantem, verius de Xenophante. Nunc ad eum. Primo, cum anima sit nobilissima, cur duo infima elementa eam constituent? Tum secundo, cum maxime sit activa, cur passiva elementa

A 11r de ejus solum sint essentia? / Quod si dicatur, frigus agit quod in terra et aqua repertum est; verum inquam, sed non per se, ut ex quarto *Meteorum* probatur;⁴⁵ anima autem per se motiva est. Tum tertio quia /

B 7rb vita⁴⁶ maxime per calidum conservatur, quod his duobus non congruit elementis. Tantum sit de isto Xenophante, quasi peregrine fante: a *xenos*, peregrinum, et *fans*, fantis.

Quintus hujus senarii, totius numeri septimus decimus, Boetes⁴⁷ exstitit. Inquit enim, quasi advertens Xenophantis imperitiam qui ex passivis principiis et tam ignobilibus tam nobile ens et activum ut animam constituit: Anima est ex aere et igne. Cujus fundamentum in contrarium est Xenophanti; aër enim et ignis maxime sunt activa principia et nobilissima elementa. Ceterum secundo, secundum Philosophum ex eodem nutrimur et sumus.⁴⁸ Maxime autem aëre nutrimur, sicut aspiratio et respiratio docent, et igne quo radicale humidum consumitur et servatur. Tum tertio, quia anima est mobilis et aspectu recto et ad modum circuli dum per cognitionem in aliud tendit aut regiratur in seipsam, ut Plato voluit⁴⁹ et post Platonem divinus Dionysius.⁵⁰ Sic haec duo elementa. Videmus quidem aërem et ignem tendere sursum. Et, ut inquit Alpetragius,⁵¹ ignis sursum movetur perfecto circulo; aër quasi dimidio; aqua vero quia minus distat a calido solum per fluxum et refluxum; terra vero quia minus valde ex frigore stat immobilis. Ex quo satis patet quod⁵² frigus immobilitat, sed calidum ad motum excitat. Unde et calidi magis vigent ingenio.

Sed haec modica sunt, tum primo quia continue compositum mutaretur animatum, etiam substantialiter, cum aër continue ingrediatur et exeat. Tum secundo, quia haec duo elementa nil⁵³ habent unde sint, et si sint cognoscibilia cognitiva numquam.⁵⁴ Tum tertio, quia non apparet modus qualiter ex his duobus tertium resultet quin ignis aërem corrumpat vel econtra.

Sextus hujus senarii et totius ultimus fuit Epicurus. Hic dicit: Anima est species ex igne et aere mixta.⁵⁵ Hic turpis de specie loquitur de qua dicit Porphyrius: Species Priami digna est imperio.⁵⁶ Et vere anima sic

⁴⁰ Genesis i, 2: *Et Spiritus Dei ferebatur super aquas.*

⁴¹ in B.

⁴² Om. B.

⁴³ terrenum B.

⁴⁴ Macrobius, *In Somn. Scip.*, I, xxi ff.; ed. cit., p. 570 ff.

⁴⁵ Psalm xxvi, 13.

⁴⁶ Aristotle, *Meteor.* IV, 5.

⁴⁷ Om. A; corr. for quia bis B.

⁴⁸ Boethos, acc. to Macrobius.

⁴⁹ Aristotle, *De respiracione* V, 472b26; and especially XXI, 480b12.

⁵⁰ *Timaeus* 90C; *Theaetetus* 153B.

⁵¹ *De divinis nominibus*, IV, § 8; PG 3, 703-706.

⁵² Alpetragius (Abu Ishak al-Bitruschi), died ca. 1204 A. D., author of *Kitab-al-har'ah* (*Liber astronomii*) translated into Latin by

Michael Scot at Toledo in 1217 (unedited). It was used by William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon and John Buridan. Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* II (Berlin, 1928), pp. 366, 372, 597; also G. Sarton, *Introduction to the history of science* II-2, pp. 399-400.

⁵³ quia A.

⁵⁴ non A.

⁵⁵ numquam in marg. B, with no indication of place.

⁵⁶ Macrobius (*supra*, c. iii, note 1, p. 237); Epicurus speciem ex igne et aere et spiritu mixtum.

⁵⁷ Cf. Porphyrius, *Eisagoge*, c. 2 (De specie). On the interesting but incorrect mediaeval reading used here, cf. the note in *Opera omnia S. Bonaventurae*; ed. cit., I, p. 544, n. 10. The correct reading should be

capiendo speciem speciosa quidem^{es} est, nullatenus tamen species, cum talis species qualitas sit. Si vero dicatur species quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid, poterit anima dici

- B 7va species, melius tamen / pars dicetur speciei quia totius quam species.
 A 11v Hic porcus inscius / locutus est nesciens quid diceret. Satis enim ex superioribus exstitit improbatus. Unde et nomen ejus ejus^{rr} ignorantiam ostendit; dicitur enim *epi*, id quod *supra*, *kirrios* vero duplice *rr* porcus est. Sic igitur Epikurrus, supra porcos praesidens, non de quidditate animae sed de porcis deinceps se intromittat, qui etiam^{eo} dictus est vulgaris philosophus—Et tantum de his tribus philosophorum senariis in hoc triplici capitulo.

VI. QUID SIT ANIMA¹ SECUNDUM ARISTOTELEM

Quia Aristoteles philosophorum princeps dicitur (quod et nomen indicat: ab *ares* enim, quod est virtus, et *olon*, totum, descendit Aristoteles quasi totus virtuosus), ideo quid de anima senserit videndum est;² de qua sextum egit librum philosophiae naturalis tribus in libris cum *Parvis naturalibus*, quae Magnus Albertus ampliavit.³

Sunt autem de ea in secundo *De anima* ab eo duae datae definitiones, et tertia est magistralis, quae ex eis concluditur. Prima est talis: Anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis.⁴ Nec imaginemur hanc definitionem esse quidditativam quasi nil sit quin in

either *Primum species*, etc., (Boethius); or *Prima species*. The Quaracchi editors trace the quotation to Euripedes. Cf. also William de Vauouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 74C, for another instance of this reading.

^{es} quid A.

^{rr} Om. B.

^{eo} et B.

¹ anima sit A.

² No one particular source can be given for this chapter. It is suggested by Macrobius (*Comm. in somn. Scipionis*, I, xiv, 19; ed. cit., p. 543); perhaps by Saint Albert the Great (cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, [Toronto, 1934], p. 83), though I doubt if de Vauouillon knew the *Summa de creaturis*. He is certainly following the demands of his topic. There is a parallel treatment of the first Aristotelian definition in his *II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 1. ed. cit., fol. 179D:

Primus igitur terminus est anima. Unde ultra datas de anima diffinitiones distinctione 17 hujus secundi (those of Cassiodorus and Alcher of Clairvaux; cf. *infra*, Book II, c. iii, p. 260), potest anima diffiniri, sicut diffinit eam Aristoteles in *II De Anima*: Anima est actus primus corporis phisici, organici, potentia vitam habentis. Ubi Aristoteles tangit tria: primo tangit genus animae dum dicit: Anima est actus primus. Vocatur actus primus qui est quasi in habitu, et actus secundus qui est in quasi operari. Ita habet animam homo dormiens sicuti vigilans cum tamen tunc de communi cursu careat operationibus maxime nobilibus, sicuti est intelligere et velle. Dicitur autem actus qui se habet per modum perficiens in corpore, non perfectibilis. Unde et hoc requirit perfectio mundialis. Est enim purus spiritus non informans, sicuti sunt angeli qui nequeunt esse formae, quia sunt personae; est rursus purum corporale nullum habens spiritum ipsum informantem, sicuti sunt lapides, etc. Exigebat igitur ratio, ut in

medio esset unus spiritus participans cum utroque, sicuti est anima quae cum spiritibus participat, quia est spiritualis substantia, et cum corporibus, quia eorum extat forma.

Secundo dicit Aristoteles corporis organici phisici, et sunt tria. Primo dicit corporis. Anima enim intellectiva non est forma sensitivae, nec sensitiva vegetativa. Se habent enim secundum Philosophum in *II de Anima* sicuti trigonum in tetragonum et tetragonum in pentagono. Sic perfectio animae vegetativa est in sensitiva, et sensitivae in intellectiva. Unde non est imaginandum quod in homine sint tres animae, sicuti posuit Pitagoras et Plato post eum, sed una in perfectione tribus aequivalens. Ideo dicit Aristoteles quod anima est perfectio corporis. Secundo dicit phisici. Nullum enim artificiale habet animam . . . Tertio organici dicit, unde ista corpora quae organis carent, sicuti lapides, non habent animas, licet Democritus male dixerit eos habere animam, licet depressam. Exigit siquidem anima propter potentiarum diversitatem in suo corpore quod informat membra varia, sicuti patet in anima vegetativa, de qua minus videtur ubi sunt radices loco oris, cortices loco pellis et medulla loco cordis, et sic de aliis; ideo dicitur organici.

Sed tertio dicit principaliter potentia vitam habentis; corpus quippe quod anima informat ex se formaliter non est vita, sed dicitur in potentia ad hoc quod animam suscipiat. Debet tamen ista potentia attendi disposita non remota; unde granum antequam seminetur potentia habet vitam, sed illa est remota; ut concludatur quod anima est actus primus corporis phisici organici potentia vitam habentis.

³ St. Albert. *De anima libri tres*; ed. cit., V, pp. 117-420; his Commentaries on the *Parva naturalia* of Aristotle are to be found in tomes IX and X.

⁴ Aristotle, *De anima* II, 1, 412a20 ff.

anima quidditative includatur; nam sic⁵ falleremur multum. Est enim definitio naturalis ex tribus causis constans: ex causa formalis, dum in recto dicitur actus; ex causa materiali, dum in genitivo dicitur nomine triplici corporis physici organici, ut sit materia in qua, non ex qua; tertio ex causa finali, dum in ablativo subjungitur potentia vitam habentis. Ad hoc enim anima corpus animat, ut corpus possit opera vitae exsequi.

Primitus ergo dicitur: anima est actus; actus genus est animae. Sed quaeritur: quis actus? Dico: non accidentalis ut albedo, sed substantialis solum et formalis. Dico rursus: non secundus, sicuti considerare, sed primus, sicut scire, nisi intelligamus de vivere qui est continuus actus animae communicatus corpori quod informat quamdiu ipsum informat. Per actum igitur differt a potentia, materia et corpore, quia haec tria ut sic non sunt actus formales, sed anima.

- B 7vb Sed tunc magnum occurrit dubium: si anima / est actus⁶ corporis, etc., ubi ergo sic actuat ibi erit animal, et ita cum quaelibet pars corporis animalis animetur quaelibet / erit animal, sicut quaelibet pars ignis ictus est. Unde et Philosophus de anima rationali dicit quod nullius corporis est actus;⁷ cuius ratio potest dari: quia si est actus totius corporis ea ratione qua vita est a corde et a manu et qua ratione sensus et motus a cerebro et a pede; quod abhorrent philosophi.
- A 12r

Hic dicit Doctor Seraphicus, ex distinctione octava primi *Sententiarum*, parte secunda, articulo primo, quaestione tertia, quod forma triplex est.⁸ Prima quae perficit, extenditur et dependet. Dum perficit est in toto; quia extenditur, totius perfectionem⁹ partibus communicat; ut dependet per organa operatur, si corpus organicum sit, aut per partes sicut est forma ignis. De qua obicitur: quae perficit, extenditur et dependet. Est secundo alia forma quae perficit et dependet in sua operatione, nec tamen extenditur. Quia non extenditur, nulla pars compositi animal est; perficit enim partes toto mediante, non e contra; sicut anima vegetativa et sensitiva in plantis et brutis animalibus quae dependet in operationibus suis a subjecto. Est tertia forma quae totum perficit, nec extenditur nec dependet; dimittit duo, tertium retinet. Haec est anima rationalis. Ideo bene dicit Philosophus quod nullius corporis actus est, scilicet aut extensus aut dependens, bene tamen perficiens, quia totum corpus vivit.

Quia anima rationalis in toto est suo per essentiam corpore¹⁰ quasi in microcosmo, sicut¹¹ Deus in universo quasi in macrocosmo, unde Parisiensis Cancellarius Philippus, et ante eum Chalcidius super *Timaeum* Platonis, male opinatus fuit in *Summa* quae incipit: *Vadam in agrum, collocans substantiae¹² animam in corde, quasi in suo domicilio secundum suam essentiam, per totum corpus secundum potentiam ad modum quo aranea est in tela, motus ex hoc quod laeso corde separatur anima.*¹³ Nec intelligere valuit unum simplex per totum esse sine extensione. Quod tamen bene intellexit Augustinus motus triplici medio, experimento, exemplo, et¹⁴ ratione.¹⁵ Experimento: dolor est in singulis

- B 8ra partibus dum separatur anima et perceptio subita nocumenti / ita in

⁵ Om. nam sic B.

⁶ Add et A.

⁷ De anima, loc. cit., 413a6.

⁸ St. Bonaventure, I Sent., d. 8, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, ad 1-2; ed. cit., I, pp. 171-172.

⁹ *perfectiones A.*

¹⁰ *corpore per essentiam A.*

¹¹ sic B.

¹² subjective A.

¹³ Cf. Leo Keeler S. J., *Ex Summa Philippi*

Cancellarii quaestiones de anima (Opuscula et textus, series scholastica, fasc. XX, Münster, 1937), p. 20. Father Keeler gives as reference to Chalcidius: Mullach, *Fragmента philosophiae graecae*, II, ccvi, 227.

¹⁴ Om. B.

¹⁵ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate VI*, vi, 8; PL 42, 939; de Vauvillon has taken this from Saint Bonaventure, loc. cit., resp., p. 171.

parte distante sicut propinqua. Exemplo: quia¹⁶ una sanitas, inquit,¹⁷ quae forma est corporalis est in uno toto et suis partibus; quanto magis potest esse de forma spirituali ut anima? Ratione: quia anima est totalis forma simplex et motor sufficiens.¹⁸ Quia est totalis forma, ideo

- A 12v est / in toto; quia simplex, non est secundum partem et partem sui; quia motor sufficiens, ideo non habet situm ut dicatur aut in puncto aut in parte determinata. Hoc sentire videtur Doctor Devotus de qualibet anima, sit vegetativa, sensitiva aut intellectiva, quamvis¹⁹ Doctor Subtilis in quarto, distinctione prima, hoc animae rationalis judicet proprium.²⁰

Sed est advertendum quod non est imaginandum tres animas in homine fore distinctas realiter seu etiam²¹ plures sicut aestimavit Plato, dicens sensitivam in cerebro, nutritivam in hepate, appetitivam in corde, vegetativam in membris gignitivis.²² Una est enim anima in homine, scilicet intellectiva, in se habens eminenter et etiam formaliter omnem perfectionem vegetativae et sensitivae, cum tamen distinctione formali; ut verum sit quod in *VIII Metaphysicae* dicit Philosophus: Species se habent sicut numeri.²³ Et patet quomodo glossanda est definitio animalis, dum dicitur quod animal est substantia animata sensibilis.²⁴ Debet enim intelligi primo ut dicatur: animal est primo substantia animata, quia si anima partibus animalis conveniat²⁵ non tamen primo sed toti, ideo non sunt animalia. Et sciendum est²⁶ quod ab anima sensitiva maxime animal dicitur, non solum a vegetativa quae paucum in gradibus habet animae, in tantum quod de plantis dicat Gregorius, super illud: *Praedicate evangelium omni creaturae:*²⁷ Vivunt quidem, non per animam, sed per viriditatem.²⁸ Et tantum de actu qui in definitione animae in recto ponitur²⁹ sicut genus.

Quoad causam materialem, id est, quoad subjectum quod anima informat, dicuntur tria.³⁰ Primo: corporis. Nec debet hic sumi corpus quod est quantitas, sed corpus quod est substantia quod informat anima ut vivens sit. Diverso tamen modo: vivit anima, quia per suam essentiam formaliter, non dico originaliter; corpus ipsum, quia per animam quae informat et tamen non³¹ est pars corporis; et ipsum constitutum ex corpore et anima, quia per partem principalem. Physici additur, quod

- B 8rb distinguitur contra artificiale; / etsi per artem aliqua ex se moveri videantur, nequaquam animata sunt. Unde Antiphon solebat dicere quod si lectus germinaret, non lectum sed lignum germinaret,³² operationes

- A 13r tales innuens esse naturalium non artificialium. Sic anima / solum corpus physicum quod naturale est³³ informat. Organici dicitur propter varias potentias quae distincta exigunt organa vel instrumenta ut patet in plantis, quarum radices habent modum oris et cibum attrahunt; rami vero locum gignitivi,³⁴ gignunt enim folia, flores et fructus, et ista ratione dicitur homo arbor eversa seu in graeco *anthropos*, ab anti quod est contra et *tropos*, versio, cuius est os superius quo cibus trahitur et

¹⁶ Om. B.

¹⁷ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, with reference by the editors to St. Augustine, *Epist. 187*, iv, 13; PL 33, 836.

¹⁸ Saint Bonaventure, *ibid.*

¹⁹ quodvis B.

²⁰ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon. IV*, d. 1, n. 30; ed. cit., XVI, p. 90b.

²¹ Om. B.

²² *Timaeus* 69E; cf. Aristotle, *De anima II*, 413b13 ff.; St. Thomas, *Summa theol. I*, 76, 3c. (Ottawa, 1941), p. 453b.

²³ C. 3, 1043b33 ff.

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima II*, 2, 413b2 ff.

²⁵ communicat B.

²⁶ Om. B.

²⁷ Mark xvi, 15.

²⁸ St. Gregory the Great, *Homilia 29 in Evangel.*, n. 2; PL 76, 1214B.

²⁹ Add. animae A.

³⁰ tria dicuntur A.

³¹ non tamen B.

³² Cf. Aristotle, *Phys. II*, 1, 193a12.

³³ dicitur A.

³⁴ gignitivum A.

pars gignitiva inferius.³⁵ Et sic organici a corporibus secernit simplicibus seu homogeneis quae nequaquam animantur.³⁶

Utrum tamen anima habeat materiam ex qua, grave dubium est. Dicit Doctor Devotus quod anima vegetativa aut sensitiva materiam ex qua non habent, sed sunt formae simplices quae generantur, aut corruptiuntur cum corpore. De anima autem intellectiva dicit eam esse compositam ex materia et forma, quia potest per se esse.³⁷

Altius quidem sentiunt qui sic dicunt quam qui negant in angelo vel anima materiam. Aliquando enim ubi est materia est potentia, quantitas et contrarietas, sicut est in elementis. Secundo, alicubi est materia ubi non est contrarietas, licet³⁸ quantitas cum potentia, ut in caelo. Tertio, alicubi est materia ubi tamen non est contrarietas nec quantitas, dico molis, sed sola potentia, ut in angelo et rationali anima.³⁹

Aut juxta Doctorem Subtilem dicatur quod quaelibet anima est constituta ex forma et materia, vocando⁴⁰ formam animae quidditatem et materiam ejus differentiam individualem,⁴¹ modo quo loquitur Philosophus⁴² in *De caelo et mundo*: Cum dico caelum, dico formam; cum dico hoc caelum, dico materiam cum forma,⁴³ et prius est animam esse hanc natura quam esse in corpore.⁴⁴

Et si obicitur fratrem Alexandrum de Halis⁴⁵ sentire animam Adae non esse compositam ex materia quia nec corporali nec intellectuali, ut post Augustinum deducit,⁴⁶ ergo nec reliquae animae rationales cum eiusdem sint rationis; dicendum quod materia spiritualis dicitur

- B 8va dupliciter. / Uno modo, positive, quod cognitiva sit vel vivens, et sic tam ipse quam Augustinus dicunt animam non⁴⁷ componi ex materia. Alio modo dicitur materia spiritualis negative, quia non corporea, quemadmodum enim animal in quantum animal nec est homo nec A 13v asinus, sic materia ut materia est nec est corporea nec / incorporea, ut sunt differentiae dividentes materiam, et sic dicit animam ex materia et forma constitui. Vide eum.⁴⁸

Et notandum quod quanto organa sunt distinctiora, tanto arguimus nobiliorem animam.

Sed de parte ultima definitionis dicitur potentia vitam habentis. Corpus enim quod ex se vitam non habet sed potest suscipere, ex eo anima informatur ut opera vitae exerceat, ut sic sit corpus finis quodammodo, non dico animae sed animationis;⁴⁹ licet⁵⁰ loquendo simpliciter anima sit finis corporis et plus animetur corpus propter animam quam anima animet propter corpus. Unde sapienter dictum est quod membra leonis non differunt a membris cervi nisi quia

³⁵ Cf. Alexander Neckam, *De natura rerum*, c. clii; ed. Thomas Wright (*Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores*, London, 1863), p. 232: *Anthropos* interpretatur arbor inversa.

³⁶ animetur A.

³⁷ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 15, a. 1, q. 1, resp.; ed. cit., II, pp. 374-375; d. 17, a. 1, q. 2; ed. cit., 414b.

³⁸ sed A.

³⁹ St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 12, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6; ed. cit., II, p. 303b. Vauvouillon, in his *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 132E, refers to Saint Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; ed. cit., II, p. 97b.

⁴⁰ volendo B.

⁴¹ indivisibilem A.

⁴² Philosophus loquitur A.

⁴³ *De caelo et mundo* I, 9, 278a14.

⁴⁴ Dun's Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 3, q. 6.

n. 16 and n. 20: Ad auctoritatem, etc.; ed. cit., XII, pp. 145 and 155a. Cf. Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 131C: Primus terminus est materia. Unde solet in proposito materia capi tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur materia hec etiam seu differentia individualis; sicut sorteitas aut platoniteas; et sic loquitur Philosophus in primo *Caeli et mundi*: Dum dico caelum dico formam, dum dico hoc caelum dico materiam cum forma.

⁴⁵ Om. de Halis B.

⁴⁶ St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litt.* VII, ix, 12; PL 34, 360. Cf. Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 132E.

⁴⁷ Om. A.

⁴⁸ *Summa theol.*, I-II, n. 323; ed. cit., II, pp. 391-392.

⁴⁹ animantis B.

⁵⁰ sed B.

anima differt ab anima.⁶¹ Non differt autem aut obstat vario aspectu aliqua mutuo fore sibi fines seu causas, ut patet ex secundo *Physicorum*.⁶² Et tantum de prima definitione.

Secunda definitio animae per quam etiam Philosophus praecedentem probat est haec brevis sed compendiosa: Anima est qua vivimus.⁶³

Ubi notandum secundum fratrem Joannem de Rupella, in suo tractatu *De anima*,⁶⁴ quod viventium aliqua sunt spiritus sed non sunt anima,⁶⁵ ut Deus est spiritus sed non est⁶⁶ anima. Sic separatae intelligentiae; nequeunt enim vitam ministrare corpori formaliter etsi quandoque corporibus sumptis appareant. Et sic videtur vitam definire Commentator in libro *De intelligentiis*: vita est id quod primo fluit ab ente quieto et sempiterno.⁶⁷ Secundo, viventium aliqua sunt animae sed non sunt spiritus, sicut anima vegetativa in plantis et sensitiva in brutis. Dicuntur autem⁶⁸ anima quia animant et vitam dant et⁶⁹ corpori quod informant et resultanti ex eis et corpore. Non sunt autem spiritus, quia aut non sunt cognitivae ut anima vegetativa quae nimis materiae est immersa, aut ad sensibilia limitatae ut anima sensitiva, quorum oppositum habet spiritus qui⁷⁰ ad spiritualia secundum nomen tendit. Et sic de vita loquitur Isidorus in libro⁷¹ *De summo bono*: vita corporis anima;⁷² quod respectu animae verum est per essentiam, respectu corporis causaliter. Unde Avicebron in libro *De motu cordis*: Primus et continuus actus animae vita est.⁷³

B 8vb Tertio viventium / aliqua sunt et anima et spiritus, sicut anima rationalis, quae est anima ut animat et spiritus dum sursum aspicit, ut

A 14r patet per / Augustinum in libro *De spiritu et anima*.⁷⁴ Et hoc Maria in suo innuit cantico, dicens: *Magnificat anima mea Dominum: et exultavit spiritus meus in Deo salutari meo*.⁷⁵ Sed qualiter differt spiritus qui non est anima, ut angelus, a spiritu qui est anima, ut anima rationalis? Dicit frater Joannes Scotus quod differunt ex rationibus propriis, sicut species et pars speciei, quia proprie anima rationalis non est species sed pars speciei humanae.⁷⁶ Sed alias frater Joannes, qui dicitur de Rupella, dicit quod unibile corpori et non unibile faciunt eos differre secundum speciem.⁷⁷ Quod nequit intelligi cum sint passiones essentiam animae et angeli consequentes. Et tantum de secunda definitione.

Ex his duabus animae definitionibus tertia elicetur magistralis: Anima est forma substantialis corporis viventis, potens in eo vitales operationes exercere. Et quia clara est, expositione non eget. Et tantum de mente

⁶¹ Cf. Averroes, *I De anima*, text 53, VI (Venice, 1574), 1-2, fol. 28F.

⁶² *Phys.* II, 3, 195a10 f.

⁶³ Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2, 414a12 f.

⁶⁴ *Summa de anima* I, ii; ed. cit., p. 106.

⁶⁵ quae A.

⁶⁶ Om. B.

⁶⁷ Cf. Pseudo-Avicenna (?), *De intelligentiis* (inter opera Avicennae, Venice, 1508), fol. 66v^r; and in the critical edition, *De causis primis et secundis et de fluxu qui consequitur eas*, chap. viii, of R. de Vaux O. P. (*Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins du xii^e-xiii^e siècles*, Bibliothèque thomiste, XX, Paris, 1934), p. 122, 9 ff.: Vita prima est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto sempiterno et primus motus.

This is based on the *Liber de causis*, § 17, ed. cit., p. 179: Vita est processio ex ente primo quieto sempiterno et primus motus. Cf. also Vauquillon, *I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 86E: Secundo dicuntur vita interior operatio seu actus secundus a tali actu primo egre-

diens; et isto modo dicit Commentator, propositione de causis, definendo vitam, vita inquit est processio procedens ab ente primo quieto etiam sempiterno.

⁶⁸ Om. B.

⁶⁹ Om. B.

⁷⁰ quia B.

⁷¹ Om. in libro B.

⁷² St. Isidore of Seville, *Sententiarum* I, xii, 1; PL 83, 562.

⁷³ Cf. Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis* VIII, 1; ed. Cl. Baumerker, p. 30. There is no work of this title credited to Avicebron.

⁷⁴ anima et spiritu A. Cf. Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* ix; PL 40, 784.

⁷⁵ Luke i, 46-47.

⁷⁶ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 1, q. 5, n. 2; ed. cit., XI, pp. 188 ff.; cf. also St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 3, q. 1; ed. cit., II, p. 48.

⁷⁷ *Summa de anima* I, xiv; ed. cit., pp. 121-122; cf. *infra*, in the present text, Book II, c. x. p. 284.

Aristotelis de anima in se, et de opinionibus antiquorum philosophorum de anima.—Et sic finis primi libri.⁶⁸

SECUNDUS LIBER¹ QUID SIT ANIMA RATIONALIS²

Excussis auxilio Christi, beatae Mariae matris ejus et beati Francisci,³ antiquorum opinionibus philosophorum de anima, dempta ea quae est Aristotelis quae vera est; consequens exigit ordo, ut ad theologicam transeamus disciplinam ut et compleatur clarius philosophica inquisitio et distinctius anima sit agnita, supposito quod anima sit.⁴ Quod in vegetabilibus probat motus augmenti, nutrimenti et generationis; in sensibilibus cum hoc motus progressivus, dilatatio et restrictio, et sensus secundum animalium varietatem. Et tertio in homine quod cum aliis,

A 14v primo probat actus multiplex / qui aliunde esse nequit quam a vita vel vitali principio: ratiocinari videlicet,⁵ verum a falso discernere, et bonum a malo, inventio artium et liberum velle. Secundo forma erecta superius cum reliqua animalia terram prospiciant; unde Ovidius in primo *Metamorpheseos*:

B 9ra Pronaque⁶ con- / spiciunt⁷ animalia cetera terram
Os sublime dedit homini caelumque videre
Jussit et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.⁸

Tertio, membra ut puta lingua loquens, manus scribens, totius positio secundum ante, retro, dextrum, sinistrum, superius et inferius, ad modum caeli quod etiam intellectuale movet principium.⁹ Haec inquam tria et si qua alia sunt, animam indicant rationalem.

Et quia ipsa cognita vegetativa et sensitiva lucidius cognoscantur¹⁰ et in se et in suis potentiis, ideo¹¹ ad animam rationalem principalis dirigatur intentio. Quia autem anima rationalis¹² exstat in quodam meditullio inter Creatorem a quo¹³ est et corpus quod perficit seu apta nata est perficere, ideo hanc partem in tres partes dividimus. Quarum prima erit de anima secundum se: quid sit secundum suam entitem; secunda de anima secundum suam quantitatem virtualem; tertia de anima secundum ad alia suam comparationem. Miscebuntur autem aliquando philosophorum sententiae, non ut solidiorem sed ut certiorem reddant sententiam, ut sic sciamus aliqualiter quae, qualis, quanta.

Occurrunt autem animae rationalis quoad primum tres definitionum ternarii.¹⁴

⁶⁸ Add. Sequitur secundus. Explicit liber primus de anima A.

¹ Incipit secundus A.

² Om. title A.

³ Om. et beati Francisci A.

⁴ Cf. John of Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, i; ed. cit., pp. 104-105; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae* I-II, n. 320; ed. cit., II, p. 384, as sources.

⁵ Om. B.

⁶ Prona A.

⁷ prospiciunt A.

⁸ Verses 84 ff.:

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram

Os homini sublime dedit: caelumque tueri

Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.
⁹ Cf. Alexander, *loc. cit.*, d; p. 384b.

¹⁰ cognoscuntur A.

¹¹ Om. B.

¹² rationalis anima A.

¹³ qua A.

¹⁴ On the definitions cited in chapters I, II, III, cf. the following sources: Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, ii-ix; ed. cit., pp. 105-114; Alexander of Hales, *Summa*, I-II, n. 321; ed. cit. II, pp. 384-388; perhaps St. Albert, *Summa de creaturis*, p. II, tr. 1, q. 2, a. 1; ed. cit., XXXV, pp. 10 ff. (Cf. A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem*, etc., pp. 84 ff.). I would judge that Rupella and Alexander are the direct sources.

I. [DE PRIMO TERNARIO DEFINITIONUM ANIMAE]¹

Prima definitio est² beati Augustini in libro *De anima et spiritu*: Anima est substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accomodata.³ Haec tres habet particulas. Prima dicit quod anima est substantia quaedam. In hoc distinguitur a vegetativa in plantis et sensitiva in brutis, quae non sunt substantiae hoc modo quo hic accipitur,⁴ quia per se stare nequeunt sed cum corpore corrumpuntur. Anima rationalis non corrumpitur, ut post videbitur, consumpto⁵ corpore.⁶ Ideo Augustinus se limitat ut dicat non solum substantia sed substantia quaedam, quia etsi aliae animae substantiae sunt, non tamen sic.

A 15r Secunda pars dicit quod anima est rationis particeps. In hoc a Deo distinguitur qui partem non capit rationis sed est tota ratio, id est, intelligentiam plenariam omnium / rerum in se habet et secundum quod vult aliis distribuit. Anima vero rationalis non sic, sed est particeps rationis.

B 9rb Tertia pars dicit: regendo corpori accomodata, in quo distinguitur ab angelo, cui bene duae primae partes definitionis convenient, quia et per se potest stare et stat, et est rationis particeps. / Et si obicitur quod etiam angelus corpus regit humanum, dicendum ut frater Alexander dicit quod regit ut moveat, non ut vivificet, de quo regimine praedicta intelligitur descriptio; et patet quod est data per comparationem ad corpus.⁷

Secunda definitio est quam etiam in libro *De anima et spiritu* ponit Augustinus, quae data est de anima per respectum ad creaturas generaliter: Anima est omnium similitudo.⁸ Hoc quod dico anima tria sequuntur; est omnium similitudo. Quae tria per se in loco praefato exponit Augustinus:

Anima ad similitudinem totius sapientiae facta, in se omnium gerit⁹ similitudinem quia similis est terrae per sensum, similis aquae per imaginationem, aëri per rationem, firmamento per intellectum, caelorum caelo per intelligentiam; similis lapidibus per essentiam, arboribus per vitam, animalibus per sensum et imaginationem, hominibus per rationem, angelis per intellectum, Deo per intelligentiam.¹⁰

Dicamus et secundo subtilius quod anima est omnium similitudo. Ad exemplar enim totius divinae sapientiae condita est, in qua corporalia et spiritualia resplendent. Corporalia exemplar praeformatum in corporalibus solum repreäsentant; spiritualia ut natura angelica, ut sic in spiritualibus; sed anima in utroque. Habet enim anima potentias ad suscipiendas res

¹ I have inserted the chapter-division at this place; it is not given in either manuscript.

² est definitio A.

³ Cf. Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), *De spiritu et anima*, i; PL 40, 781; ultimately, this definition is from St. Augustine, *De quantitate animae* xiii, 22; PL 32, 1048: Mihi videtur esse substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo corpori accomodata. Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, ii; *ed. cit.*, p. 106; and I, vii, p. 112-113, for the analysis of this definition.

⁴ capitul B.

⁵ corrupto A.

⁶ Add. seu consumpto A.

⁷ Alexander of Hales, *op. cit.*, I-II, n. 321,

II; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 385b: Respondeo quod est regere corpus dupliciter: vel ut per illud moveatur, et sic etiam convenit angelo ut regat corpus; vel ut per illud vivificetur, et sic convenit animae: ex hoc enim dicta est anima, quia corpus vivificat; non sic dicitur angelus.

⁸ *De spiritu et anima* vi; PL 40, 783: Unde et a Philosopho definita est omnium similitudo. Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 8, 431b20. See also Rupella, I, vi; *ed. cit.*, pp. 111-112; and Alexander, *loc. cit.*, p. 385a.

⁹ gerit omnium A.

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, with some words omitted; Vauquillon has taken the quotation from Rupella, *loc. cit.*

corporales sensibiliter sive rerum corporalium similitudines ut sensum; habet et potentiam ad suscipiendas res spirituales spiritualiter seu¹¹ intellectualiter. Recto ergo de anima, non de angelo, dictum est quod est omnium similitudo quia angelus rerum solum est intellectualis similitudo. Haec¹² juxta fratrem Joannem de Rupella.¹³

Dicamus etiam¹⁴ tertio quod anima est omnium similitudo aut in esse, ut cum lapidibus convenit in esse, cum arboribus in vita,¹⁵ et cetera, aut in percipere omnium modo ut in duobus modis praecedentibus dictum est. Ideo sola est omnium similitudo. Et si dicatur: ergo potest dici omnis creatura, sicut homo de quo dicitur: *Praedicate omni / creaturae*,¹⁶ id est, homini, secundum Gregorium;¹⁷ dicendum quod non est simile quia homo habet realiter ex corpore quod est corporeus et corpus est pars ejus intrinseca, et anima quae est spiritualis est altera pars ejus. Non sic de anima; solum enim habet corpus perceptibiliter.¹⁸ Ideo non est simile. Haec frater Alexander.¹⁹

Tertia definitio animae rationalis quae datur in respectu ad Deum

A 15v **B 9va** ut ejus principium est, est ista:²⁰ Anima est deiforme spiraculum vitae.²¹ Sumitur autem haec definitio quantum ad hoc quod dicitur deiforme ex illo Genesis primo: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem, et similitudinem nostram.*²² Quantum autem ad hoc quod dicitur spiraculum vitae, sumitur ex illo Genesis secundo: *Formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae.*²³

In hac definitione tria tanguntur.²⁴ Primo dicitur: anima est deiformis, et sic tangitur anima secundum quod est spiritus. Sic enim ad imaginem Dei est, ut patebit infra, et sic ab anima irrationali distinguitur. Secundo dicitur quod est spiraculum, et sic differt ab angelo; et convenient animae rationali secundum quod est²⁵ anima, non secundum quod est²⁶ spiritus, spiritum accipiendo a spiritualitate non spiratione secundum quod hic dicitur spiraculum. Et sic tangitur hic anima sensitiva. Tertio dicitur vitae, in quo tangitur anima vegetativa quae sola gaudet vita. Ex qua definitione liquidum est tres animas unam esse realiter in homine. Patet etiam ex dictis has tres animae definitiones datas esse secundum quod consideratur anima et in quantum anima et in quantum spiritus.²⁷

Et si obicitur quod haec ultima animae²⁸ definitio angelo convenient, deiformis enim est et spiratur a Deo et vivit; dicendum²⁹ est quod si spiratur a Deo, non tamen spiraculum corporis est, de quo in praefata intelligitur definitione.³⁰—Et tantum³¹ de primo ternario definitionum animae.³²

II. DE ALIA TRIPLEXI ANIMAE DEFINITIONE

Definitur rursus quarto anima in libro *De motu cordis*. Et sumitur

¹¹ et A.

¹² Hoc A.

¹³ *Summa de anima* I, vi; ed. cit., pp. 111-112; this paragraph is almost verbatim.

¹⁴ et A.

¹⁵ *Om. in vita* A.

¹⁶ *Mark* xvi, 15.

¹⁷ St. Gregory the Great, *Homil. 29 in Evangel.*, n. 2; PL 76, 1214.

¹⁸ perceptible A.

¹⁹ *Summa*, loc. cit., contra VI, ad 2; ed. cit., II, p. 388a.

²⁰ *Om. est ista* B.

²¹ Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima*, xliv; PL 40, 811; cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, viii, ed. cit., p. 113; and Alexander, *loc. cit.*, p. 384b.

²² *Genesis* i, 26.

²³ *Genesis* ii, 7: *Formavit igitur Dominus Deum hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae.*

²⁴ dicuntur B.

²⁵ *Om. A.*

²⁶ *Om. A.*

²⁷ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, vi-viii; ed. cit., pp. 112-113; and Alexander, *loc. cit.*, *Contra I [solutio]*; ed. cit., II, p. 385.

²⁸ *Om. B.*

²⁹ respondendum B.

³⁰ From Rupella, I, viii; ed. cit., p. 113; and Alexander, *loc. cit.*, p. 385b.

³¹ *Om. B.*

³² Add. Sequitur secundus ternarius A.

- haec animae definitio secundum quod anima est spiritus, et est haec:¹ Anima est substantia incorporea, intellectualis, illuminationum quae sunt a Primo ultima relatione perceptiva.² Haec definitio primo declaratur sic.³ Inquit⁴ in *Soliloquias* Augustinus quod sicut sol tria habet: quod est, quod fulget, quod illuminat, sic Deus est, intelligit et intelligere
- A 16r facit.⁵ Ideo quod angelus vel anima intelligat, / a Deo habet. *Omne enim datum optimum et omne donum perfectum desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum,* ut Jacobi primo scribitur.⁶ Sed differenter. Angelus enim illuminatur non ultima relatione sed prima. Statim enim ut fuerunt
- B 9vb Angelii, intellexerunt, ut sit eis intellectio / connaturalis⁷ et coaeva⁸ et ad primum eorum esse pertinens sicut ignis cum esse quod a quinta capit essentia immediate lumen capit. Anima autem, sicut dicit in III *De Anima* Philosophus,⁹ est sicut¹⁰ tabula rasa in qua nihil depictum est, depingibilis tamen est et scientia et virtutibus. Ideo non prima relatione sed ultima illuminationes suscipit, in esse scilicet secundo, quemadmodum fit a sole lumen in aëre, qui de se non est lucidus sed fit lucidus in esse secundo et non primo.
- Et si obicitur quod anima etiam secundum primum esse dum creatur lumen capiat, dicitur enim in¹¹ Psalmo quarto:¹² *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine,*¹³ quod dicitur de anima; dicendum est¹⁴ quod si anima in sua creatione lumen suscipiat, non tamen percipit se suscipere. Unde Aurelius Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate* notitiam animae qua se cognosceret a sua creatione inditam abditam nominavit, sicut caecus lumen solis suscipit, sed nullatenus percipit.¹⁵
- Secundo declaratur haec definitio. Referuntur res ad Deum ut ad principium, et haec est prima relatio; secundo ad Deum referuntur ut ad finem; haec est secunda relatio. Adducunt aliqui tertiam, ut res ad Deum referantur ut ad causam exemplarem; sed haec exemplaritas ad distinctum causae genus non pertinet secundum Philosophum in II *Physicorum*.¹⁶ Ars enim et artifex idem dicunt principium, scilicet effectivum. Unde ars non dicit distinctum sed distinctius. Ut sit noster ternarius et valeat, Angelus in proposito refertur ad Deum ut ad suum principium. Prima enim die conditi sunt angeli. Ideo lux conditi sunt, sicut lux corporalis ipsa die condita est. Ideo prima relatione lumen suscipiunt. Anima autem sicut homo ultimo¹⁷ condita est; ideo ultima relatione, scilicet ut ad finem, refertur ad Deum, et sic lumen suscipit; ut angelus sit ut ignis et anima sit ut aér. Nec obviat malos homines ad Deum non accedere sed potius recedere, qui tamen / pollent ingenio. Dico quidem quod si recedunt moribus, accedunt ingenio, et sic intelligi habet in proposito.¹⁸
- B 16v A 10ra Tertio declaratur haec definitio. Habet enim tres particulas / quae animam rationalem distinguunt ab omnibus creaturis. Prima est: sub-

¹ haec est B.² Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis*, Prologus, n. 2; ed. cit., p. 2.³ Cf. Rupella, op. cit., I, iii; ed. cit., pp. 107-109; and St. Albert, *Summa theologiae*, p. II, tr. 12, q. 69, m. 1; ed. cit., XXXIII, pp. 7 ff.⁴ Add. enim A.⁵ *Soliloquia* I, viii, 15; PL 32, 877. Cf. also E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de s. Augustin* (1^o éd. Paris, 1931), pp. 105 ff.⁶ James i. 17.⁷ naturalis A.⁸ Add. ac connaturalis A.⁹ Philosophus in III *De anima* A.—Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, 4, 430a1.¹⁰ quasi A.¹¹ Om. B.¹² Om. A.¹³ Psalm iv, 7; this is an objection based on the viewpoint of Saint Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 84, 5c; ed. cit., pp. 518b45 ff.¹⁴ Om. B.¹⁵ Cf. *De Trinitate* X, iii, 5 ff.; PL 42, 975 ff.; and especially XIV, vii, 9, col. 1043; see also E. Gilson, *Introduction*, etc., p. 128 ff.¹⁶ Aristotle, *Phys.* II, 3, 195b22; 8, 199a12.¹⁷ Om. A.¹⁸ Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIV, xv, 21; PL 42, 1052; Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 4, n. 1, and nn. 21-22; ed. cit., IX, pp. 162 and 190; this seems to be the immediate source of this remark.

stantia incorporea. Per hanc particulam ab omni corpore et corporeo distinguitur. Secunda pars: intellectualis. Haec pars animam distinguit a vegetativa et sensitiva anima. Tertia particula: illuminationum, et cetera. Haec¹⁹ distinguit animam ab angelo.

Quinto definitur anima a Remigio sic: Anima est substantia incorporea regens corpus;²⁰ et est animae secundum quod anima. Pro cuius definitionis declaratione tria occurunt dubia.²¹

Primum dubium. Dicit enim Gennadius in libro *Ecclesiasticorum dogmatum*: Solus Deus incorporeus est; creature autem alias dicimus corporeas.²² Falsum ergo dicit Remigius: Anima est substantia incorporea.—Dicendum primo quod anima est incorporea si corporeum dicitur quod triplici dimensione protensum est.²³ Si autem corporeum dicitur quod non solum dimensione sed virtute finitum est, sic solus Deus incorporeus, et anima et angelus corporei. Dicendum secundo secundum Augustinum in libro *De anima et spiritu*,²⁴ quod si corporeum dicimus quod ita totum est in uno loco quod non in alio, sic et angelos et animas et circumscribi et esse corporeos dicimus et solum Deum incorporeum qui ubique est. Si autem dicatur corporeum cui locus secundum principium, medium et finem corporales per se respondet, sic anima est incorporea.²⁵ Tertio dicendum secundum fratrem Alexandrum: Animam esse corpoream aut incorpoream potest capi aut absolute, sic est incorporea, aut respective, sic dicitur corporea respectu divinae essentiae quae immensa est.²⁶

Secundum dubium. Quomodo anima dicitur substantia? aut a per se stando, cum sit forma corporis, aut a subsistendo seu substando accidentibus? Respondendum quod anima rationalis dicitur substantia a per se stando, quia licet habeat in composito unum esse commune sibi, corpori et composito, tamen habet suum proprium esse in quo remanet separata.²⁷ Non sic vegetativa et sensitiva, quae per naturam a corpore non sunt separabiles. Est etiam substantia a sub stando accidentibus, intellectio enim immediate est in intellectu possibili, licet sensationes sint in quadam constituto ex potentia et organo, ut declarat Doctor

A 17r Subtilis, *Operis / Anglicani* libro primo, distinctione tertia, quaestione ultima.²⁸

B 10rb Tertium dubium. Quia videtur / quod etiam angelus regat corpus humanum cum ipsum moveat; dicendum quod si angelus corpori uniatur, quod assumit ut motor, non tamen ut rector. Regis enim regere est. Anima autem corpori humano²⁹ conjungitur ut rex regno suo, quod

¹⁹ Hoc B.

²⁰ Cf. my note 'Remigius-Nemesius,' *Franciscan Studies*, VIII (1948), 275-284, in which it is shown that the Remigius quoted here by Vauvouillon and elsewhere by other Scholastics is actually Nemesius of Emesa. On the present reference, cf. *art. cit.*, 279-280; and Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, c. 2; PG 40, 554 and 566; c. 3, 591 ff.

²¹ From Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, iv; ed. *cit.*, pp. 109-110.

²² C. xi-xii; PL 58, 984 (and PL 42, 1215-16). Rupella, *loc. cit.*, p. 109, quotes this as St. Augustine.

²³ Cf. William de Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 8, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 152D: Primus ergo terminus est incorporeum. Unde incorporeum solet capi tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur incorporeum quod omni loco praesens est, et nihil aliud; et hoc modo solum Deus dicitur incorporeus. cetera autem omnia dicuntur corporea. Hoc modo loquitur Damascenus dicens quod angelus eo quod loco diffinitur

corporeus est. Secundo modo dicitur incorporeum respective ad magnum corpus, sicut gracilis homo dicitur non habere corpus. Hoc modo daemones quos Plato ponit dicerentur incorporei respectu nostri . . . Tertio modo accipitur incorporeum ut opponitur contra corporeum proprie sumptum, quod habet trinam dimensionem, longum, latum et profundum; et hoc modo accipit Porphyrius in suis *Isagogis*, dum dividit substantiam in corpoream et in incorpoream.

²⁴ C. xviii; PL 40, 793-794.

²⁵ non corporea A; corporea corr. from incorporeaa.

²⁶ *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 321; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 385b.

²⁷ Cf. *infra*, Book II, vi, notes 16 and 18, p. 273.

²⁸ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 9, n. 8; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 409b; cf. also *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 44, q. 2, n. 6; XX, *ed. cit.*, pp. 217a ff.

²⁹ humano corpori A.

gubernare debet ad jussum aeterni imperatoris, et ex hoc sibi et corpori mereri. Unde et angelus motor est voluntarius, anima vero³⁰ corpori³¹ quadam necessitate alligatur.³²

Replicemus igitur definitionem et dicamus: Anima est substantia: in hoc differt ab accidente. Incorporea: in hoc differt ab essentia corporis quod trinam habet dimensionem. Regens corpus: in hoc differt ab angelo qui non regit, licet moveat.

Tertia definitio animae est in hoc ordine et sexta secundum totum, Senecae: Anima, inquit, est spiritus intellectualis ad beatitudinem in se et in corpore ordinatus.³³ Haec datur et ratione spiritus et animae. Ubi tria occurunt.

Primum, quod tribus binariis solet accipi spiritus. Primo dicitur spiritus ipse Deus: Joannis quarto: *Deus spiritus est.*³⁴ Secundo aër seu ventus: Danielis tertio: *Benedicite omnes spiritus Domini Domino.*³⁵ Ecce primus binarius. Tertio flatus corde receptus et emissus per spirationem; unde respiratio et aspiratio. Quarto dicitur animae vis inferior; unde Augustinus: *Spiritus est quaedam vis animae inferior mente, in qua rerum corporalium species imprimuntur;*³⁶ prima ad Corinthios,³⁷ 14°: *Orabo spiritu, orabo et mente;* et Apocalypsis, 20°: *Sustulit me in spiritu in montem magnum, et altum.*³⁸ En secundus binarius. Quinto dicitur spiritus vis animae superior; unde Augustinus: Ille spiritus ad imaginem Dei factus est, in quo est cognitio veritatis et amor virtutis.³⁹ Hunc autem spiritum Apostolus vocat mentem ubi ait: *Renovamini spiritu mentis vestrae,*⁴⁰ nec est aliud spiritus mentis quam mens; est enim constructio intransitiva. Sexto dicitur spiritus substantia animae rationalis aut angeli. Unde Danielis tertio: *Benedicite spiritus, et animae justorum Domino.*⁴¹ Hic ly et expositio⁴² accipitur, et sic accipitur in proposito dum dicitur anima est spiritus.⁴³

Secundum quod occurrit: quia dicitur quod anima est spiritus ad beatitudinem in se et in corpore ordinatus, cum beatitudo sit visio Dei B 10va et amor. Cui / dicendum profecto quod est prima stola quae est visio et amor, et secunda quae corporis erit glorificati ut sit completa animae A 17v beatitudo et cum quo / meruit cum illo praemietur,⁴⁴ et⁴⁵ hoc modo⁴⁶ Seneca intellexit, quatenus non sit anima beata in parte sed in toto.

Tertium quod occurrit: partes definitionis discurrere, ut videamus a quibus distinguant. Sunt autem tres partes ejus. Primo dicitur: anima est spiritus: a corporeis distinguit.⁴⁷ Secundo: intellectualis: a vegetativa et sensitiva. Tertio: ad beatitudinem in se et in corpore ordinatus: distinguit ab angelis.—Et tantum de secundo ternario definitionum animae.

³⁰ *Om. B.*

³¹ *Add. quasi A.*

³² Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, iv; *ed. cit.*, p. 110.
³³ Though cited constantly as Seneca's, this definition does not appear in his works. Cf. the remark of the Quaracchi editors of Alexander, *loc. cit.*, p. 385, n. 3: Colligitur autem hec diffinitio a Seneca in quadam epistola, ut ait Phil. Grev., *Summa II* (fol. 34°). Cf. Seneca, *Epist.* 98, 2.

³⁴ John iv, 24: *Spiritus est Deus: et eos, qui adorant eum, in spiritu et veritate oportet adorare.* Cf. Rupella, I, ix; *ed. cit.*, p. 114, for the various meanings of *spiritus*.

³⁵ Daniel iii, 65: *Benedicite omnes spiritus Dei Domino.*

³⁶ Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*; and see the discussion of Prof. E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude, etc.*, p. 53, n. 1.

³⁷ Corinthiorum B.

³⁸ I Cor. xiv, 15; and *Apocalypse* xxi, 10.

³⁹ Cf. *De Trinitate XIV*, xvi, 22; PL 42, 1053; the quotation is from Rupella, without reference.

⁴⁰ Ephesians iv, 23.

⁴¹ Daniel iii, 86.

⁴² ex positione B.

⁴³ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, ix; *ed. cit.*, p. 114.

⁴⁴ praemietur A.

⁴⁵ ut B.

⁴⁶ medio A.

⁴⁷ distinguitur B.

III. DE TERTIO TERNARIO DEFINITIONUM ANIMAE

Septimo anima definitur et primo in hoc ternario a Cassiodoro in libro *De anima*: Anima est substantia spiritualis a Deo creata, propria sui corporis vivificatrix.¹ Ubi habet dividi haec definitio in tres partes. Prima est de anima secundum se, dum dicitur: anima est substantia spiritualis. Sed contra: anima est spiritus, ut dictum est in praecedenti definitione; ergo non est spiritualis. Sequitur enim: haec anima est anima; ergo haec anima non est animata. Dicendum est² quod anima rationalis et est spiritus, ut Seneca dicit, secundum essentiam; spiritus enim de quidditate est animae; et est spiritualis in intellectionibus et affectionibus, quae sunt operationes ejus propriae, et non est inconveniens nomen principale et casuale de eodem praedicari diversis respectibus.

Secunda pars dicit: a Deo creata. Obicitur quod haec pars male ponitur, quia a nullo separat, cum tamen deberet: omnia enim alia a Deo creata sunt. Dicendum est quod Cassiodorus istam³ partem posuit propter errorem illorum qui dicebant animam esse de substantia Dei, quia scriptum est *inspiravit*, Genesis secundo,⁴ secundum textum nostrum, vel *insufflavit*, secundum LXX^a, in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae. Deus autem alio non indiget ut spiret. Ergo se spirat, et habetur propositum, sicut Spiritus Sanctus qui a Patre spiratur et Filio ejusdem naturae est cum ambobus. Et si dicatur quod inspiratio vel insufflatio potest esse rei diversae per naturam, obicitur per glossam Augustini super illo verbo Joannis vigesimo: *Insufflavit in eos et dixit:*⁵ *Accipite Spiritum Sanctum:*⁶ In hoc ostendit ex se procedere Spiritum Sanctum; ergo a simili in proposito. Secundo, quia Ecclesiastes ultimo⁸ dicitur: *Donec*

B 10vb *pulvis revertatur / in terram unde erat, et spiritus redeat ad Deum,*

¹ C. ii; PL 70, 1283A; cf. also his *Expositio in Psalterium*, Psalm i, 13; PL 70, 367BC. The source for Vauvouillon's comment on this definition is Alexander of Hales, *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 321; ed. cit., II, p. 385a, and 386b. Cf. also de Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 173E, for a long discussion of the present definition: Secundus terminus est anima. Unde anima ab animando dicitur, sicut spiritus a spirando quammaxime in bona caelestia . . . Unde noto quod anima rationalis secundum Cassiodorum sic definitur: Anima est substantia spiritualis a Deo creata proprii sui corporis vivificatrix.

In qua diffinitione tria patent. Primo enim consideratur secundum se dum dicit quod anima est substantia spiritualis, id est simplex. Unde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*, animam diffiniens dicit: Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, vivens, semper in motu, bona malaeque voluntatis capax. Unde patet quod anima est substantia, et quia non est mixtura seu corporis dispositio, sicut posuit Alexander peripateticus. In eo autem quod est spiritualis patet quod non est potentia imaginativa, quae organo alligata est, sicut posuit Anempeche [Avempace].

Secundo dicit quod est a Deo creata. Unde et solet anima sic diffiniri: Anima est spiraculum vitae, et accipitur ex illo verbo: *Spiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae* [Gen. ii, 7]. Ex quo patet quod non est Deus de substantia animae, sicuti posuit Carmenides, qui omnia posuit unum, quia non est ejusdem rationis creator et creatura. Item David de Dinanto, qui posuit tria rerum genera, corpora, animas et intelli-

gentias, et posuit quod corpora componebantur per athoma indivisibilia, animas per diversam Noim et intelligentiae per Deum multiplicatum. Et ita cum noys primaria sit Deus, ponebat consequenter Deum esse de substantia animae. Noto tamen quod hic cum sit triplex anima, vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva, solum loquor de intellectiva. Tertio dicit quod anima est propria sui corporis vivificatrix. Unde sic diffinitur ab Augustino in libro *De spiritu et anima*: Anima est substantia quaedam rationis participes, regendo corpori associata sic, scilicet ut vivifex. Ex quo patet error Platonis qui posuit animas in corpore esse velut nautam in navi. Et patet etiam ex quo est propria anima cuiilibet corpori error Averrois, qui posuit omnium hominum eundem esse intellectum agentem et possibilem, et solum in hominibus secundum aspectum fantasiarum fieri aut ignorantiam aut scientiam.

^a *Om. B.*

³ illam A.

⁴ Genesis ii, 7; cf. Alexander of Hales, *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 321, III, resp.; ed. cit. II, p. 386b; and n. 322, *ibid.*, pp. 389-390, for points of doctrine; the objections in the paragraph are drawn from St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 1; ed. cit., II, 410b-411a.

⁵ dicit A.

⁶ John xx, 22: *Haec cum dixisset, insufflavit: et dixit eis: Accipite Spiritum Sanctum.*

⁷ St. Augustine, *In Joann.*, tr. 121, n. 4; PL 35, 1958.

⁸ undecimo (xi^o) B.

A 18r *qui dedit illum.*⁹ Si ergo¹⁰ est similitudo sicut homo / secundum carnem est de terra, sic secundum spiritum de substantia Dei. Unde Paulus, Actuum decimo septimo, contra Athenienses disputans, quemdam eorum poetam qui Aratus dicitur qui etiam magnus fuit astrologus allegavit: *Genus enim Dei sumus,*¹¹ sed non secundum carnem; ergo secundum spiritum. Tertio, quia anima rationalis est immortalis eo quod imago. Unde Augustinus: Non esset imago si mortis termino clauderetur.¹² Est lux spiritualis, et omnis lux spiritualis est¹³ ejusdem rationis, sicut omnis lux corporalis, et reduci habent ad fontale lumen sicut omnia corporalia ad materiam corporalem.

Propter elidendum ergo hunc errorem Cassiodorus de anima dicit: a Deo creata. Et hoc patet tripliciter: primo, quia Genesis primo dictum est: *Faciamus hominem*¹⁴ ad *imaginem, et similitudinem nostram,*¹⁵ quod de anima non de carne dictum est. Secundo, quia anima potest depravari, potest mutari, imperfectior est ipso homine sicut pars toto; quae Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit summe bonus quoad primum, summe immutabilis¹⁶ quoad secundum, summe perfectus quoad tertium. Ex quo etiam patet quod Deus nequit esse materia animae. Tertio, quia non est de Deo per generationem: tunc enim esset Verbum; nec per spirationem: quia esset Spiritus Sanctus; ergo per creationem, quia non est aliis modis ab his tribus quo communicetur Deus aut secundum totum aut secundum partes, quas non habet. Unde illa¹⁷ opinio quae ponebat animam rationalem eamdem esse cum divina essentia, sed dici intellectum divinum dum in se consideratur, humanum dum perficit, merito reprobatur.¹⁸ Secunda rursus opinio quae exstat Manichaeorum ponentium in hominibus duas animas: unam de Dei natura quae facit bonum et nequit facere malum, aliam quae facit malum et nequit facere bonum, impia et erronea¹⁹ judicata est.²⁰ Ideo tertia pia est et Catholica:²¹ anima a Deo creata, ut inquit Cassiodorus.

Nec obstat de spirare: aut enim est spiritum producere, sic ad intra in divinis producitur Spiritus Sanctus, quod significatur in Ioanne; aut facere spiritum, et sic spirata est anima. Nec illud Ecclesiastes; sicut

B 11ra enim dum corpus in pulveres redactum / est, jam quiescit, sic spiritus dum in Deum reducitur alibi quietem non inveniens; sic intendit hic Sapiens. Unde alius textus habet: *Ad Deum qui fecit illum.*²² Sic

A 18v Apostolus post Aratum poetam:²³ *Genus quidem sumus Dei,* quia ab eo conditi et reducendi in eum. Non aliter: aequivocatio / est de genere. De immortalitate: aliam habet Deus quia per naturam, aliam anima quia per gratiam. Est lux Deus, est lux anima, sed diverse etsi in transcendentia communicant, sed nil ad rem, et reductio fit in luce aliter quia ad lucem primam in genere causae efficientis, et in corporalibus ad primam materiam in genere causae materialis.

Tertia particula dicit: Propria sui corporis vivificatrix. Quaerit hic frater Alexander: quis est proprius actus quo distinguimus vitam viventis

⁹ Ecclesiastes xii, 7; the text is quoted as found in St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., p. 411a.

¹⁰ igitur B.

¹¹ Acts xvii, 28-29.

¹² Pseudo-Augustine, *De spiritu et anima* xviii; PL 40, 798; cf. St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., arg. 5; ed. cit., p. 411a.

¹³ Om. et omnis lux spiritualis est A.

¹⁴ homines B.

¹⁵ Genesis i, 26; cf. St. Bonaventure, loc. cit.; ed. cit., p. 411b, for this and the following two arguments.

¹⁶ immaterialis B.

¹⁷ ista A.

¹⁸ St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., resp.; ed. cit.,

p. 411b.

¹⁹ Om. et erronea B.

²⁰ St. Bonaventure, ibid., with reference also to St. Augustine, *De duabus animabus* i ff., 1 ff.; PL 42, 93 ff. The answers to the objections (below) are likewise taken from St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., 412b, with a Scotist note of univocation at the end of the paragraph. Cf. also William de Vauroillc., II Sent., d. 17, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 175B.

²¹ fidelis B; catholica A and St. Bonaventure.

²² Septuagint; cf. Alexander, *Summa I-II*, n. 322, *solutio;* ed. cit., II, p. 390b.

²³ Om. B.

a non-vivente?²⁴ Et dubio respondet²⁵ quod motus vitalis motui naturae contrarius est. Cujus tria dat exempla. Primum exemplum: motu naturae grave deorsum et leve sursum fertur; motu autem vitali grave sursum, ut in plantis, leve aut²⁶ igneum, ut cholera, deorsum in animalibus, cum simile simili nutriatur. Secundum exemplum: motu naturali aliquid fertur tripliciter: sursum aut deorsum aut in orbe; sed in motu animali fertur quid ante aut retro, dextrorum seu sinistrorum. Sic in animalibus distinguitur spiritus vitalis a naturali. Tertium exemplum: secundum intellectum fit abstractio speciei a materia aut subjecto, secundum naturam non. Merito igitur²⁷ dicit in hac Cassiodorus particula: Propria sui corporis vivificatrix. Et in tantum de hac definitione quae sumpta est ex triplici aspectu ad causam triplicem: ad formalem quoad primam particulam, ad efficientem quoad secundam, ad materialem in qua quoad tertiam.

Octava definitio et secunda hujus ternarii est illa²⁸ quam beatus ponit Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*, quae consonat cum alia Joannis Damasceni. Et datur per respectum animae ad vires suas. Est autem haec:

Anima est spiritus intellectualis, rationalis, semper vivens, semper in motu, bonae malaeque voluntatis capax.²⁹

Circa hanc definitionem triplex surgit dubium.³⁰ Primum dubium: cur cum sit praeposita³¹ differentia intellectualis, cur adjungitur rationalis, cum omne rationale sit intellectuale? Secundum dubium: cum semper vivens communior sit differentia quam intellectualis praeponenda videtur; in definiendo enim communiora praeponimus. Tertium dubium:

B 11rb de illa / differentia: semper in motu. De quo motu intelligat? Et si dicatur de motu voluntatis, cur additum est: bonae malaeque voluntatis / capax?

A 19r Ad haec tria dubia simul dicimus quod in hac definitione sunt duo particularum ternarii, quorum unus cognitionem aspicit, secundus motum considerat. Primus est: spiritus intellectualis, rationalis. Spiritus est genus; per intellectuale in notitia communicat³² cum angelo; per rationale differt, rationale enim sicut etiam ratiocinatio proprie animae est. Secundus ternarius: semper vivens, semper in motu, bonae malaeque voluntatis capax. Primum dicit continuam influentiam ad movendum a Deo; secundum continuam motionem naturae, non quod semper moveat quia corpus corruptibile impedit, sed quia potest movere aut apta est ad movendum; tertium, motionem voluntatis. Et tantum de hac animae definitione.

Nona quoad totum³³ et tertia hujus ternarii, quae etiam est ex libro *De anima et spiritu* sumpta, et est data respectu eorum a quibus anima differt, sicut supra aut infra, est:

Anima est substantia spiritualis, simplex et indissolubilis, incorporea, passibilis atque mutabilis.³⁴

In hac sunt duo ternarii differentiarum: per primum respicit in medio posita suum inferius; per secundum ternarium suum superius. Primus

²⁴ *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 321, *Contra*, III, resp., ad 2; ed. cit., II, p. 386b.

²⁵ respondet dubio A.

²⁶ autem B.

²⁷ ergo A.

²⁸ ista B.

²⁹ C. viii; PL 40, 784; cf. St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa* II, xii; PG 94, 923; Alexander of Hales, I-II, n. 321, V; ed. cit.,

II, p. 385a. See also A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas*, etc., p. 86, n. 24.

³⁰ Taken from Alexander, loc. cit., contra,

V; ibid., p. 387b.

³¹ proposita B.

³² convenit A.

³³ Add. est A.

³⁴ C. xxiv; PL 40, 796; and Alexander, ibid., VII; ed. cit., p. 388a.

ternarius est: spiritualis³⁵ simplex, indissolubilis. Spiritualis³⁶ animam rationalem separat a corpulentia substantia quae est inferior; simplex separat a spirituali³⁷ substantia quae est composita, sicut spiritus qui dicitur naturalis aut vitalis in corpore; indissolubilis³⁸ separat a vegetativa in plantis et sensitiva in brutis. Secundus ternarius est: incorporea, passibilis,³⁹ mutabilis. Incorporea conjungit cum angelis; passibile et mutabile distinguunt, quia hic limitantur⁴⁰ prout anima pro statu viae potest pati et mutari a corpore.—Et tantum de isto definitionum animae ternario.

IV. DE TRIPLO CAUSA ANIMAE

Tempus jam est ut veniamus ad secundum quod promisimus, ad quantitatem animae virtualem exquirendam. Et quia animae quantitas ex tribus quoad praesens, ex causis, ex simplicitate et eminentia formalis, cognoscitur, de tribus his sigillatim agendum est. Et primo de causis juxta artem Philosophi et in *I Physicorum* juxta principium¹ et in *I Posteriorum*:

- B 11va Tunc unumquodque / scire arbitramur per se et non sophistico modo cum causas illius cognoscimus et quoniam illius sunt causae,
A 19v et / non contingit alio modo se habere.²

De materia animae rationalis jam dictum est dum juxta Aristotelem anima fuit definita.³ Restant ergo⁴ tres animae causae: efficiens, formalis et finalis, quas praesens expediet capitulum.

Catholico⁵ nullum dubium est animam rationalem a solo fore Deo, juxta illud Psalmi: *Qui finxit sigillatim corda eorum.*⁶ Fingere facere est; corda autem animae sunt. Ex quo patet magna animae rationalis⁷ nobilitas, quae solum a Deo fieri potest: Idem sentit de vegetativa in plantis et sensitiva in brutis frater Alexander cum nullum incorporeum apud eum causari a corpore possit, nisi quoad eas recurratur ad creatos spiritus.⁸

Sed dubium in hoc primum⁹ est an omnes animae rationales¹⁰ simul productae sint, cum dictum sit: *Qui finxit sigillatim,*¹¹ id est, unam post aliam. Quod primo¹² patet auctoritate¹³ Gennadii in libro *Ecclesiasticorum dogmatum*: Tenendum est, inquit,¹⁴ quod animae non sunt simul creatae.¹⁵ Secundo, quia tunc meruissent aut demeruissent antequam essent in corpore¹⁶ contra Apostolum ad Romanos nono: *Antequam quidquam boni vel mali egissent.*¹⁷ Tertio, quia si voluerunt venire in talia corpora, fuerunt stultae; si noluerunt, fuit facta eis injuria cum essent innocentes

³⁵ spiritualis A.

³⁶ spiritualis A.

³⁷ spiritualis A.

³⁸ dissolubilis corr. s. m. to indissolubilis B.

³⁹ Add. et A.

⁴⁰ limitatur B.

¹ Aristotle, *Phys.* I, 1, 184a9 ff. The primary source of this chapter, as indicated later by the author himself, is Saint Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 444 ff.

² *Analyt. Post.* I, 2, 71b8 ff.

³ Cf. *supra*. Book I, c. vi, p. 252.

⁴ Om. B.

⁵ Add. enim B.

⁶ Psalm xxxii, 15; St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, q. 2, fund. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 448b; and q. 3, resp., p. 453. Cf. also William de Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 178, for a discussion of creationism and traducianism.

⁷ Om. B.

⁸ *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 326; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 395-396; especially the end of the article, p. 396b: *Fatendum est ergo, etc.*; and n. 329, p. 401b: *Consequenter dicendum de causa efficiente in plantis et brutis, quam non est ponendum esse corporalem, etc.*

⁹ *Om.* in hoc primum B.

¹⁰ aequales A.

¹¹ Add. corda eorum A.

¹² *Om.* A.

¹³ bis. in A.

¹⁴ *Om.* B.

¹⁵ C. xiv; PL 58, 984 (or PL 42, 1216); cf. St Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 448-451; and Alexander, *Summa I-II*, n. 333; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 405-406.

¹⁶ corpora mss.

¹⁷ Romans ix, 11: *Cum enim nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid boni egissent, aut mali, etc.*

et venerunt a statu perfectiori ad minus perfectum, quod non est ordo congruus. Unde patet opinio Platonis¹⁸ erronea et Origenis,¹⁹ qui in multis in hoc cum eo concordat, qui omnes animas simul posuit conditas in stellis comparibus et post corporibus conditis per lacteum circulum quem nos dicimus galaxiam descendere ad corpus proprium, ipsoque corrupto reascendere unde descenderant,²⁰ nisi peccatum impedit quo detrudantur²¹ in corpora bestiarum; sicque²² post magnum annum qui, ut Guillelmus Parisiensis in *Summa de universo*,²³ tenet spatium 36000, redeunt ad eadem corpora et in descensu bonorum obliscuntur quae

B 11vb relinquunt, et in ascensu malorum quae passae sunt. / Hanc positionem multum magnificat Ambrosius Macrobius super primum *De somnio Scipionis*, de qua dictum est superius²⁴ in secundo philosophorum senario, dum de Heraclito Pontico loqueremur.²⁵

A 20r Sed vere haec positio somnium est.²⁶ / Primo, quia nullum habet fundamentum rationis; secundo, quia de descensu tali quis unquam recordatur? Tertio, quia tollit beatitudinem animarum, cuius est conditio perpetuitas. Unde contra tales rectissime dicit Doctor Subtilis illud Psalmi: *In circuitu impii ambulant.*²⁷

In idem secundo venit judicium Manichaeorum positio dicentium animas cum angelis a principio conditas et dei tenebrarum deceptione peccasse et immersas corporibus ut carceri quoisque sint purgatae et redeant.²⁸ Primo, contra fidem est hoc cum Paulus ad Romanos nono dicat: *Antequam boni vel mali aliquid egissent.* Ponit etiam ultimo omnes salvari, cum scriptum sit: *Ibunt hi in supplicium aeternum.*²⁹ Secundo, contra philosophiam: Cum proprius actus sit propriae materiae.³⁰ Haec autem positio dicit animam diversa circuire corpora. Etiam vocat corpus carcerem et ita negat hominem, cum ex carcere et incarcerato non fiat unum per se. Tertio, est contra sensibilem experientiam quia *nolumus expoliari*³¹ corpore. Si tamen esset carcer id vellemus. Nec recordamur cujuscumque illius alterius status.

Ideo tertia est opinio Catholica quod successive creantur et creando infunduntur corporibus, etiam anima Adae, licet de ea dubitaverit Augustinus.³² Et si obiciatur primo quia Deus dicit Job, quadragesimo capitulo: *Ecce behemoth, id est, Lucifer diabolus, quem feci tecum;*³³

¹⁸ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *ed. cit.*, II, 449, n. 4, where the editors refer to *Timaeus* 42 and *Phaedrus* 246. However, St. Bonaventure himself refers to Macrobius, *In Somnium Scipionis* I, xiv, 1 ff., *ed. cit.*, p. 539); so also Vauquillon, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 178B: Ex quo patet error Macrobi in libro *De somnio Scipionis*: qui posuit animas simul creari in caelo aplanes seustellato, quod vocat Plato campum Elisios, et poste descendere hic inferius per circulum lacteum, quem vocant philosophi galaxiam et hinc descendere in corpora, et peracto officio juste rursum superius ascendere.

¹⁹ Origen, *In Erod.*, Hom. I, 3; PG 12, 299; and *Periarchon* I, vii, 3 ff.; II, ix, 1 ff.; PG 11, 172 ff. and 225.

²⁰ descendenter A.

²¹ detrudatur A.

²² sic patet A.

²³ De universo II^a-I^a, xvi, in Guilelmi Alverni Episcopi Parisiensis opera omnia I (Orleans, 1674), fol. 707: Annus autem iste, ut eis visum est, continet 36 millia annorum. Cf. Noel Valois, *Gillaume d'Auvergne . . . sa vie et ses ouvrages* (Paris, 1880), pp. 306-307.

²⁴ prius A.

²⁵ Cf. *supra*, Book I, c. iv, p. 242; Macrobius,

loc. cit.; and St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 2, resp.; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 449a.

²⁶ St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*: Sed vere ista positio plus est somnium quam aliquod dictum authenticum, etc. The refutation of Vauquillon is drawn from this text.

²⁷ Psalm xi, 9; quoted by Duns Scotus in *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 43, q. 3, n. 3; *ed. cit.*, XX, p. 67a, at the suggestion of St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XII, xiii; PL 41, 360-362, who quotes the same Psalm in reference to the present topic.

²⁸ Cf. St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., from which the arguments used here are taken. See also the parallel of Vauquillon in *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 178B.

²⁹ Matthew xxv, 46.

³⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, 2, 414a22.

³¹ II Cor. v, 4.

³² Cf. St. Bonaventure, loc. cit.; St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* VII, xxviii, 40 ff.; PL 34, 370-372; and de Vauquillon, *II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 175A-D.

³³ obicitur B.

³⁴ Job xl, 10. This and the following objections are taken from St. Bonaventure, *art. cit.*, p. 448, and the responses, *ibid.*, p. 450b.

dicendum quod intelligitur non simultas durationis, sed rationis. Nec oportet quod si angeli sint simul conditi quod animae, quia animae inclinationem habent ad corpora sua quae³⁵ carent angeli. Et dato quod corpus sit propter animam, non tamen³⁶ animam duratione oportet praecedere, sed solum dignitate et natura. Secundo dico quod dato quod a parte post anima non excedatur ab angelis quia etiam est aeviterna

B 12ra et finem non habet, et infinito infinitum non est majus; non est sic / a parte ante cum sic habeat finitatem. Tertio dico quod primo³⁷ est dare spiritum qui semper est separatus, ut est angelus, secundo spiritum semper conjunctum, ut vegetativus est³⁸ in brutis, tertio spiritum aliquando conjunctum, aliquando separatum, ut anima rationalis quae corrupto corpore manet.³⁹

Sed exsurgit secundum dubium, cum omnes animae sint una et non plures in omnibus hominibus, qualiter creantur successive.⁴⁰ Assumptum probatur tripliciter: primo, quia anima est perpetua, ideo in uno potest

A 20v conservari individuo; est autem / multiplicatio individuorum in eadem specie ad conservationem speciei. Secundo, quia anima a corpore non dependet; ideo ab eo non individuatur, quin immo in uno corpore partes jungit diversarum rationum, ut os et carnem; ergo poterit ejusdem rationis unire carnes in diversis hominibus. Etiam forma universalis in intellectu existens foret individua ratione corporis, sicut anima in qua est. Tertio, contingit plures homines unum intelligere; ergo unum habent intellectum, ex intelligenti enim et intellecto fit unum; ergo inter se intelligentes sunt unum. Et tamen patet quod non: primo, quia propriae materiae et proprii perfectibilis est proprius actus et propria perfectio; anima ergo distinguitur ab anima cum sit actus et perfectio tam distinctorum corporum et esse donans quam⁴¹ distinctis hominibus. Secundo, quia tunc eadem anima primo esset bona et mala, secundo sciens et ignorans, et⁴² tertio esset⁴³ damnata et salvata. Tertio, quia sic peribit praemium, nec locum habebit justitia.

Ex hoc patet primo tam Pythagoram quam Marcum Terentium Varronem falsum dixisse, asserendo eamdem animam non solum hominum sed etiam⁴⁴ omnium animalium unam fore quae esset⁴⁵ Deus, ut in *De civitate Dei* Augustinus narrat;⁴⁶ quod insania est ex parte Dei quia mutaretur, ex parte animae humanae quia nobilissima et tamen materiam seu hyle vocabant intellectum possibilem quia susceptivus est.

Secundo patet Averroem falsum dixisse eamdem animam ponendo⁴⁷ in omnibus hominibus,⁴⁸ et agentem intellectum et possibilem esse aeternos sed passivum corruptibilem, cuius verba sunt haec super tertium *De anima*:

³⁵ Add. inclinatione A.

³⁶ propter hoc A.

³⁷ Om. B.

³⁸ est vegetativus A.

³⁹ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*, ad 5, p. 451a. This answer departs somewhat from the thought of the Seraphic Doctor, who says: *Spiritus, qui naturaliter conjungitur corpori, nunquam natus est a corpore separari nisi propter poenam peccati.* Cf. also his *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 41ff.

⁴⁰ From St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad opp. 3-5; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 444-445, with the refutation taken from the *respondeo* and the *ad objecta*, p. 447.

⁴¹ tam B.

⁴² Om. B.

⁴³ Om. B.

⁴⁴ Om. B.

⁴⁵ est B.

⁴⁶ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, p. 446; St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* IV, xxxi, 2; VII, vi and xxiii; PL 42, 138, 199, 211 ff. For Pythagoras, cf. *ibid.*, VIII, i, 225. See also William de Vauvillou, *I Sent.*, d. 37, a. 1; *ed. cit.*, fol. 89GH: Noto quod Deum esse ubique per essentiam potest capi tripliciter. Uno modo ut Deus sit materia omnium creatorum entium, et includatur in quolibet ente per modum materialis principii. Et ista videtur fuisse opinio viri Romani Terentii Varronis, quae censemur haeretica.

⁴⁷ ponendo anima eamdem A.

⁴⁸ hominibus omnibus A.

B 12rb Opinandum / est, quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus accipiens, secunda autem efficiens, tertia autem factum; et duae harum sunt aeternae, scilicet agens et recipiens, tertia [autem] est generabilis et corruptibilis.⁴⁹

Animam autem tertiam, quam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem, vocat intellectum passivum, et ibidem dicit quod nihil aliud est quam imaginatio. Et probat istam⁵⁰ identitatem tripliciter: primo, ratione immaterialitatis, quia materia est principium individuationis; et secundo, incorruptibilitatis, quia in talibus unicum individuum conservat speciem; tertio, quia actu essent animae infinitae, ponendo mundum aeternum, sicut voluit ipse et Philosophus,⁵¹ / ut sit primo color materialis intellectus, secundo lux sit agens, tertio oculus sit intellectus possibilis.⁵² Loquor per metaphoram: idem color in numero, eadem lux, idem oculus; erit eadem visio sed colore variato visio variatur; sic phantasmate variato variatur⁵³ intellectus.

A 21r

Sed hoc primo removet praemium et meritorum retributionem; secundo removet rationem, quia homines et inquantum animalia et inquantum homines sunt distincti etiam principio formalis; tertio removet experientiam ex diversis affectionibus quas in se experiuntur homines.⁵⁴ Nec primo obviat immaterialitas, materia enim non est individuationis principium; nec secundo incorruptibilitas, quia in eadem specie multi sunt angeli; nec tertio quia actu essent infinitae, quia non est mundus aeternus. Unde et patet primo ad primum principale quod anima non individuatur ex corpore sed ex suis principiis, ut in definitionibus animae secundum Philosophum dictum fuit.⁵⁵ De multiplicatione animarum in eodem specie jam patuit. Secundo dico quod non est simile de carne et osse in eodem homine quae habent colligantiam et de carnibus in diversis hominibus quae colligantiam non habent. Unde illa forma in intellectu universalis est representative, singularis tamen subjective. Unde et tertio dico quod intelligentes in intellecto sunt unum quia intellectiones aut species per quas intelligent ad unum intellectum terminantur, licet in se sint distinctae.⁵⁶

Ex quo tertio concludamus Catholicam fore positionem: unumquemque hominem propriam habere rationalem animam quae non solum ad

B 12va regendum corpus condita est, sed ad fruendum Altissimo / et videndum Altissimum.

Sed rursus tertium venit dubium. Dictum est animas fore a Deo; quia Luciferiani et Cyrillus animam obiciunt fore ex traduce:⁵⁷ tum primo auctoritate Genesis quadragesimo septimo: *Omnes animae quae egressae sunt de femore Jacob septuaginta duae.*⁵⁸ Hoc enim dicunt esse ex traduce: sicut corpus ex corpore, sic anima de⁵⁹ anima. Secundo, quia perfectum

⁴⁹ Averroes, *Super III de anima*, text 17; ed. cit., VI, 1-2, fol. 169c; quoted by St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*

⁵⁰ illam A.

⁵¹ St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, p. 466a: Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris, super librum De anima, quam etiam vult imponere Aristoteli et trahere ex verbis suis . . . quia ponit mundum aeternum, et ita homines innumerabiles praecesserunt. Cf. also *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1-2; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 17, and 22-23.

⁵² St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*, p. 446b.

⁵³ Om. B.

⁵⁴ The refutation is based on St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, p. 447a.

⁵⁵ *Supra*, Book I, c. vi., p. 252. Cf. also St.

Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 414-415; and *III Sent.*, d. 10, a. 1, q. 3; III, p. 231b.

⁵⁶ These three last statements, *Unde et patet primo*, etc., are based on St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 1-4; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 447.

⁵⁷ Cf. Gennadius, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* xiv; PL 58, 984 (or PL 42, 1216).

⁵⁸ tres A. The correct text seems to be *Exodus* i, 5: *Erant igitur omnes animae eorum qui egressi sunt de femore Jacob, septuaginta.* Cf. also *Genesis* xlvi, 26. The present question is based on St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 18, a. 2, q. 3; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 451 ff.

⁵⁹ ex A.

potest facere sibi simile.⁶⁰ Tertio, quia anima est causa generationis, et brutum brutum generat, et in adulterio complacabit Deus dum ex adulterio natum animat. Unde fuit haec opinio prima? Auctor *De causis*, qui⁶¹ dicere visus est intelligentiam creatam animam producere, sicut

A 21v hominis corpus caeleste corpus, ut custodiatur / divina unitas et⁶² unus unus producat; secundo, divina immutabilitas ne mutetur; tertio, divina honestas ne dedecus faciat.⁶³ Sed hoc tamquam haereticum fugiamus. Unde quod quidam philosophus⁶⁴ dicit animam rationalem creari in umbra intelligentiae et animam sensibilem in umbra rationalis animae, ad notitiam referatur, quia unius cognitio alterius cognitionem antecedit.

Ideo secunda⁶⁵ succedit opinio: anima est ex traduce; sicut ex carne caro, sic anima ex anima modo multiplicationis ut patet in lumine candelae; quod ex peccato originali ostenditur in quo nascitur puerulus. Sed tunc anima Christi ejusdem non fuit rationis cum ceteris animabus, quia peccatum non habuit; quod impium est dicere.⁶⁶

Eapropter dicendum tertio quod anima rationalis a solo Deo condita est, ut eum arctius diligeret cuius existit imago. Unde in Genesi anima ponitur pro homine; nec semper perfectum est productivum sibi⁶⁷ similis nisi materiam habeat transmutabilem. Etsi enim anima principale in generatione sit agens, non tamen de anima sed de corpore gignit; nec est vituperium Deo si animam tribuit nato ex adulterio, sed laus dum pactum non immutat, nec divinae repugnat unitati, nam primo secundum Dionysium a monade venit dias,⁶⁸ quam dicimus binarium; nec ex hoc est mutabilis si ab eo de novo prodit anima; contingenter enim agit, et tamen immutabiliter, ut in primo *Operis anglicani*, octava distinctione, quaes-

B 12vb tione ultima, Doctor declarat Subtilis.⁶⁹ / —Haec in magna sui parte ex Doctore Seraphico in secundo, distinctione decima octava, articulo secundo, excerpta sunt.—Et in tantum de causa efficiente.⁷⁰

Quoad secundum, de causa formalis, aliud non occurrit nisi ut dictum est dum Philosophi definitio de anima tractabatur: animam rationalem ex materia et forma constitui, quasi ex⁷¹ duobus principiis intrinsecis,⁷² simplicibus tamen.⁷³ Potest enim cogitari quantae nobilitatis sit animae rationalis forma constitutiva per quam anima est deiformis, vitae spiracula, imago Dei, capax Dei et particeps Dei, qua tam nobile regit corpus et administrat; omnium similitudo et maxime Dei, natura intellectualis triplici ornata quam maxime potentia: memoria, intelligentia,⁷⁴

A 22r voluntate; clarum splendidissimum speculum ex se sine macula; / ex supernis illuminationes suscipiens; incorporea, tota in suo toto corpore, indivisa, impartibilis,⁷⁵ sicut Deus in toto suo orbe indivisus residet; in se et in⁷⁶ suo corpore ad felicitatem ordinata; a solo creata Deo, ut spiritus et spiritualis substantia, immortalis, semper vivens, cum ceteris nobilitatibus quibus anima decoratur.⁷⁷

⁶⁰ similem A.

⁶¹ Om. B.

⁶² ut A.

⁶³ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*, *resp.*, p. 452; and the *Liber de causis*, ed. Bardenhewer, §§ 5, 9 and 19, pp. 169, 174, 181.

⁶⁴ St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*: Et ideo dicit quidam philosophus, etc. The editor of the *editio minor* of *II Sent.* (Quaracchi, 1938), p. 466, refers to Isaac, *De definitionibus* (Lyons, 1515), fol. 3^r.

⁶⁵ tercia A.

⁶⁶ St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*, p. 453. The following solution and answers to the previous arguments are to be found *ibidem*, in the *respondeo* and *ad 1, 3, 4, 6*.

⁶⁷ sui A.

⁶⁸ Pseudo-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*

iv, § 21; PG 3, 722; xiii, § 2; 978. Cf. also St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 2, q. 1, ad 6; ed. cit., II, p. 24.

⁶⁹ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.*, I, d. 8, q. 5, n. 19, 22, 25; ed. cit., IX, pp. 756, 761, 765.

⁷⁰ B here begins a new chapter: *De causa formalis et finali*, a division unwarranted by the opening words of the present chapter. We here follow A and continue the same chapter.

⁷¹ e A.

⁷² intrinsecis principiis A.

⁷³ Cf. *supra*, Book I, c. vi, p. 252.

⁷⁴ intellectiva B.

⁷⁵ in particulis B.

⁷⁶ Om. B.

⁷⁷ Cf. Pseudo-Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux), *De spiritu et anima vi ff.*; PL 40,

Quo tertio ad finalem causam, quare condita est rationalis anima, dicendum quod ad triplicem finem per se. Primus est communissimus, secundus est⁷⁸ communis, tertius est proprius. Finis communissimus est finis increatus propter quem condita⁷⁹ sunt omnia. Unde Proverbiorum sexto decimo scriptum⁸⁰ est: *Propter semetipsum omnia creavit Altissimus.*⁸¹

Finis sibi et angelo communis tripliciter assignatur. Primo a Magistro sententiarum in secundo, ubi dicit:

Facta est rationalis creatura ut intelligeret summam bonitatem, et intelligendo amaret et⁸² amando possideret et⁸³ possidendo frueretur.⁸⁴

Quatuor sunt in voce, tria in re: cognitio, amor, possessio, fruitio, quae tribus modis exponuntur.⁸⁵ Primo, ut intellectio sit rationis respectu primae veritatis, amare voluntatis respectu summae bonitatis, possidere memoriae respectu aeternitatis, frui vero sit ipsa divinitate respectu horum trium aut in via aut in patria. Ideo non condividitur contra tria nisi voce, sed complectitur haec tria. Secundo, per haec tria tres dotes

B 13ra intelliguntur in patria: per intelligere dos visionis, / amare ad dotem dilectionis, possidere ad dotem comprehensionis [pertinet].⁸⁶ Tertio, per haec tria tres theologicae virtutes intelliguntur in via: per intelligere fides, per amare caritas, per possidere spes.

Secundo assignatur finis animae communis et angelo: facta est ut laudaret, serviret et frueretur ipsa, scilicet, summa bonitate. Quod tribus modis exponitur. Primo sic: laudaret lingua, serviret opere, corde frueretur. Et debent hic sumi cor et lingua large, ut extendant se ad angelos; Paulus enim prima ad⁸⁷ Corinth. tertio decimo dicit capitulo: *Si linguis hominum loquar, et angelorum.*⁸⁸ Secundo sic: laudaret pro praeteritis beneficiis, serviret pro futuris, frueretur pro praesentibus. Tertio sic: laudaret Dei sapientiam, serviret omnipotentiae, frueretur summa bonitate.

A 22v Tertio assignatur ab Augustino finis communis animae et angelo: / Facta est ut videret, laudaret, diligenter.⁸⁹ Quae sic distinguuntur:⁹⁰ ut videre pertineat ad actum rationis, amare ad actum voluntatis, laudare ad actum sermonis, ut⁹¹ fiat protestatio summae majestatis, sapientiae et bonitatis.

Tertio assignatur principaliter finis animae proprius. Est ut tota in Deo sit beata, secundum intellectum in divinitate, secundum sensum in conjuncta ei humanitate. Unde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*: Propterea Deus homo factus est, ut totum hominem in se beatificaret, sive intus ingredieretur per intellectum sive foras egredieretur per sensum, in Creatore suo⁹² pascua inveniret, pascua intus in divinitate⁹³ Creatoris, pascua foris in carne Salvatoris.⁹⁴

⁷⁸ ff.

⁷⁹ Om. B.

⁸⁰ creata A.

⁸¹ dictum A.

⁸² Proverbs xvi, 4: *Universa propter seipsum operatus est Dominus.* Vauouillon reverses to Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xvi; ed. cit., pp. 125-126, for his thought here, though he changes Rupella's division of *finis communis* (duobus modis: *principalis . . . secundarius*), *finis proprius*, to make his own ternary: *finis communissimus, communis, proprius*. There is also some dependence on Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologiae* I-II, n. 330; ed. cit., II, pp. 401-402.

⁸³ Om. B.

⁸⁴ Om. B.

⁸⁵ Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum* II, d. 1, c. 4 (Quaracchi, 1916), I, p. 309.

⁸⁶ Cf. Rupella, loc. cit., p. 126; and Alexander, loc. cit., ad 2, p. 402b.

⁸⁷ Om. A and B; added from Rupella and Alexander.

⁸⁸ Om. B.

⁸⁹ I Cor. xiii, 1.

⁹⁰ St. Augustine, *De diligendo Deo* ii; PL 40, 850.

⁹¹ distinguitur B.

⁹² et B. Alexander is the source of the third explanation of the *finis communis*.

⁹³ Creatorem suum A.

⁹⁴ deitate A.

⁹⁵ De spiritu et anima ix; PL 40, 785.

Reparatio autem ruinae angelicae, quam Augustinus in *Enchiridion* et Anselmus in libro *De casu diaboli* et in libro *Cur Deus homo*⁶⁵ dicunt esse finem creationis animae rationalis et est sumptum ex illo Moysi cantico, Deuteronomii trigesimo primo capitulo: *Statuit terminos gentium juxta numerum⁶⁶ angelorum Dei*, secundum aliam translationem,⁶⁷ non est finis per se animae rationalis, sed solum per accidens. Dato enim quod angeli non peccassent, adhuc fuisse homo conditus et per consequens anima rationalis, sicut dato quod Adam non peccasset, adhuc Filius Dei fuisse incarnatus.⁶⁸ Nec enim primo Christus, nec secundo B 13rb rationalis anima, nec homo tertio entia censer / debent occasionata.⁶⁹— Et in tantum de causis animae dictum sit.

V. DE SIMPLICITATE ANIMAE

A. 23r De simplicitate animae jam loquamur. Est autem in praesenti triplex simplicitas. Est primo simplicitas opposita malitiae, de qua Job primo scribitur: *Vir erat in terra Hus, nomine Job: hic simplex et rectus.*⁷⁰ Secundo dicitur simplicitas opposita compositioni cum his; et hoc modo simplex est quod non est cum altero componibile, sicut Deus qui nulli est componibilis, licet sit bene unibilis. Tertio dicitur simplicitas opposita compositioni ex his; et hoc modo illud⁷¹ simplex est quod est irresolubile; ideo simpliciter simplex, ut apud Scotum primae et ultimae⁷² differentiae,⁷³ aut dato quod conceptum resolubilem habeat, tamen in conceptu suo inclusa nullam dicunt finitatem, sicut apud et subtiliter et vere loquentes est de conceptu Dei, / qui includit quidditative ens, substantiam et spiritum.⁷⁴

Tunc dico quod primo modo capiendo simplicitatem, anima rationalis secundum se ut creata a Deo simplex est sine macula speculum, sed in unione ad corpus origine primaria originale peccatum contrahit, nisi eximatur ipsa lege aut legis privilegio, ut de Christo et Maria.⁷⁵ Capiendo vero secundo modo simplicitatem, anima non est simplex sed ex anima rationali et corpore constitutus homo. Ideo cum corpore concurrit ad constituendum per se tertium, non solum per accidens ut albedo cum homine ex quibus non resultat unum per se. Capiendo vero tertio modo, dividitur simplicitas aut compositione ei opposita tripliciter.⁷⁶ Simplex enim est quod compositionem non habet. Ideo simplex dicitur sine plica.

⁶⁵ Cf. Alexander, loc. cit., p. 401a; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* xxix; PL 40, 246; St. Anselm, *De casu diaboli* v; PL 158, 334; and *Cur Deus homo* I, xvi-xviii; PL 158, 381 ff.

⁶⁶ numeros B.

⁶⁷ Correctly, *Genesis* xxxii, 8, according to the Septuagint; according to the Vulgate: *Constituit terminos populorum juxta numerum filiorum Israel.* See Alexander, loc. cit.

⁶⁸ incarnatus fuisse A.

⁶⁹ In holding this doctrine of the *finis proprius*, William de Vauouillon has completed Rupella, by adopting Alexander's conclusion. Cf. Rupella, ed. cit., p. 126: *Finis vero proprius animae rationalis, assignatur reparatio ruinae angelorum. Sed hic est finis per accidens.* And Alexander, loc. cit., p. 402a: *Finis principalis est participatio beatitudinis . . . finis vero secundarius est reparatio angelicarum ruinae.* The final sentence voices the Scotistic position; cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 20, q. 2, n. 2; ed. cit., XIII, p. 120b; and III, d. 7, q. 3, n. 3; XIV, pp. 254-255.

⁷⁰ Job i, 1: *Vir erat in terra Hus, nomine*

Job, et erat vir ille simplex, et rectus, ac timens Deum, etc. Cf. St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.* d. 8, p. 2, q. 2; ed. cit., I, pp. 167 ff.

⁷¹ hoc A.

⁷² secundae A.

⁷³ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 21; ed. cit., IX, p. 47b; d. 8, q. 3, nn. 27-28; ed. cit., I, p. 627.

⁷⁴ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 8, q. 3, n. 27 ff.; ed. cit., IX, pp. 627 ff.

⁷⁵ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.* d. 31, a. 2, q. 1; ed. cit., II, p. 749; Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 31, q. un.; ed. cit., XIII, pp. 298 ff.

⁷⁶ See the parallel in Vauouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 131G: *Tertius terminus est compositionis.* Unde quoad praesens nota triplicem compositionem quam tangit Doctor Subtilis, libro I, dist. 8, q. 1. Prima est partium quantitativarum: sicut componitur corpus hominis ex diversis partibus etherogeneis. Secunda compositionis est partium essentialium, sicut componitur quaelibet species in praedicamento ex suis principiis diffinitivis. Tertia compositionis est ex subjecto et accidente, sicut ex homine et albedine fit hoc totum, homo albus.

Prima compositio est ex partibus essentialibus, sicut homo est ex corpore et anima, et haec est in omnibus per se entibus. Secunda compositio est ex partibus integralibus, et haec est in omnibus corporibus. Tertia est ex partibus repugnantibus seu dissimilibus, et haec est in omnibus animatis et viventibus.⁸

Tunc descendo ad propositum et dico quod primo modo capiendo compositionem pro compositione ex partibus essentialibus, anima est composita. Deduco sic: in rebus creatis triplex differentia invenitur.⁹ Prima est substantiae, virtutis et operationis, quae est rei ut est agens. Unde patet quod aliam essentiam dico dum dico anima intelligens quam cum simpliciter anima. In primo enim intellectu dico, quae altera

B 13va essentia est ab anima; / est enim accidentis. Scriptum est autem in IV¹⁰ *Physicorum*: Essentiae praedicamentorum sunt impermixtae.¹¹ Qualiter autem sic¹² virtus seu potentia distinguitur, patebit infra, libro tertio.¹³

Secunda differentia est rationis individuantis et essentiae, et haec etiam in anima reperitur.¹⁴ Haec enim anima rationalis aliiquid a parte rei distinctum dicit, dum dicitur haec, ab essentia animae. Quod si non placeat id rem dicere, dicere tamen oportet aliiquid rei; alioquin omnes animae rationales una forent anima, cum essentia animae ut¹⁵ sic omnibus sit communis animabus. Et haec differentia quae nominatur materialis aliquando dicitur hicceitas, ut hic lapis, aliquando haecceitas,

A 23v ut haec petra, aliquando / hocceitas, ut hoc saxum. Nec ideo est anima suppositum aut¹⁶ persona.¹⁷ Tria enim se habent per ordinem: individuum, suppositum, persona. Omnis enim persona est suppositum, non econtra; leo enim suppositum est, non persona. Rursus omne suppositum est individuum, non econtra; haec enim albedo singularis est individua, non suppositum, quia suppositum solum est in praedicamento substantiae.¹⁸

Tertia differentia est entis et esse,¹⁹ et est rei in se et est in omni creato et concreato, quia non sunt a seipsis, sive²⁰ sint principia sive²¹ principiata; ideo dependent a primo Conditore. Ideo cum animam dependentem dico a parte rei,²² compositus dico quam cum dico animam simpliciter. Ulterius et secundo dico descendendo magis limitate, quod loquendo de hujusmodi compositione ex partibus essentialibus anima rationalis composita est ex materia et forma, et hoc modo non est simplex sed composita, ut dictum fuit in ultimo capitulo primi libri.²³ Non dico de materia corporali, nec secundo de intellectuali, sed dico tertio de indifferenti ad ambas. Et haec est mens trium doctorum almae Universitatis Parisiensis: Doctoris Irrefragabilis,²⁴ Doctoris Seraphici²⁵ et fratri Nicolai

⁸ Cf. also St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2, resp.; ed. cit., I, p. 168a.

⁹ St. Bonaventure, *ibid.*

¹⁰ quinto A.

¹¹ Phys. IV, 1, 208b18-19; and 3, 210b7.

¹² Om. B.

¹³ Infra, Book III, c. i.

¹⁴ This is a Scotist interpretation, so to speak, of Saint Bonaventure's second difference; *II Sent.*, loc. cit.: Secunda est differentia suppositi et essentiae. This is apparent immediately below, in reference to hecceity, etc. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaph.* VII, q. 13, n. 9 and n. 26; ed. cit., VII, p. 410a and 426a.

¹⁵ Om. A.

¹⁶ ante B.

¹⁷ Add. haec A.

¹⁸ See the parallel in William de Vauvouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 23, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 59H: Noto secundo quod ista tria se habent per ordinem: individuum, suppositum et per-

sona. Omnis enim persona est suppositum, non econtra. Persona enim solum est in natura intellectuali aut rationali . . . Suppositum vero reperitur in omni substantia, sicut dicitur leo suppositum, lapis suppositum, non tamen persona. Rursus omne suppositum est individuum, non econtra: nam ratio individui reperitur in accidentibus, sicut dicitur: haec albedo, hic color, non tamen ratio suppositi.

¹⁹ essentiae B.

²⁰ Om. B.

²¹ sint B.

²² a parte rei dico A.

²³ Supra, Book I, c. vi, p. 252.

²⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica* I-II, n. 328; ed. cit., II, pp. 398-399. Cf. Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 132F: Concordat huic sententiae (of St. Augustine) Doctor Irrefragabilis Alexander de Ales harum scholarum primus doctor: qui in sua parte summae in materia ange-

Boneti²⁶ in sua mirabili *Philosophia naturali*.²⁷ Sunt alii plures, sed huius sufficiunt; *in ore enim duorum aut trium testium stat omne verbum*, ut in lege Dei scriptum est.²⁸

Adduco tamen ad hoc trium veterum auctoritates.²⁹ Prima est Philosophi, quae est triplex. Prima est in III *De Anima*:

B 13vb Sicut in omni natura / est materia et efficiens, sic in anima est intellectus quo est omnia fieri et intellectus quo est omnia facere.³⁰

Secunda est IX *Metaphysicae*:

Sicut materia est subjectum formarum substantialium, sic compositum est subjectum accidentis.³¹

Sunt autem scientia et virtus in anima. Tertia est VIII *Metaphysicae*: Operans nihil facit aliud nisi per materiam.³² Secunda est et principalis³³ Dionysii: Post monadem sequitur binarius:³⁴ ergo anima se habet in ratione numeri et ita in ratione materiae et formae. Tertia est Boethii in libro *De Trinitate*: In omni quod est citra Primum est hoc et hoc.³⁵ Pars adversa glossat hoc³⁶ quomodo vult; utinam quomodo deberet. Quare non potero ergo³⁷ exponere veritatem?

A 24r Sed dicit quis: Qualiter ergo / erit anima rationalis simplex cum sic³⁸ sit composita sicut dictum est?³⁹ Cui pro tertio dico sicut dicit Aristoteles in I *Elenchorum*: Ad pauca aspicientes, de facili paralogisantur.⁴⁰ Est quidem⁴¹ simplex rationalis anima simplicitate opposita secundae compositioni, quae ex partibus est integralibus, quae in corporibus est. Et est⁴² etiam simplex simplicitate opposita tertiae compositioni, quae est ex repugnantibus partibus, sicut est in mixtis, non tamen simplex sicut Deus. Sunt enim in simplicitate gradus. Connexa sunt entia; connexionem non faciant tales in connexam, alias catena platonica, ut Doctor Subtilis loquitur,⁴³ aut secundo socratica, ut Philippus Cancellarius in *Summa* sua dicit quae incipit: *Vadam in agrum*,⁴⁴ seu tertio timica, ut in *Timaeo* Timaeus fatur (sit gonifos in graeco, sit aurea in latino),⁴⁵ deperibit.—Video in grammatica: simplex, simplicior, simplicissimus. Tales debent advertere quod ubi textus noster habet: *Deus in domibus*

lorum variis sanctorum fultus auctoritatibus dicit angelos compositos ex materia et forma.

²⁶ St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2; ed. cit., II, p. 415; and d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1; ed. cit., II, pp. 90-91. Vauvouillon, loc. cit.: Idem Doctor Devotus sanctus Bonaventura . . . Idem dicit Doctor Subtilis in *Quaestiones* . . . *De anima*. (!)

²⁷ Om. A.

²⁸ *Physicorum* I, iii, (Venice, 1505), fol. 48^{va}.
²⁹ *Deuteronomy* xix, 15; cf. *Matthew* xviii, 16; and *II Cor.* xiii, 1.

³⁰ auctoritatem B. These are taken from St. Bonaventure, II *Sent.*, d. 17, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 1-3; ed. cit., II, pp. 413b-414a; and Alexander, *Summa* I-II, n. 328; ed. cit., II, p. 398a.

³¹ *De anima* III, 5, 430a10 ff.

³² *Meta.* IX, 7, 1049a34 ff.

³³ naturam A. The reference is, correctly, *Meta.* VII, 8, 1033a23; Vauvouillon has copied the error of St. Bonaventure, from whom he derived these authorities.

³⁴ Om. et principalis B.

³⁵ *De divinis nominibus* IV, § 21; PG 3, 722 f.

³⁶ C. ii: PL 64, 1250.

³⁸ haec B.

³⁷ ego ergo A.

³⁸ Om. A.

³⁹ Om. sicut dictum est B.

⁴⁰ The closest reference seems to be *De sophisticis elenchis*, c. 10.

⁴¹ equidem A.

⁴² est et A.

⁴³ This reference I have been unable to locate, and inquiry from several mediaevalists has brought negative results.

⁴⁴ Philip speaks of a *catena Pythagorae*, not *socratica*. Cf. L. Keeler, *Ex summa Philippi Cancellarii quaestiones de anima*, p. 53: Primo igitur sumemus rationes ad probandum immortalitatem animarum ex ordine rerum ex connexione, quae est aurea catena Pythagorae.

⁴⁵ *Timaeus* 38E (?), which is rather vague. I should judge *Theaetetus* 153C a much better reference; here Plato speaks of the golden chain of Homer (*Iliad* viii, 18 ff., esp. 26). Cf. Vauvouillon, II *Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 133B: Ex quo patet quod illa materia metaphysica extat velut quaedam catena qua ligatur intrinsece universum.

ejus cognoscetur, alias textus habeat: *Deus in gradibus ejus cognoscetur*.⁴⁶ Si gradus sunt compositionis, gradus non negent simplicitatis ne tales⁴⁷ nimis pateant simplices.⁴⁸ Miror satis non miratus, quotiens eis⁴⁹ occurrit de materia materiam concipiunt corpoream, acsi animal intelligere non possent⁵⁰ in asino intellecto; et positi in Aegypto solum comedant porros et allia!⁵¹

B 14ra Sed ultimo dicent mihi: Quae est ista materia, quam tu dicas quae nec corporalis nec intellectualis dicitur? Quibus inquam: Ens est finitum, de quo super II Sententiarum, distinctione tertia, dixi! Illic quaere; ibi invenies!⁵²—Et tantum de simplicitate animae.

VI. DE EMINENTIA FORMALI ANIMAE RATIONALIS¹ INTER FORMAS

Eminentia formalis² animae rationalis³ hoc tertio exigit loco ut aliquid de ea loquamur, breviter tamen, quia in superioribus jam aliquid dictum fuit. Ad praesens autem capitulum de tribus est agere: Primo⁴ quod sit substantia, secundo quod sit incorporea, tertio quod una sit anima intellectiva,⁵ sensitiva et vegetativa⁶ in homine.

Prima conclusio.⁷ Quod autem rationalis anima substantia sit, et ita omne⁸ excedat accidens, probatur tripliciter.⁹ Primo sic: Quod movet substantiam et regit est substantia et hoc¹⁰ aliquid et non accidens; movens enim in quantum movens non dependet ab eo quod movet, nec A 24v habet esse dependens. / Secundo: Nullum accidens nobilium est substantia; sed omne movens secundum quod hujusmodi est nobilium, virtuosius et actualius substantia mota; ergo¹¹ anima quae movet corpus substantia est, non accidens. Tertio arguitur sic: Omne quod recipit manens intransmutatum opposita contrarie est substantia; sed anima rationalis est hujusmodi, recipit enim successive ignorantiam et scientiam, malitiam et bonitatem; ergo¹² est substantia. Et si obiciatur contra majorem quia quantitas ut superficies recipit diversos colores, modo albedinem modo nigredinem, et tamen quantitas non est substantia; dicendum quod talis quantitas accidentia non suscepit virtute propria sed substantiae; et loquor naturaliter. Unde merito dicit Philosophus, in *Praedicamento* substantiae, quod proprium est substantiae secundum eam susceptibile esse contrariorum.¹³

Sed obicitur quia ista videntur innuere quod anima rationalis habeat esse distinctum existentiae a corpore quod movet, et ita verum dicit Plato, quod anima est in corpore sicut nauta in navi,¹⁴ et non Philosophus qui dicit quod anima est in corpore sicut forma.¹⁵ Dicendum, ut in sua

⁴⁶ Psalm xlvi, 4.

⁴⁷ Om. B.

⁴⁸ simpliciores B.

⁴⁹ ei B.

⁵⁰ posset A.

⁵¹ Cf. Numbers xi, 5: *Recordamur piscium quos comedebamus in Aegypto gratis: in mentem nobis veniunt cucumeres, et pones, porrique et cepe, et allia.*

⁵² Cf. William de Vauouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1-3; ed. cit., fol. 130H-133H; the editor, Daniel Agricola, thus entitles the question: *Quaestio ista docet de compositione angelicalis naturae ex forma et materia meta-physicali, in qua opinionem Thomae acriter impugnat* (fol. 131A).

¹ Om. B.

² Om. B.

³ rationalis animae B.

⁴ Om. B.

⁵ intellectualis A.

⁶ vegetativa et sensitiva A.

⁷ In marg. A and B. Most of this chapter is taken quite literally from Rupella, the loci being indicated below.

⁸ omnino A.

⁹ Almost verbatim from Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xx; ed. cit., pp. 130-131; likewise, the objection to the third proof.

¹⁰ Om. A.

¹¹ igitur B.

¹² igitur A.

¹³ Aristotle, *Categ.* 5, 4a10 ff.

¹⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, 1, 413a8 ff.; the closest references to such a statement in Plato himself are: *Timaeus* 69 and 88, *Phaedo* 80, *Cratylus* 400 (and the doubtful *Alcibiades* I, 129E ff.).

¹⁵ *De anima* II, 1, 412a20 ff.

Philosophia frater Nicolaus Boneti dicit,¹⁶ quod anima rationalis habet dum informat corpus unum esse existentiae commune sibi et corpori, et secundum hoc esse dicitur forma corporis; et hoc amittit in separatione B 14rb sui a corpore. Et si dicatur contra: est immortalis, ut patebit / infra,¹⁷ ergo nullum amittit esse existentiae quia res non moriuntur ut sic secundum esse essentiae, dicit¹⁸ quod est mortalis secundum esse hoc existentiae, quia corruptitur; separatione facta habet aliud esse existentiae sibi proprium, et secundum hoc est immortalis. Et tunc dico quod si Plato intellexit animam esse in corpore sicut nauta in navi cum praecisione, falsum dicit; si autem illud dicit et esse formam non negavit, verum quidem dicit sed non plene.

Secunda conclusio¹⁹ est: Anima rationalis est incorporea. Probatur tripliciter.²⁰ Primo sic:²¹ Omne corpus sensibile est et qualitates habet sensibiles ab omnibus sensibus aut aliquibus; sed anima rationalis non est sensibilis nec habet qualitates sensibiles, ut patet; ergo, et cetera. Secundo sic:²² Omne corpus est extensum secundum longum, latum et profundum. Anima rationalis nullam habet extensionem; patet ex operationibus imaginativae et memorativae, de quibus minus videretur si essent illae operationes extensa: oportet imaginativam et memorativam²³ esse quasi / infinite extensas cum quasi sint infinita imaginabilia et memorabilia. Tertio sic: Nullum corporeum est comprehensivum aut cognitivum incorporei; anima rationalis est comprehensiva incorporei sicut patet et secundum philosophiam et secundum theologiam.

A 25r Tertia conclusio est quod eadem est anima realiter in homine vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva,²⁴ licet sit formalis distinctio. Probatur tripliciter.²⁵ Primo sic:²⁶ Sicut se habet perfectibile ad perfectibile sic ad perfectionem perfectio; sed idem est perfectibile per vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum; probatur et de partibus hominis et de ipso homine. Ergo eadem anima quae est perfectio. Secundo sic: Quae in nullo convenienter nequeunt uniri ut unum faciant per se. Si ergo sunt tres animae, non est unus per se homo, quin immo in diversis foret speciebus. Et si dicatur quod non sequitur, quia anima rationalis multum distinguitur a corpore, et plus quam anima sensitiva a rationali, dato quod essent distinctae, et tamen²⁷ unum per se cum corpore constituit; dicendum quod non est simile, quia anima est forma²⁸ corporis et anima non esset forma animae. Est et alia convenientia inter corpus et animam,

¹⁶ Bonneti A. Cf. his *Philosophia naturalis*; i. e., *Physicorum Libri I, iv* (Venice, 1505), fol. 48v: In omni composito per se uno actu existente necessario sunt ibi quattuor realitates seu positiva quae ponunt in numerum: ut verbi gratia, in homine sunt istae realitates: prima animalitas, secunda rationalitas, tercia humanitas, quarta quae additur istis tribus est existentia actualis una qua existunt ista tria prima. Et si arguas contra hoc de anima et corpore quod existunt alia existentia ab existentia composita, scilicet nominis, quod homo cum corruptitur amittit suam existentiam; anima autem et corpus non: cum tamen separatim existant et remaneant nomine corrupto; hic dicimus quod anima et corpus et homo unica existentia existunt communi eis quamdiu adinvicem sunt unitae in composito et quamdiu manet compositum: cum autem homo corruptitur amittit ista tria illam existentiam communem: et trahitur animae quiditas ad suam propriam existentiam, et similiter quiditas corporis ad suam.

¹⁷ infra patebit A. Cf. *infra*, Book II, c. xii, p. 288.

¹⁸ Bonetus, loc. cit.: Et si dices: igitur sequitur quod corrupto corpore corruptitur anima naturaliter cum amittat existentiam quam habebat in corpore; respondetur: non corruptitur simpliciter corruptione quae separat ab omni existentia; sed tantum ab existentia communis sibi et corpori: sed non ab existentia sibi propria.

¹⁹ In both text and margin, *mss.*

²⁰ The source is Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxii; ed. cit., p. 131; Vauouillon has combined Rupella's first two arguments to form his own first.

²¹ modo A.

²² modo A.

²³ memorativam et imaginativam A.

²⁴ intellectualis A.

²⁵ Adapted from Rupella, *Summa* I, xxiv; ed. cit., p. 135.

²⁶ modo A.

²⁷ Om. A.

²⁸ forma est A.

de qua infra suo loco.²⁹ Tertia³⁰ ratio: Si sunt tres animae in homine, **B 14va** una³¹ non impedit aliam³² / in suis operationibus; sed istud est falsum. Videamus enim quod multum occupati in exterioribus contemplationi apti non sunt,³³ et optima digestio in otio sensuum fit exteriorum, et sic, ut dictum fuit libro primo in capitulo de origine nominis animae,³⁴ voluit Philosophus, dum dicebat vegetativam in sensitiva ut trigonum in tetragono, et ambas³⁵ in intellectiva sicut trigonum et tetragonum in pentagono; patet enim quod tria ex toto sunt in quatuor et ambo ex toto sunt in quinque; sic in ultimo semper fit additio; sic in proposito. Est tamen formalis distinctio ratione additi.

Et si dicatur quod embrio secundum Philosophum prius vivit vita plantae quam vita animali et prius animali quam rationalis adveniat,³⁶ ergo tres sunt animae, aut secundum alios tres substantiae qui volunt quod ultima substantia solum dicatur anima; respondet frater Joannes de Rupella in tractatu suo *De anima*³⁷ quod dare oportet animam³⁸ vegetativam in fieri quae in semine traducitur et qua vivit embrio, et

A 25v dicitur disponens / antequam animali vita vivat. Sic dico de disponente sensitiva; et in infusione animae rationalis corpore disposito, hae corrumpuntur et intrat rationalis. Et dicit frater Alexander quod se habent per modum artificis, sed non perficientis;³⁹ ideo nec plantam nec animal constituunt. Anima enim constituit ut perficiens, non ut artifex. Et patet quasi ad oculum quod eadem est anima in homine quia in resurrectione dicimus quod solum corpus reparatur. Sunt igitur hominis tres animae separatae? quaero: ubi est anima vegetativa aut sensitiva: aut in caelo aut⁴⁰ in terra? et quid ibi operetur? Haec est sententia Augustini in libro *De spiritu et anima* dicentis quod anima rationalis cum separatur trahit secum sensum et imaginationem.⁴¹ Et rursus in *Ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*:

Neque duas animas in uno⁴² homine esse dicimus, sicut Jacobus et alii Syrorum scribunt, unam animalem, qua animetur corpus et immixta sit sanguine, et aliam spiritualem, quae rationem ministret; sed dicimus unam eamdemque animam in homine quae et corpus sua societate vivificet et semetipsam sua ratione disponat, habens in se libertatem arbitrii.⁴³

²⁹ Cf. *infra*, Book II, c. x, p. 284.

³⁰ secunda A.

³¹ unam B.

³² alia B.

³³ apti non sunt contemplationi A.

³⁴ *Supra*, Book I, c. ii, p. 236.

³⁵ animas B.

³⁶ Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* II, 3, 736b27.

³⁷ *Summa de anima* I, xxiv; ed. cit., p. 137: Duplex est vegetativa, scilicet disponens et vegetativa perficiens. Una est forma in fieri, alia in esse; prima autem traducitur et seminatur in corpore; secunda vero infunditur cum rationali anima. Prima ergo transit completo fieri, id est formato corpore et organizato. Cf. also St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1, resp.; ed. cit., II, p. 742a.

³⁸ Om. B.

³⁹ *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 332, ad objecta 1; ed. cit., II, p. 404b.

⁴⁰ vel B.

⁴¹ C. xv; PL 40, 791. Cf. William de Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 31, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 206C: In homine non est nisi unica anima:

anima vegetativa, sensitiva et intellectiva; solum quippe inter potentias est differentia formalis cum identitate substantiae, ut alibi dictum est. Ex quo patet error Pictagorae qui posuit in homine tres animas. Patet rursus error cuiusdam Jacobi et aliorum quorundam de Syria qui in homine posuerunt duas animas, unam sensibilem et aliam rationalem. Contra quos ita ait Augustinus in libro *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus*: Non duas animas . . . Nec obviat huic illud Philosophi, XVI *Animalium*; Solus intellectus fit ab extrinseco. Debet enim glosari: i. e., sola anima intellectiva, et illa in homine comprehendit vegetativam et sensitivam. Nec quod dicunt philosophi quod embrio prius vivit vita plantae quam animalis. Jam enim in primo articulo dictum est quod non vivit per animam quam habeat. Dicitur enim vivere aut virtute seminis aut virtute matris.

⁴² uno in B.

⁴³ Gennadius, *De eccl. dogm.* xv; PL 58, 984 (or PL 42, 1216).

Sed ex quo anima rationalis, ut dictum est, et substantia et incorpoream
B 14vb est et est in corpore, merito quaeritur si locum habeat / et quis sit locus
eius.⁴⁴ Et dicendum quod animae triplex est locus. Primus locus animae
rationalis Deus est, sicut et caelestium spirituum. Locus enim naturalis
tres habet proprietates:⁴⁵ videlicet⁴⁶ continere, salvare locatum et quod ad
ipsum moveatur. Sic Deus animas rationales continet, salvat, et ad ipsum
moveatur. Sic Deus animas rationales continet, salvat, et ad ipsum
reducuntur. Hoc modo dicit Gregorius currere spiritum circumscriptum
infra incircumspectum spiritum.⁴⁷ Secundus locus animae rationalis est
species sibi immediata superior, sicut locus aëris est sphaera ignis; locus
enim immediata ambit locatum, sicut dicit Philosophus in IV *Physicorum*.⁴⁸ Et sic discurrendo per spiritus usque ad increatum spiritum;
semper enim hoc modo spiritus⁴⁹ immediate superior est locus immediate
inferioris et immediate inferioris tota perfectio est contenta in immediate
superiori, sicut optime declarat frater Joannes de Ripa in I *Sententiæ*,⁵⁰
A 26r et isto modo accipitur illud Joannis / Damasceni: Angeli sunt
intelligentiae in locis spiritualibus existentes.⁵¹ Tertius locus animae est
propriae virtutis terminatio; locus enim circumscribendo terminat. Et
hoc modo dicit Hieronymus in libro *De Spiritu Sancto*:

Licet non contineantur finibus corporalibus, circumscriptione non
tamen carent substantiae suae.⁵²

Est tamen notandum quod esse in loco potest accipi⁵³ tripliciter ut
videatur, si etiam anima rationalis queat dici esse in loco corporeo:
proprie, minus proprie et communiter.⁵⁴ Proprie per circumscriptionem,
ut corpora sunt in loco; minus proprie per definitionem, ut spiritus sunt
in loco etiam corporali; communiter per praesentiam, ut Deus est in
loco, ut per praesentiam ponatur co-existentia loci et locati, per
definitionem addatur terminatio, per circumscriptionem addatur tertium,
commensuratio, secundum tria: principium, medium et finem.

Et sic patet ex tribus animae rationalis nobilitatis et quantitas virtualis:
ex causis, ex simplicitate, ex eo quod substantia in corpore una in tribus,
in vegetativo, sensitivo et intellectivo.

VII. DE PRIMO IMAGINIS TERNARIO

Ordo exigit congruus ut postquam visum est de anima rationali quae
sit et secundo quanta sit, nunc videamus tertio¹ qualis sit, comparando
scilicet eam ad alia.² Illa enim interrogatio communis in Logica: quae,

⁴⁴ This question is to be found in Rupella, I, 1-lii, *ed. cit.*, pp. 201-209, though much of
the doctrine here is borrowed from Alexander, *Summa theol.* I-II, nn. 334-335; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 407-408; and St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 2, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 75 ff. There is a parallel discussion in Vauquillon, *I Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90D.

⁴⁵ Vauquillon, *loc. cit.*: Dico quod locus habet tria officia. Primum quod est salvatorius: quia res in suo loco salvatur, et sic non est Deus in loco, quia locus non salvatur, sed econtra. Secundum officium loci est continere. Unde Philosophus in quarto *Physicorum*, locum diffiniens dicit: Locus est ultima superficies corporis ambientis. Nec sic Deus est in loco: quia a nullo circumdatur. Tertium officium loci est perfici a locato ne sit vacuum, et sic est Deus in omni loco, quia omnia perficit. Cf. *infra*, n. 48, for the reference to Aristotle.

⁴⁶ *Om. B.*

⁴⁷ St. Gregory the Great, *Homil.* 34 in *Evang.*, n. 13; PL 76, 1255.

⁴⁸ Aristotle, *Phys.* IV, 4, 210b34.

⁴⁹ spiritus hoc modo *B.*

⁵⁰ Cf. A. Combès, 'Jean de Vippa, Jean de Rupa, ou Jean de Ripa', *AHDLM*, XII (1939), 253-290. Cf. esp. 267 ff., which would show this reference to be *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 3, a. 2; and also in *I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 4, a. 2, concl. 4: Igitur in tali latitudine duo gradus (of soul and angel) erunt immediati (*art. cit.*, 273).

⁵¹ *De fide orthodoxa* II, iii; PG 94, 870.

⁵² *Om. B.* *Op. cit.*, n. 6; PL 23, 108.

⁵³ capi *A.*

⁵⁴ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, 1; *ed. cit.*, p. 202: In loco esse dicunt tribus modis, etc. Cf. a like treatment by Vauquillon, *I Sent.*, d. 37, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, fol. 90F.

¹ tertio videamus *A.*

² The matter of this chapter is taken for

qualis, quanta, errat; deberet enim petere: quae, quanta, qualis, quis quantitas anteponitur qualitati nisi aliunde se excuset.³

B 15ra Habet autem anima rationalis / comparari ad tria: ad Deum ad quem comparatur in ratione imaginis, ad corpus proprium ad quod comparatur in ratione unibilis, et ad suas potentias ad quas comparatur in ratione divisibilis. In praesenti autem agemus de comparatione ad Deum in ratione imaginis.⁴

Unde dicit frater Alexander quod consideratio de imagine spectare videtur ad qualitatem in quantitate.⁵ Ubi tres ternarii occurunt meditandi. Primo tres definitiones imaginis sunt ponendae.⁶ Prima est Philosophi: *Imago est cuius generatio per imitationem est.*⁷ In qua tria ponuntur. Primo, cuius, in quo notatur quod *imago solius* est substantiae sicut et generatio. Secundo, generatio, in quo notatur quod solum in producto

A 26v modo naturae *imago* / reperta est. Unde licet *Spiritus Sanctus* a Patre productus sit et Filio, non tamen illorum est *imago* quia non natura producitur, sed Filius qui est *Imago Dei*. Tertio, per imitationem. Unde secundum Augustinum duo ova licet sint similia, neutrum tamen alterius *imago* est, quia unum non est ab alio.⁸ Unde *imago* dicitur quasi *imitago*: ratio enim ejus in imitatione est.⁹

Secunda est Hilarii in libro *De synodis*: *Imago est ejus rei quam imaginamur, species indifferens.*¹⁰ In qua tria notantur. Primum est¹¹ quod ratio imaginis in similitudine incipit quia dicitur species, id est, similitudo. Secundum, quod in identitate mediat quia additur¹² indifferens. Tertium, quod¹³ terminatur in rebus, non entibus rationis, quia concluditur ejus rei.

Tertia definitio est ejusdem in eodem libro: *Imago est rei ad rem coaequandam imaginaria et indistincta similitudo.*¹⁴ In qua tria exprimuntur. Primum, quod ubi est *imago* plures sunt res, non unica; dicitur enim rei ad rem. Secundum, quod in imagine est *quantitas respectu prototypi*; additur enim coaequandam. Tertium, esse absolutum imaginis relatio consequitur, quia dicitur *imaginaria et indistincta similitudo*.

Sed tripliciter obicio contra dicta, maxime quod *imago* imitationem significat.¹⁵ Primo sic: Deus enim est *imago* qui nullum imitatur. Unde Hilarius, *IV De Trinitate*: Deus ad communem sibi cum Deo imaginem eamdemque similitudinem reperitur hominem operari.¹⁶ Secundo, auctoritate Bedae in glossa super illud *Genesis* secundo: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram:*¹⁷

B 15rb Cum / dicitur faciamus et nostram non una et communis *imago* Dei et angelorum, sed trium personarum intelligitur *imago*.¹⁸

the most part from Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxv ff., ed. cit., pp. 138 ff. However, the order of chapters seems to be based on Alexander, in whose *Summa* the Imago-doctrine follows immediately upon the questions of the place of the soul (I-II, n. 336 ff., ed. cit., p. 408 ff.), whereas in Rupella the doctrine is treated (xxv-xxxii, pp. 138-160) prior to the chapters on *locus* (1 ff., pp. 201 ff.).

³ excusat A.

⁴ Om. in ratione imaginis B. Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xxv-xxviii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 138-147.

⁵ In the introduction to n. 336 ff., *ed. cit.*, II, p. 408a: Restat consideratio de imagine, quae dicitur spectare ad qualitatem in quantitate.

⁶ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xxv; *ed. cit.*, p. 138.

⁷ Aristotle, *Topic.* VI, 2, 140a.

⁸ *Liber LXXXIII Quaestitionum*, q. 74; PL 40, 86.

⁹ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 31, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 4; *ed. cit.*, I, p. 540a; and note of editors: Haec etymologia nominis *imitago* attribuitur Sexto Pompeio Festo, etc.

¹⁰ N. 13; PL 10, 490; the correct reading is: *Imago est ejus rei ad quam imaginatur, species indifferens.*

¹¹ *Om. B.*

¹² dicitur A.

¹³ *Om. A.*

¹⁴ St. Hilary, *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ significat A. Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*, p. 139.

¹⁶ N. 18; PL 10, 111.

¹⁷ Correctly, *Genesis* i, 26 (the error is also in Rupella).

¹⁸ *Hexaëmeron* I; PL 91, 29.

Tertio obicio¹⁰ contra hoc dictum Bedae, quod trium personarum intellegitur imago quia essentia divina secundum se non consideratis personis imago dicitur. Unde Augustinus in sermone de imagine dicit quod anima est imago omnipotentis²⁰ Dei²¹ eo quod sicut Deus est, vivit et sapit, ita anima secundum modum suum est, vivit et sapit.²² Haec tria competit divinae essentiae tribus per intellectum abstractis personis.

A 27r Dicendum ad haec tria quod imago accipitur / tripliciter.²³ Primo, proprie quod ad imitationem alterius est expressum, et isto²⁴ modo definivit Philosophus et sumitur passive aut quasi propter Filium Dei. Secundo, dicitur improprie ad quorum imitationem aliud exprimitur quasi active; sic sumpsit Beda et Hilarius. Tertio, magis improprie ut solum competere possit illi ad cuius imitationem aliud fit nulla rerum considerata pluralitate hoc modo aut²⁵ personarum; et²⁶ hoc modo sumpsit Augustinus.

Sed quaeritur sub qua ratione Deus dicitur imago animae rationalis. Dico quod loquendo ut loquuntur communiter hi tres, Hilarius, Augustinus, et²⁷ Beda, sub ratione divinae essentiae in tribus personis, ut exemplaris' ad imitationem expressae, quod additur propter reliquas creaturas.²⁸ Secundo principaliter dico quod Filius Dei est imago Dei Patris; neutrius Spiritus Sanctus; et hoc ratione triplici: primo, quia natura procedit, et non Spiritus Sanctus, ex prima definitione. Secundo, quia species est indifferens Patris, et²⁹ non Spiritus Sanctus, juxta secundam definitionem;³⁰ licet enim indifferentia essentiali non differant tres personae, tamen notionali plus convenient Pater et Filius quam Spiritus Sanctus cum eis, quia inspiratione activa qua ambo producunt Spiritum Sanctum. Et si dicatur quod etiam Filius et Spiritus Sanctus in hoc convenient quod ab alio sunt et non Pater; dico quod esse ab alio in eis est differenter, quia in Filio natura, in Spiritu Sancto voluntate, Pater autem et Filius uniformiter voluntate producunt Spiritum Sanctum.³¹ Tertio, quia verbum, ex tertia definitione, imaginaria, id est, distincta notitia.³² Tertio principaliter dico quod homo seu rationalis anima exstat imago Dei et ad imaginem Dei.³³ Probo triplici auctoritate. Primo, Genesis secundo: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.*³⁴ Secunda, prima ad Corinthios undecimo capitulo:

B 15va *Vir est imago Dei.*³⁵ Tertia, Augustini in libro 83 *Quaestionum:* / Homo est imago Dei et ad imaginem.³⁶ Prima auctoritas est quod ad imaginem, secunda quod imago, tertia quod utrumque.

Sed contra tripliciter.³⁷ Primo: imago est species indifferens aut indistincta similitudo, ex datis definitionibus; hoc non³⁸ convenit homini respectu Dei. Secundo: imago est in imitatione in quantitate et figura; haec non sunt in Deo. / Tertio: imago est convenientia aliquorum in forma substantiali vel accidentalis; quae non est inter Deum et hominem. Ad primum: definitiones Hilarii de imagine sunt proprie de Filio Dei

¹⁰ obicitur *B.*

²⁰ optima *A.*

²¹ Add. quae *A.*

²² Sermo 52, vii, 18; PL 38, 361; cf. also *De spiritu et anima* xxxv; PL 40, 805.

²³ Taken from Rupella, I, xxv; ed. cit., p. 140. Cf. Vauouillon, *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 3, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 18BC; the imago-doctrine is given meager treatment in his *Sentences*.

²⁴ illo *A.*

²⁵ autem *B.*

²⁶ Om. *B.*

²⁷ Om. *B.*

²⁸ Rupella, loc. cit., p. 141.

²⁹ Om. *B.*

³⁰ ex secunda definitione *A.*

³¹ producunt Spiritum Sanctum voluntate *A.*

³² Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xxvi; ed. cit., pp. 142-143.

³³ Ibid., xxvii; pp. 143-145; cf. St. Augustine, *Liber LXXXIII Quaest.*, q. 51; PL 40, 32 ff.

³⁴ *Genesis* i, 26.

³⁵ Om. *B.*

³⁶ *I Cor.* xi, 7: *Vir quidem non debet velare caput suum, quoniam imago et gloria Dei est . . .*

³⁷ Q. 51; PL 40, 32 ff.

³⁸ Rupella, loc. cit., ed. cit., p. 143; and response, *ibid.*

³⁹ modo *A.*

ut est imago Dei. Ad secundum dicendum quod in Deo est quantitas et figura virtutis, et sufficit. Ad tertium dicendum quod est convenientia ordinis qua immediate anima rationalis ordinatur ad cognitionem primae veritatis et amorem summae bonitatis. Secundo,⁴⁰ secundum suas⁴¹ potentias quae tribus appropriantur personis, quae sunt memoria Patri, intelligentia Filio, voluntas Spiritui Sancto. Tertio, secundum actus qui personis attribuuntur: meminit homo, intelligit homo, amat homo. Sic dicatur⁴² in divinis. Haec duo ultima in IX et X *De Trinitate* declarat Augustinus, ut sic definiamus imaginem ut est reperta in homine: Imago est maxima convenientia rei ad rem immediate expressam⁴³ de altero.⁴⁴

B 15vb Et si dicatur quod in aliis creaturis repraesentatur Trinitas, ut patet primo in his tribus: unitas, veritas, bonitas; secundo in his tribus: modus, species, ordo; tertio in his tribus: essentia, species, usus, secundum Augustinum,⁴⁵ dicendum quod sola rationalis est imago; inferiores creature vestigium; superior ut angelus similitudo seu signaculum similitudinis Trinitatis. Declaratur tripliciter. Primo, inanimata sentiri possunt, sed⁴⁶ sentire nequeunt; irrationalia sentire et cognoscere possunt, sed solum sensibilia; anima rationalis et sensibilia et intelligibilia usque ad Deum inclusive. Ideo vestigium ad eum⁴⁷ reducitur ut unitas ad memoriam, in⁴⁸ qua colliguntur species, veritas ad intelligentiam, bonitas ad voluntatem, et sic de aliis. Secundo, Deus est exemplar omnium sensibilium et intelligibilium. Sic anima suo modo quae species corporales in sensibus suscipit, intelligibiles in suo intellectu et ad corpus aspicit; quae sic angelo non convenientiunt.⁴⁹ / Tertio, secundum Augustinum in sermone de imagine:

Sicut Deus in mundo ubique est praesentia, potentia, essentia, his tribus, sic anima in suo⁵⁰ est corpore ipsum regens, vivificans et gubernans.⁵¹

A 28r Quod angelo non convenient. Faciamus igitur hoc gratissimum ternarium: primo vestigium, quod convenient irrationalibus creaturis; secundo signaculum / similitudinis, quod angelis, ut de Lucifer propheta Ezechiel dicit;⁵² tertio imago, quae homini aut rationali animae.

Est autem vestigium in creaturis remota, obscura et particularis repraesentatio Trinitatis. Tria sunt: particularis dicitur ad differentiam imaginis in homine; obscura, ad differentiam similitudinis in angelo; remota, ad differentiam utriusque. Signaculum autem similitudinis in angelo est immediata, particularis et lucidissima repraesentatio Trinitatis. Tria sunt: immediata dicitur ad differentiam vestigii; particularis, ad differentiam imaginis animae rationalis; lucidissima, ad differentiam utriusque. Vestigium equidem obscurum est; imago lucida; angelus lucidissimus, nec tamen imago nisi communiter. Imago vero est immediata, plena et lucida sicut possibile est repraesentatio Trinitatis. Immediata

⁴⁰ dico A.

⁴¹ Om. A.

⁴² dicam A.

⁴³ expressa B.

⁴⁴ E. g., *De Trin.* IX, iv, 4 ff.; PL 42, 963; X, xi, 17; 982; the definition is taken from Rupella, *loc. cit.*

⁴⁵ Cf. *Liber LXXXIII Quaest.*, q. 18; PL 40, 15; and Alexander of Hales, *Summa I-II*, n. 27 ff.; *ed. cit.*, II, 38 ff., for the whole doctrine of St. Augustine.

⁴⁶ Om. B.

⁴⁷ eam B.

⁴⁸ Om. A.

⁴⁹ Within this one sentence the author passes from chapter xxvii to chapter xxviii of Rupella: *An angelus sit imago* (*ed. cit.*, p. 145).

⁵⁰ in suo anima A.

⁵¹ Sermo 52, vii, 18; PL 38, 361.

⁵² Ezechiel xxviii, 12: *Et dices ei: Haec dicit Dominus Deus: Tu signaculum similitudinis, plenus sapientia, et perfectus decoro, etc.* The conclusion is taken from Rupella, xxviii; *ed. cit.*, pp. 146-147.

dicitur ad distinctionem vestigii; lucida, ad differentiam signaculi quod est lucidissimum in angelis; plena, ad differentiam utriusque.⁵³

Sic loquuntur de imagine doctores veteres et sancti multoties,⁵⁴ licet secundum novos, ut Doctorem Subtilem⁵⁵ et similes, limitando imaginem ad memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, aut mentem, notitiam et amorem, ut facit in *De Trinitate* Augustinus,⁵⁶ in angelo verissime⁵⁷ imago reperiatur.—Et tantum de primo ternario.

VIII. DE SECUNDO IMAGINIS TERNARIO

Secundus de imagine ternarius in tribus dubiis terminatur propter illam auctoritatem Genesis secundo: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.*¹

Primum dubium. Quid intelligitur dum Genesis secundo dicit Deus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram?* Dicendum

B 16ra hunc locum tripliciter intelligi.² Primo / ut imago imitatio sit,³ et tunc ad nota est similitudinis ut sit sensus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem*, id est, ad⁴ imitationem. Secundo ut imago forma sit exemplaris ad imitandum expressa, et sic essentia divina in tribus personis imago dicitur, ut sit sensus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram*, id est, secundum imaginem nostram. Tertio ut imago sit nota formae exemplatae, et tunc est sensus: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram*, id est, ad talem perfectionem quae sit imago nostra.⁵

A 28v Sed⁶ quis obiciet⁷ contra secundum modum: / homo enim conditus est ad imaginem Filii, de quo verificari non potest textus iste: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram.*⁸ Verbum enim Dei neque sui neque Sancti Spiritus imago est, sed solius Patris. Ergo textus iste⁹ secundo modo non habebit veritatem dum *nostram* dicitur. Et assumptum patet, tum primo ratione naturae conditae, auctoritate Augustini *Super Genesim*:

Quae est imago Dei ad cuius imaginis similitudinem factus est homo nisi Salvator noster qui est primogenitus omnis creaturae?¹⁰

Tum secundo ratione gratiae additae; Filius enim Dei est imago ad quam per gratiam reformatur homo, secunda ad Corinth. tertio: *In eamdem imaginem transformamur.*¹¹ Tum tertio ratione gloriae consummatae, quia Filius est imago secundum quam beatificabitur homo. Unde ad Romanos octavo scriptum est: *Praedestinavit conformes fieri imagini Filii sui.*¹² Et dicendum quod textus bene expositus est et Filius Dei imago Patris est, sed non ut textus Genesis secundo loquitur. Est enim¹³ primo imago per quam creamur, quia *per ipsum facta sunt omnia;*¹⁴ secundo per quam recreamur: *qui pro nobis mortuus est;*¹⁵ tertio per

⁵³ Rupella, *ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵⁴ multotiens A.

⁵⁵ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 16, q. un., n. 20; *ed. cit.*, XIII, p. 45b.

⁵⁶ E.g., *De Trin.* IX, iv; PL 42, 963; XIV, viii; 1044.

⁵⁷ verissime in angelo A.

¹ *Genesis* i, 26.

² Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxviii; *ed. cit.*, p. 147; the doctrine of this chapter is almost exclusively taken from Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xxviii-xxx; *ed. cit.*, pp. 147-154.

³ sit imitatio A.

⁴ Om. A.

⁵ nostra imago A.

⁶ Si A.

⁷ obiciat A.

⁸ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, xxix; *ed. cit.*, p. 148.

⁹ Om. A.

¹⁰ *De Genesi ad litteram, opus imperfectum*, xvi, 61; PL 34, 244; the text is taken from Rupella, *loc. cit.*

¹¹ *II Cor.* iii, 18.

¹² *Romans* viii, 29: *Praedestinavit conformes fieri imaginis Filii sui.*

¹³ autem B.

¹⁴ *John* i, 3: *Omnia per ipsum facta sunt.*

¹⁵ *Romans* v, 9: *Christus pro nobis mortuus est.*

quam glorificamur, in eo intus et extra refecti, ut sic per imaginem Patris sit perfecta¹⁶ imago Trinitatis.

Unde notandum secundum Augustinum in libro *Octoginta trium Quaestionum*,¹⁷ quod aliquid est imago et non ad imaginem, ut Filius Dei, qui est imago Dei Patris; ad enim transitionem secundum substantiam dicit. Secundo, aliquid est ad imaginem, non imago, ut irrationalis creaturae; debet tamen tunc imago communiter accipi,¹⁸ ut aspicit exemplar, licet

B 16rb non expressum. Tertio, aliquid / est imago et ad imaginem, ut homo; est enim ad exemplar expressum Trinitatis.

Secundum dubium. Quae differentia sit inter esse ad imaginem et esse ad similitudinem, quia scriptum est: *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram?*¹⁹ Dicendum quod prima nominis impositione imago et similitudo differunt. Imago enim nominat conformitatem in quantitate, similitudo vero convenientiam in qualitate. Imago namque nominat quamdam configurationem et ita importat figuram quae est quantitas in qualitate²⁰ vel qualitas in quantitate. Similitudo vero dicitur rerum differentium eadem qualitas. Unde post dicit consequenter Doctor

A 29r Seraphicus, libro secundo, d. 16, articulo 2, q. 3, / quod tripliciter solet distinctio assignari inter similitudinem et imaginem.²¹ Primo, quod similitudo respicit naturam, imago figuram, quomodo distinguit Hugo,²² quia similitudo dicit convenientiam in qualitate naturali, imago convenientiam in distinctione figurali, ad modum trianguli in quo tres termini et tres lineae sunt, quia sunt tres potentiae, quarum quaelibet habitudinem habet ad quamlibet, et similiter tres personae; et potentia et persona tenet rationem termini, habitudo vero vel emanatio tenet rationem lineae. Secundo, quia imago est in naturalibus, similitudo in gratuitis, ut dicitur in *Glossa super Genesim*:²³ imago enim est²⁴ respectu potentiarum quae naturaliter insunt, ut est memoria, intelligentia, voluntas; ideo dicitur naturalium. Similitudo autem est a gratia, quae est qualitas; ideo dicitur respectu gratuitorum. Tertio, quia secundum Augustinum in libro *De anima et spiritu*,²⁵ imago est in potentia cognoscendi quia stat in habitudine potentiarum et origine ad invicem, quae plus est ex parte cognitivae. Similitudo autem in potentia diligendi, quia caritas in qua maxime assimilamur Deo est in voluntate. Non loquor autem²⁶ hic de imagine recreationis, quia ut patet plus est similitudo quam imago. Unde notandum secundum Augustinum in libro 83 *Quaestionum*,²⁷ quod ista tria differunt: similitudo, aequalitas, imago. Cujus verba sunt haec:

Ubi est imago continuo similitudo est, non continuo est aequalitas.

B 16va Ubi vero aequalitas est et similitudo; et similiter, ubi est similitudo non necessario imago et aequalitas, ut in / duobus ovibus²⁸ imparibus.

Tertium dubium. Utrum anima rationalis solum sit ad imaginem aut imago Dei respectu Dei aut etiam respectu aliorum.²⁹ Dicendum juxta

¹⁶ perfecta sit A.

¹⁷ Q. 51; PL 40, 32 ff.; from Rupella, *op. cit.*, xxix; *ed. cit.*, p. 149.

¹⁸ recipi A.

¹⁹ Rupella, *op. cit.*, xxx; *ed. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

²⁰ quantitate B; corr. from quanlitate A, with 'n' deleted by dot subscript.

²¹ Resp.; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 405a.

²² Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* I, p. 6, c. ii; PL 176, 264; the rest of the sentence is verbatim from St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*

²³ Peter of Poitiers, *II Sent.* ix; PL 211, 966;

cf. also Haymo, *In Gen.* I, vii; PL 117, 459 ff. (according to editors of Alexander, *Summa*; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 411, note 3).

²⁴ est est enim A.

²⁵ C. xv; PL 40, 785 ff.

²⁶ autem loquor A.

²⁷ Q. 74; PL 40, 85.

²⁸ ovis A.

²⁹ Cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xxxi; *ed. cit.*, p. 154; with Alexander of Hales, *Summa* I-II, n. 340, III; *ed. cit.*, II, p. 413b; and St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 2, resp.; *ed. cit.*, I, pp. 83-84, as second sources.

mentem Augustini in libro *De Trinitate*³⁰ quod in anima est imago³¹ proprie et trinitas proprie, et sic est anima respectu Dei. Unde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*: In eo³² anima Dei imago est, quod capax et particeps illius esse potest.³³ Secundo, in anima est imago improprie et trinitas proprie, et sic est respectu sui seu angelorum. Unde Augustinus, *XIV De Trinitate*:

A 29v Non in eo quod se meminit anima et se novit et se amat, sed in eo quod meminit ejus a quo est et noscit et amat, est in ea trinitas secundum quam est / imago Dei.³⁴

Et debet intelligi proprie, ut declarat Doctor Subtilis, *Operis Anglicani* libro primo, distinctione tertia, quaestione ultima.³⁵ Et patet alia Augustini auctoritate in libro *De Trinitate*:

Ecce mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem, nondum quidem Deum, sed jam³⁶ imaginem Dei.³⁷

Tertio, in anima est proprie trinitas sed nullo modo imago, ut respectu inferiorum a se. Unde Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate*:

In eo solo, (id est, in ea sola parte animae,) quod ad contemplationem pertinet aeternorum, non solum est trinitas sed imago Dei. In hoc autem, quod dirivatum est in actione temporalium, hoc est, in inferiori parte rationis et viribus inferioribus, etsi trinitas possit dici, imago Dei non potest inveniri.³⁸

Ex quo patet hominem proprie esse ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei secundum portionem superiorem et non secundum inferiorem.—Et tantum de secundo imaginis ternario.

IX. DE TERTIO IMAGINIS TERNARIO

Tertius ternarius imaginis est primo de divisione imaginis, secundo de ordine partium imaginis, tertio de actibus imaginis.¹

Quoad primum. Glossa super illud Psalmi: *Signatum est super nos lumen vultis tui, Domine,*² triplicem distinguit imaginem, et large capitur imago.³ Est imago creationis, imago recreationis, imago similitudinis; seu naturae, gratiae et gloriae. Imago naturae, de qua jam saepe dictum est; imago gratiae in fide, spe, caritate continetur, in his tribus virtutibus.

B 16vb Unde beatus Bernardus de increata imagine, / de creata imagine, de recreata imagine, sic dicit sub nomine Trinitatis:

Est trinitas creatrix, Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ex qua cecidit trinitas creata: memoria, ratio, voluntas. Est trinitas per quam cecidit: suggestio, delectatio, consensus. Est trinitas in quam cecidit: impotentia, caecitas, immunditia.⁴

³⁰ Lib. XII, iv, 4; PL 42, 1000; XIV, viii, 11; 1044; and XIV, xii, 15; 1048.

³¹ *imago est A; anima* is written after *est*, but corrected to follow *in*.

³² Ideo A.

³³ More correctly, *De Trin.* XIV, viii, 11; PL 42, 1044.

³⁴ *De Trin.* XIV, xii, 15; PL 42, 1048.

³⁵ Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 9, n. 7; ed. cit., IX, p. 409a.

³⁶ ipsam mss.

³⁷ Lib. XIV, viii, 11, PL 42, 1044.

³⁸ Lib. XII, iv, 4; PL 42, 1000.

¹ This chapter is based on Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxxii-xxxiii; ed. cit., pp. 155-160.

² Psalm iv, 7.

³ Peter Lombard, *in hoc loco*; PL 191, 88.

⁴ et A.

⁵ The references to St. Bernard are taken from Rupella xxxi; ed. cit., p. 157; they are to be found, to some extent, in St. Bernard, *Sermones de diversis*, sermo xlvi; PL 183, 667; and in the form used here, in the florilegium, *S. Bernardi sententiae*, n. 25; PL 183, 753.

Ecce tres ternarii imaginis cadentis: medii, casus et termini generales.

A 30r Iterum, memoria cecidit in tres cogitationes: affectuosas, otiosas, onerosas.⁶ Ratio, in triplicem ignorantiam: / veri et falsi, boni et mali, commodi et incommodi. Voluntas autem in triplicem concupiscentiam: carnis, oculorum, superbiae vitae. Ecce rursus tres ternarii casuum particularium imaginis cadentis.

Est etiam trinitas per quam resurget: fides, spes, caritas. Et similiter unaquaeque habet suam trinitatem. Est autem fides signorum, promissorum, praceptorum; est spes veniae, gratiae, gloriae; est caritas de corde puro, de⁷ conscientia bona et fide non ficta.—Ecce imago recreationis tres habet ternarios quibus resurgat imago creationis.

Est tertio imago gloriae seu similitudinis. Haec tribus dotibus consummatur: visionis, dilectionis, fruitionis. Et sic de uno ternario aliis exit ternarius.⁸ Loquor autem ut loquuntur communiter. Et tantum de primo.

Quantum ad secundum, de ordine partium imaginis, notandum est quod tripliciter possunt intelligi ordinari memoria, intelligentia et voluntas.⁹ Primo, secundum ordinem innatum, et sic dicit Augustinus quod memoria Patri, intelligentia Filio, voluntas Spiritui Sancto respondet.¹⁰ Ex memoria enim primae veritatis generatur intelligentia primae veritatis sicut ex Patre Filius. Et ex memoria et intelligentia primae veritatis producitur amor ejus sicut ex Patre et Filio producitur Spiritus Sanctus. Ut secundum Doctorem Subtilem¹¹ memoria sit potentia cum praesentia objecti in actu primo, et ad habendum in divinis completam memoriam, debet accipi potentia pro quodam communi, tam intellectivae quam volitivae potentiae, aut utraque potentia, ne sit quaternarius et non sufficiat ternarius; intelligentia sit ipse intellectus / cum actu secundo;¹² voluntas sit ipsa potentia cum objecti¹³ amore, ut sic actus primi cum secundis concurrant ad completam rationem imaginis.

B 17ra Secundo potest attendi iste ordo secundum acquisitionem in fieri, et sic prima pars imaginis est intellectus, secunda voluntas, tertia memoria. Primo quidem intelligimus, secundo volumus, tertio memoriam. Unde Glossa super illud Ecclesiastici 17°: *Secundum imaginem suam fecit illum:*¹⁴ Sicut ex Patre Filius, ex utroque Spiritus Sanctus, ita ex intellectu voluntas, ex utroque memoria.¹⁵

A 30v Tertio attenditur secundum acquisitionem in esse, et sic memoria potest procedere, / memoria potest mediare, memoria potest esse ultima, quod innuit Augustinus in sermone de imagine:

Ex his quasi excellentioribus animae dignitatibus jubemur Deum diligere, ut quantum intelligatur tantum in memoria habeatur, nec solus sufficit intellectus nisi sit voluntas in amore ejus, nec haec duo sufficiunt nisi memoria addatur, qua semper in mente intelligentis et diligentis maneat Deus.¹⁶

Sed quam identitatem habent hae potentiae cum animae essentia? Loquor secundum actus primos, non secundos. Dico in brevi quod sunt tria potentiarum genera.¹⁷ Primae sunt accidentales, quae possunt subjectum relinquere, sicut pupilla oculi potest speciem coloris suscipere, et tamen in senio aut in toto aut in parte deperditur de communi hujus

⁶ onerosas, otiosas A.

¹² primo A.

⁷ Om. B.

¹³ Om. A.

⁸ Om. Et . . . ternarius B.

¹⁴ Ecclesiasticus xvii, 1.

⁹ Cf. Rupella xxxiii; ed. cit., pp. 157-158.

¹⁵ Glossa ordinaria, from Rabanus Maurus,

¹⁰ Cf. De Trinitate X, xi, 17 ff.; PL 42, 982.

in hoc loco; PL 109, 874D.

¹¹ Op. Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 9, n. 3-5; ed. cit., IX, pp. 406-407.

¹⁶ Sermo 52, vii, 19; PL 38, 362.

¹⁷ Cf. Rupella, I, xxxiii; ed. cit., pp. 159-160.

potentia. Secundae sunt naturales et hae subjectum sequuntur sed subjectum non relinquunt, ut in igne potentia calefaciendi. Est tertia potentia quae est inseparabilis (contra primas) et idem cum substantia (contra secundas), ideo substantialis, de quo genere sunt memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, ut sentit Joannes Bonaventurae in primo, Joannes Scotus in eodem, Joannes de Rupella in tractatu *De anima*.¹⁸ Tres sunt Joannes quorum praecipua est auctoritas. Unde Aurelius Augustinus in IX *De Trinitate*:

Admonemur si possumus videre utcumque haec in anima substantialiter existere non tamquam in subjecto, ut color et figura aut alia qualitas aut quantitas; quidquid enim tale est, non excedit subjectum in quo est; mens autem amore quo se amat potest et aliud amare propter se.¹⁹

Et paulo post:

B 17rb Nec sunt sicut tres partes quibus unum totum compleetur, quia nulla / pars totum cuius est pars complectitur. Mens vero cum se totam novit per totum est notitia ejus. Nec etiam se habent sicut aqua, vinum et mel ex quibus fit una potio; non enim unius substantiae sunt quamvis ex illis fiat una substantia; nec etiam se habent sicut caput et capitatum, vel sciens et scientia, nam remanebit altera sine altera, vel alterum sine altero.

Et concludit:

Miro itaque modo tria illa sunt inseparabilia a seipsis, tamen singulum eorum quodque est substantia vel essentia.²⁰

Et tantum de secundo.

A 31r Quantum ad tertium, de actibus imaginis.²¹ Quia dicit Augustinus in libro *De Trinitate*²² quod actus imaginis se mutuo circuminceund, / ut similitudo ad divinas sit personas, inter quas est circumcessio, ut quod memini intelligo et volo, quod intelligo memini et volo, quod volo memini et intelligo; obicitur quia multa intelligimus quae nolumus, ut peccata et mala. Et dicendum breviter quod respectu trium habet dictum Augustini vel debet habere veritatem: primo²³ respectu Dei a quo imago ipsa est,²⁴ secundo, animae rationalis quae ipsa est; tertio, beatitudinis ad quam ipsa est aut habitu aut actu. De ceteris non oportet.—Et tantum de isto ternario imaginis et de tota imagine.

X. DE UNIONE ANIMAE AD CORPUS

Viso de anima rationali secundum quod comparatur ad Deum in ratione imaginis, videamus de ipsa secundum quod comparatur ad corpus. Hoc enim et ad qualitatem pertinet; praedicatur enim in quale comparabilitas¹ aut non-comparabilitas.² Et hic est triplex consideratio secundum quod anima tripliciter ad suum corpus comparatur: primo,

¹⁸ St. Bonaventure, *I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 2, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; *ed. cit.*, I, p. 86a; Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 9, n. 3-4; *ed. cit.*, IX, pp. 406-407 (and II, d. 16, q. un.; *ed. cit.*, XIII, pp. 23 ff.); Rupella, *Summa de anima*, loc. cit.

¹⁹ C. iv, 5; PL 42, 963; more or less a correct quotation; the text in Rupella, *ed. cit.*, p. 160, is very faulty.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 7, 964, *ad sensum*; from Rupella, p. 160.

²¹ Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*, pp. 158-159.

²² Lib. IX, v. 8; PL 42, 965.

²³ *Om. B.*

²⁴ *Om. A.*

¹ comparitas *B.*

² non-comparitas *B.*

secundum suum accessum ad corpus; secundo, secundum suum statum in corpore; tertio, secundum suum recessum a corpore.³

Circa primum notandum est quod haec tria se habent per ordinem:⁴ mixtum, complexionatum, compositum. Omne enim complexionatum mixtum est, non econtra. Ad mixtionem enim solum simpliciter sufficiunt elementa illo⁵ modo quo in I *De generatione* mixtionem definivit Philosophus: Mixtio est alteratorum unio.⁶ Ad complexionem vero certa et determinatio⁷ requiritur proportio. Unde bene dicimus: Haec arbor vel haec herba talis est complexionis, quod de lapide dicere non valemus,

B 17va licet mixti lapides sint. Unde forma simplicis / mixti non est anima, sed complexionati anima vegetativa. Rursus, omne compositum complexionatum est, non econtra; capitur enim hic compositum ut accipiunt medici ex conjunctis organis quae proprie plantae non habent, non autem communiter ut dicitur⁸ compositum⁹ ex materia et forma; et haec animantur nobiliori anima secundum quod plura habent organa differentia secundum speciem aut perfectiora, non dico secundum numerum quia plures pedes¹⁰ secundum numerum habent musca quam homo; et

A 31v idea / quia anima rationalis nobilissima est animarum, corpus suum in organis plus abundat; sic enim ascendunt in perfectione animalia.

Unde relinquitur corpus humanum fore compositissimum,¹¹ tum primo ratione plurium virtutum, tum secundo ratione plurium operationum, tum tertio quia in corpore magis disposito perfectius operatur, ut patet in operibus vegetativae nutriendo, generando, augmentando, et sensitivae cujus sunt operationes perfectiores magis in homine quam in alio animali. Videmus enim quod sicco appetit animal alimentum, frigido retinet, calido digerit, humido expellit; et complexius in homine. Et tali corpori immediate jussu Dei unitur anima, non mediante unione; prius enim natura anima rationalis cum corpore humano per se unum facit quam sit unio, cum unio extrema sequatur;¹² quin immo nec quantitas natura praecedit hominem ex anima constitutum et corpore, cum ex anima rationali et corpore sine quantitate possit homo per potentiam Dei constitui. Si enim Deus potest facere quantitatem sine substantia, quae prior est, ut patet in Sacramento altaris, quare non poterit facere substantiam sine quantitate, quae posterior est? Ideo solum ex his duobus, corpore scilicet et anima, tertia fit entitas, homo scilicet, nullo habito respectu ad accidens. Unde nec unibilitas animae de ratione essentiali est animae, ut dicit frater Joannes de Rupella hic,¹³ nec de ratione constituti; anima ergo rationalis¹⁴ seipsa perficit corpus, non mediante potentia ut patet in paralisi, ubi membrum vivit non tamen sentit.

³ Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxxiv; ed. cit., p. 161.

⁴ pro ordine B.

⁵ primo B.

⁶ Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, 10, 328b25.

⁷ determinata A.

⁸ dicimus B.

⁹ Om. B.

¹⁰ Om. A.

¹¹ Cf. Rupella xxxvi; ed. cit., pp. 164-165.

¹² consequatur A.

¹³ Scilicet, I, xxxv; ed. cit., p. 161: Cum unibilitas non sit accidentalis animae, sed essentialis, et sit id quo essentialiter differt anima rationalis ab angelo, sicut dictum est prius (I, xiv; pp. 121-122), ut uniuersa anima corpori per unibilitatem, ergo unitur per suam essentiam; ergo sine medio. Cf. also

St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 2, a. 3, q. 2, resp., ed. cit., II, p. 50: Illud ergo, quo anima est unibilis corpori, tale dicit quid essentiale respiciens quod est nobilissimum in anima, etc. From Book I, c. vi, *ad finem*, of the present text, it is evident that William de Vauvillon follows the position of Duns Scotus, as opposed to that of Rupella and Saint Bonaventure. Uniblity and non-uniblity do not constitute the difference between soul and angel; they differ *ex rationibus propriis* (*Op. Oxon.* II, d. 1, q. 5, n. 2; ed. cit., XI, p. 188). Uniblity and non-uniblity, according to Duns Scotus, are something consequent to the essence of soul and angel: *passiones essentiam animae con sequentes* (*supra*, I, vi).

¹⁴ rationalis ergo A.

Et si dicatur¹⁵ primo quod ex caelo et elemento non fit tertium et tamen magis convenient ad invicem, ergo nec ex anima et corpore; secundo, quia in megacosmo ex motore seu anima caeli et caelo non fit per se

B 17vb unum, ergo nec in microcosmo a simili; tertio, quia / non habent communem materiam, ergo, etc.;¹⁶ ad primum dicendum¹⁷ quod in talibus non requiritur major convenientia, sed major proportio, quae est in proposito, quia corpus est perfectibile et anima est¹⁸ perfectio; non sic in caelo respectu elementi. Ad secundum: non est simile; anima enim caeli seu motor nec est vegetativa nec sensitiva quae ad talem unionem

A 32r exigitur. / Ad tertium: non sequitur, ut dictum est solvendo primum, etiam falsum sumit, convenient enim in materia scilicet remota, ut dicamus unum ternarium in ascensu, dimissa mixtione in descensu quia non sufficit ut mixtum anima informetur: complexionatum, compositum, organicum, ut complexionato ut sic anima vegetativa, composito sensibilis, organico rationalis respondeat, quae tamen non ut rationalis sed ut vegetativa et sensibilis informat. Et limbo organicum ad corpus hominis ex sui¹⁹ perfectione, licet largissime, capiatur dum Philosophus animam definit in II *De anima* dicens quod anima est actus corporis organici,²⁰ largius dum appropriatur animae sensibili, stricte rationali. Non quaeramus ergo animae medium ut corpus informat sed ut movet et se habet²¹ ut artifex.

Sunt hoc modo tria: anima, medium, corpus.²² Et ex parte cujuslibet horum trium tria collocemus. Anima rationalis est incorporea, cognitiva, non dependens. Corpus est corporeum, obtusum, dependens. Ecce incorporeum animae corporeo opponitur corporis; cognitivum obtuso, independenti dependenti. Dependet enim corpus ab anima tripliciter, ut a vivificatore, rectore, motore. Anima vero rationalis libera est.

Veniamus ad medium ut haec extrema uniantur. Est autem triplex medium, unum ex parte animae, unum ex parte corporis, unum quod stat in medio. Ex parte animae sic dicamus: anima intellectiva, anima sensitiva, anima vegetativa: sunt tria. Capiamus animam vegetativam. Tria habet: est incorporea, obtusa, dependens. Ex obtuso et dependenti ad corpus proximat, ex incorporeo ad rationalem animam; ex duobus ad corpus, ex uno ad intellectum. Occurrit anima sensitiva; est incorporea,

B 18ra cognitiva,²³ dependens. Tria sunt: incorporea / est dimensione carens; alioquin esset major in majore corpore sensus et minor in minore; dependens sicut vegetativa a corpore per quod operatur. Ecce ex incorporeo et cognitivo ad rationalem animam, ex dependentia ad corpus

A 32v proximat, everso modo ad animam / vegetativam quae ex uno solo ad intellectum sed ex duobus ad corpus propinquat. Vide proportionem mirabilem. Ex parte corporis sunt tria: proportio geometrica, proportio arithmeticæ, proportio musicalis: haec triplex, quae in humoribus fundatur et maxime in sanguine, ut patet per Aegidium de Salerno juxta finem libri *De pulsibus*.²⁴ Est autem sanguis simplex, obtusus, dependens. Ecce tria. Quia simplex cum anima, quia obtusus et dependens cum corpore convenit, et fit symphonia quae est duorum ad unum.

Est autem tertio tertium medium quod stat recte in medio, ut nec sit anima nec corpus ex elementis sed a caelo veniat—non dico formaliter

¹⁵ Objections drawn from Alexander, *Summa theologica* I-II, n. 344; ed. cit., II, pp. 417-418.

¹⁶ Om. ergo, etc. B.

¹⁷ dicendum est ad primum A.

¹⁸ Om. B.

¹⁹ sua A.

²⁰ C. 1, 412a20 ff.

²¹ habeat B.

²² Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xxxii; ed. cit., pp. 166-167.

²³ sensitiva A.

²⁴ Part III, lines 257 ff., ed. cit., p. 38 ff. Cf. also Vauquillon, *Dubietas praemialis in Secundum collativa*, q. 1, ad 1; ed. cit., fol. 123A: Solent mathematici triplicem dicere proportionem: arithmeticam, geometricam et musicam.

sed dico virtualiter—, et dicitur spiritus, quod philosophi²⁵ virium animae vehiculum nuncuparunt.²⁶ Est autem hic spiritus subtilis, spiritualis, in concavitatibus membrorum diffusus. Ecce tria. Quia subtilis et spiritualis cum anima, quia in concavitatibus membrorum diffusus cum corpore convenit, everso modo ad praecedentem modum. Unde motus ipsius a fontibus est, sicut motus irradiationis et illuminationis a corporibus luminosis. Fontes autem dicuntur principalia et radicalia membra. Tria haec: cor, cerebrum, hepar, secundum quae triplex distinguitur spiritus: naturalis in hepate, vitalis in corde, animalis in cerebro. Per hos spiritus, maxime per vitalem unde gignitur secundum diastolem et sistolem pulsus, cognovit sapientissimus medicorum Galienus harmoniam in pulsibus.²⁷

Aspiciat quis diligenter tot in numero convenientias aut differentias cum anima reperiet sicut cum corpore²⁸ omnibus bene computatis; et hoc, confuse tamen,²⁹ dabat Augustinus intelligi dum in libro *De anima et spiritu* dicit:

B 18rb Convenientissima media carnis et animae:³⁰ sensualitas carnis quae / maxime ignis est; [et] phantasticum spiritus quod igneus vigor dicitur. Unde et quidam de animabus loquens ait:

Igneus est ollis³¹ vigor et caelestis origo.³²

Mira societas carnis et animae, spiritus vitae et limi terrae! Sic enim scriptum est: *Fecit Deus hominem de limo terrae, et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae,*³³

A 33r ut sic³⁴ ignis elementum, / quod duo habet cum corpore, unum solum cum anima: unde a parte se tenet corporis et sensualitas apud eum nominatur;³⁵ et igneus vigor qui a caelo venit et phantasticum dicitur spiritus, duo habens cum anima, unum autem cum corpore et stat ex parte animae rationalis in homine ex anima et corpore constituto, mira societate convenient et consonantes fiant harmoniae.

Sed merito quis inquiret:³⁶ Ex quo anima rationalis suo corpori tanta unione jungitur ut tanta prodeat harmonia, qualiter haec vocetur unio cum multiplex sit unio apud sapientes philosophos? Sunt enim tres ternarii unionum. Unum continuatione ut linea, unum contiguatione ut lapides sunt in domo, unum colligatione sicut membra in corpore: ecce primus ternarius. Et neutrum harum nostrae potest³⁷ unioni applicari. Unum commixtione sicut elementa in mixto, ut inquit Galienus in libro *De elementis*,³⁸ unum complexione sicut humores in corpore complexionato; unum impressione sicut figura in cera a sigillo imprimitur: en secundus ternarius. Et nulla harum trium est unio quam quaeramus. Unum insertione ut rami inseruntur stipiti; unum com-

²⁵ Om. A.

²⁶ Cf. Rupella, loc. cit., p. 167: Dicitur a physicis vehiculum virium animae. Alfredus Anglicus, *De motu cordis*, c. 10, nn. 7, 9-10; ed. cit., pp. 40, 42, can be cited as an example.

²⁷ Cf. his *De pulsu usu*, in *Opera omnia* I (Venice, 1541), fol. 224 ff., esp. fols. 224F and 227F. See also Alfredus Anglicus, op. cit., c. 6, n. 8; p. 24; c. 10, n. 8; p. 41; and Alcher of Clairvaux, *De spiritu et anima* xx-xxii; PL 40, 794-795.

²⁸ corporibus B.

²⁹ tamen confuse A.

³⁰ animae et carnis A.

³¹ illis mss.

³² Vergil, *Aeneid* VI, 730.

³³ *De spiritu et anima* xiv; PL 40, 790; *Genesis* ii, 7: *Formavit igitur Dominus Deum hominem de limo terrae, etc.*

³⁴ sit A.

³⁵ *De spiritu et anima* xiv; PL 40, 789. A fuller explanation is given by Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1; ed. cit., fol. 205GH, taken almost verbatim from St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 31, a. 1, q. 1; ed. cit., II, p. 742a.

³⁶ Cf. Rupella, I, xxxviii, ed. cit., p. 169; and Alexander, I-II, n. 347; ed. cit., II, pp. 421-422.

³⁷ potest nostrae A.

³⁸ Lib. I; ed. cit., I, fol. 3EF: *Quicumque vero ex iis quae remanent qualia fuere, et solum miscentur invicem, sicuti in acervo frumenta, vel hordea, cicer, ac fabae . . .*

positione ut ex materia et forma fit unum, et bene haec unio nostra est. Anima enim forma est, corpus non simplex materia, ut quidam grosse intelligunt, sed ex forma quae corporeitas dicitur et prima materia compositum, nisi sint et aliae formae corporeitatem praecedentes, de quo dixi super quartum.³⁹

Ex his ergo duobus anima et humano corpore fit tertium unum, quod homo dicitur. Sed haec unio formae cum materia non est adaequata nostrae unioni; convenit enim ut patet in⁴⁰ multis. Ideo ut propriam habeamus et tertium ternarium finiamus,⁴¹ Bernardum adeamus, qui in libro *De consideratione ad Eugenium*⁴² dicit quod haec est nativa /

B 18va unio ut de anima rationali quasi patre et corpore humano quasi matre homo nascatur proles tertia.—Et tantum de accessu animae ad corpus.

XI. QUOMODO ANIMA EST IN CORPORE

A 33v Postquam visum est de accessu animae ad corpus, qui est in unione, nunc videre secundo oportet qualiter sit anima in corpore.¹ Et quia in ultimo capitulo primi / libri explanando definitionem Philosophi de anima ostensum est quomodo anima rationalis est tota in toto corpore suo et tota in qualibet parte ejus, secundum fratrem Joannem Bonaventuram,² pauca sunt dicenda hic ad confirmationem aliorum.

Unde notandum secundum fratrem Alexandrum³ quod anima rationalis in corpore suo potest intelligi tripliciter: primo ut perfectio, secundo ut agens, tertio ut movens. Primo modo sic est perfectio totius quod nullius partis. Et intelligas quod non perficit partem nisi per totum, ut dictum est ubi⁴ supra.⁵ Secundo modo, si intelligatur de intelligere nullo modo dependenti a corpore, nec dicitur esse in parte corporis nec in toto; si autem intelligatur intelligere cum phantasmate, quo modo media cellula⁶ capitis dicitur logistica seu rationalis,⁷ sic est in parte, non in toto, et sic videtur intelligi quod dicit Philosophus in I *De anima*⁸ quod similiter videtur de texere, aedicare et intelligere. Et sic potest effici quoddam ternarium ut anima aliquando dicatur esse in toto corpore, non in parte; secundo, in parte, non in toto; tertio, nec in parte nec in toto.⁹ Tertio, consideratur ut movens, et hoc tripliciter: aut primo, motu affectionis: sic potest esse praeter corpus; aut secundo, motu vitalis operationis: sic est in corde; aut tertio, motu locali: sic est ubique in corpore.

Frater Joannes de Rupella alio modo facit ternarium.¹⁰ Anima rationalis in suo corpore potest considerari tripliciter. Primo ut perfectio, et sic¹¹ est in toto quod in nulla parte ejus; aut secundo ut motor, et sic¹² est in toto quod in qualibet parte ejus; tertio ut radius luminis ad illuminatum, et sic separabilis est a toto et a parte, nec major est in majori corpore nec minor in minori.

Aut sequamur fratrem Alexandrum aut secundo¹³ Doctorem Devotum aut tertio fratrem Joannem de Rupella. Dicamus tamen semper¹⁴ consequenter.—Et tantum de esse animae in corpore.

³⁹ Vaurouillon, IV Sent., d. 44, art. 1; ed. cit., fols. 438 ff. and ed. Venice, 1496, fols. 301r-302v.

⁴⁰ Om. A.

⁴¹ habeamus B.

⁴² Liber V, viii; PL 182, 799. Cf. Alexander, loc. cit., p. 422. This solution is not found in Rupella.

¹ The question is suggested by Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xl; ed. cit., p. 176 ff. The actual sources are noted below.

² *Supra*, I, vi, p. 251.

³ *Summa theol.* I-II, n. 348; ed. cit., II, pp.

422-423.

⁴ Om. B.

⁵ *Supra*, I, vi, p. 250.

⁶ cellula media A.

⁷ Cf. Guillaume de Conches, *De philosophia mundi* IV, xxiv; PL 172, 95.

⁸ C. 4, 408b13 ff.

⁹ Om. tertio . . . toto A.

¹⁰ *Summa de anima* I, xl; ed. cit., p. 177.

¹¹ bis in A.

¹² bis in A.

¹³ Om. B.

¹⁴ semper tamen dicamus A.

XII. DE IMMORTALITATE ANIMAE RATIONALIS¹

Videamus jam qualiter se habeat rationalis anima post suum recessum a corpore. Et tres habet haec pars considerationes. Prima est de

B 18vb immortalitate / animae; secunda de passibilitate; tertia de motu.²

Quoad³ primum, animae rationalis immortalitas triplici probatur fundamento: primo ex dictis philosophorum, secundo ex communibus rationibus theologorum, tertio ex propriis.⁴

A 34r Quoad / primum, sciendum quod licet philosophorum plures fuerint sectae, tres tamen principaliores asseruntur: una Academicorum, qui etiam Stoici dici queunt; secunda Peripateticorum; tertia Epicureorum. Haec sectae animam astruunt immortalem.

Ecce Socrates, Plato in *Phaedrone*,⁵ Speusippus nepos Platonis ex sorore, hi tres quos Academia sequitur, id sentiunt et referunt ad stellarum comparatatem. Non laudo eos in falso: inter vepres colligo rosas! Haec eorum opinio Bragmanorum multos eremitas constituit ut purgarent intellectum. Ad hoc Hermes Tresmegistus, Pythagoras et Prometheus, avus Mercurii, quem jam eremitam protuli, deveniunt.⁶ En aliis ternarius, etsi Pythagoras omnes animas ejusdem censuerit rationis; ergo in suis dixit⁷ legibus grande piaculum⁸ animalia occidere et edere:

Quid enim meruere boves vel animalia⁹ sine
fraude dolisse?

O quantum scelus est in viscera viscera mergi!¹⁰

Unde¹¹ et Aristoteles ipsum in hoc ipsum¹⁰ arguit, a principali tamen non discedens,¹² licet probabiliter solum aut dubie, inquit Doctor Subtilis libro quarto, distinctione 43, quaestione secunda.¹³

Venio ad Anaxagoram, qui quoddam Peripateticorum fuit exordium. Hic intellectum impassibilem, immortalem et immixtum, per tria haec, posuit.¹⁴ Quem Averroes Cordubensis, Maurus Abubacher et Avempace flos Arabum, tres isti secuti sunt.¹⁵ Fateor multum deliquesce eos solum phantasticum supremum hominis et intellectum extra asserendo.¹⁶ Ad¹⁷ idem alius ternarius: Avicenna et suus sequax in omnibus Algazel¹⁸

¹ rationalis s. m. B.

² This division is taken from Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xli; ed. cit., p. 178: Dicendum est de esse ipsius post separationem a corpore, de quo quatuor sunt quaerenda. Primo, de immortalitate; secundo, de passibilitate; tertio, de loco; quarto, de motu. The question of place is treated above, Book II, c. vi, p. 275; see the remark of Vauouillon, *infra*, at the beginning of chapter xiv, p. 296.

³ Om. Quod . . . propriis A. This division is proper to the author; the second and third groups of reasonings are suggested by Rupella, I, xlii; ed. cit., pp. 179-180. The first, ex dictis philosophorum, is based entirely on St. Albert the Great, *De natura et origine animae*, tr. II, c. vii; ed. cit., IX, pp. 414 ff., and other references given below.

⁴ St. Albert, op. cit., tr. II, c. i; ed. cit., IX, p. 397a: De hoc [quod] anima remanet corpore soluto autem Plato in *Phaedro* conatus est dicere. Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 245.

⁵ Ibid., vi; p. 412b: Confirmatur haec ratio [Platonis] per alia quae sumuntur a dictis Socratis et Hermetis Trismegistus, cuius avus fuit Prometheus. Also p. 414a: Et haec ratio est quae multos philosophos praesertim in Academia et Germania studentes efficerit

eremitas. Cf. also c. vii, p. 415a: De Platonis . . . sententia, quam tota suscepit scola Academicorum et Bragmanorum, etc.

⁶ dimisit mss. I have adopted *dixit* from St. Albert, op. cit., viii; p. 417b.

⁷ Add. est A.

⁸ animal B.

⁹ St. Albert, loc. cit.; p. 417a: Dixit ipse omnes animas esse unius rationis et naturae. The quotation is to be found, *ibid.*, p. 417b.

¹⁰ Om. A.

¹¹ Cf. *De anima* I, 3, 407b22.

¹² Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 16; ed. cit., XX, p. 46a.

¹³ Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.* I, 8, 989b15; and *De anima* I, 2, 405a16; III, 4, 429a19. See also St. Albert, loc. cit., ix; p. 418a.

¹⁴ Anampache mss. Cf. St. Albert, loc. cit., vii; p. 414b; ix, p. 418a; Avempace is added from chapter iv; p. 405b.

¹⁵ St. Albert, *ibid.*, iv; pp. 405b ff.; and *infra*, Book III, c. xvi.

¹⁶ Id B.

¹⁷ St. Albert, *ibid.*, ii; p. 401b: Propter quod concludit hic philosophus [Avicennal], et Algazel, qui eum in omnibus sequitur. In his *Sentences*, Vauouillon speaks of Algazel as the disciple of Avicenna (*I Sent.*, *Dubitetas proemialis*; ed. cit., fol. 5A) and his

animam post separationem dicunt influentia largissima ab intelligentia agente illustrari,¹⁸ cum quibus Isaac Israelita deambulat,¹⁹ eas post exitum a corpore psalmodiis, cantu et jucunditate perfrui inquiens.²⁰

B 19ra Unde valde miror Theophrastum, Aristotelis primum discipulum et non minimum nomine apud Peripateticos / de anima rationali id sensisse assertive²¹ ut mortalis foret in exitu corporis et voluisse corriger magistrum, ut ubi posuit magister quod anima est sicut tabula rasa

A 34v rasura posuit, ut merito etsi in multis bonus in hoc / radi debuit ex Peripateticorum collegio.²² In idem peccavit Alexander Peripateticus qui intellectum generabilem et corruptibilem posuit, nec dici debere animam sicut tabulam rasam sed sicut rasam tabulam audacter asseruit, ut in libro tertio, De divisione intellectus secundum philosophos, erit clarum.²³ Ecce tertio: Cecinna, Hesiodus et Athalus; isti tres quos Epicureorum magnificat gymnasium id sentiunt de anima hominum ut post mortem felicitate gaudeat.²⁴ Et tantum de istis quoad primum.

Quantum ad secundum, sunt tres binarii rationum,²⁵ quorum primus sumptus est ex ordine animae rationalis ad ceteras creaturas²⁶ universi. Primo pono tria,²⁷ supremam formam, primam materiam et medium. Tunc sic: aequae est de ratione universi suprema forma sicut prima materia, sed materia prima est incorruptibilis; ergo anima rationalis est immortalis. Secundo sic: est reperire substantiam incorruptibilem habentem magnitudinem, ut substantia caeli; secundo est reperire substantiam incorruptibilem sine magnitudine, ut substantia angeli; ergo tertio est reperire substantiam incorruptibilem non habentem magnitudinem sed entitatem²⁸ in magnitudine. Haec est anima rationalis. Ecce primus binarius.

Secundus binarius sumitur ex ratione divinae justitiae. Primo, quia alias multa bona essent irremunerata et multa mala impunita, sicut pater in floritione²⁹ malorum et depressione bonorum hic. Secundo, quia alias bonum opus in pejorem vergeret exitum³⁰ ut dum quis moriretur pro justitia moriendo moriretur anima ejus et perderetur justitia quae est in ea, quod omnis philosophus, lex divina et omnis secta horret. En secundus binarius.

Tertius binarius sumitur ex ordine animae rationalis ad suum finem.³¹ Primo sic: alias tolleretur beatitudo quae est ultimus finis animae³² ex I et X³³ Ethicorum,³⁴ quia beatitudo perpetuitatem exigit et ita fines reliqui vani essent. Secundo, quia frustra esset in anima rationali ad beatitudinem appetitus, quod fundamento naturae repugnat, inquit Averroes, II *Metaphysicae*.³⁵ Ecce tertius binarius. Et hi tres binarii ex

abbreviator (*ibid.*; fol. 5B; and *I Sent.*, d. 36, a. 2, concl. 2; fol. 88B).

¹⁸ St. Albert, *loc. cit.*, vii; pp. 414-415; Avicenna, *De anima* V, c. 6; *ed. cit.*, fol. 26va; Algazel, *Metaphysics*, p. II, tr. V, 3 (Toronto, 1933), p. 185.

¹⁹ deambulabat A.

²⁰ Cf. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, vii; p. 415a; and xi; p. 421. Nowhere, however, does Saint Albert class Isaac Israelita with Avicenna and Algazel, but as a follower of the Epicureans; thus, p. 421: *De opinione autem Isaac Israelitae philosophi, qui antiquissimos Epicureorum Hesiodum et Athalam et Cecinam sequi videtur . . .*

²¹ asserunt A.

²² Cf. *infra*, Book III, xvi.

²³ Cf. St. Albert, *op. cit.*, vi; pp. 407-408.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, vii; p. 415a; and xi; pp. 421-422.

²⁵ Taken from St. Bonaventure, *II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 1, q. 1, fund.; *ed. cit.*, II, pp. 458-459;

they are also found to some extent in Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xlvi; *ed. cit.*, pp. 179-180; and ultimately in Philip the Chancellor (cf. L. Keeler, *Ex summa Phil. Canc. quaest. de anima*, pp. 53-56). See the parallel in Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 2; fols. 179-180.

²⁶ ceteras B.

²⁷ Corr. from tertiam A.

²⁸ entem B.

²⁹ florificatione A.

³⁰ vergeret in pejorem exitum A.

³¹ finem suum A.

³² finis animae ultimus A.

³³ Om. et X A.

³⁴ *Ethic. Nic.* I, 7, 1097a30 ff.; X, 6-7, 1176a32 and 1177a11 ff. Cf. Vauvouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 19, a. 2; *ed. cit.*, 180F: Sed quaeritur an Aristoteles posuerit animae immortalitatem. Dicendum quod sic; etc.

³⁵ Text 1 (Venice, 1574), fol. 28^{vb}.

A 35r uno prodeunt ternario, / animam rationalem comparando ad finem
 B 19rb proprium, ad divinum judicium, ad / totum universum; nec dico has fore
 demonstrativas rationes sed persuasiones,³⁹ plus praedicabiles quam dis-
 putabiles.⁴⁰

Quantum ad tertium. Quia dies est dominicae Resurrectionis in quo
 vera immortalitas apparuit et Christo in triplici antiphona in matutinis
 fit jubilus,⁴¹ tres apparent⁴² rationum ternarii.⁴³ Immortalitatem enim
 animae rationalis primo probat quia imago Dei; si enim terminis mortis⁴⁴
 clauderetur, numquam imago diceretur, ut inquit Cassiodorus.⁴⁵ Secundo,
 quia materia quam forma animae perficit ita quietatur in nobilitate
 formae quod aliam non appetit, sicut patet in caelis. Cujus ratio est:⁴⁶
 quia illa forma non habet contrarium, quia tunc istud⁴⁷ non posset in
 se recipere nec suam similitudinem et ita nec intelligere. Tertio, hoc
 arguitur ex reflexione sui super se; cognoscit enim se et amat, quod
 corruptibili non convenit. Ecce primus ternarius.

Quarto, quia fortificatur ex alienatione a corpore: quanto enim magis
 viget homo interior tanto minus exterior. Quinto, quia operatio ejus
 propria, scilicet intellectio, nullomodo pendet ex corpore nec organum
 requirit; ideo eam cum corpore mori non oportet. Sexto, corruptibilium
 operatio antiquatur et senescit sicut patet ad sensum, quod in anima⁴⁸
 rationali nequaquam fit.⁴⁹ Unde Philosophus, in⁵⁰ II *De anima*, dicit
 quod si senex haberet oculum juvenis videret sicut juvenis.⁵¹ Et scriptum
 est: *In antiquis est sapientia, et in multo tempore prudentia.*⁵² En
 secundus ternarius.

Septimo, quia objectum ejus est immutabile ut verum aut ens in qua-
 tum ens; debet autem esse proportio objecti ad potentiam. Octavo, quia
 virtus corruptibilis laeditur ex excessu sui objecti. Unde Philosophus,
 III *De anima*, dicit: Excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum; intellectus
 autem non, sed fortificatur ex nobilissimo objecto cognito.⁵³ Ex operatione
 autem cognoscitur virtus, et ex virtute illud⁵⁴ cuius est. Nono, quia si
 esset mortal is, hoc enim⁵⁵ ex una trium causarum adveniret ei: aut
 primo ex parte sui, et probatum est oppositum et ex parte formae et ex
 parte materiae; aut secundo ex parte subjecti, et hoc non quia ex corpore
 non dependet; aut tertio ex / absentia causae effectivae, et hoc non
 quia ubique praesens est Deus. En tertius ternarius. Nec dico quin
 anima verti possit in nihilum semota manutenentia Dei, sicut reliqua
 omnia.

A 35v
 B 19va Has collegi brevius quo potui doctorum antiquorum rationes ad pro-
 bandum immor- / talitatem animae, quae tamen apud Scotum solum
 sunt leves manudictiones.⁵⁶ Et si dicatur quod de Deo, prima ad
 Timotheum, ultimo capitulo, scriptum est: *Qui solus habet immortalitatem;*⁵⁷ secundo, quia Damascenus dicit: Omne quod a versione incipit
 in versionem tendit,⁵⁸ anima autem rationalis incipit a non-esse in esse;

³⁹ persuasibles B.

⁴⁰ This is a radical departure, under Scotist influence, from the opinion of St. Bonaventure, who writes (*loc. cit., resp.; p. 460*): Rationes vero superius inductae ostendunt quod anima est immortalis, et verum concludunt et ideo concedendae sunt.

⁴¹ fit jubilus in matutinis A.

⁴² apparebunt B.

⁴³ This series of *rationes propriae* is drawn from Saint Bonaventure, *loc. cit., resp.; p. 460a*, and fund. 7-12; p. 459. The reference to Easter Matins is unintelligible.

⁴⁴ mortis terminis A.

⁴⁵ *De anima* ii; PL 70, 1285.

⁴⁶ *Om. B.*

⁴⁷ illud A.

⁴⁸ natura A.

⁴⁹ Add. id est, in anima A.

⁵⁰ *Om. B.*

⁵¹ sicut juvenis videret A. Aristotle, *De anima* I, 4, 408b22 f.

⁵² Job xii, 12.

⁵³ C. 4, 429b1 ff.

⁵⁴ id A.

⁵⁵ ei A.

⁵⁶ *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 43, q. 2, n. 16 and 11.
 26-27; ed. cit., XX, pp. 46a and 56.

⁵⁷ *I Tim.* vi, 16; objections are drawn from St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.; p. 457b.*

⁵⁸ *De fide orthodoxa* I, iii; PG 94, 795; and II, xxvii; 959.

tertio, quia dicit Philosophus: Intellectus corrumpitur quodam interius corrupto;⁵⁶ ad primum dicendum quod Deus est immortalis per essentiam solus, anima autem⁵⁷ immortalis est⁵⁸ per participationem, sed non sola.⁵⁹ Ad secundum dicendum quod bene probat quod anima ex se in nihilum tenderet nisi manutentia Dei in esse teneretur. Ad tertium dicendum quod Philosophus intelligit de intellectu materiali, de quo dictum fuit in praesenti capitulo, impeditur enim ratione laesae phantasiae.—Et in tantum de animae immortalitate dictum sit.

XIII. DE PASSIBILITATE ANIMAE

Superest ut de passibilitate animae aliquid dicatur, aut breviter pertractetur.¹ Ubi primo sciendum quod passio dicitur tribus binariis. Primo dicitur passio condivisa contra actionem, et hoc modo apud Philosophum est praedicamentum.² Apud autem³ Gilbertum Porretani, in libro *Sex Principiorum*, dicitur secundum principium; de quo dicit definiens: Passio est effectus illatioque actionis.⁴ Secundo dicitur passio propriæ proprium alicujus,⁵ eo modo quo dicimus quod risibilitas est passio hominis, de quo modo passionis loquitur Philosophus in I *Topi-corum*.⁶ Ecce primus binarius.

Tertio dicitur⁷ passio idem quod receptio, de quo modo loquitur Philosophus in III *De anima*: Intelligere est quoddam pati.⁸ Licet enim secundum Doctorem Subtilem intellectus sit causa partialis efficiens aequivoca intellectionis,⁹ non tamen dicitur intelligere in quantum producitur, sed in quantum recipit; ideo pati in proposito idem est quod intellectu subjective recipere. Quarto modo dicitur passio / ut opponitur passibili qualitatibus, ut passibilis qualitas dicatur permanens, sed passio transiens, et hoc modo accipit Philosophus in tertia specie qualitatis.¹⁰ En secundus binarius.

A 36r

Quinto dicitur passio ut operationi opponitur naturali, et sic sumendo eam eam sic definit Damascenus: Passio est motus praeter naturam sive ex se sive ex alio.¹¹ / Operatio vero est motus qui est secundum naturam, ut cordis pulsus naturaliter motus operatio est; qui vero secundum saltus immoderatus existens passio est. Sexto dicitur passio, passio animalis, quam sic definit Damascenus: Passio est motus appetitivæ sensibilis in imaginatione boni vel mali.¹² Et Remigius: Passio est motus irrationalis partis animae per suspicionem boni vel mali.¹³ Ecce tertius binarius.

Et de his passionibus dicit Boethius in metro ultimo¹⁴ I *De consolatione*:

Gaudia pelle, pelle timorem,
spemque fugato, nec dolor adsit.¹⁵

Et Vergilius:

⁵⁶ *De anima* I, 4, 408b26 ff.

⁵⁷ *Om. A.*

⁵⁸ est immortalis A.

⁵⁹ Cf. St. Bonaventure, *loc. cit.*, p. 460b.

¹ *Om. B.* Cf. John of Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xlvi; *ed. cit.*, pp. 190 ff. As will be evident, Rupella is but a partial source of this chapter; the core of the doctrine is from Duns Scotus.

² *Categories* I, 9, 11b1 ff.

³ *Om. B.*

⁴ *Liber de sex principiis* Gilberto Porretano ascriptus, c. III, n. 10; *ed. A. Heyesse O.F.M.* (*Opuscula et textus, series scholastica*, VII, Münster, 1929), p. 15, line 10; also found in PL 188, 1262.

⁵ alicujus proprium A.

⁶ C. 5, 102a17 ff.

⁷ *Om. A.*

⁸ C. 3, 427b17; and 4, 429a18 ff.

⁹ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* I, d. 3, q. 8, n. 4; *ed. cit.*, IX, p. 401a; *Quodlibet XV*, *passim*; XXVI, pp. 118 ff.; *Quæst. subtil. in Metaph.* VII, q. 18, n. 9; VII, p. 459a.

¹⁰ *Categories* I, 8, 9b27 ff.

¹¹ *De fide orthodoxa* II, xxii; PG 94, 942.

¹² *Ibid.*, col. 939.

¹³ Cf. my 'Remigius-Nemesius', *Franciscan Studies*, VIII (1948), 281. The correct reference is Nemesius, *De natura hominis* xvi; PG 40, 674.

¹⁴ ultimo metro A.

¹⁵ Metrum vii, verses 25-29; PL 63, 657-658.

Hi metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque.¹⁶

Tangit autem Damascenus primo subjectum harum passionum dum dicit appetitivae partis sensibilis, quod Remigius dicit irrationalis partis animae. Primo enim cognitae sunt inesse parti sensitivae et ex hinc translatio facta est ad partem intellectivam. Secundo tangit ductivum: in imaginatione, inquit, quod dicit Remigius per suspicionem. Tertio objectum: boni vel mali; quod et Remigius dicit.

De passionibus autem in particulari habetur libro tertio in expositione opinionis¹⁷ Joannis Damasceni de potentis animae post capitulum De concupiscibili et irascibili,¹⁸ et amplius De motivis potentis in opinione Philosophorum.¹⁹

Tunc dico discurrendo: anima est passibilis primo modo relate²⁰ ad agens qui imprimet; passibilis secundo modo, immo passibilitas est passio ejus; passibilis tertio modo dum intellectionem recipit; passibilis quarto modo nisi passio ad sensibilia limitetur; passibilis quinto modo ex peccato: immo omne peccatum hoc modo passio est quia et contra et praeter naturam, et ex poena quam patitur; passibilis sexto modo et conjuncta dum condolet corpori patienti, et separata dum aut²¹ gaudet aut tristatur in inferis. Ex quo patet quod anima potest pati et quinto et sexto modis, et secundum portionem inferiorem et secundum superiorem; dum

A 36v enim / se avertit ab eo cui subjecta est, pati meruit ab eo cui subjecta non erat, et consolations removeri ab ea quae essent gratae ei. Juste enim Sapientiae undecimo scriptum est capitulo: *Per quae quis peccat, per haec et torquetur.*²²

B 20ra Unde secundum Augustinum, XXI / *De Civitate Dei*,²³ dolet et patitur anima tripliciter. Primo dolet aut condolet corpori per compassionem; dolet secundo in corpore incolumi per aliquam invisibilem causam; dolet²⁴ tertio separata sicut apud inferos dolet Dives, nec oportet semper imprimens passionem esse nobilioris dum fit justitia ut ignis inferi²⁵ cruciat daemones, nec exstat causa totalis. Aut compassionem ut corporis in animam. Videmus enim pati dominum in poenam servi et matrem in poenam filii. Ex inclinatione ergo²⁶ naturali animae et conjunctione cum corpore²⁷ anima corpori compatitur.

Et si dicatur:²⁸ Omnis actio naturalis est per contactum, anima autem non potest tangi a corpore nec daemon ab igne, cum quantitatatem dimensionem non habeant; dicendum quod triplex est actio: prima, corporis in corpus et ista est per contactum; secunda, spiritus in spiritum et fit per applicationem sicut in daemoniacis: dum daemon applicatur corpori cuius anima est perfectio anima patitur; tertia, corporis in spiritum et fit per colligationem ut animae et corporis.

Sed quia mentio facta est quod daemon ab igne patitur infernali aut anima separata, modum quaero²⁹ maxime propter triplex dictum Augustini, qui³⁰ videtur hanc passionem realem non ponere, sed ad modum somnii aut quod ille ignis corporeus non sit. Prima est libro³¹ XII *Super Genesim ad litteram*: Inferorum³² substantiam arbitror, inquit, esse spiri-

¹⁶ Aeneid VI, 733.

¹⁷ Om. B.

¹⁸ *Infra*, Book III, vi.

¹⁹ *Infra*, Book III, xv.

²⁰ relata A.

²¹ autem B.

²² Wisdom xi, 17: *Ut scirent quia per quae peccat quis, per haec et torquetur.*

²³ Chapter x, 1-2; PL 41, 724-725; cf. Rupella, *op. cit.*, I, xlviij; p. 194.

²⁴ Om. A.

²⁵ justa A.

²⁶ igitur A.

²⁷ Add. et anima A.

²⁸ Cf. Rupella, *loc. cit.*

²⁹ Cf. Rupella, I, xlviij-xlix; pp. 195 ff.

³⁰ quia B.

³¹ Om. A.

³² Inferiorem A.

tualement non corporalem in qua spiritus cruciantur.³³ Et datur ibi exemplum. Et³⁴ dicit ibi:

Anima a corpore exuta similitudinem gerit corporalem et per hoc afficitur corporum similitudinibus; unde ab eis patietur, sicut accidit in dormientibus cum somniant.³⁵

Secunda est ejusdem XXI³⁶ *De civitate Dei*: unde exponendo quomodo ardebat Dives ille cum dicebat: *Crucior in hac flamma*,³⁷ dicit:

A 37r Talem fuisse illam flammatum quales oculi quos levavit, qualis lingua qua³⁸ aquam / desideravit; ubi erant sine corporibus animae. Sic ergo incorporalis illa flamma qua exarsit et illa guttula quam poposcit; qualia [etiam] sunt³⁹ visa dormientium sive in ecstasi cernentium⁴⁰ res incorporales, habentes quasdam similitudines corporum.⁴¹

B 20rb Tertia est ejusdem / in libro *De anima et spiritu*:

Anima, inquit, incorporeta est, potest tamen habere similitudinem corporis, non corporalem, sed corpori similem, et corporalium omnino membrorum cum de corpore egreditur et pro meritis fertur ad loca poenalia similia corporibus.⁴²

Dico quia subtilissima est materia juxta mentem Doctoris Subtilis, quem totus⁴³ orbis magnificat latissime, ex quarto, distinctione 44, quaestione secunda, ab eo non devians.⁴⁴ Quo in loco duabus narratis opinionibus suam ponit ut tertiam. Prima fuit Thomae, libro quarto, distinctione 44, in quaestione illa: Utrum anima separata⁴⁵ possit ab igne corporeo pati, dicentis quod ideo ab igne cremantur aut daemones aut animae damnatae separatae quia apprehendunt ab illo igne ut eis disconveniente se cremari.⁴⁶ Unde Gregorius in IV *Dialogorum*: Eo patitur quo videt, et quia cremari se respicit, ideo cruciatur.⁴⁷ Quod ex Avicenna,⁴⁸ IX *Metaphysicae* sua, ostenditur, ubi dicit quod aliquando contingit aliquem tantum affligi ex apprehensione alicujus disconvenientis in somno quantum ex experientia ejus in vigilia.⁴⁹ Contra quem arguit Scotus:⁵⁰ quia aut daemon vel anima separata illum ignem apprehendit ut suae naturae disconvenientem vera apprehensione aut falsa. Primum dari non potuit, non enim ignis corruptivus est aut daemonis aut animae rationalis separatae, sed sibi conveniens in ratione objecti. Si dicatur quod Deus per suam justitiam sic vult fieri, quaerimus modum quomodo potest

³³ cruciatur B. *De Gen. ad litteram XII*, xxxii, 61; PL 34, 481.

³⁴ Unde A.

³⁵ St. Augustine, *ibid.*, col. 480.

³⁶ 12 mss. The error is in Rupella also, xlix; p. 197.

³⁷ Luke xvi, 24.

³⁸ quae B.

³⁹ sunt bis B.

⁴⁰ cernenti mss.; add. ut A.

⁴¹ *De civitate Dei XXI*, x, 2; PL 41, 725.

⁴² Chapt. xxx; PL 40, 800, with a few words omitted at the end of the quotation.

⁴³ Om. B.

⁴⁴ deveniens A. Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 44, q. 2; ed. cit., XX, pp. 208 ff. In his *Vademecum*, William de Vauvouillon identifies the opinions as given here in the *De anima*: In secunda parte hujus distinctionis movet [Duns Scotus] duas quaestiones. Prima est: utrum ignis infernalis cruciet

malignos spiritus. Prima opinio est Thomae in praesentia distinctione, q. 1, utrum anima separata possit pati ab igne corporeo, et Egidii de Roma, *Quodli.* 2, q. 9, et *Quodli.* 4, q. 15, quod spiritus cruciatur ab igne inquantum apprehendit ignem sub ratione disconvenientis. Secunda opinio est Henrici *Quodli.* 8, q. 38, quod spiritui datur quidam habitus supernaturalis propter demeritum peccati et per illum habitum subiicit agenti naturali (Padua, 1485), fol. 55b.

⁴⁵ pati possit ab igne corporeo A.

⁴⁶ St. Thomas, *IV Sent.*, d. 44, q. 3, a. 2, q^a 1 (Parma, 1852), VII, p. 1104b; and *Summa theol.* III, q. 97, a. 5 (Ottawa, 1944), p. 495^b.

⁴⁷ St. Gregory the Great, *Dialog.* IV, 43; PL 77, 401.

⁴⁸ Add. in A.

⁴⁹ Chapt. 7 (Venice, 1508), fol. 106^b.

⁵⁰ *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 44, q. 2, n. 3; ed. cit., XX, p. 209a.

fieri, sed non aperit.⁵¹ Si falsa, tunc primo non igne sed sua falsa apprehensione cruciatur; tum secundo quia si illa falsa apprehensio est a Deo, erit Deus immediata causa deceptionis; tum tertio, si dicatur quod a daemone vel anima, non videtur probabile, quia secundum Dionysium, *De divinis nominibus*,⁵² in daemonibus naturalia sunt splendidissima; unde possunt cognoscere quod ignis non est eis disconveniens. Unde et

- A 37v Gregorius, ubi supra, dicit: / Non solum videntendo sed etiam experiendo patitur.

Secunda opinio est Henrici de Gandavo, quem doctores Parisius Doctorem Solemnam nominant. Dicit ergo, *Quodlibeto VIII*, q. 34,⁵³ quod

daemoni aut animae propter peccati demeritum datur aliquis habitus

- B 20va quo mediante / ab igne corporali patitur.⁵⁴ Contra tripliciter arguit Joannes de Duns aut de Donis.⁵⁵ Primo: aut ille habitus est corporalis aut spiritualis. Si corporalis, ita potest Deus facere angelum album per albedinem inhaerentem aut nigrum per nigredinem; sicut oportet angelum dici corporeum, si ille habitus inhaereret,⁵⁶ si pro quia, quia est accidentis. Si autem est spiritualis, totum passum est inproportionatum corpori, sicut prius. Secundo: quia habitus non est quo simpliciter possumus sed aliqualiter; ergo si spiritus non potest ex se pati, non potest ex habitu aliqualiter pati; cujus enim est pati et sic pati? Tertio: quia illa passio ponitur immediate in essentia animae aut daemonis aut in habitu; si primum, igitur habitus nihil facit; si secundum, tunc habitus etiam separatus pateretur, sicut quantitas separata in Sacramento altaris est alba.⁵⁷

His semotis Scotus ponit mentem suam, in quodam binario,⁵⁸ quod complebo ternario. Et dicit quod daemon et anima separata damnata ab igne inferni patitur duplicitate: primo⁵⁹ ut a loco detinente, secundo ut ab objecto immutante.

Quoad primum, scilicet locum detinentem, dicit Doctor quod hanc poenam initiat naturae angelicae indifferentia ad quemcumque locum, mediat daemonis superbia qua appetit uti propria potestate, terminat invidia qua Deo invidet quod potest ipsum sic arctare ut sit semper in igne quasi carceribus. Unde sequitur tristitia tanto major quanto plus peccavit. Et impletur quod dicit Psalmus:⁶⁰ *Superbia eorum, qui te oderunt, ascendit semper;*⁶¹ non quidem in se stat, sed vadit ad invidiam. Unde patet omnes daemones non aequaliter ab igne cruciari, sed juxta demerita, sicut de animabus in IV *Dialogorum* dicit Gregorius.⁶² Et haec detentio a Deo est effectiva qui in ignem trusit eos, ab igne vero formaliter.⁶³ Exemplum ponit Scotus de desperatis hominibus cupientibus mori ante tempus propter aliquod contristans.⁶⁴

- A 38r Quoad secundum, ignem scilicet ut objectum / immutantem intellectum daemonis, loquitur pariformiter.⁶⁵ Sunt equidem tria. Primum, naturae angelicae indifferentia ad quodcumque objectum creatum;

- B 20rb secundum, superbia qua propria vellet / uti potestate; tertium, invidia dum videt se non posse impediente⁶⁶ Deo; unde invidet, et sequitur tristitia magna secundum demerita⁶⁷ aut major aut maxima.

⁵¹ This doctrine is not found in Duns Scotus.

⁵⁹ Om. B.

⁶⁰ Psalmista A.

⁵² *De div. nominibus* IV, § 23; PG 3, 723-726.

⁶¹ *Psalm* lxxiii, 23.

⁵³ q. 24 A.

⁶² *Dialog.* IV, 43; PL 77, 401.

⁵⁴ Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 4; p. 209b; Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 34 (Paris, 1518), fol. 338v-339r.

⁶³ Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁵ Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁴ Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 8; p. 218a.

⁵⁶ inhaeret B.

⁶⁵ Ibid., n. 10; p. 219a.

⁵⁷ Duns Scotus, *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Ibid., n. 11; p. 229.

⁵⁸ Ibid., n. 7; p. 217b.

⁶⁷ B is illegible here; it reads *impedire*,

with -re apparently deleted.

⁶⁸ secundum demerita magna A.

Et si dicatur quod multa considerat alia quam sit ignis; dicendum quod verum est usque ad ultimum judicium propter nostrum exercitium, sed facto ultimo judicio maxime ad ignem arctabitur. Unde valde timet ultimum judicium. Dicebant enim Christo daemones: *Cur venisti ante tempus torquere nos?*⁶⁸ Unde patet quod in caelo empyreо hoc modo possent torqueri a Deo daemones, et ut objectum et ut locus; solum locus est nobilior.

Est tamen ad primum modum differentia, quia in primo ignis locus solum continet formaliter, in isto modo ignis agit causaliter effective.⁶⁹ Et si dicatur quod agens est praestantius paciente, ut inquit Augustinus, XII *Super Genesim ad litteram*,⁷⁰ sed ignis non est nobilior spiritu,⁷¹ dico tripliciter.⁷² Primo, quod illa auctoritas dependet ex ista, quod agens est praestantius termino actionis, et terminus actionis est nobilior subiecto recipiente. Et⁷³ regula⁷⁴ non est vera nisi in quantum agens est in actu virtuali et terminus in actu formali, et subiectum solum in potentia, et nobilior est actus quam⁷⁵ potentia secundum quod potentia; non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod sit nobilis absoluta natura patientis. Sed quia Augustinus intendere videtur per illud concludere quod corpus non agit in spiritum, secundo dicamus quod auctoritas est vera de agente totali et principali et aequivoce, cuiusmodi non est ignis. Tertio dicatur quod qui amplius desiderat pro sensu illius auctoritatis, ad primum Scoti *Operis Anglicani*, distinctione tertia, quaestione sexta, in solutione argumentorum pro opinione prima, vadat et ibidem reperiet.⁷⁶

Ex predictis patet quod illae tres auctoritates Augustini adductae ad probandum quod animae separatae cruciantur non igne corporali sed similitudine corporum, intelligi habent de immediato cruciatu, nam tristitia est immediata poena eorum, quae quodam modo est similis corpori quia causata in parte ab eo juxta secundum modum / aut sequens illud ex primo modo, et in hoc ignis quodam modo assimilat sibi spiritum.⁷⁷

A 38v Addo ad binarium Doctoris Subtilis, ut suum binarium ad ternarium B 21ra veniat.⁷⁸ Est enim in igne daemon aut / anima per modum colligationis, non ut ignem perficiat aut sibi det vitam, sed ex hinc poenam sentiat. Unde Augustinus, XXI *De Civitate Dei*:

Adhaerebunt daemones, licet incorporei, corporeis ignibus cremandi,⁷⁹ non ut ignes eorum junctura inspirentur et animalia fiant, sed ineffabilibus modis accipientes ex ignibus poenam, non dantes ignibus vitam.⁸⁰

Haec quaestio⁸¹ extra propositum, sed tamen sic oportuit; nec est idem iste⁸² modus cum aliis duobus: alio enim modo est siccum in poto, alio modo humidum; siccum non adhaeret, sed humidum.

Qualem autem cognitionem habeat anima separata aut habere possit in suis puris naturalibus, nunc non aggredior inquirere quia⁸³ nimis prolixum agerem tractatum et⁸⁴ forsan ultra quam petit desiderans.

⁶⁸ Matthew viii, 29: *Venisti huc ante tempus torquere nos?*

⁶⁹ Cf. Duns Scotus, *loc. cit.*, n. 12; p. 230a.

⁷⁰ Om. ad litteram B. St. Augustine, *loc. cit.*, xvi, 33; PL 34, 467.

⁷¹ Add. ergo, etc. A.

⁷² Cf. Duns Scotus, *ad arg.*, *loc. cit.*, n. 17;

p. 247a.

⁷³ Om. A.

⁷⁴ secunda B.

⁷⁵ Om. B.

⁷⁶ Op. Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 6, n. 17; *ed. cit.*, IX,

p. 257; and n. 18; pp. 272 ff.

⁷⁷ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Op. Oxon.* IV, d. 44, q. 2, ad 2, n. 17; *ed. cit.*, XX, pp. 247b-248a.

⁷⁸ Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, xlxi; *ed. cit.*, p. 198, for the doctrine adopted here.

⁷⁹ remandit ignibus A.

⁸⁰ Chapt. x, 1; PL 41, 725; taken from Rupella, *loc. cit.*

⁸¹ quasi B.

⁸² ille A.

⁸³ eo quod A.

⁸⁴ Om. et . . . desiderans A.

Unum tamen⁸⁵ dico juxta mentem Doctoris Subtilis, libro quarto, distinctione 45, quaestione ultima seu quarta,⁸⁶ quod potest cognoscere omne creatum.⁸⁷ Ex quo patet manifeste nobilitas animae rationalis, et quod recte Alpharabius ipsam vocavit animam nobilem in libro *De Causis*, et ceteri philosophi Arabiae dantes ei triplicem proprietatem.⁸⁸ Dicunt enim quod anima nobilis, id est, rationalis, triplicem habet virtutem: divinam, intellectualem, animalem. Per primum cum Deo cuius est imago, per secundum cum intelligentiis quarum est socia, per tertium cum corpore, cuius est magistra et quod animat, convenit.—Et tantum de passibilitate animae.

XIV. DE MOTU ANIMAE POST SEPARATIONEM

Jam tempus est ut post habitas de immortalitate et impossibilitate animae considerationes ad motum brevissime animae post separationem veniamus.⁸⁹ De loco enim ejus, ut oportuit, in capitulo de eminentia formali animae rationalis inter formas in hoc secundo libro dictum est.⁹⁰ In particulari tamen post ejus exitum locus ejus ex lege caelum est empyreum, infernus vel purgatorium, nisi specialiter aut ex privilegio aliud Deus ordinet.⁹¹

A 39r Notandum tamen cum de motu animae agimus, animae triplicem esse locum, ut inquit frater Joannes de Rupella: primus ambitus divinae virtutis, secundus ambitus propriae virtutis, / tertius locus corporalis.

B 21rb Primo modo non mutat locum, sed mutatur in loco, quia infra ambitum divinae virtutis discurrit. Secundo modo non⁴ mutat / locum nec mutatur in loco, quia non relinquit ambitum propriae virtutis. Tertio modo mutat locum et mutatur in loco, non tamen movetur per locum, quia hoc exigit partium distinctionem⁵ quas anima non habet, quas non exigit in loco mutari aut de loco mutari ad locum. Et inde⁶ est quod dicit Augustinus, VIII *Super Genesim ad litteram*,⁷ quod Deus movet spiritualem creaturam per tempus et non per locum, corporalem vero per tempus et locum; licet enim anima successionem non habeat in partibus, habet tamen in operationibus. Unde Augustinus in libro *De anima et spiritu*:

Anima inter Deum et corpus posita per tempus movetur vel reminiscendo quod oblita fuerat, vel discendo quod ignorabat, vel volendo quod nolebat, per locum autem non movetur quoniam per loci spatium non distenditur.⁸

Unde patet quod illud Augustini in eodem libro: Ibi est anima post corpus ubi erat agens in corpore,⁹ intelligitur de loco secundo modo accepto. Unde in eodem libro dicit Augustinus:

Anima, conformato corpore in morte et recurrentibus ad regionem suam elementorum partibus, non habens ubi vires suas extendat, requiescit tantum ab his motibus quibus corpus movebat, ipsa per tempus et illocaliter mota.¹⁰

⁸⁵ Om. B.

⁸⁶ quarta seu ultima A.

⁸⁷ Loc. cit., n. 2; XX, pp. 376-377; cf. also q. 2, n. 5 ff.; pp. 281-283; and n. 12; pp. 304-307.

⁸⁸ Liber de causis, § 3, ed. cit., pp. 165-166. Taken, perhaps from St. Albert, *De natura et origine animae*, tr. I, viii; ed. cit., IX, p. 395.

⁸⁹ Cf. Rupella, *Summa de anima* I, lv-lvii; ed. cit., pp. 212-216, of which this chapter is more or less an abbreviation.

⁹⁰ Supra, Book II, chapter vii, p. 275.

⁹¹ Cf. Rupella, loc. cit., liv; pp. 211-213.

⁹² Om. A.

⁹³ distinctionem A.

⁹⁴ tamen A.

⁹⁵ Chapters xx-xxi, nn. 39-40; PL 34, 388. Cf. Vaurouillon, *II Sent.*, d. 2, a. 2; ed. cit., fol. 129H.

⁹⁶ Chapt. xv; PL 40, 791-792.

⁹⁷ Chapt. xxx; PL 40, 800.

⁹⁸ Chapt. xv; PL 40, 791.

Sed an subito vel successive moveatur, scire oportet.¹¹ Dico quod successive, sicut declarat Doctor Subtilis de motu angeli in secundo.¹² Et si dicatur quod corpora glorificata moventur subito et motus radii solaris subitus est; dicendum secundum fratrem Guidonem seu Ricardum Eliphat in *Summa sua*,¹³ quod nec glorificata corpora nec radii solares subito moventur, capiendo subito, id est, in instanti, sed dicuntur subito moveri respectu aliorum motuum, quia sunt multum cito et quasi imperceptibiles.¹⁴ Contradictio enim est quod sit motus non successivus. Et si dicatur: mutantur,¹⁵ dico quod et mutantur et¹⁶ moventur, non tamen instantanee; multiplicatur enim lumen in medio sed paucō tempore. Et si dicatur secundum Philosophum in VI¹⁷

A 39v *Physicorum*: Omne quod movetur / partim est in termino ad quem, partim in termino a quo,¹⁸ quod animae convenire nequit quae indivisibilis est; dicit ad hoc frater Petrus de Candia in II *Sententiarum*, quod pars accipitur dupliciter, uno modo ut toti opponitur, alio modo ut totaliter.¹⁹ Dato ergo quod primo modo anima non habeat partem, tamen bene B 21va secundo modo. Unde partem virtutis exercet / in termino a quo et partem in termino ad quem, et hoc sufficit.

Concedo tamen bene quod virtute divina possunt mutari in instanti per locum et corpora glorificata et solis radius et anima, sicut patet in Sacramento altaris, sed de isto non loquimur. Unde nec anima naturaliter nec angelus moveri queunt de loco ad locum nisi pertransseundo medium, non tamen se commetiendo medio ut corpora, quia non sunt in loco circumscriptive sed definitive, ut dictum est, et prius est considerare a parte rei angelum in loco quam operari in loco. Nec umquam Joannes Damasceni voluit dicere oppositum. Unde quando dicit: Angelus est ubi operatur,²⁰ unum affirmat, reliquum non negans.

Ut hic secundus liber finem accipiat, et sit de anima in sua totalitate, respectu non habito ad suas potentias, sequens autem et tertius et ultimus, Christo duce, erit de anima per respectum ad suas potentias.— Et²¹ tantum de libro secundo.

Explicit liber secundus.²²

¹¹ The question is suggested by Rupella, *op. cit.*, lvi; pp. 213-215; but the answer is that of Duns Scotus. Rupella says: Motus est subitus (p. 214).

¹² *Op. Oxon.* II, d. 2, q. 9, n. 40; *ed. cit.*, XI, p. 516.

¹³ I have not succeeded in identifying this Scholastic. The only Friar Minor by the name of Eliphat (Halifax, Alifas, Elephas, Olephard, Elevita) known to scholars is Robert Eliphat, and of him we have little information. (Cf. A. Lang, *Die Wege der Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts* (BGPTMA, XXX, 1-2, Münster, 1931), p. 154, n. 2). He is listed by Eccleston among the intellectual lights of the English Province and numbered fifty-fifth or fifty-sixth among the Franciscan Masters at Cambridge (Cf. A. G. Little, *Franciscan papers, lists and documents*

[Manchester, 1943], p. 133; and *The Grey Friars at Oxford* [Oxford, 1892], p. 238). He is reckoned as having taught at Oxford; and is acknowledged author of a *Sentences* (*Lang, op. cit.*, p. 154, n. 2).

¹⁴ imperceptibilia A.

¹⁵ et moventur is here added in B, but it seems to be deleted.

¹⁶ Om. B.

¹⁷ VII B.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Phys.* VI, 4, 234b15.

¹⁹ II *Sent.*, q. 2, a. 2, Contra tertiam opinionem, Ms Bruxelles, Bibl. Royale 3699-3700, fol. 124^{rb}. Cf. F. Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V* (Franziskanische Studien, Beiheft 9, Münster, 1925), p. 18.

²⁰ *De fide orthodoxa* II, iii; PG 94, 870.

²¹ Om. Et . . . secundus B.